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THE

MONTHLY

MILITARY REPOSITORY.

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TO

THE MILITARY

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

By CHARLES SMITH.

VOL. I.

NEW-YORK:

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Editor begs leave to inform his readers of the ſources from which he means to draw the materials of the preſent Work.

Some rare and valuable manuſcripts with which he has been favoured, will furniſh him with a copious ſupply of original matter:

Extracts will be made from the hiſtories of the ſeveral wars in Europe, and particularly of the battles of the late king of Pruſſia:

Of the principal battles and actions fought during the American revolution, deſcriptions will be given, accompanied with engraved military plans, deſigned by officers that were preſent at thoſe actions:

Extracts will alſo be made from military Works of merit, in divers languages, and of every thing intereſting in the ſeveral military periodical publications of

Berlin, Hanover and Paris, illuſtrated, when the ſubject requires it, by plans, &c. To which will be added, occaſionally, the lives and heroic actions of the ſeveral brave commanders of the preſent age.

The Work will be enlivened with anecdotes, with hiſtory and hiſtoric plates; but nothing will be introduced that is trifling or unimportant in itſelf.

The Editor will be thankful for any hints of improvement, or valuable papers, that may be communicated to him.

THE

MILITARY REPOSITORY.

ON THE ADVANTAGE OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE TO THE MILITARY.

IT has been aſſerted by ſome writers, that, by a falſe application of theory, a commanding officer may do more harm than good, and that he has little occaſion for extenſive knowledge, provided he has a good adjutant. A great extent of knowledge in a ſubaltern, they likewiſe ſay, may create diſcontent and envy, leading him to arraign the conduct of his commander, diſpute his orders, and thus deſtroy ſubordination. An enlightened, well-informed ſubaltern, they continue, will thus become ſenſible of the unimportance of his own inferior ſtation, and be diſcouraged at it; beſides, an acquaintance with the finer arts, and a ſcientific knowledge, will ſo far refine his ideas, as to enervate his mind, and render him almoſt unfit for the field; and the ſtandard-bearer's ſenſe of his own inſignificance, will lower that military pride, in which he otherwiſe would glory.

We will admit that the growing fire of the youthful warrior may have been thus, occaſionally, damped; but it is certain, the more the ſoldiery are enlightened, the leſs frequently ſuch conſequences will occur. Some are of opinion, that any other branch of literature but what tends to the utility of a military life, muſt be ſo much loſs of time; but this is not univerſally the caſe. If we inſtruct a ſoldier in moral duties, we teach him to be brave; for nothing, ſurely, has a greater tendency to render him courageous than to make him a good chriſtian, and of courſe not afraid to die. If we teach him the duties of a citizen, he will naturally ſtand up in defence of his country and of liberty, and his breaſt will glow with patriotic warmth. If in every garriſon there be a good military police; if nothing be there allowed againſt the rules of the ſervice; if the field officers be but affable and condeſcending to the ſubalterns,

receive them as friends, and join them in their diverſions and amuſements, it will inſpire them with mutual confidence, and induce them to act as one confederate body. There are many little duties connected with the military character, not ſo unimportant as they may ſeem to be. The better informed an officer is, the more he will ſee, that many things which the ignorant call trifling in his profeſſion, do not deſerve that appellation. No one would extol Newton or Locke for having been able to read; but would they have been ſuch luminaries of the world, had they not firſt learnt to read?

A ſoldier, we will allow, may be conſidered as a piece of mechaniſm; ſo is a clock; but a clock will never go, unleſs wound up and put in motion. The centinel, even in time of peace, ſhould be as diligent as if the houſe beſide him was an out poſt of the enemy; and in time of war, as quiet as if before the guard of his own garriſon. Both theſe habits are acquired by practice.

Though a ſoldier be a piece of mechaniſm in ſome reſpects, yet he is a man, a citizen, a huſband, a father, and a friend. He becomes ſometimes a commander, ſometimes a military judge, and is often employed in civil life, in matters of importance; ſurely, all this requires that an officer ſhould not only be taught the duties of a military life, but thoſe of humanity alſo, and have a general knowledge of men and things. According to military law, every officer is judge of a ſoldier's crime or miſdemeanor; and, can he decide on this without a knowledge of natural rights, and the morality of actions? It is neceſſary, therefore, that, whilſt he is made acquainted with the duties of a ſoldier, he ſhould be inſtructed in thoſe of civil life; they ſhould go hand in hand.

The buſineſs of a commanding officer is of great extent; his duty requires him to correſpond with the firſt men of the country; to take care of his men, quarter them properly; and, in order to victual them well, he ſhould be acquainted with the diſtrict he is in, and the productions, not only of the ſpot where he is, but of the places adjacent; he ſhould know well the laws of the country, its national and natural ſituation. He ſhould, by his own conduct, give ſuch an example to the whole body of officers under his command, as would make them uſeful to their country, zealous in its ſervice, eſteemed by foreigners, and beloved by their fellow citizens; but, this can be done only by enlightening their minds, extending their knowledge, by practice, prudence, military ſtrictneſs, fatherly admonition and an unblemiſhed character.

Subordination is the very ſoul of military life; but an officer will, notwithſtanding, execute the orders of his general with more alacrity, if he has reaſon to look up to his perſonal merits, and admire his virtues; not only the officer, but the private, will advance with greater intrepidity againſt the enemy, when convinced that his commander does not leave him to the chance of events, but ventures an action only with a moral certainty of ſucceſs, or where neceſſity urges him to a deſperate blow. The more enlightened an officer is, the more military knowledge he has acquired, the more contented will he remain in a lower ſtation, until an opportunity of promotion offers. Knowledge of the world will teach him, that in the arrangement of things he muſt ever ſupport a certain chain of connection, and cannot always fill the poſts he would aſpire to; for a great and noble mind, which every officer ſhould poſſeſs, will pride itſelf more in having the knowledge of a general with the rank of a coronet, than to carry a marſhall's ſtaff with the abilities of a corporal.

The more a young officer ſtudies, the more he will feel the want of that knowledge, neceſſary to make him an able general. Even among the privates, it is not what a ſoldier learns from the articles of war that can inſpire him with a ſenſe of duty; it is a due and impartial correction, an indefatigable attention in the commanding officer to the comfort and protection of his men, and a regular and unfailing ſupply for their daily wants. In ſhort, where is the man without principle, without knowledge of his profeſſion, that can diſcharge his duty as he ought?

There is no ſubaltern but looks forward to a command at ſome future time. Even the ſerjeant, as the chief of his guard, has many duties of a commander to perform. It muſt, therefore, be allowed, that an officer ſhould be acquainted with the laws of war, and the knowledge of that profeſſion he has taken up; nay, the honor of arms requires this of him, and when peace allows him to ſheathe the ſword, it muſt be a ſource of ſatisfaction to him to feel, that he has acquitted himſelf well in the ſervice of his country, and can return with well-earned laurels, amidſt the acclamations of his fellow citizens.

THE AMERICAN WAR, FROM 1775 TO 1783.

THE end I design in a part of this work, is to lay before my readers, with exactness, plans of the principal battles fought during the late American war. The reader is not to expect long historical details. I shall confine myself in the narrative to those explanations only, which are necessary to combine the great events. In voluminous works, in vain we seek descriptions that give clear, satisfactory ideas of battles; the chief part of those works are little else than compilations from public papers, and breathe, like them, a party spirit.

It is from facts and from events only, that we should decide on the merit or demerit of the actors. Of such facts and events I shall treat in the most simple manner; without remarks, without observations, without reasoning, and consequently without partiality.

INTRODUCTION.

THE discovery of America by Columbus, in 1492, has justly been ranked among the greatest and most beneficial events in the history of nations.

The subsequent settlements under the influence and protection of Great Britain increased in number, wealth and resources, with an astonishing rapidity. In the short space of 150 years, their number increased to almost three millions, and their commerce to such a degree as to be more than one third of that of Great Britain. They also extended their territories 1500 miles on the sea-coast, and 300 miles to the westward. From their first settlement in America, the colonies were devoted to liberty, enjoying a government which was but little short of being independent. The question, where parliamentary supremacy ended, and at what point colonial dependency began, had never been agitated. These colonies united with Great Britain their arms in war, their commerce and councils in peace; and, under these favorable circumstances, advanced to the magnitude of a nation, while the greatest part of the globe was ignorant of their progress. Till after the war, from 1755 to 1763, in which the colonies were distinguished parties, the colonial regulations seemed to have no other object but commerce; but Great Britain now thought proper to change the ancient salutary

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N

EEDS HILL,*

ne 1775.

AN FORCES,

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ſyſtem. New regulations were adopted, which conſiſted in reſtricting the former commerce of the colonies, and in ſubjecting them to the taxation of the Britiſh Parliament.

Oppoſition to the ſeveral acts of the Britiſh Parliament ſoon became general. Debates, controverſies and acts, one repealing another, on the ſide of the Britiſh Parliament, and reaſonings and oppoſition on that of the colonies, kept equal pace from 1764 to 1774. At this period every thing aſſumed a bolder aſpect; a continental congreſs having been convened, they agreed upon a declaration of their rights. An addreſs to the king and to the people of Great Britain, was alſo drawn up; different plans for conciliation were brought forward in the Houſe of Commons, but men, accuſtomed to uncontrouled ſway, are not eaſily brought to regulate their conduct by the ſimple rules of reaſon and of juſtice. Solid revenue and unlimited ſupremacy were the objects of Great Britain. To accompliſh them, the immediate coercion of the colonies were reſolved upon; Parliament agreed on an augmentation of their forces; the mercenary circles of Germany were ranſacked to dragoon the colonies into unconditional ſubmiſſion; domeſtic inſurrections were excited among ſlaves, whoſe price of freedom was the murder of their maſters, and even the relentleſs ſavages were brought down upon their defenceleſs frontiers.

Commencement of Hoſtilities.

BATTLE OF BREED's HILL.*

[WITH A PLAN.]

IN the beginning of 1774, general Gage, the new governor, arrived at Boſton from England, followed by two regiments of foot, a detachment of artillery and ſome cannon, which afterwards were reinforced by others from Ireland, New-York, Halifax and Quebec. The Boſtonians, who were thought to be the firſt and moſt conſpicuous in the oppoſition, were ſingled out as the firſt objects of military operations. The new governor fortified the neck of land that joins Boſton to the continent, and ſeized the provincial powder and military ſtores at Cambridge and Charleſtown. Nothing of any conſequence, however, happened till April 1775, when the preparations throughout the colonies, to oppoſe by force the execution of the obnoxious acts of Parliament, determined general

* Erroneouſly called Bunker's Hill.

MISTICK RIVER
A PLAN
of the
ACTION at BREEDS HILL,
on the 17th of June 1775.
Between the AMERICAN FORCES,
and
THE BRITISH TROOPS.
* Erroneously called Bunkers Hill.
Mistick Ferry
Ferry Transport
Mistick Pasture
Mistick Fort
Mistick Pasture
Mistick Fort
A BREED'S HILL
Breeds Redoubt
Breeds Hill
Breeds Hill Battery
Breeds Hill Battery
School Hill
Town House
Town Pump
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Gage to ſeize and deſtroy every thing that was collected for the ſupport of a provincial army. With this view he detached a party to Concord, which was oppoſed in their way by a party of Americans near Lexington. A ſkirmiſh enſued, the reſult of which was, that of the Britiſh troops 65 were killed and 174 wounded, and 24 made priſoners; and of the Americans 49 were killed, and 39 wounded and miſſing. The Britiſh troops, however, executed their commiſſion.

After this action, which rouſed all America, not only the arms, ammunition and forts in the colonies were ſecured for the uſe of the provincials, but regular forces were raiſed. A conſiderable army was aſſembled in Maſſachuſetts, which formed a line of encampment from Roxbury to Miſtic River.

About the latter end of May a great part of the reinforcements ordered from Great Britain, arrived at Boſton; three Britiſh generals, Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton, alſo arrived about the ſame time. General Gage, thus reinforced, prepared for action, but before he proceeded to extremities, he iſſued a proclamation, holding forth the alternative of peace, or war:—Menaces on the one ſide, and promiſes on the other.

Confidence among men is of a nature ſo delicate, that when once it is violated, it is ſeldom reſtored. Britiſh menaces and promiſes had by this time loſt all influence. The blood of thoſe who were killed at Lexington had proved the firm cement of an extenſive union. The Americans ſuppoſing this proclamation to be a prelude to hoſtilities, prepared accordingly.

Adjacent to the peninſula of Boſton, on the North, is another of ſimilar form, called the peninſula of Charleſtown: They are ſeparated from one another by Charles River. Over againſt Boſton on the north bank of this river, lies Charleſtown. The peninſula of Charleſtown being bounded on the North by the river Medford or Miſtic, and on the eaſt by Boſton harbour, is entirely ſurrounded by navigable water, except where it is joined to the main land by an iſthmus; in the centre of the peninſula riſes an eminence, called Bunker's Hill, with an eaſy aſcent from the iſthmus, but ſteep on every other ſide; and at the bottom of this hill towards Boſton ſtands Charleſtown; Bunker's-Hill was ſufficiently high to overlook any part of Boſton, and near enough to be within cannon ſhot.

The poſſeſſion of that eminence was a matter of great conſequence to either of the contending parties. Orders were therefore

iſſued by the provincial commanders that a detachment of 1000 men ſhould intrench upon Bunker's-Hill. They moved from Cambridge, paſſed by Charleſtown neck, in ſilence, and reached the hill unobſerved; but, by ſome miſtake, the eminence called Breed's-Hill, ſituated on the furtheſt part of the peninſula, was marked out for the intrenchment inſtead of Bunker's-Hill. Here the provincials threw up a ſmall redoubt about eight rods ſquare, and an intrenchment, reaching to the bottom of the hill towards Miſtic River, both of which they had nearly completed in the night time of the 16th of June; their works being in many places cannon-proof. (Plan No. 1. *a*.) Although the peninſula was almoſt ſurrounded with Britiſh ſhips of war and tranſports, the provincials carried on the work with ſuch profound ſilence that they were not diſcoverd till the morning; when, at break of day, the alarm was given at Boſton by a cannonade, begun upon the American works from the Lively ſhip of war. A battery of ſix guns was ſoon afterwards opened upon them from Copp's-Hill, in Boſton. The provincials bore this with great firmneſs, and continued at their works.

About noon, a detachment from the army was landed upon the peninſula of Charleſtown, under the command of Major General Howe, and Brigadier General Pigot, with orders to drive the provincials from their works. The troops were formed without oppoſition as ſoon as they landed, (*b*) but the generals thought it neceſſary to apply for a reinforcement. While the troops were waiting for this reinforcement, the provincials, who occupied the left of the breaſt-work, and the open ground ſtretching to the water ſide, pulled up ſome adjoining poſts and rail-fences, and ſet them down in two parallel lines at a ſmall diſtance from each other, and filled the ſpace between with hay, which, having been lately mowed, remained on the adjacent ground. (*c*)

When the reinforcement arrived, the whole detachment, conſiſting now of near 3000 men, the flower of the Britiſh army, formed in two lines, moved on towards the provincials, with the light infantry on the right wing, (*d*) commanded by Major-General Howe, and the grenadiers on the left, (*e*) by Brigadier-General Pigot; the former to attack the provincial lines, and the latter the redoubt.—The attack was begun by a ſharp cannonade from ſome field pieces and howitzers, (*f*) the troops advancing ſlowly, and halting at intervals to give time for the artillery to produce ſome effect. The left wing in advancing, received orders to burn Charleſtown, in order

to deprive the Americans of a cover in their approaches, which, by the aſſiſtance of carcaſes thrown from Copp's hill, in Boſton, was ſoon effected.

The Britiſh moving on but ſlowly, gave the provincials upon the hill behind their works a better opportunity for taking aim. They reſerved their fire till their adverſaries were within ten or twelve rods, but then began a furious and unremitting diſcharge of ſmall arms. So inceſſant and ſo deſtructive was this continued blaze of muſquetry, that the Britiſh line recoiled, and gave way in all parts. Major-General Howe, it is ſaid, was for a few ſeconds left nearly alone, moſt of the officers who were about him, being either killed or wounded; and it required the utmoſt exertions in all the officers, from the general down to the ſubalterns, to repair the diſorder which this hot and unexpected fire had produced. The Britiſh returned to the attack, but the provincials reſerving themſelves again, put their enemies a ſecond time to flight. At this juncture, General Clinton, who had arrived from Boſton during the engagement, was extremely ſerviceable in rallying the Britiſh troops. He brought them back to the charge. By this time, the powder of the Americans began ſo far to fail, that they were not able to keep up the ſame briſk fire as before. The inſide of the breaſt-work was by ſome cannon balls raked from end to end, the fire from the ſhips, batteries and field artillery were redoubled, and the redoubt was attacked on three ſides at once. Under theſe circumſtances, a retreat from it was ordered.

While theſe operations were going on at the breaſt work and redoubt, the Britiſh light infantry were attempting to force the left point of the former. The provincials here, in like manner, reſerved their fire till their adverſaries were near, and then poured it upon them with ſuch an inceſſant ſtream and in ſo true a direction, as mowed down their ranks. The engagement was kept up on both ſides with great reſolution. The king's troops could not compel the Americans to retreat, till they obſerved that their main body had left the hill, when they gave way. This retreat was, with little loſs, effected over Charleſtown Neck,(*g*) though it was enfiladed by the Glaſgow ſloop of war and ſome armed tranſports and floating batteries.

The number of Americans actually engaged amounted only to 1500. The Britiſh did not puſh the advantages they had gained, contenting themſelves with throwing up works on Bunker's Hill for their own ſafety. The provincials did the ſame on Proſpect

Hill, in front of them; both were guarding againſt an attack, and both were in a bad condition to receive one.

The ſecond continental congreſs met on the tenth of May, 1775, and, two days before this action, appointed George Waſhington, a native of Virginia, to the chief command of the American army. This general ſoon after joined the army at Cambridge, and, at the head of his troops, publiſhed a declaration, previouſly drawn up by congreſs, in the nature of a manifeſto, ſetting forth the reaſons for taking up arms. In this, after enumerating various grievances, it was added: "In our own native land, in defence of the freedom "which is our birth-right, and which we ever enjoyed till the late "violation of it, for the protection of our property acquired ſolely "by the induſtry of our forefathers and ourſelves, againſt violence "actually offered, we take up arms, we ſhall lay them down when "hoſtilities ſhall ceaſe on the part of the aggreſſors, and all danger "of their being renewed ſhall be removed, and not before."

When General Waſhington joined the army, he found the Britiſh intrenched on Bunker's Hill; they had three floating batteries in Miſtic River, a ſeventy gun ſhip below the ferry, between Boſton and Charleſtown, and a battery on Copp's-Hill. They were alſo ſtrongly fortified on the neck. The Americans were intrenched at Winter-Hill, Proſpect-Hill, and Roxbury, communicating with one another by ſmall poſts over a diſtance of ten miles. This army, about 14,500 men ſtrong, was ſo ſtationed round Boſton, as to confine the Britiſh to the town, and to exclude them from the forage and proviſions, which the adjacent country afforded General Ward commanded the right wing at Roxbury, General Lee the left at Proſpect-Hill, and the centre was commanded by General Waſhington

LOSS OF THE BRITISH.	LOSS OF THE AMERICANS.
1054 killed and wounded.	453 killed and wounded and miſſing.
	5 pieces of cannon.

[*To be continued.*]

GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN FORMING CAMPS OFFENSIVELY AND DEFENSIVELY.

IF an army aſſembles with a certain intention, and continues in any environs for ſome time, we call the poſition that army has taken, a camp: as we ſay, the army is encamped. There are camps in

peace, in which the troops of a ſtate are aſſembled and inſtructed in grand manœuvres, and camps in war. Thoſe are either march-camps, or ſuch in which we continue for ſome time expecting the enemy's attack, or by which we cover the ſiege of a ſtrong place. If we have recourſe to the general principles of the art of fortification, it is not difficult to determine whether the camp, which the army has pitched, is ſuch as the army encamped in it, may expect an attack from the enemy. It reſts chiefly on the following points:

Is the camp commanded by hills at a ſmall diſtance, for inſtance, 3000 ſteps? Can the camp be approached without being diſcovered? That is, are there in the front of it hollow ways, ravins, hedges, buſhes and woods, in which the enemy may make its arrangements unobſerved? Are the flanks of the camp well covered, or can we get round them? Is the front of the camp ſo ſituated that croſſing fires might be applied? Is it in the enemy's choice to attack where they find it the eaſieſt, or muſt they abſolutely attack on one certain point; and can we give to that point all poſſible ſtrength? How are the ways in the rear of the camp; and in how many columns may the army retreat, if it ſhould be compelled to do it?

We ſhould likewiſe be acquainted with all the ways before the right and left flank, and front of the army; that we may be able to march off to the right or left, or forwards, according to circumſtances. And laſt of all we ſhould be informed of the two following circumſtances: How long the army may remain in ſuch a camp, with reſpect to forage and other proviſions; and whether it is poſſible for the enemy to cut us off from our magazines, by any little motion it may make.

In forming a camp we ſhould take care to give every arm that ground, on which it can act. The infantry is therefore placed on hills, in villages, if theſe lay at a little diſtance before the front, or on the flanks of the camp, behind hedges, ditches, even in woods, if they can only keep a free proſpect before them. If the camp is on a hill, the firſt line crowns the deſcent of the hill ſo, that it can perfectly ſee the foot of the hill. The ſecond line is placed at a proper diſtance on the ſummit; here it is ſuppoſed, that at a diſtance of 3000 paces there is no other hill, which commands that where the camp is. But if the hills before the front of the camp are as high as the hills on which the camp is; then the firſt line places itſelf on the ſummit; and the ſecond behind it, at ſuch a diſtance, that it can go directly to the aſſiſtance of the firſt, if that ſhould be compelled to give way.

The artillery advances at war before the infantry. The field-pieces remain with the field-guard, which, as it is known, throws up a *fleche* 300 ſteps before the front of every battalion. The batteries muſt be erected on ſuch places, ſo as to ſee the foot of the hill, and ſo as to reach the plain below.

It is certainly a great military prejudice, if we are accuſtomed to carry the heavieſt cannons on the higheſt hills, within the circumference of the camp, as ſuch there, leaſt annoy the enemy.

We muſt point out for the cavalry in the camp that ſituation where they will be able to act beſt. If the ground is level, we may place the cavalry on both the wings of the army; or on one only, if the other is properly ſecured. If both wings are defended by a river, moraſs, great lake, or open ground, then the cavalry may be placed in the ſecond or third line. If the center of the army be level ground, we muſt place the cavalry there; but, at all events, behind the infantry. For we never ſhould place cavalry in the firſt line. But, if the ground is intermixed, then we place the cavalry in ſeveral parts, behind the infantry, in order to be every where at hand, when the enemy attacks. In intrenched camps, it is of courſe underſtood, that the cavalry takes the ſecond or third line.

In a camp, the connection of the ſeveral parts of which the army conſiſts, muſt not be ſubjected to interruption. A camp, therefore, muſt never be croſſed or cut through by great rivers, or ſuch as are difficult to be paſſed. Though the communication may be kept open by bridges, yet, it is certain, that the march of the infantry, artillery, and particularly the cavalry, over bridges is extremely ſlow and is ſubjected to many difficulties. That part of the army which is ſeparated from the other by a river, is kept to itſelf, and muſt be looked upon as a corps by itſelf. If the enemy finds that out, and does not fall with all his forces upon that ſeparate corps, it ſhews want of capacity and reſolution. In camp, there ſhould likewiſe be no great defile, particularly ſuch as are incloſed by ſteep rocks. We muſt ſay the ſame of meadows, moraſſes and foreſts. If the army is ſeparated by the latter, we have a double diſadvantage; we cannot aſſiſt the part attacked ſoon enough, and do not ſee what happens on the other ſide of the road. The camp of an army, alſo, ſhould not be croſſed by villages, particularly when they are very long, as, ſhould the enemy ſet them on fire, by howitzer-grenades, the communication in the camp would be for ſometime interrupted, and would be alſo difficult in future.

But if a general is forced, by the ſituation of the war, to pitch his camp where the communication of the troops is interrupted by rivers defiles, &c. he ſhould be particularly careful to ſupply the communication by bridges. If he has not a ſufficient quantity of pontons, he muſt make uſe of veſſels, boats, or rafts. That part of the army which is ſeparated by a river or defile, muſt be ſo ſtrongly intrenched, that the enemy cannot attack it, without ſuffering great loſs.

Each camp muſt be ſpacious. The troops muſt not only be able to ſtand with eaſe in the camp, but they muſt alſo be able to make thoſe motions within it, which are requiſite to an attack, without cauſing confuſion. However, it may happen, that infantry are obliged to take poſt in hilly environs, where there is but little ſpace. Sometimes they are poſted as to be far extended, where the poſts are of that nature, ſo that a ſmall number can defend themſelves, with advantage, againſt a ſuperior force.

If an army is in camp, there ſhould be no want of ſtraw, wood, or water, particularly if it be neceſſary to ſtay a conſiderable time in that camp. The wells, in the neighbouring villages, may be ſufficient for the infantry, but, for the cavalry, they are ſeldom ſufficient. The place where they are to ride to watering ſhould not be too far from camp; it is a good thing if there are watery ditches, rivulets, and rivers in the neighbourhood. But thoſe places ſhould be ſo ſituated as not to be liable to moleſtation from the enemy; particularly if we are at no great diſtance from it, and if it can at every hour in the day attack us; for, if the cavalry, and other horſes in the camp, are obliged to go three or four miles or farther for water, the enemy may ſeize that opportunity to attack the army in reality, or at leaſt trouble it very much, by feint attacks. In ſuch a caſe we ſhould be obliged to recal the cavalry ſuddenly, that were ſent to watering, which would be injurious to the horſes, and perhaps occaſion diſorder and confuſion.

We muſt remark here, that the ſtaff officers who chooſe the camp, and direct it for the army, muſt likewiſe point out to every brigade, as well cavalry, as infantry, where they are to ride to watering, and where to fetch it.

Let circumſtances and ſituations be as they may, a camp can only be eligible, where we find forage for the army, and are not forced to quit the ground for want of it. If it is determined, therefore, in the plan of operations, how long the army is to remain in

ſuch camp, or if we can nearly calculate the time, from the arrangements the enemy takes for the ſupport of its poſition, we conſider what quantity of corn, oats, hay, and ſtraw, the army will want, in caſe we cannot forage green; and how many forage-bundles will be requiſite, if the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced that we can forage green. Such a calculation is not ſo very difficult; and it is better for every officer, ſent by his general, to a magazine, with an order to make a calculation how long the army can be ſupplied from the corn, oats, hay and ſtraw, in ſtore, to do it himſelf, than be obliged to apply to a commiſſary for that purpoſe. We know from experience, that 75 pounds of flour will produce, when baked, 100 pounds of bread; two pounds is the daily portion for a man; and thus, by multiplication and diviſion, we may ſoon find how many days an army, whoſe number we know, may be ſupplied from the quantity in ſtore.

We know the daily portion for every horſe, in oats, hay and ſtraw, and, of courſe, it is eaſy to find, by multiplication and diviſion, how many days the horſes may be ſupplied by a certain quantity in ſtore; or how much will be wanting, if the time we are to ſtay is determined.

It would not be unuſeful, if every young officer would form tables on that ſubject, according to the ſpecimen we have here given.

Let us ſuppoſe a buſhel of flour weighs 75 pounds, and this to produce 100 pounds of bread. Suppoſe the daily portion to be two pounds a man, this, for a 100 men, is two buſhels of flour. Suppoſe, further, the army to conſiſt of 40,000 men, and it will require, daily, 800 buſhels; we may, by the Rule of Three, ſay, If 800 buſhels are ſufficient for one day, for how many days will 144,000 buſhels ſerve? This we ſhall find to be 180 days. Taking the month at thirty days, we can ſay, for an army of 40,000 men it requires,

144,000	buſhels,	for	180	days, or	6 months
120,000	- - -		150	- -	5
96,000	- - -		120	- -	4
72,000	- - -		90	- -	3
48,000	- - -		60	- -	2
24,000	- - -		30	- -	1
12,000	- - -		15	- -	1-2

Now let us conſider the caſe, when the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced that we can forage green, or be ſupplied with green meat, how many forage-bundles an army wants, if they are to remain a certain given time in camp. We will ſuppoſe an army to conſiſt of 12,000 horſes; for each horſe we muſt count, daily, three ſheaves of oats, or any other corn. This army requires, therefore, 36,000 ſheaves, daily; and, if the army is to be 20 days in camp, it will want for that time 720,000 ſheaves. That quantity we muſt be able to get in the environs, that is, within ſeven or eight miles, at fartheſt, of the camp; as, otherwiſe, the procuring of forage is attended with too much trouble.

The providing a ſufficient quantity of forage, is of more importance than many may think. From the want of it we are often obliged to leave a very good poſt, and place ourſelves in another, where we give up great advantages to the enemy. Are we forced to quit ſuch a camp, we may run the riſk of being attacked on the march in a place where the ſituation of the ground is very much to our diſadvantage.

The moſt eſſential thing in a camp is, that the enemy may not be able to attack it, in front, flank, and rear, at one and the ſame time. There certainly could be no camp where the enemy could not get round it, if they would take a great, round about-way; but, if the enemy riſks the attempt to get at the flank, or rear of our army, the camp muſt be ſo made, that the enemy ſhould run the riſk of being cut off from their magazines, and forts, or of expoſing a whole province to us. It is not probable that the enemy will venture ſuch a ſtep, if they have to fear one of the beforementioned caſes, neither will they venture it, if they ſhould be obliged to take a diſadvantageous poſition, in our rear, or in our flanks, in which caſe they will be beaten, if we get directly at them. Has the enemy detached ſome corps from their main army? and do they venture, notwithſtanding, to turn our camp? This, perhaps, may give us the beſt opportunity to get upon ſuch a corps, and ruin it, before they can obtain any aſſiſtance: Now we ſay a flank is ſecured, if it be either abſolutely impoſſible, or at leaſt, very difficult, for the enemy to attack it, and muſt ſacrifice, at the attack, many troops, without a proſpect of good ſucceſs. The following objects are very proper to cover the flanks of an army. Rivers, over which the enemy cannot paſs: lakes, and marſhes of conſiderable extent; hills, particularly when they are very ſteep, and if the foot of them may be

commanded by a battery ſideways: long villages, particularly ſuch, through which ſmall rivers, or rivulets run, or which are ſurrounded by ſmall lakes, and ſwampy meadows; or ſuch as lie at the foot of hills, from whence they may be commanded; alſo lawns, forts, and woods, if they are very thick.

If rivers are to cover the flanks of an army, they muſt be ſuch as the enemy can neither ride nor march through. All the fords muſt be made impaſſable. This is done by making them deeper; by throwing trees into them, with their limbs; or by putting cartropes; becauſe the ground in rivers is always firm where we find fords. If bridges croſs the river, they muſt be thrown down, or, at leaſt, ſuch meaſures muſt be taken, that we can ſet them on fire as ſoon as the enemy ſhews any ſign to paſs them. But if we are obliged to keep up a communication with the environs, on the other ſide of the river, it is neceſſary to raiſe a ſufficient bridge-redoubt, in which ſome battalions may defend themſelves againſt a ſuperior power.

In many places we find ſmall rivulets whoſe ſhores are lined with moraſs. Theſe may, likewiſe, be made uſe of to cover the flanks of an army. Should the enemy ſucceed, in paſſing their infantry over at ſome places, they cannot, however, get their cavalry and artillery along. Beſides, as the infantry cannot paſs in the beſt order, they may eaſily be repulſed, if we get at them vigorouſly, before they can form.

Some ſay we ſhould draw up the flank of an army cloſe to a river, as then we have an opportunity of keeping the oppoſite ſhore clear, and preventing the enemy's taking poſt near the river. If the ſhore on this ſide commands the oppoſite, if we know that the enemy is forced to fetch water for the cavalry, and for the army in general, from the river, it may be advantageous to place our flank near the river. But in other caſes we ſhould keep ſo far from it as not to be reached by cannon-ſhot, for otherwiſe we ſhould be continually annoyed. If an army is often alarmed, it will ſoon get accuſtomed to it, and become careleſs and indolent. But as ſoon as a ſly enemy finds this out, they will at laſt make a bold effort, and ſurpriſe the army at a time when we leaſt expect it.

If a village is on one flank of the army, in which are many ſtrong built houſes; or a good burial ground, ſurrounded with a wall; theſe may be put in a ſtate of defence, and occupied with light troops; but the camp muſt not be pitched too near the village, leſt the enemy ſhould ſet it on fire with howitzer gre-

nados, as the fire and ſmoke would be troubleſome to the troops in the camp.

If heights are ſo ſituated as to form a hook in our flank, and level ground towards the enemy, or if they are commanded by other mountains, and are ſeparated from them by defiles; we may very well uſe theſe to cover our flank. Vineyards are particularly good for this purpoſe, becauſe the trees, hedges and fences, by which they are ſeparated, throw the greateſt obſtacles in the enemy's way.

We may lean the flanks of an army on woods, if they are very thick and buſhy, and have much cut ground; but we muſt not place the camp ſo near it that the enemy may, under the protection of the wood, find an opportunity to ſurprize us. If, for example, the wood is conſiderable, ſo that we can have no outpoſts on the other ſide of it; we ſhall not be able to get intelligence of the enemy's motions. The enemy may therefore get round our flank and on our rear before we perceive it. But, as in mountainous environs, which generally are full of woods, we can ſeldom avoid leaning a flank on a foreſt; we ſhould raiſe on our flank a ſtrong barricade of trees, ſo ſituated, as to oblige the enemy to work ſideways, under a heavy cannon and cartridge-fire. To theſe means already mentioned, for covering the flank of an army, we muſt every where add art, where more ſecurity is required. Thus we may cauſe inundations, where there is a ſmall river eaſy to be paſſed; we may fortify heights, &c. We muſt remark alſo, that the ſame means, by which the flanks of an army are covered, will ſerve to cover the front of a camp. This, for inſtance, may be done by rivers, lakes, moraſſes, great defiles, villages, &c.

In a defenſive war, each camp ſhould be ſo ſituated, that by the poſition of the army in it, the frontiers of a ſtate may be covered; this will render it difficult for the enemy to attempt any thing againſt the environs, either backwards or ſideways, without danger of being cut off from their magazines and detached corps, and of being moleſted in their tranſports.

Should the enemy, by penetrating into our provinces, give our army an opportunity of penetrating with advantage into their ſtates, and there take a firm poſt; ſhould they not find an advantageous poſt in our country, in which they may wait an attack from us; ſhould they after the loſs of a battle be liable to be entirely cut off from their magazines and forts; if the loſs of a fort

to them, or a whole province is the conſequence, we may ſay, that the general underſtands the art of carrying on a defenſive war well.

If our camp has ſuch a poſition, that we may, by a ſlight movement, get into thoſe environs where the enemy direct their intention, and where they, on the contrary, are forced to great motions; if we can move in a ſtraight line, and they are obliged to make uſe of a round-about motion; then ſuch a camp is well known to cover a whole province.

In a defenſive war, it is a general rule to have rivers, rivulets, in ſhort all ſorts of defiles, before the front of a camp.

It is politic and wiſe to plan, ourſelves, an attack on that camp where we wait, expecting the enemy's attack; and examine the points carefully, on which the attack can eaſieſt be made. We ſhould then ſee, perhaps, the faults we have made in our arrangements for defence, and have ſufficient time to alter and improve them; but, if the enemy is already drawn up, and has taken all meaſures for the attack, we muſt not endeavour to alter any thing, for orders miſunderſtood, may produce wrong motions, and expoſe us to the danger of being beaten.

Camps, in an offenſive war, ſhould have the following requiſites: We ſhould be able to march to all the environs; at each new camp we ſhould advance ſo far that the defiles may remain behind the front.

They muſt have ſuch a ſituation as to force the enemy to quit their advantageous poſition. In this intention we ſhall ſucceed, if we can take a poſition on their flanks, for the enemy is then expoſed to the danger of being cut off from their magazines and forts, or from a detached corps. It is very advantageous if we can pitch our camp ſo as to be able to detach ſeveral parties, to make the paſſage of the enemy's tranſports difficult, trouble them when foraging, threaten them with blockading up a fort, and put the enemy's country under contribution. But we muſt likewiſe take care that theſe detachments are ſupported by the main army, if attacked by a ſuperior force. As it may happen that the enemy ſhall change defence into attack, as ſoon as they find it advantageous; we ſhould, in the choice of our camp, in an offenſive war, not loſe ſight of thoſe rules of precaution which have been recommended for camps in a defenſive war. This is particularly neceſſary if we are in the neighbourhood of the enemy; we ſhould then proceed with all poſſible precaution, and not ſend away any detachment if we cannot ſupport it properly.

As we are now upon an offenſive war, we will inſert ſome of the moſt important principles which ſhould be obſerved at the attack of ſtrong poſts. The whole army ſhould never be drawn into the combat. If the attack is made with one wing, the other wing of the army ſhould be kept back. If the attack is made from the centre, both wings are kept back. The attacking wing muſt have all the ſtrength of a military corps, that is, all the arms muſt there be connected in a proper manner. To this end are requiſite a numerous artillery, ſeveral lines of infantry, which may ſupport and relieve one another, in caſe the attack of the firſt line ſhould not have good ſucceſs; and on the ſide and behind the infantry a ſufficient number of cavalry, if the ground is advantageous for the latter. That wing of the army which is kept back ſhould be covered, that the enemy may not be induced to attack that wing. The more advantageous it will be, if we can lean it on defiles or mountains, which we muſt ſtrongly occupy with heavy arms.

At the attack of heights, we muſt make uſe of howitzers, rather than cannon, becauſe the grenados, which tear in pieces, by ſcattering more, cauſe greater terror among the enemy than cannon-balls, the greateſt part of which fly over their heads.

If the hills on which the enemy ſtands, are ſo ſteep that we looſe breath in aſcending them; we muſt not attack with infantry, as ſuch attack could not poſſibly be ſucceſsful. But it is another thing with hills on which a ſoldier can reſt himſelf, and take breath.

At the attack of a poſt we muſt know how to determine that point, which is the key of the enemy's poſition, that is, the hill which commands the enemy's camp. This hill we muſt attack firſt. If we have gained that, we are maſter of the whole poſt. It is certainly more advantageous to lead the troops in the firſt onſet to the ſtrongeſt poſt, whilſt the battalions are perfectly cloſed, than when they are fatigued by the attack of a leſs conſiderable poſt, and are intimidated by a view of the dead, and the groans of the wounded.

The troops, which make this firſt attack, muſt have ſtrict orders to overthrow the enemy at all events. Some late generals of great merit have propoſed to lead on to the firſt attack, not the beſt troops of the army, but free battalions; in doing which, we muſt ourſelves give the fire, if they will not attack with vigour, or give way. If the firſt attack be not ſucceſsful, we may always renew it, with good troops, and continue it till we have carried our deſign.

KING OF PRUSSIA's BATTLES.

BEFORE I enter upon the Third Sileſian, or what is commonly called the *Seven Years War in Germany*, in which not only almoſt all the nations of Europe, but alſo ſome parts of Aſia and America were involved, and during which the greateſt military talents of the preſent century were diſplayed, it is neceſſary to give a ſhort account of the two preceding Sileſian Wars, in order to trace the origin of the laſt, and to combine all thoſe great events.

After the death of the emperor, Charles VI. in 1740, Frederic II, king of Pruſſia, in order to maintain the rights of his houſe over ſome part of Sileſia, aſſembled on the frontiers of that country, an army of twenty eight thouſand men, under the command of marſhal Shwerin. He offered his aſſiſtance to the daughter of Charles VI. Maria Thereſa, queen of Hungary and Bohemia, in order to ſecure to her the poſſeſſion of her other hereditary ſtates, on condition, that ſhe acknowledge the legality of his pretenſions; but, in caſe of a refuſal, he threatened to maintain his rights by force of arms.

The court of Vienna rejecting this propoſition, the king entered and took poſſeſſion of all Lower Sileſia. On the 20th of April, 1741, a battle took place near Mollwitz, between the king, and the Auſtrian field marſhal Neipperg, in which the Auſtrians were routed. George II. king of England, allied with Maria Thereſa, aſſembled an army on the borders of Kent, and took both Heſſian and Daniſh troops in pay. Maria Thereſa, perſiſting in her reſolution to give up no part of Sileſia, in the month of September Frederic found himſelf compelled to join the French and Bavarians; and a ſtrong army of the latter, with marſhal Broglio at their head, marched into Bohemia. They took Lintz, and marched ſtraight to Vienna. Maria Thereſa took ſhelter at Preſburg. The king, during this time, took the fort of Neiſſe, which accompliſhed the conqueſt of Sileſia.

The ſecond campaign of the firſt Sileſian War, in 1742, was diſtinguiſhed by the battle of Czaſlau, in Bohemia. Frederic, after having been abandoned by his French allies, as well as by the Saxons, haſtened to Czaſlau, to ſave his magazines. There he was met by prince Charles of Lorraine, an Auſtrian general, whom, after a bloody conflict, he forced to take ſhelter in Moravia.

The reſult of this victory was the peace of Breſlaw, by which Maria Thereſa ceded to Frederic, Sileſia and the county of Glatz.

In 1743, the elector of Bavaria was, by Frederic's influence, elected emperor, under the name of Charles VII. but found in his dignity no refuge againſt the misfortunes which oppreſſed him. Whilſt he was crowned at Frankfort, his hereditary ſtates were laid waſte by the Auſtrians. In the next campaign of 1744, between the allied Auſtrians, Engliſh and Hanoverians, the former were forced to retire to their own country, and the new crowned emperor was likewiſe compelled to fly over the Rhine, where he died ſoon after. The misfortunes of the latter, in whoſe election the king of Pruſſia had intereſted himſelf, diſpoſed him to accede to the union between the new emperor, France, the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel. He entered Bohemia, and took Prague, but the French again remaining inactive, he ſtood expoſed, alone, to the whole Auſtrian force, and was obliged to relinquiſh Prague, and withdraw through Luſatia.

This event put Maria Thereſa, queen of Hungary, upon attempting to retake Sileſia. The Auſtrians, accordingly, made incurſions into upper Sileſia, and took the fort of Coſel by ſtratagem. Prince Charles of Lorraine aſſembled the Auſtrian troops, conſiſting of 92,000 men. Frederic, to oppoſe him, aſſembled about 50,000 men. On the 30th of May, 1745. Frederic marched to Jauernich, in order to meet prince Charles, and detached the van-guard to Strigau. This manœuvre brought down prince Charles from the mountains into the plains, where, exulting in the ſuperiority of his numbers, he encamped, intending to ſurround the Pruſſians. On the 3d of June, at eight in the morning, Frederic left his camp, and, by a forced march, came ſuddenly during the night, to Strigau. At day-break the battle commenced, the reſult of which was that the Auſtrians were beaten. They counted 9000 killed and wounded, beſides 9000 which the Pruſſians took priſoners. The Pruſſians counted about 2300 killed and wounded.

Want of ſubſiſtence, however, compelled the king to retire from one camp to another. The great detachments neceſſary for covering his convoys, diminiſhed his army to 26,000 men. Prince Charles, whoſe army was above 60,000 ſtrong, deſirous of profiting by his ſuperiority, projected an attack. He followed the king, and on the 30th of September, near Soor, a bloody battle took place. The Auſtrians were again beaten, with the loſs of 10,000,

killed, wounded and prisoners. The Austrians and Saxons forming the project of a winter campaign, prince Charles, with a strong army, marched into Upper Silesia, in order to join the Saxon army. To prevent this junction, the king, on the 15th of December, gave battle to the Saxons near Kesselsdorf, over which he gained a complete victory.

A few days after, the peace of Dresden was concluded; in which Silesia, and the county of Glatz was again granted to the king of Prussia.

THE SEVEN YEARS, OR THIRD SILESIAN WAR, FROM 1756 TO 1763.

By I. W. d'ARCHENHOLZ, Captain in the Prussian service.

[Translated from the German, by the Editor.]

THE peace of Aix la Chapel had, after a long continued contest, restored tranquillity to all the nations of Europe. The arts flourished again, and the revival of warlike scenes was thought to be very remote. However, the greatest potentates of Europe were at that very time far from being peaceably disposed. The cabinets were never more zealously occupied in bringing new offerings to the Dæmon of war. It succeeded. Alliances were formed; not on the foundation of a wise policy, but rather on private passions. The wish of making conquests was entirely subjected to the desire of gratifying hatred and revenge. Two princesses, who then reigned over numerous nations, thought themselves personally offended by a monarch, on whom the eyes of all nations were directed, who had ended two wars crowned with laurels, whose greatness of mind excited universal admiration, and who by his virtuous government, was celebrated as the pattern of kings. The most essential plans were made to humiliate him, or rather to extinguish his existence. Thus the fire was kindled of a war, which, on account of the great number of armed bodies of men, of such different nations and languages; on account of the generals and their actions; of the refined art of war, that was employed; of the bloody battles by land and by sea, with their consequences; of the extraordinary events of such manifold kinds; and on account of its extent over all parts of the globe, belongs to the most noted that ever desolated the world.

Silesia, a fine country, full of industrious inhabitants, which Frederic the second, king of Prussia, soon after his accession to the throne, had conquered, and which he had supported with his sword, as well in the peace of Breslaw as in that of Dresden, could not be relinquished by the empress, queen Maria Theresa. She was compelled to yield it to the conqueror, who, at the commencement of her reign, was, of all her crowned enemies, the first that appeared with sword in hand, and made unexpected claims. The value of that country became known then only, when Frederic, in a manner peculiar to himself, shewed how to make use of it. To reconquer it by formidable alliances, seemed to them a very easy enterprise. The king of Poland and elector of Saxony, Augustus III. who, by his powerful neighbour, was once before driven from his residence, and who hoped to be indemnified for that humiliation by the acquisition of new provinces and security for the future, was the first that joined the league. The same did Elizabeth, empress of Russia, who found herself highly offended by some expressions of Frederic on her private character; and at last Lewis XV. king of France, who was followed by the Swedes as being dependent on him by the subsidies they enjoyed.

This alliance between Austria and France, which astonished all the world, and which was considered as the greatest master-piece of policy, was a mere accident; for, France never wished the total defeat of the king of Prussia: the chief plans of that court were directed on England; they wanted to conquer Hanover, in order to obtain greater advantages in America. As by this Austrian alliance, France had now an opportunity of sending troops into Germany, the court of that country promised to the empress, Maria Theresa, to furnish her with 20,000 auxiliaries. But those troops were soon augmented from divers causes, by new principles, by changed plans, by intrigues, and by the fate of war, to more than 200,000 men.

Frederic's ruin, which, however, by his genius and his good fortune was afterwards prevented, would have been inevitable, if he had not, by treason, received information of that dangerous league. His dispersed states, his open provinces, and his security, invited the allies to begin a campaign, which afforded a prospect, not of a heavy war, but of a chain of easy triumphs. But the timely discovery of those political designs, weakened extremely the danger of a prince, who, in a manner hitherto unknown, was always prepared for war; who possessed the great talent of a general in an extraordinary degree; who had 200,000 of the best disciplined sol-

diers, and a treasury richly filled. His great mind knew how to improve upon those advantages, and as the court of Vienna repeatedly refused giving him the desired assurances of peace, he suddenly resolved to anticipate his enemies, and draw his sword the first.

The allies had then hardly begun their preparations; money was every where wanting, and the troops destined for the war were for the most part still in their cantonments, from the Pyrenees to the Caspian Sea, when the king of Prussia, in the month of August 1756, rose like a lion from his couch, and entered Saxony with 60,000 men. To invade Bohemia, it was unavoidably necessary first to take possession of Saxony. He had no other ally but the king of England, George the second, who, on account of his electorate of Hanover had entered into an alliance with Frederic, of which, however, the advantage appeared at a distance only. The preservation of the king of Prussia depended, therefore, solely on the promptness and on the effect of his war operations. The march into Saxony was effected in three columns, the commanders of which were the king, the duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, and the duke of Bevern, all which were to join at Dresden.

The consternation of that court was extreme on the news of Frederic's march. They kept secret counsels, at which count Bruhl presided, a minister, whose greatness consisted, not in a sound policy, but in the talent of making a royal show and in governing his royal master entirely. In this dangerous situation, therefore, they took of all possible measures the most unwise. They in haste collected the Saxon troops, who formed an army of 14,000 men, and pitched a camp on the frontiers of Bohemia, near Pirna. The situation of this place was strong by nature, and with the assistance of art they made it invincible. But they thought only on putting themselves in a state of defence against the Prussian sword, and forgot to provide against a far more powerful enemy; an enemy who for thousands of years has conquered so many armies, has put to flight so many generals, who has deluded so many victories, and at once ended many a long extended war. The word hunger could not fail to be strange to a minister, who, accustomed to an Asiatic abundance, never had a notion of want, who, therefore, took the most insignificant measures for the provision of his brave and courageous troops, and who kept, even during that difficult situation, a magnificent table. The army had but a fortnight's provision in their camp. They provided themselves with palisadoes but not with

bread, and relied on the Auſtrian troops, who were haſtily aſſembled in Bohemia, under the command of Field-Marſhal Brown.

During this, Frederic had entered Saxony, where he took every meaſure to keep firm ground; giving, however, the aſſurance that he would take it in *depot* only—an invention of modern policy, to obviate from ſuch a proceeding the appearance of an inimical invaſion; which, however, the enemy commonly calls by its proper name. Contributions of corn, cattle, and forage, were demanded for the Pruſſian army: They fortified the city of Torgau, and occupied it with cannon, which they found in ſeveral Saxon towns. Some thouſands of citizens were obliged to work at theſe fortifications; for which, however, they were at firſt paid. In this place they put the Pruſſian commiſſion of war, and the treaſury of war: all the contributions of the country were likewiſe carried thither.

The king of Pruſſia himſelf entered Dreſden, the 10th of September, without reſiſtance, and occupied the town and the royal palace. His conduct, and that of his ſoldiers, characteriſed on that occaſion, the ſpirit of our age, where they endeavour to employ refined morals, ſenſibility and civility, even in war, in the midſt of hard humiliations, and under terrible ſcenes. Frederic took his head-quarters in a garden of the ſuburbs, in the neighbourhood of which his army was encamped. Every meaſure was taken to ſoften the frightful picture of war, in the eyes of the conſternated Saxons, and to ſhew their new commander in an amiable light. He wiſhed to be looked upon as a friend, as a future ally, and as a gueſt. Nothing was therefore wanting to make his conduct gracious. He held levies for the foreign ambaſſadors, at which all ſeemed to be in good ſpirits. Almoſt all people of diſtinction came to pay their reſpects; the ſame did all the magiſtrates of the town. All were well received. The king gave public dinners, at which the Saxons appeared in great numbers as ſpectators. He frequently ſent his compliments to the royal family, and the latter extended their civility ſo far, as to invite him to dinner, and to offer chamberlains to attend him, which, however, he declined. Notwithſtanding all thoſe civilities, the public offices at Dreſden were all ſealed up; the treaſury was locked; ſome of the civil officers diſcharged; all the artillery and amunition taken from the arſenal of the Reſidence, and carried to

Magdeburg, and all the money in the different treaſuries of the country, belonging to the elector, was appropriated. The communication between Dreſden and the Saxon camp, was entirely cut off, ſo that it was open only to the tranſport of victuals, for the king of Poland's own table, and to the couriers and trumpeters, that were ſent.

This alliance, which was planned for the deſtruction of the king of Pruſſia, was, it is true, revealed to the king; he likewiſe had copies of many important papers reſpecting it, but many a thing remained dark to him. Nevertheleſs, it was, for his ſafety, of the utmoſt importance to know the formed plans thoroughly. To this was added, the political duty, to juſtify, by indiſputable documents, his invaſion into Saxony, which aſtoniſhed all the courts of Europe. Theſe conſiderations impoſed on him the duty to gain poſſeſſion of the Saxon archive. They foreſaw his deſire, and tranſported thoſe political ſecrets into the apartment of the queen of Poland. She herſelf had the key to it, and guarded it as a treaſure of the greateſt value. Frederic's requeſt to deliver it up, was, therefore, refuſed by that princeſs, who was his declared enemy. The Pruſſian general Winterfield, a favourite of the king, a man equally great as a warrior, as he was polite as a courtier, was then ſent to her. But all his propoſitions were nugatory, ſhe remained firm, though Winterfield let himſelf down upon his knees before her, in order to diſpoſe her to comply with the king's wiſh. He left her, but ſoon after, other meſſengers appeared, who proceeded in a military manner and made ſigns to open the cheſt with the help of inſtruments. The queen thought ſhe could ſufficiently defend it by her own body, and placed herſelf before it, extending her arms acroſs it. But this firmneſs ſerved only to humiliate her the more. They carried her from her poſt, in ſpite of her ſcreams and her perſonal reſiſtance, and Frederic obtained the deſired papers.

This diſreſpectful conduct againſt a royal perſonage, though perfectly juſtified by circumſtances, was conſidered as a particular cruelty. This event, which with great exaggerations, by the ſufferers was ſpread all over Europe, and Frederic's conduct in Saxony, which was painted with the blackeſt colours, did not a little contribute to increaſe the number of his enemies, and to alter the ſentiments of many of his friends. It is well known that the then Dauphine, mother of Lewis XVI of France, a daughter of the

offended queen of Poland, fell upon her knees, melted with tears, before Lewis XV, and entreated his aſſiſtance to ſave her royal parents and her native country. The court of Verſailles now began to loſe ſight of the principles of policy, and took a ſerious part in a war that ſo much oppoſed her true intereſt, andwhich ſhe had hitherto conſidered as a mere political farce.

However, they continued in the endeavour to effect peace between the kings of Pruſſia and Poland. The Engliſh and Dutch ambaſſadors, Lord Stormont and Mr. Calkoen, uſed all their abilities to accompliſh that beneficial buſineſs. Frederic required of the king of Poland a ſtrict neutrality and as a proof of it, he deſired that the Saxon troops ſhould be diſembodied and go to their quarters. Auguſtus promiſed to remain neuter, but he refuſed confirming his aſſurance by facts. He encouraged his troops by a public proclamation to ſave the honor of their king, and to defend themſelves to the laſt drop of their blood. The faithful Saxons, who love their regents to a high degree, whatever their character may be, manifeſted their readineſs to comply with the expectation of Auguſtus. In their camp they already began to ſuffer by want, ſo that the daily portions for men and horſes were ſhortened of one third. Their courage, increaſed however, when they heard of the approach of the Auſtrian army, that was in Bohemia already 70,000 men ſtrong.

Brown had poſitive orders from his court to riſk every thing, to diſlodge the Pruſſians and give aſſiſtance to the Saxons. The junction of thoſe two armies, under ſo experienced a general, would then have given another appearance to the war. Frederic was ſenſible of this, and therefore doubled his aſſiduity to confine the Saxon camp, and to cut off every aſſiſtance that might be given to the troops in it. In order to gain that point the better, Field-Marſhal Keith received orders to advance with a conſiderable corps into Bohemia, to obſerve the movements of the Auſtrians. The Pruſſian Field-Marſhall, Count Schwerin, had already entered Bohemia with 35,000 men from the ſide of Sileſia, having encamped himſelf near Koniggratz. Both theſe Pruſſian armies were to occupy the Auſtrian in their own country, according to Frederic's plan, ſo that they could not think of the Saxons. He, himſelf expected daily their ſurrender, not finding it prudent to go before into Bohemia, where he had no magazines. He would by ſuch a proceeding, likewiſe have given the Saxons room to make

themſelves maſters of the Elbe, and to remain in his rear. Beſides, he was at that time in want of waggons, &c. for the tranſportation of proviſion; and the terrible deſiles that cover the avenues to that country on all ſides, required many other meaſures.

Brown, in order to give aſſiſtance to the Saxons, was obliged to paſs the river Eger; but then he had not the neceſſary pontoons. They did not arrive with the artillery in his camp till the 30th of September, after which he put himſelf inſtantly in motion. It was now Frederic's intention to compel him by a battle to retreat; he therefore, roſe the 30th of September, on the ſame day in which Brown had paſſed the Eger. The next morning, after day break, the two armies met near Lowoſitz, a Bohemian village. The Auſtrians were 52 battalions and 56 ſquadrons ſtrong, and they had one hundred and two pieces of cannon. So thick a fog happened at that time, that they hardly could ſee three ſteps before them. The heights of Loboſh and Radoſtiz, that commanded the poſition of the Auſtrians, were not occupied by Brown. This circumſtance cauſed Frederic to think that the Auſtrians had paſſed the Elbe, and that he only had touched their rear. Some thouſands of Croats and Hungarian infantry, who were poſted at the foot of the mountain of Loboſh in vineyards, and who made a loſing fire on the approaching Pruſſians, confirmed that opinion, as a retreat is generally covered with ſuch light troops. The Auſtrian cavalry, which had expoſed itſelf to the fire of the Pruſſian cannon, and which kept ground as if they wanted to effect it by another intention, completed that error. They fought in the fog without ſeeing one another. During this, the king cauſed the heights to be occupied.

Brown's poſition being ſecured towards the middle of his line, and on his left wing, by a moraſs and other impenetrable avenues againſt every attack, he directed his intention entirely on the village of Lowoſitz, which covered his right wing, having poſted there his beſt infantry, with a large quantity of heavy arms; there was likewiſe before it a ſtrong battery and redoubts. Towards the middle of the day the fog diſperſed, and they ſaw one another. The Pruſſian cavalry made now a regular attack, and overturned that of the Auſtrians, but they purſued them with too much ardour, till they came under the cannon of Lowoſitz. The violent fire of the artillery mounted there, repulſed them with great loſs. The next undertaking of the Pruſſians now was, to drive the Croats from the vineyards, the fences and walls of which ſerved thoſe troops as bulwarks. They ſucceeded with a great deal of trouble.

Brown now ſent his beſt infantry to attack the heights; but the Pruſſians who were poſted there defended themſelves like lions, and ſome regiments, after having fired away all their cartridges, fell, with their bayonets, on the enemy. This terrible ſcene laſted till the Auſtrians were puſhed down from the heights, and into the village of Lowoſitz. The Pruſſians ſeized this time of confuſion to ſet the village on fire, and to drive the enemy entirely from thence, whereby the fate of the day was at laſt decided. Brown made a maſterly retreat, and left the field of battle to the king, without giving up his pretenſions to the victory. This, however, was not doubtful, as was proved by the conſequences; though the Pruſſian army had loſt more men, and both parties counted their priſoners.

Such was the firſt battle in this memorable war, which laſted from ſeven o'clock in the morning till three in the afternoon, and which was, as we may ſay, the ſignal of the Pruſſian valour for the ſubſequent battles. The loſs of the conquerors was 3300, dead, wounded and priſoners. The Auſtrians loſt a few hundred leſs.

Brown was now compelled to retire over the Eger and obliged, entirely to alter his plan of liberating the Saxons. It was reſolved, that theſe allies ſhould go over the Elbe in the night of the 11th of October, and then they intended to attack the Pruſſians from both ſides. But very rainy and ſtormy weather cauſed this paſſage to be deferred. They determined to effect it two days after. Frederic made uſe of that precious time; reinforced the poſts on the Elbe, and fortified them by intrenchments and barricades. The right ſide of this river, near Pirna and Konigſtein, is full of mountains, covered with woods. The deep declivities that ſeparate them, preſent nothing but impracticable environs, not made for the march of an army, particularly when a powerful enemy is in the neighbourhood, having the heights in their poſſeſſion. The Saxons, after having paſſed the Elbe, hoped to hear ſomething of the approach of the Auſtrians; but they could not perceive any thing of their allies, who were prevented from advancing farther by a Pruſſian corps; they perceived on the contrary that the Pruſſians were maſters of the defiles, which they were obliged to paſs, in order to reach Bohemia. However, they tried to form themſelves at the foot of the mountain Lilienſtein, but it was impracticable, on account of the ſmall ſpace, wherefore they encamped themſelves, full of diſmal expectations of their ſorrowful

fate. This fatal ſituation had its ſource entirely in the Auſtrians as well as the Saxons being ignorant of the ground, and who, therefore, made hazardous plans.

The Pruſſians inſtantly took poſſeſſion of the camp which the Saxons had left; they touched on their rear, took them priſoners, with the moſt part of their baggage and artillery. This was a conſiderable tranſport, which could not reach the troops, the bridge being broke.

Never was a well diſciplined army of a valiant nation in a more deplorable ſituation. It was quite the hiſtory of Caudinum. Hunger plagued the Saxon troops; to this was added the ſeverity of that rough ſeaſon of the year and the loſs of their baggage. They were three days and three nights ſucceſſive under arms without any victuals; they even were in want of ammunition. They laid in the open air, ſurrounded by vigilant enemies, deprived of all means and of every hope to ſave themſelves. Their fate depended now entirely on the conqueror's grace, to whom they at laſt offered a capitulation, with the conſent of Auguſtus. The conditions of it were hard, as well for the Saxon troops as for their king. The whole army was obliged to lay down their arms. The officers were diſmiſſed, but the non-commiſſioned officers had no choice; they were forced to ſwear allegiance to the king of Pruſſia.

The king of Poland now ſuffered a humiliation which for ſome centuries ſince has not been the fate of an European prince. He loſt at once his whole Saxon army that was faithful to him, and a few of his body guard only were left to him who were with him at Konigſtein. His endeavors to gain better conditions from the conqueror were in vain. Frederic himſelf, gave the anſwers on the articles of capitulation of that memorable treaty. Some of thoſe anſwers, which reſpect the great want of the troops, are quite laconic, and are ſignified only by the word *good*, but all denote the deciſive tone of the conqueror, who thinks to comply with more than they had reaſon to expect. Auguſtus begged he would leave him his guards at leaſt. But Frederic's anſwer on that head was extremely humiliating, and manifeſted the right of the ſtronger over the weaker in a ſtriking manner. It was this: "They ſhould "have the ſame fate as the other troops, as he ſhould not wiſh "the trouble of taking them priſoners a ſecond time."

Ten Saxon regiments remained entirely together, with this difference only, that they received Pruſſian uniforms, colours and com-

manders; but the reſt were with the whole cavalry diſtributed among the Pruſſian regiments.

This action of Frederic, to force a whole army of a foreign prince, to ſerve the conqueror in cloſe columns, is perhaps without example in the hiſtory of the world. However, they relied to much on Auguſtus' impotence of keeping an army, and on the wants of the troops who were without a maſter. They did not pay any attention to the attachment which the Saxons naturally have to their princes and their native country. But this ſhewed itſelf ſoon to Frederic's aſtoniſhment. Though they expected ſome deſertions among the Saxons, they did not think that whole regiments would run away with order and reſolution. Moſt of them ſet off with all the military ſigns of honour, and went either to Poland or joined the French army. The king of Pruſſia had given commiſſions to many non-commiſſioned officers of the Saxons, in order to make his ſervice agreeable to them. But this meaſure was not ſufficient; for thoſe officers were at the head of thoſe deſerters; and thoſe who would not go with them they forced to go out of the way.

The fort of Konigſtein was declared neutral during the war, and the king of Poland, who on that rock waited for the deciſion of his fate, received paſſports for himſelf and his ſuite to go ſafely to Warſaw, whither he went without delay. This monarch was extremely humbled by his great misfortune; he wrote, the 14th of October, to his Field-Marſhal Rutowſky: "We muſt reſign ourſelves to providence—I am a free king—As ſuch I will live and die. I leave the fate of my army in your hands; your court marſhal may decide, whether to ſurrender or to chuſe death, either by hunger or by the ſword." He had carried on a correſpondence with the Pruſſian monarch from Konigſtein, which, from the firſt offered neutrality, came by degrees to a propoſal of an alliance, and as Auguſtus remained immoveable, Frederic gave him a kind letter as a companion on his journey. The title in thoſe royal letters was, on both ſides, *my brother*; a tender expreſſion which, under ſuch circumſtances, deſerves a place in hiſtory. They ſhewed to the departing king all poſſible reſpect; they removed even the troops from the road in order to prevent diſagreeable objects from the eyes of the unfortunate king.

The campaign was now at an end. The Auſtrian army drew farther into Bohemia, and the Pruſſians went into their winter quarters in Saxony and Sileſia. Frederic remained during the

winter at Dresden, and now treated his depoſit as a conquered province. He often gave audience to the Saxon miniſters, iſſued his orders on all ſubjects relative to the adminiſtration of the country, and demanded of the repreſentatives 10,000 recruits.

The preparations of all the powers connected in the war, were great for the next campaign. Frenchmen and Swedes, Siebenburgians, Maylaneſes, Wallones, Coſaks and Calmuks, put themſelves in motion, and as money was in great demand, they uſed every art, partly to make loans, and partly to diſpoſe monied people to furniſh neceſſities in advance. But the king of Pruſſia had the advantage over his enemies, not being in need of ſuch means. His great treaſury and rich depoſit afforded means to the Pruſſians, with every thing abundantly provided, to open the next campaign. The Saxons, who, on account of the likeneſs of their religion, language, morals, and their way of thinking, had far more inclination to the Pruſſians than to the Auſtrians, were wiſhing that their royal maſter (war being inevitable) might ally himſelf with the former. They were yet not treated with any ſhadow of ſeverity. The only thing they felt of the war was the contributions of proviſion, which, however, were not burthenſome. They lived quite amicably with the Pruſſians. They had comedies, balls, maſquerades and concerts at Dreſden; the king himſelf gave, almoſt daily, concerts, which that ſo powerfully threatened monarch accompanied on his German flute.

This tranquillity of mind, the reſult of his philoſophical way of thinking and of the knowledge of his forces, was, however, diſturbed in divers manners. Among other things there happened, during that winter, an event, of which the particulars are known by a few only. Before the nineteenth century it will hardly be allowed to any hiſtorian to communicate them to the world. Frederic was to be poiſoned. A page, Glaſau by name, whom the king liked particularly, was hired to ſend the monarch out of the world. The plan was known to a few only, and a diſcovery was not to be feared from thoſe. However, an accident diſcovered in the hour of the execution to the king, that a ſcheme was laid againſt his life. Glaſau fell upon his knees before the king, and begged his forgiveneſs, which, however, could not be granted. He was put under arreſt, examined in the king's preſence, and ſent next day in irons to Spandau, where he ſoon after died in priſon in a lamentable manner. It ſeemed the king was ſo anxious to keep the

affair ſecret, that he even would not give leave to a phyſician to attend him in his laſt moments.

The moderation which the king had hitherto obſerved in Saxony, had its cauſe in the hope which was ſtill entertained, that Auguſtus might be diſpoſed to a peace; but the wound was too deep: the alliance with Auſtria and Ruſſia too cloſe; and his expectations of a happy change too great for him to liſten to the Pruſſian propoſals. On the contrary, the complaints of his ambaſſadors, ſupported by his powerful allies, were at Ratiſbone before the German diet, and all the European courts without limits. Paſſion ſuppreſſed all prudence, and weakened the faculties of learned men ſo far, that they repreſented Frederic's march into Saxony, in all political publications, as an undertaking without example in the hiſtory of the world. They obtained their point. All the allied courts doubled their zeal in their enormous preparations and the Germanic diet at Ratiſbone made uſe of a puniſhment that for many generations had not been put in force. They pronounced againſt the king of Pruſſia the anathema, and declared him thereby to have forfeited his ſtates and dignities. To execute this ſentence they called together, nothwithſtanding the cries of Pruſſia's friends, an army of all the nations of Germany, which under the name of the execution-army of the empire, was to give effect to the decree of the majority. In this manner a new army united itſelf to the many others, among whom Frederic's deſtruction was the motto, and they began already to determine the approaching moment when the war ſhould be ended.

Frederic, to whom nothing was left but to face every where the thunder of war by the moſt effectual uſe of his arms, now began to direct his finance-operations in Saxony with more effect. The pay of all the electoral ſervants was curtailed or entirely taken away. Hitherto 190,000 dollars were annually paid for the public offices at Dreſden; this ſum was reduced to 30,000, and in this manner he proceeded. This finance reform extended itſelf over every thing. Two important perſonages at the court of Dreſden were the queen's confeſſor and the director of the opera. The former had 12,000 and the latter 15,000 dollars annually; but now they were obliged to content themſelves with 2,000 dollars. The enormous quantity of porcelain in the electoral manufactories was ſold as property taken at war. A Saxon merchant bought it for 200,000 dollars, and laid thereby the foundation of an enormous fortune. He roſe to the dignity of a Daniſh miniſter of ſtate, and died as the richeſt man of the northern empires.

Frederic, however, left the royal palace at Dreſden untouched. He often viſited the excellent collection of paintings, but without appropriating any thing of it; he made, on the contrary, great preſents to the inſpectors of the gallery. But this moderation left him entirely, with reſpect to Count Bruhl, whom he conſidered as the cauſe of the alliance between Saxony and his enemies. The magnificent palace of this miniſter, and his garden, an ornament of the reſidence and open to every body, was razed; and to this very day the ruins of a beautiful pavillion are monuments of a revenge which that crowned philoſopher was not thought to be capable of. The Saxon recruits for the Pruſſian ſervice were now demanded. The hereditary prince of Saxony made urgent repreſentations againſt it, but Frederic requeſted of him, in his anſwer, with all poſſible civility, not to trouble himſelf with thoſe affairs.

In all the provinces of Germany there reigned now a warlike activity, which for centuries was not ſo univerſal. In all the wars of modern times, even when under Charles V. and under Guſtavus Adolphus, the Germans cut each others throats from a religious zeal, they did not make ſuch powerful preparations as now; when all the nations of Germany, great and ſmall, took up arms, in order to fight either for the ſingle or for the double headed eagle. The army, before-mentioned, of the empire, was now aſſembled, which preſented that reſpectable Germanic union in a ridiculous light. Thoſe troops were, perhaps, not unlike the cruſaders. The contingents of Bavaria, of the palatinate, of Wirtemberg and ſome other imperial ſtates excepted, the reſt of that army was a collection of undiſciplined hords, divided into bodies which formed a variegated maſs. In Swabia and Franconia there were ſtates of the empire which had but a few men to furniſh. Some had to give but a lieutenant without ſoldiers, who not ſeldom was a fellow juſt taken from the plough; ſome furniſhed but a drummer, and gave him a drum from their old magazines. Cattle-drivers were converted into fifers, and old cart-horſes deſtined to carry dragoons. The prelates of the empire, proud of being the allies of ſuch great monarchs, changed the cloth of their convent ſervants and ſent them to the army. Arms, cloth, baggage, in ſhort every thing differed among thoſe fellows whom they ſtiled ſoldiers, and of whom they expected great doings.

During all this Pruſſia took the moſt neceſſary meaſures for opening the campaign early, in order to anticipate her enemies. The

moſt formidable of them were the Auſtrians. Frederic reſolved, therefore, to fall upon them with united forces, in order to ſtrike a great blow, before the armies of the other nations could approach. The Imperial court adopted an oppoſite ſyſtem; wiſhing to act defenſively, till, after the junction of all the allies, they could all at once fall upon the king of Pruſſia and deſtroy him. In conſequence of this arrangement, Brown divided his army into four great bodies in order to cover Bohemia. Frederic, notwithſtanding this, entered that kingdom in four columns. The duke of Bevern led one of thoſe columns, which conſiſted of 16,000 men; and ſoon fell in with one of the enemy's, of 20,000, which, under the command of count Konigſegg, had intrenched themſelves near Reichenberg. The Auſtrians were inſtantly attacked, and forced to retire, with the loſs of 1000 men, killed, wounded, and taken priſoners. After this battle the duke advanced; and ſoon after joined the army of Field Marſhal Schwerin, who had entered Bohemia by the way of Trautenau.

The king of Pruſſia paſſed the Moldau ſoon after, in ſight of the enemy, who neglected the precious moment to attack Frederic's ſmall corps, notwithſtanding the advantages of ſuperior force, and the proſpect of certain victory. Jealouſies had ariſen among the chiefs of the Auſtrian army, which appeared in a variety of ſhapes and in a very ſtriking manner: for Brown was now under the command of prince Charles of Lorrain, who had the command in chief.

On the 6th of May the Pruſſian army was aſſembled in the vicinity of Prague, to the number of 100,000 men ſtrong. They formed a junction near that capital, except the corps commanded by Keith and Moritz, who remained on the other ſide of the Moldau, and ſome hours after commenced one of the moſt memorable battles that ever was recorded in the annals of the world. The Pruſſian army that effectively came to action, conſiſted of 68,000, and the Auſtrian of 76,000 men. The latter ſtood on fortified mountains. The avenues to them were ſwampy meadows, ditches full of moraſs, very narrow ways, and ſmall wooden bridges, over which the ſoldiers could paſs but one by one. The Auſtrian infantry ſtood quiet in this ſtrong camp, and the cavalry was out on foraging parties, when Frederic appeared. Prince Charles now recalled haſtily the foraging troops, who partly fought in their undreſs with the Pruſſians. In ſpite of the badneſs of the ground, the

attack of the Pruſſians was conducted with an aſtoniſhing courage. Thoſe who were obliged to paſs the meadows ſunk into the moraſs at every ſtep; ſome regiments fell in to their very knees; it was with great trouble they could extricate themſelves. In this ſituation they endeavored to aſſiſt and encourage each other. Several battalions were obliged to leave their cannon behind, though they were in great want of them. At one o'clock in the afternoon thoſe obſtacles were at laſt ſurmounted, and the Pruſſians began ranging themſelves in order of battle. Without even taking breath after the great fatigue, they fell impetuouſly on the enemy, who received them with a terrible diſcharge of artillery. The king had given orders to attack the enemy with fixed bayonets, and not to loſe time with a muſquet fire: but the fire from the Auſtrian artillery was ſo horridly deſtructive, that humanity put limits to valour. The Pruſſians retreated.

During this the cavalry of both armies came likewiſe to action. The prince of Schoneich, who commanded the Pruſſian cavalry, attacked with a part of his the whole Auſtrian cavalry, and overturned their firſt line: but he was outflanked and repulſed by the enemy's ſecond line. However, the Pruſſian cavalry formed itſelf again, received reinforcements, and fell afreſh on the enemy. The attack was deciſive. The Auſtrian cavalry was entirely overpowered and puſhed upon their own infantry, which thereby became diſordered, and the Pruſſian huſſars made uſe of that opportunity to ruſh in amongſt them and increaſe the confuſion.

Field marſhal Schwerin, was, during this, zealouſly occupied to form the repulſed infantry again; and he cauſed them to advance againſt the enemy. He diſmounted his horſe, put himſelf at the head of his regiment, and took hold of a ſtand of colours, which in his hand was to open the way to victory. The Pruſſians found that way; but their noble leader fell to the ground, killed by three muſquet balls. Several Pruſſian generals followed this glorious example, and led their brigades on foot; Even Prince Henry of Pruſſia leaped from his horſe, and at the head of his brigade forced a battery of the enemy. Now the whole Pruſſian line fell upon the Auſtrians, who were in great diſorder, and whoſe wings were ſomewhat ſeparated. Frederic made proper uſe of that advantage. He advanced into the open ſpace, and the ſeparation was completed. The Auſtrians now formed two large armies; of which the one fled, and the other threw itſelf into Prague. They choſe

this aſylum in haſte, without reflecting on the conſequences. However they ſoon ſaw the terror of that ſituation. They even tried, the very ſame day, to draw themſelves out of it again; but the Pruſſians had occupied all the ſorties from the town, and forced the Auſtrians back into their confinement.

This was the hiſtory of that memorable day, which, on account of the great armies that fought, the quantity of blood that was ſpilt, the valour ſhewn by both parties, and the conſternation cauſed by the defeat, was not unlike that of *Rome*. The Roman decided the fate of all Italy, Rome alone excepted; and the German would have decided the whole war, if a very inſignificant circumſtance, a pair of miſerable pontoons, had not determined the fate of ſo many nations. The army of prince Moritz of Deſſau, was on the other ſide of Prague, and on the other ſide the Moldau, over which this general endeavoured to make a bridge, in order to fall on the enemy in the rear. This river was ſwelled; they had not provided for that accident, and ſome pontoons were wanting to complete the boat-bridge. Theſe courageous Pruſſians remained, therefore, mere ſpectators of the battle. A few pontoons more, and the entire deſtruction of the great Auſtrian army was not a moment doubtful. This day would have been immortal in the hiſtory of the world. In that caſe, there would have been no battle of Collin, no battle of Hochkirch; in ſhort, a hiſtory quite different from that which we now read in the annals of the eighteenth century. All that Moritz could do, in this diſagreeable ſituation, was to cannonade thoſe beaten Auſtrians, who were retiring towards the army of Daun.

The loſs of the Pruſſians on that day was 11,000 men killed and wounded, 1500 were taken priſoners. The Auſtrians counted 12000, killed and wounded beſides 8000 men, which with ſixty cannon, the treaſury of war, and a quantity of baggage, fell into the hands of the conquerors. From the field of battle the king wrote to his mother, "I and my brother are very well; the Auſtrians have loſt the campaign, and I have free hands with 150,000 men. We are maſter of a kingdom, that will afford us men and money. I ſhall ſend a part of my troops to pay a compliment to the French; with the reſt I will purſue the Auſtrians."

Bloody as this battle was, and great as the expectations were that all Europe had formed, matters however turned out quite different. This dreadful defeat is therefore the more remarkable, on account of the conſequences it did not produce. All the world

thought the flying Auſtrian army would be purſued and annihilated, and the confined part forced to ſurrender from hunger and fire: but the fortune of war ſuddenly diſappointed the hopes of the Pruſſians, and inſpired their enemies with new courage. At the battle of Prague each army loſt an excellent general. Frederic lamented the death of Shwerin, his tutor in military tactics, to whoſe memory he erected a ſtatue at Berlin at the end of the war. Field marſhal Brown died of his wounds; and beheld before his diſſolution the diſtreſsful ſcenes which had been exhibited at Prague.

A whole army was now within the walls of this large city. There were, beſides the garriſon of Prague, 50,000 men aſſembled, among which were all the principal commanders, the princes of Saxony, the duke of Modena, and even prince Charles of Lorrain. So powerful an army had not been locked up in a city in that quarter of the globe ſince the ſiege of Aleſia. All the nations of Europe, allied or neutral, expected ſcenes of an extraordinary nature. Frederic now blockaded this city, which is ten miles in circumference, and occupied all the forties with batteries. They thought at firſt, at Vienna, that ſo powerful an army as the Auſtrian would ſoon break the bolt of their priſon; however, all their vigorous and repeated attempts, though planned with prudence and executed with deſperate efforts, were fruitleſs; and the Auſtrians, repulſed by numerous batteries, were always obliged to return to their allowance of horſe fleſh. This was the food of the blockaded army from the very firſt week: artillery and cavalry horſes were butchered, and the fleſh ſold in the beginning for two pence, and afterwards for four pence per pound. No preparations were made for ſo extraordinary an accident: the magazines in the city were but indifferently filled: the troops in want of every thing, and 80,000 inhabitants in danger of periſhing by famine.

Prague was now regularly beſieged, and more and more encloſed. Bombs and red-hot balls were thrown into the city, which ſet many houſes on fire and kept up a continual burning. The ſcreams and lamentations of the inhabitants were heard in the night time by the Pruſſians. 12,000 of the inhabitants were expelled the city to leſſen the famine, but the cannon balls of the beſiegers drove them back again. After a ſiege of three weeks the whole new town, and the quarter occupied by the Jews, in which were

ſeveral ſtore-houſes, were reduced to aſhes. Many people, who had nothing to do with the war, old men, women, and children, were killed by the bombs, and by the falling in of the houſes. The confuſion in this unhappy city was inexpreſſible. The ſtreets were filled with waggons and horſes, the churches with ſick and wounded, and death like a deſtructive peſtilence, committed dreadful ravages, among men and beaſts.

The clergy, the magiſtrates, and the citizens, intreated prince Charles' compaſſion; which, willing as he was, he could not ſhew to any effect. A capitulation was propoſed, and a free departure required. Frederic was deaf to this offer; and, in return, ſuggeſted terms which they could not accept of. The hope of the troops, to force their way out of the city, was vaniſhed; and their reliance on the army of Daun, that ſtood near Collin, was very doubtful. Nothing, therefore, remained to the blockaded but to reſign themſelves to their fate.

Such was the critical ſituation of the empreſs Maria Thereſa. All the paſſes of her kingdom, Bohemia, towards Lauſatia and Vogtland, towards Saxony and Sileſia, were in poſſeſſion of the Pruſſians. The flower of her army, with the principal generals, blockaded at Prague; the remainder of her troops defeated, diſheartened, and ſcattered about in ſmall parties, and in want of ſubſiſtence in their own country; the capital of Bohemia reduced to the laſt extremity by famine and fire; the confined army on the point of ſurrendering; and the whole kingdom as well as the adjoining Auſtrian provinces, approaching to the fate of being ſubdued by the conqueror. From the ſide of Saxony every aſſiſtance was cut off, all the Imperial hereditary dominions were open and expoſed to the enemy: even Vienna itſelf was not ſecure from being beſieged. The Pruſſians, who ſince the year 1741 had been victorious in eight battles, without loſing one, were now conſidered invincible, and nothing was thought impoſſible to the king. The conſternation in that capital was therefore beyond deſcription; they already imagined the victor to be before the gates of that reſidence, and already were means deviſed to offer to him peace with great ſacrifices.

Frederic himſelf loſt that favorable ſituation by a precipitate reſolution, which can be excuſed only by the danger that ſurrounded him. The ſiege of Prague laſted longer than he thought; he knew that the Ruſſians, the Swedes, the French, and the troops

of the empire approached his ſtates from all parts. Each day was precious to him. Having never been conquered in the field of battle, he could not entertain an idea of the poſſibility of a defeat. He left the beſt part of his army about Prague to continue the ſiege, and marched with 32,000 men to attack Field Marſhal Daun, in order to delude at once every hope of the beſieged.

This general came from Moravia with a ſtrong army, intending to join the main army of the Auſtrians. On the day of battle, he was but four German miles from Prague. This was favorable for thoſe Auſtrians that fled; Daun received them, and formed an encampment of 60,000 ſtrong on the mountains near Collin, where he entrenched himſelf. The cautiouſneſs peculiar to this general, and his limited knowledge of an offenſive war, made it extremely probable that he would not have undertaken any thing of moment, or at leaſt that he would have done nothing effective for the deliverance of the beſieged, though the orders of his court were very ſtrict on that point. Add to this that his troops became diſcouraged, the Pruſſian name ſounding terrible in their ears. The duke of Bevern, who was ſent towards him beforehand with 20,000 Pruſſians, made uſe of thoſe advantages, taking before Daun's eyes ſome conſiderable magazines. The king, at the head of a ſtrong corps of his beſt troops, joined at laſt the army of the duke of Bevern, and advanced on the 18th of June towards the enemy.

Daun, in the mean while, had altered his poſition; one of his lines ſtood on the declivity, the other on the ſummit of the mountains. Before his front were villages, ravins and perpendicular heights, partly inſurmountable: a numerous artillery, which made a tremendous fire, ſeemed to put limits to any attack. However it was executed, after the king had turned that poſt, with a courage never excelled by any nation upon earth, and which filled the enemy with aſtoniſhment. This great day was worthy of the Pruſſian name, Since the battle of Arbela, where, on the fields of Perſia, Grecian tactics decided the fate of numerous kingdoms, perhaps heroiſm and warlike ſkill, were never united to a higher degree. The Pruſſians attacked the enemy ſeven times, although very advantageouſly poſted, and when the terrible ſhower of balls overturned every thing, and conſtantly repulſed the battalions, it was not as if they gave way; but only fell back, in order to rally and renew the attack. Full of warlike enthuſiaſm, they ſcrambled

over the heaps of the ſlain, as over hillocks of earth. Not valor or ſkill, but accidents, decided the fate of this memorable day. The Pruſſians gained ſeveral important advantages; the enemy's right wing was defeated, the cavalry there poſted was overturned, and Daun thought already of retreating. The adjutant haſtened with the orders for that purpoſe, from wing to wing, when the ſcale, in which the fate of men and empires is decided, ſuddenly and unexpectedly preponderated to Frederic's diſadvantage. The wiſe diſpoſition of his army was not executed. One of his beſt generals broke the line, induced by military ardor; he ſtopped with his battalions at a time, when, without fighting, he ſhould have moved forwards with the whole war-machine, in an inſeparable connection. The Pruſſian army became thereby a falſe direction, and ſome Saxon regiments of cavalry that were with Daun's army, and who burnt with ardor to cope with the Pruſſians, broke their line without waiting for orders, and fell upon the enemy.

Till the battle of Collin, where the high diſcipline of the troops kept pace with their valour, it was an invariable principle among all nations renowned in war, that if the cavalry can by any means penetrate into the infantry, the latter have no other alternative but to fly, to prevent impriſonment or death. Here they ſuffered entire ſquadrons of Saxon horſe to penetrate; and in the midſt of that tumult of men and horſe, which threatened death and deſtruction, whole Pruſſian regiments formed cloſe ſquares, with an aſtoniſhing preſence of mind and charged the enemy in platoons with an admirable order, as if they were on the place of exerciſe. Confined within thoſe living walls, that ſpread deſtruction, horſe and men fell in crowds, and formed hills of ſlain. Thoſe courageous ſquadrons ſaw nothing but certain death before them. But more cavalry came to their aſſiſtance, attacking the Pruſſians at once in front and rear, ſo that they were at laſt forced to yield to numbers. The Saxons were eager after vengeance. The defeat which they experienced twelve years before, in conjunction with the Auſtrians in Sileſia, where the fate of the Saxons was ſo mournful, was ſtill in the memory of thoſe warriors; and hence many cried out, whilſt their ſwords cut down every thing before them, "This is for Stri-" gau!" All that their ſwords could reach were cut to pieces or taken priſoners. Among the former were Frederic's life guards, conſiſting of a thouſand of his ableſt men, brought up in the military ſchool of Potſdam and richly provided with military ambition. They fought till every man was killed, and the bloody field was

covered with their bodies. Thereſa's generals beheld the ſlain Pruſſians with the ſame ſenſations which animated Pyrrhus on beholding the ſlain, when he firſt fought with the Roman legions.

The Pruſſians left the field of battle to the Auſtrians. It was evening; and a part of the Pruſſian army, which had conquered, made themſelves ready to encamp, and to celebrate the victory. Some regiments of horſe were even on the point of unſaddling, when the dreadful news reached them, that the battle was loſt, and that they were to retreat. This retreat of Frederic, with baggage and artillery, was effected with ſo much military prudence that the great exploits of the day were outſhone thereby. The enemy, to whom a Pruſſian retreat from the field of battle was a proſpect entirely new, calmly beheld this ſpectacle, and ſuffered Frederic to retreat uninterrupted in good order. His loſs was 11,000 men. The Auſtrians counted 9000 killed and wounded. Only 43 pieces of cannon fell into their hands.

(*To be continued.*)

Relation of CHARLES XII. King *of* Sweden, *being taken Priſoner at* Varniza, *near* Bender.

HAVING never found a circumſtantial account, in the Engliſh language, of this extraordinary defence of a houſe, we here relate it from Lieutenant General Steel, who was preſent with the king in that affair. It is tranſlated from the Swediſh Bibliotheque into French, and here, from the Encyclopedie Militaire (December 1772) into Engliſh.

After the Turks and Tartars had blockaded the houſe in which the king was, for three weeks, they reſolved to ſtorm it. They fired at it with cannon, the firſt of February, 1713, and attacked the intrenchments at the ſame time. They had juſt ended divine ſervice when the attack began: each ran, at the firſt ſhot, inſtantly to his poſt and the king mounted his horſe, and haſtened to the redoubt, which ſome Swedes defended with great vigour. Notwithſtanding this, they were all taken priſoners, and the king only eſcaped.

He was purſued to the very houſe, and nothing but his valour ſaved him. He did not diſmount till he came before the door of

his apartment, within the court-yard. Mr. Rooſe intreated him to enter, "*No*," ſaid the king, *I will ſtay here, and ſee what the* "*Turks intend to do.*" But, as they did not ceaſe firing at him, Mr. Rooſe endeavoured to perſuade him to go in. He would not; but wanted, abſolutely, to jump through a window, into an outer court, on the other ſide, where many thouſand Turks kept up a terrible fire againſt the houſe, whilſt others had forced ſeveral windows, and fought with the Swedes, in the ſaloon, and in the apartments below. When the king perceived this, nothing could retain him; Mr. Rooſe caught hold of him by the ſword-belt, but the king unbuckled it, and got from him; Mr. Rooſe caught hold of him again, and threw his arms round him, ſaying, with warmth, "*Now your majeſty ſhall not eſcape me.*" Two Swedes came to the aſſiſtance of Rooſe, and drew the king into the apartment, which ſome others immediately barricadoed. The king then got into the ſaloon, in which, as before mentioned, they were fighting. The apartment was full of Turks, and it was ſome time before they could drive them out. Some were killed, and others took flight, through the windows and the doors. The king placed then, five or ſix men before every window, and, in this manner, he withſtood, with a handful of men, an army of Turks and Tartars, for eight hours. He went from one room to another, and animated his men to a vigorous defence; carrying them powder and balls in his hat. Even from the killed, he took the ammunition they had about them, and divided it among the living.

Whilſt he was thus occupied, he went into an adjoining apartment, and ſhut the door behind him; the next to this was the apartment of Marſhal Duben, which, from want of men, could not be occupied. Mr. Rooſe, being informed that they had loſt the king, went in ſearch of him; ſcarce was the door of the ſaid apartment opened, when he ſaw the king fighting with three Turks. Rooſe inſtantly ſhot one of them, who had his back towards the door. The king did not perceive this till the man fell; he could ſcarce know Mr. Rooſe for the ſmoke; he looked at him, without ſaying a word, and cut one of the Turks to pieces. The third during this, was killed by Mr. Rooſe's ſecond piſtol. "*Are you now*," ſaid the king to Rooſe, "*come to my aſſiſtance? I ſee you have not forgot me.*" This ſaying, he wiped away the blood which ran from the wounds, he received from the Turks, and enquired

after his other people whom he thought had left him; but, learning they were moſtly killed or taken priſoners, he ſaid: "*Let us* "*now occupy the ſaloon only.*" The Turks had endeavored, during this, to force the windows, but were repulſed; they now approached with moveable parapets, filled with dung, which they ſhoved before them upon wooden machines. Theſe machines were made ſo that they could ſtand behind them and fire. They approached in this manner, without much loſs, but were forced, by the fire of the Swedes, to quit theſe machines. The cannonade continued, however, uninterrupted, but this, alſo, could decide nothing, the building being very ſtrong.

Towards evening they began to throw combuſtibles, and fire red hot balls. This, likewiſe, had no effect. At laſt the Turks brought to that ſide of the building where Mr. De Duben's apartment was, and which was not occupied, a quantity of ſtraw, ſet it on fire, and thus ſet the houſe on fire alſo. The Swedes ſcarce perceived this, when the king took ſome men with him, and endeavoured to extinguiſh the fire; but, when they opened the door, in order to go up ſtairs, they found themſelves in the midſt of flames, and ſome of the Swedes had their faces and clothes burnt. The king ordered the roof of the houſe to be pulled down; but as there were no inſtruments neceſſary for ſuch a work, they could not do it. At laſt they were obliged to quit this intention, and the more ſo, becauſe the Turks fired continually at the place where the Swedes ſtood, with cannon and ſmall arms. During this, the fire had ſpread ſo far, that the king and the reſt were obliged to run through it, covering their faces with their clothes, to prevent their being burnt. Even the *ſaloon*, the chief place of defence, was alſo on fire. The king now wanted to defend himſelf in another apartment, that had not caught fire, ſaying: "*Let us go* "*in my bed-room; there we can defend ourſelves.*" Scarce had he ſpoke theſe words, when he ſaw four Turks approach him; though continually fighting with his ſword, he took the carbine from Mr. Rooſe, and ſhot the firſt with it, who fell; but the others approaching nearer; Mr. Rooſe intreated the king not to expoſe himſelf, but, as the king did not pay any attention to his advice, Mr. Rooſe ran between the king and the window; where the Turks approached, and fired their piſtols. A ball grazed Mr. Rooſe's head; he fell into the arms of the king, but ſoon recovered; whilſt the three Turks were killed by the Swedes. The Turks now undertook another ſtorm, but in this alſo were repulſed.

During all this, the fire ſpread every where through the wainſcot and doors, and they were obliged either to get out of the room or periſh. They accordingly jumped into the court, which was filled with the enemy. The king cried: "*Courage; let us defend ourſelves as long as we can, let the conſequence be as it may.*"

They now placed their backs againſt the wall of the houſe, in which poſition they fought deſperately, for an hour; but, the roof falling in; "*Follow me, to the chancery,*" cried the king, and doubled his ſteps, with an intention, if poſſible, to get through the Turks; but, unfortunately, his ſpurs entangled together; he fell, and the Turks got upon him, and upon all the reſt of the Swedes, and they were taken priſoners. This was at eight o'clock in the evening.

Extract from an Order Book of an American Colonel, who was taken Priſoner in the Battle of Flatbuſh, Long Iſland.

Order of GENERAL WASHINGTON.

New-York, Aug. 23, 1776.

I HEAR the enemy is arrived at Long Iſland, and approaches every hour nearer. The honor and ſucceſs of the army, and the good of our bleeding country, depend on our conduct.

Remember, officers and ſoldiers, that you are a free people fighting for bleſſed liberty—that ſlavery will be the lot of you and your following generations, if you do not conduct yourſelves like men. Remember, how your cruel deſtructors have laughed at your courage and zeal, though they know from experience at Boſton, Charleſtown, and other places, what a few, who voluntarily fight in their country's cauſe, can do againſt mercenary troops. Be compoſed, yet firm: fire not at too great a diſtance, but wait for the command of your officers. It is the command of the general that thoſe, who ſecrete themſelves, lie down or retreat without orders, ſhall be inſtantly ſhot for the example of others. He hopes there is no ſuch coward in the army, but on the contrary, that every man is reſolved, either to conquer or die; and that he will fight, ſure of the approbation of God, in ſo juſt a cauſe, with courage and firmneſs. Thoſe who diſtinguiſh themſelves by a good conduct, may be certain of reward, and ſure of being diſtinguiſhed. If they imitate their countrymen in other American virtues, the general doubts not but that they will ſave their country by a glorious victory, and acquire immortal honor.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MILITARY REPOSITORY.

Sir,

AS it will, no doubt, be agreeable to your plan, to collect the portraits of the moſt diſtinguiſhed military characters in our country, I ſend you a ſketch of one, who ranks high in the ſcale of public opinion, not only for the part he acted during the war of independence, but alſo for his late brilliant ſucceſſes againſt the confederate Indians and Britiſh at the Rapids of the Miamis. I could have wiſhed that this product of a few hours amuſement had been rendered more perfect and pleaſing to the eye of a true artiſt; but the unfiniſhed ſtate of the original from which this was taken, and the want of ſufficient practice in the executor have prevented; however, he conceives it will be gratifying to ſome, to be preſented even with the caricature of a man of ſuch extraordinary ſkill and undaunted courage. While we deprecate the horrors of an Indian war; while we revere the characters of thoſe men, who, in times paſt, encountered the ſevereſt trials, and braved death in every ſhape, in order to eſtabliſh our freedom and independence, the Hero of Stoney-Point, and the Victor at the Rapids of the Miamis, will not be forgotten.

January 25th, 1796. W.

ON THE INTERNAL DEFENCE OF FORTS.

MAJOR General Bernhard Virgin who has the ſuperintendency of the fortifications in Sweden, has in his work entitled '*La defenſe des places miſes en equilibre avec les attaques ſavantes et furieuſes d'au jourdhui*,' given a more full and ſatisfactory account of the manner in which forts ought to be defended, than ever was done before. His plans and remarks for putting forts in ſuch a ſtate, that they may reſiſt a ſuperior force as long as poſſible, are new, and merit the attention of every engineer who wiſhes to riſe in his profeſſion.

In my opinion, therefore, I cannot render my readers a more acceptable ſervice, than to give them the outlines of the work. It is divided into two parts.

The firſt part treats of the errors committed in the modern ſyſtem of fortification; of the uſe and preſervation of cannon and mortars in forts—and of the choice of places proper to be fortified, with general remarks on the manner in which forts ought to be conſtructed.

The ſecond part ſhews how to fortify a ſquare, whoſe ſides are two hundred toizes and treats of the different modes of erecting fortreſſes

The moſt important articles of this work, ſhall be given in this repoſitory with occaſional ſtrictures. I mean to begin with the introduction to the firſt part, becauſe the author there relates many important truths with great candour. General Virgin who has written the above work, is now far advanced in age, and was preſent at no leſs than eight ſieges in 1745 and 1746 in the war of the Low Countries.

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PART.

It has been a general remark for this century paſt, that forts never hold out long. Count Pagan, in a treatiſe written ſo long ago as the year 1645, on the conſtruction of forts, obſerves, 'that all Europe was ſurpriſed at the little reſiſtance they were able to make; that the ſtrongeſt fort could not hold out longer than a month or ſix weeks, and yet no one had thought it worth while to endeavor to remedy an evil, upon which the ſafety of a ſtate often ſo much depended. The engineers of the preſent century merit alſo cenſure, in not having paid ſome attention to the art of conſtructing and defending forts, as well as that of attacking them; the latter is brought to a very great degree of perfection, whilſt the former has been totally neglected.

The ancient mode is ſtill adopted in the conſtruction of forts, as well as in the repair of old ones; the abſurdity of which, though formerly in great vogue, has been confirmed by ſubſequent experience. The mode of attack, beſides, has been ſuſceptible of improvements unknown to our anceſtors. Theſe improvements have been ſo rapid, that the ſtrongeſt fortreſſes have been obliged to open their gates in the courſe of a few weeks to the beſiegers. For inſtance, Oſtend, Mons and Namur, three of the ſtrongeſt garriſons in the Auſtrian Netherlands, which were taken after a ſhort ſiege in the years of 1745, and 1746.

It is the nature of the art of attack, that its progreſs can go on more rapidly, and ſooner attain perfection, than the art of defence;

ſer, in the courſe of one campaign, we may take three, four, or more fortified places. Faults, therefore, committed in the ſiege of the firſt, may be repaired in thoſe of the ſucceeding ones. Should the war continue for any time, it is excellent means of improving in the art of beſieging, without being expoſed to ſuffer a heavy loſs. Quite different is the internal defence of any place. Forts already conſtructed, cannot eaſily be altered or converted. For this purpoſe, very conſiderable ſums are neceſſary, beſides more time and labour than political circumſtances will ſometimes permit. The defence, therefore, remains imperfect, as the works will not hold out againſt a regular and obſtinate ſiege. With this evil another is connected of no leſs importance. The art of defending our modern imperfect works, as far as their ſituation allows them to be defended, is not eaſily to be acquired; becauſe the engineers who are not killed during the ſiege, are made priſoners with the garriſon, and conſequently cannot be employed in defending any other place. The knowledge, therefore, they may have acquired in the firſt place, wherein they have been beſieged, they can neither apply nor bring to further perfection. Theſe are the impediments which have occaſioned the art of defending fortreſſes to be ſo very imperfect. It is not, therefore, ſurprizing that places do not hold out longer, and that they are ſeldom or ever well defended. And this is, in no ſmall degree, connected with the beſt method of fortifying poſts or garriſons. For if it was equally well known how to defend a place that is beſieged, as it is, how to attack it to the greateſt advantage, the art of fortifying any place would ſoon attain its utmoſt point of perfection.

It ſeems, however, that thoſe only, will bring the art of defending forts to this wiſhed-for perfection, who have attained the greateſt ſkill in the attack of forts. For before a place can be well fortified, it ſhould be known how it can be beſt attacked. But it is very ſingular, that the greateſt maſters in the art of attack have not been ſo fortunate in their manner of fortifying; which, for inſtance, the new ſyſtem adopted by Vauban, at Landau and New Briſac, (two forts in Alſace) clearly ſhews. The baron de Landſberg is likewiſe an engineer of no leſs celebrity, who poſſeſſed in the art of attacking forts a judgment confirmed by experience. Though his principles for his new manner of fortifying are excellent, their application ſeems liable to many obſtacles. In the courſe of this work, reaſon will be given why theſe new modes of

fortifying are not to be held up as perfect systems of fortification. It may be asked whether it is absolutely necessary to have been engaged in the defence of forts to invent a new and more perfect manner of fortifying them. It is true the siege of Landau, so much celebrated in history, which continued near three years, was the means of Reinsterns giving to the world his incomparable system of fortification. But it is equally certain that Mallet and Schetier, who were present at that siege, have in their rules for the defence of forts, given nothing new on the subject.

Whatever experience we may have in besieging and in being besieged, or whatever practical knowledge we may have acquired by the number of new forts erected, these will never lead to any thing excellent, if not aided by a creative genius who can labour with indefatigable industry, who can throw away the yoke of prejudice, and disregard the path in which his predecessors have uniformly trodden. Neither must he set too great value on the first production of his genius which would infallibly lock up the door to all future enquiries.

But where shall we find so fertile a genius, blessed with such talents? Who will be answerable, that he shall not be looked upon as an enthusiast, by the military vulgar, who vociferate like geese at the appearance of every novelty?

Until such an exalted genius shall appear, we will do all in our power to labour for the present age, and that of an impartial posterity. All progress in the sciences is attained but by slow degrees, and little is performed at the first outset. We will, however, try to be fortunate enough to contribute something at least for the amelioration of the internal defence of forts.

Very considerable alterations will be necessary in the present system of fortification, to prevent the danger accruing to a state, by the speedy surrender of its forts, if they may be so termed. Times have changed, and *Machiavel* and sound reason teach us, that we also should change our system not to be unfortunate.

The invention of gun-powder, of bombs, of the manner of firing cannon with balls, a *ricochets*, (i. e.) balls which continue bounding after they touch the ground, and the secure manner in which trenches are opened, have given such a decided superiority, over the system of defence; that if means are not found to resist force with force, to oppose subtility by subtility, and overpower skill with a greater degree of skill, our forts will, in a short time, be of

no more ſervice than the common walls round a town. Of what uſe are ſuch forts as will ſcarce hold out as many days as they have coſt millions to conſtruct them? What advantage do they offer if an enemy can in a ſingle campaign, take half a dozen of them only with detachments from the main army? In this manner, more provinces are loſt in one campaign, where ſcarce a ſingle fort ought to have been taken. Oſtend and Candia have ſuſtained ſieges of from two to three years continuance. But if fortreſſes are to be ſurrendered to an enemy every three weeks with ſeveral hundred pieces of cannon; if the enemy, in the courſe of a campaign by taking of theſe forts, makes a whole army priſoners; if this is followed by the laying waſte of the ſtate, and the loſs of thouſands of its beſt ſubjects; it may be aſked where is the advantage of ſuch forts? To what end tend the enormous expences for their conſtruction and repairs? Obſtinately to perſiſt in the erecting of them, muſt be followed by the deſtruction of the army and the impoveriſhment of the ſtate, in having furniſhed ſuch uſeleſs expences for its own ſubverſion and deſolation.

It is not here intended to declaim againſt the uſe of forts in general. Forts ſhould be erected, but ſuch only as deſerve that name. A ſingle one ought to be able to ſet limits, during a whole campaign, to the progreſs of the moſt powerful army. This is not ſo difficult as might at firſt be imagined; and it is what we ſhall take upon us to explain, with ſuch perſpicuity as clearly to convince all thoſe whoſe minds are not biaſſed by prejudice, and who poſſeſs the previous knowledge neceſſary to form a right judgment on the ſubject.

But before we proceed, it will be neceſſary to remark that the ſhort time which forts have held out, muſt not always be attributed to their not being well conſtructed; for it is too true, that in ſpite of any errors in this reſpect, which we ſhall examine into more critically, in the ſequel, there are many forts that might have held out much longer, had the perſons to whom their defence was committed had the knowledge and experience neceſſary. To know whether a fort has been well or ill defended, the following circumſtances will decide. Firſt, has the fort been well provided with victuals and ammunition? Was the garriſon ſtrong enough to occupy all the works, or did the number of the garriſon bear no proportion to the extent of the fortreſs? Was the garriſon compoſed of veteran troops inured to the ſervice, who ſupport the fatigues and

hardſhips of a ſiege with unremitting labor? Or was it wholly made up of the worſt of troops, of deſerters? What was the character of the governor? Was he a man whoſe courage grows warm with danger, or one whoſe head and heart fail on the ſmalleſt reverſe of fortune? Were there engineers in the fort who knew how to defend one, or was its defence entruſted to thoſe whoſe *ne plus ultra* was the ſcience of drilling a recruit? To underſtand the art of defending a fortreſs to the laſt extremity, is the only way by which in the preſent age, an officer can immortalize his reputation.

Few officers ever attain to the rank of lieutenant general, and if they ſhould once be ſo fortunate to beat the enemy at ſome favourable moment, the glory of the action ſoon dies away. But the caſe is widely different in underſtanding how to defend well a fortreſs. More knowledge more fortitude, more laſting courage is required in conducting this latter object, than to come off victorious in a ſkirmiſh or even in a general engagement. It is true the firſt arrangement or plan of the battle is the work of the general, but the reſult is that of chance. Excellent as the meaſures may have been which the general has taken, one lucky or unlucky inſtant is often ſufficient either for gaining a victory or for an army's being routed. At a ſiege we are for months with our enemies in view. Every advance which they make is attended with danger and the loſs of their beſt troops. Then only, if they convert the fort into a heap of rubbiſh, if they demoliſh the houſes, if the whole garriſon is buried under the falling materials it is allowed for the enemy to raiſe their ſtandard on the ruins. (*See an account of the ſiege of Elmo in the hiſtory of the knights of Malta.*) It has not without reaſon, therefore, been aſſerted that the colonel of a corps of engineers to whom the defence of a fort is entruſted, may acquire infinitely more glory than a field-marſhal, who has the honour to command under his ſovereign the firſt line in a day of battle, and whoſe name will ſoon ſink into eternal oblivion, whilſt the names of the glorious defenders of Grave, of Mentz, and of Kolberg, will be recorded in military annals to the lateſt poſterity. Perhaps a time will come when ſtatues ſhall be erected to the valiant defenders of a fortreſs, as well as to the field-marſhal, who with the colors in his hand, dies the glorious death of a hero.

I could demonſtrate, remarks general Virgin, by the hiſtory of the eight ſieges at which I was preſent in the years 1745 and 1746, were I diſpoſed to make critical remarks, how ſeldom forts are well defended. The artillery in thoſe towns was neither ſuffi-

ciently covered, nor was it diſtributed in thoſe parts where it could be uſed to moſt advantage. It is true, a briſk fire was, at firſt made upon the beſiegers, but this the enemy ſoon ſilenced, and the entrenchments were afterwards ſuffered to go on with little or no oppoſition. I have myſelf ſeen the ſappers digging in the trenches in broad day-light, without one ſhot being fired on them from the fort, in order to make the men ceaſe working. This made the enemy ſo bold, that they carried on the entrenchments without the leaſt apprehenſion, and with much greater rapidity than they otherwiſe could have done. The aim of the beſiegers was not diſcovered till it was too late to counteract them. The beſieged were ſurpriſed at the breaches that were made, which they did not occupy and therefore defended them badly. Much might be ſaid on the many errors committed by thoſe who had the defence of thoſe places. I touch upon them only to ſhew that the ſudden ſurrender of a fort muſt not always be attributed to the preſent mode of fortifying. It is in vain to expect a fort will hold out to the laſt extremity, however well conſtructed, if thoſe who have the command of it, are not men of ſkill and experience. How can a general who was never before at a ſiege, and aſſiſted by engineers of as little experience as himſelf, defend a fort againſt an artful and able attack? Profound knowledge, and not a little experience, are neceſſary to fill with honor the poſt of commanding officer in a beſieged fort. Such kind of officers are not every where to be met with. To defend a fortreſs well, ſays Cohorn, requires as much ſkill as to erect one. To compenſate as much as poſſible for the want of able men, there ſhould be, in every fort, written inſtructions, explaining how it may be beſt defended. Theſe inſtructions ſhould be drawn up by an able officer, and remain ſealed up till the fort is beſieged. In this manner there would ſtill be much judgment required, to execute the plan that had been laid down; but a man of genius or information would always be able at leaſt to derive from it ſome utility.

The commanding officer of a fort has ſtill further means of acquiring knowledge on the beſt means of defending a place, by reading the accounts of the ſieges it has already ſuſtained, and remarking the mode in which it was formerly attacked. It would be unpardonable in an officer who would not endeavour to acquire ſuch knowledge, eſpecially if thoſe accounts had long been publiſhed to the world. If the governor of Namur, when that city was beſieged in the year 1746, had read the critical remarks of the

marquis de Feuquiere, on the ſiege of that place in 1695, he would ſoon have diſcovered the intention of the beſieger, who made a breach in the horn-work before St. Nicholas's-gate, by which they entered and ſurpriſed the garriſon on that ſide.

At this latter ſiege the very ſame ſtratagem was made uſe of that had been practiſed in a former one. The counterſcarp was ſtormed from the front of the horn-work, and troops were at the ſame time ſent along the Meuſe to a place which joins to the wing of the horn-work. At laſt theſe troops penetrated a breach made by the batteries on this part from the other ſide of the river. By this feint, thoſe who were defending the horn-work were attacked in the flank, and four or five hundred men were thus cut off from the town and made priſoners. The taking of the horn-work ſoon followed by that of the town as a neceſſary conſequence.

Upon the Dutch officers who were taken priſoners being introduced to marſhal Lowendahl, one of them ſaid to him with no ſmall degree of ſimplicity: "We did not think, marſhal, you would have attacked us in that quarter;" to which the general, laughing, replied; "I beg your pardon, gentlemen, for not having given you notice before hand of the ſide on which I meant to attack you."

It is very amazing, that in ſuch an important fortreſs as Namur, which paſſed under the inſpection of Vauban and Cohorn, thoſe weak places on the borders of the Meuſe near St. Nicholas's-gate have not been put into a better ſtate of defence. The front of the horn-work ſhould be ſo conſtructed, that it could not be taken in flank, and this is the more neceſſary, as the fortreſs has been ſeveral times gained by that means.

There are no obſtacles to prevent this being accompliſhed. It would be a work worthy of an able engineer, who poſſeſſes a thorough knowledge both of the art of attacking and that of entrenching fortreſſes. If he did not poſſeſs both theſe, he would never accompliſh the object. With reſpect to the defence of forts, it would be a very inſtructive work, if exact and regular journals were publiſhed in every fortreſs that were beſieged, of all the orders that were given from time to time, and the different manœuvres of the enemy. Thoſe written by Landſberg are excellent in their kind; what makes them ſo valuable, are the critical remarks of that able engineer on the different faults committed in the ſieges at which he was preſent.

This would make us amends for the want of ſufficient information reſpecting any ſingle parts of a good defence, which is to be ſought for in vain, in the writings of engineers. The brilliancy of an attack ſeems to have inſpired them with a kind of enthuſiaſm and their memoranda and preſcriptions on that part of the art of war are abundantly ample. But of the defence of forts, they ſpeak only in general terms, as if a brave defence was not equally meritorious with a ſpirited attack; nay, I will aver it is ſtill more ſo: becauſe it is more honourable to have withſtood a ſuperior power with leſs force, than to contend with equal ſtrength. Beſides juſtice is more frequently on the ſide of him who defends; yet the doctrine of the defence of forts has never been ſo fully laid down, as that of the attack. *Vauban*, in his treatiſe on the attack and defence of fortifications, dwelt very ſuperficiouſly on the latter. To aid the attack, it was he who invented the *ricochet*-ſhots, which are ſo deſtructive to guns of the enemy. But he thought ſo little of the art of defence in forts, that he propoſed no means of obviating the fatal effects of theſe ſhots. Yet theſe means are very ſimple, and conſiſt only in raiſing the outward angles of the works, which would in other reſpects be very uſeful, and in croſs walls at different diſtances on the ramparts of the work.

It is very ſurpriſing that we ſhould have been ſo long expoſed to the deſtructive powers of this artifice; which owed its invention and ſucceſs to the careleſſneſs of engineers in conſtructing their forts, and the ill conſequence of which might have been obviated by the moſt ſimple means. No doubt *Vauban* had his reaſons for not immediatly publiſhing theſe counter-means. Moſt probably he did not like to ſtifle in its birth this invention of the *ricochets* which gave him ſo great a name, and to which he was indebted for having taken ſo many forts. Beſides, he ſet out with this invention at a time when all the firſt heads in France were filled with the ſpirit of conqueſt, it is not therefore, ſo very aſtoniſhing, that he ſhould be ſo reſerved in laying down rules for a defenſive ſyſtem of fortification.

Although our moſt celebrated engineers who have written on the ſcience of fortifications have left no inſtructions as to the beſt means of defending forts, they have not been deficient in laying down a multiplicity of rules for making them as impregnable as poſſible. But unfortunately, ſcarce any two writers agree in their

ſentiments on this ſubject. Each endeavours to convince the public that his ſyſtem of fortification is preferable to that of others. Hence have ariſen literary conteſts to the detriment of the ſcience, which the public has imagined to be founded on no fixed and certain principles. To be enabled to form any judgment in matters of this kind requires a very general knowledge of fortification as a ſcience, aided by long experience in the practical part; that is in having been preſent at the attack as well as at the defence of different fortreſſes. Even to underſtand the very terms uſed in fortification ſome knowledge is neceſſary. It is in vain to attempt to explain to a blind perſon the doctrine of colours; nor can the beſt reaſoning upon any ſubject convince one who has no knowledge of the matter propoſed to him. Neither kings nor their miniſters have the leiſure to examine into the different ſyſtems of fortification. Even generals enter into this examination no further than as it reſpects the defence of the country, and the places moſt proper to be fortified. The arrangement and erection of the works is what they never look into. And if there be ſome whoſe vanity may prompt them, although they never were at any ſiege, to expatiate on the attack and defence of forts, ſuch perſons, if allowed to interfere in theſe matters, only make the evil ſtill worſe. But ſhould they have ever been preſent at the attack or defence of any forts, and thereby acquired practical knowledge and experience in the different manœuvres, they then may be allowed to form ſome opinion on the manner in which they may be beſt conſtructed. Even the advice of an engineer whoſe knowledge is all theory, and who never has been preſent at any ſiege, is little to be depended on.

Speckle and afterwards *Cohorn* mention an anecdote that is well worth relating, which happened at the time of building the fort at Antwerp, during the reign of *Charles* the V. This monarch had ſome very good generals; although they were bad engineers. However, the engineer to whom the erection of the fort was entruſted, found himſelf obliged to ſubmit to their directions, contrary to his own judgment. Of this the Emperor afterwards repented very much, as the remarkable expreſſion he made uſe of at the time ſufficiently teſtifies. The abſurd directions given in conſtructing the fort by thoſe generals, is the cauſe of its weakneſs at this preſent period, and in the year 1746 obliged the garriſon to evacuate it, and confined their ſole exertions to the defence of the citadel.

The reply made by *Charles* V. is given in the 18th page of *Speckle's* Treatiſe on the architecture of Forts, publiſhed at Straſburg in 1619, and, likewiſe, in the introduction to *Cohorn's* new ſyſtem of fortification publiſhed at Weſel in 1706.

It ſeldom or ever therefore happens, that Sovereigns make a wiſe choice in thoſe ſyſtems of fortification they adopt. And nothing but calamities are to be expected from thoſe, who, puffed up with the vain conceit of poſſeſſing the theory of this ſcience, think that alone ſufficient to form their deciſions on whatever may occur. This naturally makes an engineer, however ſkilful and confident in the rules of his art, cautious and circumſpect in contradicting or thwarting the will of his Sovereign, or his Miniſters.

I will not here make any remarks on the cuſtom of free ſtates to examine and deliberate upon the plans of fortification that are laid before them. It muſt be obvious to every one, how inaccurate will be their deciſion, which reſts on the opinions of the Committees they appoint, not one of which are oftentimes engineers, and ſometimes not two thirds of them holding any military office. Deliberations formed on the reſult of ſuch committees muſt neceſſarily, at the beſt, be inaccurate.

It is therefore expedient, for the Sovereigns, as well as for republican governments, that all improvements in fortification ſhould be entruſted to engineers alone of approved experience, zeal, and fidelity. Their honour is too much concerned, and the danger of loſing their employments, ſhould their labours not be crowned with ſucceſs, is alone ſufficient to make them exert themſelves to their utmoſt, in the diſcharge of their duty. But ſhould they not anſwer the public expectation, what matters it whether the ſtate be ill ſerved by their engineers or by others? The former at leaſt are not likely to commit ſuch great errors as the latter, who are without experience, and therefore cannot be called upon to account for their conduct in this reſpect, like the engineers who are moſt unqueſtionably liable to a ſtrict examination.

From what has been laid down, we may draw the following concluſions; firſt, that it is not always the fault of the engineers, that forts are not better defended; nor does it altogether ariſe from a defect in the modern ſyſtem of fortification, and want of ſkill in thoſe who were appointed Governors of the fort. In the ſecond place, the plans to be adopted in erecting any new fortifications do not always depend on the ability and judgment of the engineer, but on

the will and pleaſure of thoſe who are at the head of affairs, who will oftentimes diſmiſs the ableſt and beſt concerted plan.

In theſe two inſtances, the engineers ſtand fully exculpated. But there is another circumſtance in which they juſtly merit cenſure, and that is reſpecting an error of as long ſtanding as the time in which the towers built by our anceſtors were transformed into baſtions.

The invention of cannon and mortars which followed that of powder, made this change indiſpenſably neceſſary, in order to oppoſe to ſuch terrible and inſtantaneous engines of general deſtruction, ſtrong and ſolid bodies which would not only make a powerful reſiſtance, but alſo enable the ſame means to be made uſe of in defending forts, as were employed in getting poſſeſſion of them. This end ſeemed beſt anſwered by the invention of baſtions, and the engineers have been for theſe two centuries continually labouring to bring them to greater perfection. It muſt be admitted, that there were ſufficient reaſons for changing the ancient ſyſtem of fortification, but the inventors of the modern, are cenſured for having overlooked the intentions of our anceſtors, and for neglecting thoſe excellent principles which guided them, and are as eſſential at the preſent inſtant, as they were in former times. It is to this want of a proper application of the principles of our anceſtors, that we may attribute our not being able to repair any breaches made in the principle ramparts, and that our forts are ſo much expoſed to their being taken by ſurpriſe, or by ſcaling ladders; and that though we build works without number, they are frequently ſurrendered before a ſingle ſhot has been fired at them.

Fort St Philip, in the iſland of Minorca, was, notwithſtanding its out-works and mines, taken by aſſault, and what is ſtill more remarkable, this fort was taken, before even the trenches had been opened, as the letter written by Marſhal *Richelieu* to the Spaniſh general *de la Minas* publicly teſtifies. We have beſide, ſtill later inſtances of other forts taken in like manner.

Againſt accidents like theſe, our anceſtors had taken wiſe precautions. The towers they conſtructed, defended the town, not only outwardly, but even when the enemy had already penetrated into it; they could not mount upon the wall and extend themſelves on the ramparts, till they had previouſly taken the towers. It muſt have been by the greateſt chance that the enemy could de-

ſcend from the walls into the town, as the ramparts in moſt towns were likewiſe encircled by a wall of conſiderable height. It was oftentimes more difficult to get over this ſecond wall than upon the outward one. If the enemy had got poſſeſſion of one gate, or by any means had introduced themſelves into the town, they were obliged to commence an attack upon the towers, in order to be entirely maſters of the town, as was the caſe at the ſiege of Stockholm in 1495. At that period of time we were not conſidered as maſters of a town, for having had a polygon in our poſſeſſion.

Ancient hiſtory records many inſtances of ſuch a brave and valiant defence. We will indulge ourſelves in the liberty of adducing one from the annals of Sweden.

In a very ſevere winter, in the year 1496, the Swedes were beſieged by the Ruſſians at Wyburgh, in Finland. Two towers had been converted into a heap of rubbiſh, and a conſiderable breach made even in a third. The Swedes entrenched themſelves behind the breach, which was attacked with the utmoſt fury by between two and three thouſand Ruſſians. At the ſame time, ſcaling ladders were fixed againſt the walls between the towers that had been demoliſhed. The aſſault was carried, and the Ruſſians mounted the ramparts. Not being able to extend themſelves on account of ſome adjoining towers which the Swedes ſtill had in their poſſeſſion, they endeavoured to make their way into the town. As the rampart, however, had a very high wall running round it, the Ruſſians could only deſcend it on the other ſide by ladders, which they in vain attempted to fix. The people in the town, who poſted themſelves at the foot of the rampart, inſtantly pulled them away, and killed the Ruſſians from above, whom this lower and internal wall obliged at laſt to retire from the rampart with conſiderable ſlaughter, after an attack which laſted ſeven hours.

Let us here pauſe to reflect on ſuch an obſtinate and ſpirited defence; as well as on the prudent arrangement of ancient fortification. We cannot deny, that the internal defence of towers, and the high wall on the rampart were the means that enabled the Swedes to make ſo good a reſiſtance, and that ſaved the town, after the enemy had collected all their forces on the ramparts. * Let

* *See the firſt part of the Memoirs of the Academy of Sciences of Sweden on the progreſs of the art of War during the reign of Charles XII. page* 221.

us now apply these ancient systems to our modern ones of fortification. What an obstinate resistance might we not be able to make, if instead of these weak towers, proof against arrows and musketry, we were to erect solid and spacious works, on which cannon might be planted that should command the ramparts? What advantage might we not reap in defending any fortress, if to the simple internal wall at the ramparts we were to add a side defence, with a ditch before it which might besides be defended by about thirty pieces of cannon that were planted unknown to the enemy? Might we not, by a prudent application of these principles in the modern system of fortification, still assert, that it would be practicable to give to the defence of forts, at least a kind of equilibre, perhaps even an overbalance to the present artful and powerful mode of attacking them?

We have therefore acted extremely injudicious in losing sight of the principles of our ancestors, respecting the defence of forts. We should render more justice to those respectable old times, and candidly allow that every art and science would still be in its infancy, did we not make use of the knowledge of our ancestors. It is time alone, that brings all arts and sciences to any tolerable perfection. But if we reject principles founded on reason and experience, this is the sure road to error.

Finally. As the greatest generals of the present century have not been above recurring to the experience of past ages, to improve our tactics;* engineers should act in like manner in order to bring the science of fortification to greater perfection, and not have the loss of entire provinces attributed to their ignorance, which they had before exhausted by the enormous expence of works, and which, after all, have proved scarce of any utility whatsoever.

Reinplern was the first who recalled our attention to the principles of our ancestors. But this able and experienced engineer had, like all great men, the fate of being treated ill and calumniated. Every engineer pronounced his anathema against him. His system was ridiculed as the height of enthusiasm, although he evidently demonstrated that he only wished to bring things back

* *It is true, indeed, that modern tacticians have proposed to adopt different plans from our ancestors, but the most important of their regulations, which we find to be clearly shewn, are now nugatory in that excellent work entitled,* Un Essai sur l'influence de la poudre a canon dans la tactique moderne.

to their ancient principles, and apply them to the preſent defence of forts.

The leading feature in Reinplerns ſyſtem is the internal defence of forts. It is a ſucceſsful application of the ancient principles we have already deſcribed. Reinplern has improved upon them by recommending an internal ditch, which he ſhews in what manner it may be defended; and likewiſe by placing a parapet on the rampart next the town. Conſequently, before the beſiegers can get entire poſſeſſion of the fort, they muſt attack and conquer one polygon after the other. In engagements, either by land or by ſea, we have not always come off conquerors by having defeated one or two battallions, or having taken a ſhip or two of the line. Neither ought the loſs of one or two baſtions to be followed by that of a fort as a neceſſary conſequence, any more than the defeat of a battallion or two, by that of the whole army. Why ſhould ten baſtions ſurrender, one after another, without making the leaſt reſiſtance, becauſe two of them happen to have been taken by the enemy? Is not this ſufficient to ſhew the weakneſs of our forts? Does not this ſufficiently demonſtrate how far we are, in this reſpect, behind-hand with our anceſtors?

Reinplern alſo propoſes, for the internal ſecurity of great forts, fortifying different parts of the town. This thought, however, is by no means new. A plan of this kind is laid down with great minuteneſs in a hiſtory of the Northern ſtates, written above three hundred years ago. The author, after remarking the ſuperior ſkill of our anceſtors in fortifying and intrenching themſelves, as well as in defending their trenches, and diſputing every inch of ground with the enemy; adds, if all the outworks were taken, they then defended themſelves againſt the enemy, by retiring into the town, and barricading the ſtreets and the houſes. Each houſe had but one entrance, and therefore, in caſe of neceſſity, they might be conſidered as ſeparate redoubts.

Speckle, in his Treatiſe on Military Architecture, tells us, that at La Valette, in the iſland of Malta, in the year 1566, the whole town was fortified with towers, which not only defended each other, but alſo the houſes; and that by theſe means it was thought, that an army of fifty thouſand men might be repulſed, even though they ſhould have penetrated into the town.

The reſult would perhaps have leſſened their admiration of this new ſyſtem of fortification, had they not deviſed means to pre-

vent the enemy's forming themſelves on the rampart, which would, in the end, have enſured them the entire poſſeſſion of the place. But if they had connected the towers they had erected in different parts of the town, with the internal wall of the ramparts, ſo that they both commanded the ſtreets, and gave a ſide defence to the internal wall, the intention would then have been completed of having given the town an internal defence, and La Valette would have been the ſtrongeſt fort in Europe. It is a very humiliating remark to make, in favour of the human underſtanding, that the mind often perceives a truth which it inſtantly loſes, and does not recover again till after it has made many circuitous paths.

From all theſe conſiderations it is evident, that Reinpler's plan of fortifying the different quarters of a town was not unknown to our anceſtors; nor was that of his internal ditch, which, according to De Ville in p. 133 of his work, had been propoſed by an engineer, when Leghorn was fortified, with this difference however, that no parapet was placed on the ſide of the town. It was intended to place this parapet on the oppoſite ſide of the ditch, which would have increaſed the works unneceſſarily; a proof how difficult it is, ſometimes, to perceive the truth, even when it is before our eyes.

AN EULOGIUM, SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF THE LATE MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN, WHO FELL *June* 17*th*, AT THE BATTLE OF BREED'S-HILL.

WHEN an amiable man with a promiſing family of children periſhes in the bloom of life, every friend to humanity muſt ſhare in the diſtreſs which ſuch a calamity occaſions in the circle of his acquaintances. This diſtreſs is heightened when we hear that the virtues of the man were blended with the exalted qualities of the patriot. We riſe in our expreſſions of grief, when we are told that he poſſeſſed not only the zeal of a patriot, but the wiſdom, the integrity and eloquence of a ſenator:—But, when we hear that thoſe ſhining qualities were crowned with the patience, the magnanimity, and the intrepidity of a warrior, we are led to contemplate one of the moſt auguſt characters in human nature. When ſuch a

man falls, grief is dumb—and eloquence is obliged, for a while, to muſe eulogiums which it cannot expreſs.

Such were our feelings upon hearing of the death of the illuſtrious General Warren, who fell on the 17th of June at the head of a detachment of the American army near Boſton. It is impoſſible to do juſtice to his full-orbed character. He filled each of the numerous departments in life that were aſſigned to him ſo well, that he ſeemed born for no other. He had diſplayed in the courſe of three and thirty years all the talents and virtues of the man, the patriot, the ſenator, and the hero. He was unlike the Spartan General only, in not expiring in the arms of victory. But even in this unfortunate event he has ſerved his country, for he has taught the ſons of freedom in America, that the laurel may be engrafted upon the cypreſs, and that true glory may be acquired not only in the arms of victory, but in the arms of death.

If our pleaſures are exalted in proportion to the extent and degrees of our benevolence, how ſhall we decide thoſe pleaſures which the hero feels who performs the higheſt act of benevolence to mankind, in dying in defence of the liberties of his country. He enjoys a prelibation the moſt like the joys of heaven that mortals can taſte upon earth. He partakes of the nature and happineſs of God.

Say illuſtrious ſhade! What new reſentments kindled in thy boſom at the proſpect of executing vengeance upon the foes of liberty?—Say, what were the tranſports of thy mind when the twice repulſed enemy fled before thy powerful arms?—But when, alas! born down with numbers, thou waſt forced to retreat, and death ſhewed his commiſſion to the ball that pierced thy boſom. Oh! ſay, what joy thrilled after it, at the proſpect of having thy brows encircled with the patriots crown of martyrdom?—Tell me ye brave Americans who beheld our hero fall.—Did he not in his laſt moments pour forth his uſual expreſſions of loyalty to the crown of Britain, and his wonted prayers for the welfare of his country? Did he not in flattering accents call upon his fellow ſoldiers to forget his death, and to revenge his country's wrongs alone?—Oh! he breathes his laſt?—Croud not too cloſely on his ſhade ye holy miniſters of heaven. Make room for yonder ſpirit. It is the illuſtrious Hampden who flies to embrace him, and pointing to the wound that deprived him of life, in a conflict with arbitrary power above a hundred years ago, he claims the honour of conducting him to the regions of perfect liberty and happineſs.

How ineffable are the delights of heaven to a virtuous lover of liberty? To behold the power of the ſovereign of the univerſe, directed by unerring wiſdom, and limited by the eternal laws of juſtice!—To ſee perfection in government, conſiſting in the happineſs of every member that compoſes it! To enjoy the moſt perfect freedom, and yet to chuſe nothing but ſuch things as are agreeable to the will of the Supreme Being. Theſe, bleſſed ſhade, ſhall now conſtitute a part of thy enjoyments. Oh! couldſt thou tell us what other pleaſures now occupy thy capacious mind! Doeſt thou ſtill direct by an inviſible influence the councils of thy native colony? Doeſt thou ſtill inſpire whole battallions of thy countrymen with courage, and lead them on to danger and glory?—Theſe we know would be a happineſs ſuited to the benevolence and activity of thy ſpirit, and we hope not an inferior part of the happineſs of heaven. But it is not for mortals to pry too minutely into the ſecrets of the inviſible world.

What a noble ſpectacle is the body of a hero who has offered up his life as a ranſom for his country! Come hither ye vindictive miniſters, and behold the firſt fruits of your bloody edicts. What atonement can you make to his children for the loſs of ſuch a father? And to your country for the loſs of ſuch a member of ſociety? You may now recall your military executioners. There you may ſatiate your luſt for arbitrary power; you have ſlain its moſt implacable enemy.

Come hither ye mercenary wretches who are hired to commit murder upon your fellow-ſubjects, and behold the victim of your cruelty. You have no tears to ſhed over a brother whom you have butchered, for you have given up your title to humanity. You have ceaſed to be men, and we have nothing to expect from you but the vices of ſlaves. We only beſeech you not to inſult the body of our departed hero. Spare the anguiſh of an aged mother, whoſe affection extends to the corps of her beloved ſon. You have nothing now to fear from his eloquence or his arms. Sheath your ſwords. You have performed an exploit which has filled up the meaſure of your infamy, and while the name of liberty is dear to Americans, the name of *Warren* will fire our hearts, and nerve our arm againſt the execrable miſchief of ſtanding armies.

Come hither ye military champions for American liberty and glory, come and behold a ſpectacle that ſhall rouſe in your boſoms new principles of courage and ambition. Mark! the widening luſtre of that path of glory which he trod.

Come hither American fathers and mothers, and behold the ſad earneſts of arbitrary power, behold your friend, your fellow-citizen, one of the guardians of your liberty, the pride of your country, the pillar of your hopes, behold this hero covered with blood and wounds. But pauſe not too long in bedewing his body with your tears. Fly to your houſes, and tell your children the particulars of the melancholy ſight. Chill their young blood with hiſtories of the cruelty of tyrants, and make their hair to ſtand on end, with deſcriptions of the horrors of ſlavery, equip them immediately for the field, ſhew them the ancient charter of their privileges. Point to the roofs under which they drew their firſt breath and ſhew them the cradles in which they were rocked. Call upon heaven to proſper their arms, and charge them, with your laſt adieu, to conquer, or, like *Warren*, to die in the arms of liberty and glory.

American War.

[*Continued from page* 13.]

AFTER the battle of Breeds-hill, which did not laſt above an hour, and which, on account of the ſmall number of troops engaged, the great numbers killed, and the bravery ſhewn on both ſides, belongs to the moſt extraordinary in the hiſtory of wars, the colonies caſt their eyes on the province of Canada. Surrounded by rivers and lakes, and ſtretching from Nova Scotia in an oblong direction, almoſt to the ſouthern extremity of Pennſylvania, it was conveniently ſituated for hoſtile invaſion; and would, if reduced, prove a moſt important acquiſition.

Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the former ſituated at the north end of Lake George, and the latter near the ſouthern extremity of Lake Champlain, form the gates of that quarter of Canada. Theſe poſts had already been ſecured in the following manner. A number of volunteers in Connecticut planned the ſcheme for obtaining poſſeſſion of theſe valuable poſts. Having made the neceſſary preparations, and collected 270 men, chiefly of that brave and hardy people, called green mountain boys, they rendeſvouzed at Caſtleton, where they were joined by Colonel Arnold from Cambridge. Having arrived at Lake Champlain oppoſite Ticonderoga, in the night, Colonel Arnold and Allen, with 83 men, croſſed over at the dawn of day, entered the fort without reſiſtance, and called upon the commander, who was yet in bed, to ſurrender the fort.

He aſked by what authority? Colonel Allen replied, I demand it in the name of the Great Jehovah, and of the Continental Congreſs. Thus the fort was captured with its valuable ſtores and forty-three priſoners. Crown Point was taken at the ſame time by Colonel Seth Warner, and, Colonel Arnold got by ſurpriſe poſſeſſion of a ſloop of war, lying at St. John's, at the northern extremity of the Lake. In this rapid manner the command of Lake Champlain was obtained without any loſs, by a few determined men.

The exertions of the King's governor in Canada, which were principally made with a view to recover Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and the command of Lake Champlain, induced Congreſs to believe that a formidable invaſion of their north weſtern frontier was intended from that quarter. They were ſenſible that the only practicable plan for warding off ſo terrible a blow, was to make a vigorous attack upon Canada, while it was unable to reſiſt the unexpected impreſſion.

Congreſs had committed the management of their military arrangements in this northern department to General Schuyler and General Montgomery. The Americans, about one thouſand in number, effected a landing at St. John's; which, being the firſt Britiſh poſt in Canada, lies only 115 miles to the northward of Ticonderoga. The Britiſh piquets being driven into the fort, they reconnoitred the environs, and found the fortifications to be much ſtronger than they ſuſpected. This induced the calling of a council of war, which recommended a retreat to Iſle aux Noix, twelve miles ſouth of St. John's, to throw a boom acroſs the channel, and to erect works for its defence. General Schuyler, on account of his bad ſtate of health, retired ſoon after this event to Ticonderoga, and the command devolved on General Montgomery.

This enterpriſing officer in a few days returned to the vicinity of St. John's, and opened a battery againſt it. He alſo detached a ſmall body of troops, to attempt the reduction of Fort Chamblee, only ſix miles diſtant. Succeſs attended this enterpriſe. By its ſurrender ſix tons of gunpowder fell into the hands of the conquerors, which enabled them to proſecute the ſiege of St. John's with vigor. The garriſon, though ſtraitened for proviſions, perſevered in defending themſelves with unabating fortitude. The governor of the province, with about 800 men, chiefly militia and Indians, endeavoured to croſs the river St. Lawrence, and to land at Longueil, intending to proceed thence to attack the beſiegers, but Colonel Warner with 300 green mountain boys, and a four pounder,

prevented the execution of the deſign. The governor's party was ſuffered to come near the ſhore, but was then fired upon with ſuch effect, as to make them retire with great loſs.

After this the garriſon of St. John's ſurrendered. About 500 regulars and 100 Canadians became priſoners to the provincials. They alſo acquired 39 pieces of cannon, ſeven mortars, two howitzers, and about 800 ſtand of arms.

While the ſiege of St. John's was pending, Colonel Allen, who was returning with about 80 men from a tour on which he had been ſent by his General, was captured by the Britiſh near Montreal, loaded with irons, and in that condition ſent to England.

General Montgomery now proceeded towards Montreal. The few Britiſh forces there, unable to ſtand their ground, repaired for ſafety on board the ſhipping in hopes of eſcaping down the river; but they were prevented by Colonel Eaſton, who was ſtationed at the point of Sorel river with a body of continental troops, ſome cannon, and an armed gondola. General Preſcot, who was on board, with ſeveral officers and about 120 privates, having no chance of eſcaping, ſubmitted to be made priſoners on terms of capitulation. Eleven ſail of veſſels, full of ammunition, proviſions, and intrenching tools, fell into the hands of the provincials. Governor Carleton eſcaped in a boat with muffled paddles, by a ſecret way, to the Three Rivers, and arrived in a few days after at Quebec.

General Montgomery, after leaving ſome troops in Montreal, and ſending detachments into different parts of the province, advanced towards Quebec, where his little army arrived with expedition. Nothing could damp the ardour of the Americans. Notwithſtanding the depth of winter was at hand, Colonel Arnold formed a deſign of penetrating with a detachment of one thouſand men, through woods, marſhes, and the moſt frightful deſarts, from the camp of Cambridge to Canada, by a nearer way than that which Montgomery had choſen; and this he accompliſhed, in ſpite of every difficulty, to the aſtoniſhment of all who ſaw or heard of the attempt. In aſcending the river Kennebeck, the troops were conſtantly obliged to labour againſt an impetuous current. They were often compelled by cataracts or other impediments to land and to haul their batteaux up rapid ſtreams, and over falls of rivers. On their march by land, they had deep ſwamps, thick woods, and craggy precipices alternatively to encounter. At ſome places they had to cut their way for miles to-

gether, through forefts fo embarraffed, that their progrefs was only four or five miles a day. Inceffant fatigue, and the want of provifions, caufed many men to fall ficK. From this caufe, one third of the number which fet out were obliged to return; the reft proceeded with unabated fortitude and conftancy. Having fpent thirty one days in traverfing a hideous wilderneft, without ever feeing any thing human, they at length reached the inhabited parts of Canada.

Arnold arrived at Point Levy, oppofite to Quebec, before Montgomery left Montreal. Such was the conftternation of the garrifon and inhabitants at this unexpected appearance, that had not the river intervened, an immediate attack in the firft furprife and confufion, might have been fuccefsful. The bold enterprife of one American army marching through the wilderneft, at a time when fuccefs was crowning every undertaking of another invading in a different direction, ftruck terror into the breafts of thofe Canadians who were unfriendly to the defigns of Congrefs. In a few days, after Arnold had arrived at Point Levy, he croffed the river St. Lawrence; but his chance of fucceeding by a *coup de main* was in that fhort fpace greatly diminifhed. The critical moment was paft. The panic occafioned by his firft appearance had abated, and folid preparations for the defence of the town were adopted. At the time the Americans were before Montreal, General Carleton, as has been related, efcaped through their hands, and got fafe to Quebec. His prefence was itfelf a garrifon. The inhabitants, both Englifh and Canadians, as foon as danger preffed, united for their common defence. The failors were taken from the fhipping in the harbour, and put to the batteries on fhore. As Colonel Arnold had no artillery, after parading fome days on the heights near Quebec, he drew off his troops, intending nothing more, until the arrival of Montgomery, than to cut off fupplies from entering the garrifon.

On the firft of December General Montgomery effected a junction with Colonel Arnold at Point aux Trembles.

The fiege of Quebec was then commenced; but it may firft be neceffary to give a fhort defcription of the town, in order to convey a better idea how it was attacked, and how defended. That part of it which is called the Lower Town, is feparated from the Upper, by an inacceffible precipice, in the centre of which is a narrow road, cut out of the rock that leads to the Higher Town. The diftance at this place to the edge of the river, is fomewhat better than one hundred yards; from thence to the extreme ends, the rock grows gradually narrower, till the precipice admits only of one row of houfes below it.

The Lower Town forms nearly the figure of a half moon; this is, likewiſe, the ſhape of the Higher Town, with regular baſtions and curtains facing the country, running acroſs from the precipice on one ſide to the precipice on the other, from (*a* to *f*. See Plan No. II.) No place can be better ſituated for a defence. There are three gates out of the Upper Town. St. Lewis gate, marked (*fig.* 1.) St. John's gate (*l*) and Palace gate (*m*), all built with ſtone and brick. Between the Upper and Lower Town is a ſtockaded gate.

In the Lower Town, the merchants chiefly live, and have their ware houſes, ſhops, &c. for the convenience of receiving goods from the ſhips. In it alſo is a *Cul du Sac*, *(fig.* 3.*)* where the ſhipping winter with ſafety from the ice. Directly facing this, on the ſouth ſhore of the river St. Lawrence, at the diſtance of nearly one Engliſh mile, is Point Levy, on which Gen. Monkton the preceding war had his batteries, and from whence he almoſt deſtroyed the Lower Town. Here the Americans, in the courſe of the ſiege, (April 4.) brought four pieces of cannon, which did but little damage to the ſhipping. and none to the town, their guns being only 12 pounders. About half a mile to the northward is the river St. Charles, where is an old French work, called St. Roche.

General Montgomery, upon his arrival before Quebec, found, that this place was not to be taken by raiſing batteries ; however, to intimidate the French inhabitants and merchants, he began by opening a ſmall battery of five ſix pounders and one howitzer, within ſeven hundred yards of St. John's gate. At the ſame time, he wrote a letter to the Britiſh governor, recommending an immediate ſurrender, to prevent the dreadful conſequences of a ſtorm : but the inflexible firmneſs of the governor could not be moved either by threats or dangers.

The garriſon of Quebec at this time conſiſted of about 1320 men, of which 800 were militia. The American army were not above 800 ſtrong. Some had been left at Montreal, and near a third of Arnold's detachment, as has been related, had returned to Cambridge. This force was too inſignificant to attempt the reduction of a place ſo ſtrongly fortified. General Montgomery, however, from a native intrepidity and an ardent thirſt for glory, overlooked all dangers, and reſolved at once either to carry the place or periſh in the attempt. Truſting much to his good fortune, confiding in the bravery of his troops, and depending ſomewhat on the extenſiveneſs of the works, he determined to attempt the

town by assault. He held his men in constant readiness, to take the advantage of the first bad night; hoping then to find the garrison off their guard. Arnold, who commanded about 350 men, was to enter the Lower Town, at the north end, called the *Saut du Matelot*, (pretty near to *z*.) and Montgomery was to attack and enter at the south end, just under the precipice called Cape Diamond. (*a*) At length the night of the 31st of December presented them with the wished for occasion; it was very dark, and there was a great fall of snow. Gen. Montgomery then made his disposition, which consisted of four different divisions; two inconsiderable ones, to make a false attack on the bastions, facing the country from (*b* to *e*) and two real ones, on the Lower Town. He had ordered rockets to be thrown up by Arnold's party and his own, to let each other see, from time to time, how far the parties were advanced. This was undoubtedly what they might have wished to know, yet the distance from their head quarters, was not so great but each division might have ascertained what time it would take to get to the different barriers. The lights that were thrown up, naturally gave the alarm; the bell was rung, and most of the garrison ran to their posts.

About four in the morning, Col. Arnold, at the head of his party, approached the bars at Saut du Matelot on the north. He attacked a two-gun battery, and carried it, but with considerable loss. In this attack Arnold was shot through the leg, which made it necessary to carry him off the field of battle. His party, nevertheless, pushed on. Some part of the way they were under shelter from the fire, by a row of houses, but passing some openings, several of the Americans were killed and wounded from the piquets above. They, however, passed these intervals, with their scaling ladders on their shoulders, with spirit and perseverance. They made themselves masters of a second barrier, and sustained the force of the whole garrison for three hours; but at last, finding themselves hemmed in, and without hopes either of success or relief, they yielded to numbers, and the advantageous situation of their adversaries.

It is generally thought, that wounding Arnold in the beginning of this affair, was the saving of the Lower Town. He certainly had arranged matters in his own mind previous to the attack; determining what to have done, in case he found things in such or such a state. He knew the town perfectly, which, perhaps, his successor in command did not.

A
B
C
G
2
4
ER S.t CHARLES
CAPE DIAMANT
RIVER S.t LAURENCE
A Cape Diamond
B The Glacieme
C S.t Lewis
D S.t Ursula
E S.t John
F The Potaſse
G Redoubt of Cape Diamond
H Royal Redoubt and Barracks
I Dauphineſs's Redoubt and Barracks
K Jesuits Church
L S.t Johns Gate
M Palace
N Fort S.t Lewis and Governors House
O New Gun Battery
P Great Battery
Q Cathedral
Point Levi
R
S
T
H
V
W
X
Y
Y of
EC
ct

St. Roch
RIVER St. CHARLES
CAPE DIAMANT
RIVER St. LAURENCE
Point Levi
A Cape Diamond
B The Glacieve
C St. Lewis
D St. Ursula
E St. John
F The Potaſse
G Redoubt of Cape Diamond
H Royal Redoubt and Barracks
I Dauphineſs's Redoubt and Barracks
K Jesuits Church
L St. Johns Gate
M Palace
N Fort St. Lewis and Governors House
O Nine Gun Battery
P Great Battery
Q Cathedral
R Seminary
S Jesuits College
T Recollects
U Parade
V Market Place
W Market Place in the lower Town
X Ursulines
Y Hotel Dieu
Z Intendants Palace
1 St. Lewis Gate
2 Intrenchments along St. Charles River
3 Cul de Sac
4 The Kings Yard
5 Narrow Entrance into the Lower Town
MAP of the CITY of QUEBEC
Scale of 2000 Feet
500
1000
2000

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Roberts fc.

General Montgomery, in the mean time, attacked the other end of the Lower Town, (*a*, in the Plan, or 5 *birds* in the view). He paſſed the firſt barrier, and was juſt opening to attack the ſecond, when he was killed, together with his aid-du-camp. At this barrier were ſeven ſmall pieces of cannon, all pointed to defend the paſs, below the precipice, the only place where it was poſſible for the Americans to approach. As ſoon as the centries gave intelligence of the lights in the air, all the men ſtood to their guns. The river not being frozen over, the narrowneſs of this paſs, from the rocks on one ſide, and the river on the other, admitted only of four or five men to advance in front, (See *fig.* 4. in the Plan.) Montgomery was at their head, and the heavy fall of ſnow and darkneſs prevented their being perceived by their enemies till they came within a few yards of them. They were then fired upon with cannon and muſketry at the ſame inſtant. Montgomery's fall ſo diſpirited the men, that Col. Campbell, on whom the command devolved, thought proper to draw them off.

The loſs of the Americans in killed and wounded, in the different attacks, was about one hundred, and three hundred were taken priſoners. The garriſon had only five killed and thirteen wounded. Few men have ever fallen in battle, ſo much regretted by both ſides, as General Montgomery. This amiable qualities had procured him an uncommon ſhare of private affection; and his great abilities, an equal proportion of public eſteem.

The iſſue of this aſſault relieved the garriſon of Quebec from all apprehenſions for its ſafety. The provincials were ſo much weakened, as to be ſcarcely equal to their own defence. However, Colonel Arnold encamped within three miles of the town; and, difficult as his ſituation was, impeded the conveyance of refreſhments and proviſions into the garriſon. The ſufferings of his troops were great; they were expoſed in the open air to the extreme rigour of the ſeaſon.

On the 23d of April, the Americans raiſed a battery on the heights oppoſite the gate of St. Lewis, but it was ſoon ſilenced by the beſieged. An attempt to burn the Lower Town and the ſhipping was made on the 3d of May by the beſiegers. Their plan was well conceived. They had prepared a fire ſhip, charged with combuſtibles proper for the occaſion. About ten in the evening, ſhe ſtood in for the *Cul du Sac*, and was hailed at the diſtance of about one hundred yards. The men on board very imprudently

made no anſwer ; had they replied from England or Halifax, they would have come in unmoleſted. Their ſilence made them ſuſpected, and a ſhot was fired to bring them to. The three men who had charge of the veſſel, then thought it high time to eſcape ; they ſlipped into a boat they had along ſide, after lighting the match, and made the beſt of their way back to the other ſhore. They had ſet off with the ſhip rather too late for the tide ; had it flowed five minutes longer, the light wind, and the flood would have brought her ſtraight to the *Cul du Sac*, and into the midſt of the ſhipping, which would inſtantly have been in flame, and that muſt inevitably have communicated to part of the Lower Town. She was driven down the ſtream to the Iſle of Orleans, where ſhe conſumed to the water's edge.

The morning of the 6th of May the van of the long expected reinforcement from England arrived before Quebec. They made good their paſſage through the ice up the river St. Lawrence. The expectation of their coming had for ſome time induced the beſiegers to think of a retreat, which now was carried into execution with great precipitation.

(To be Continued.)

DIRECTIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF PONTON-BRIDGES,

Addreſſed to thoſe who wiſh to acquire ſome general knowledge on this ſubject.

[*By an Officer in the Pruſſian Artillery.*]

THOUGH the conſtruction of bridges, the putting them together and taking them to pieces does not abſolutely belong to the department of engineers, yet, as it has been the cuſtom in the different European armies that the artillery ſhould conſtruct the pontons, take care of every thing belonging to them, and carry them along with them, it may not be amiſs to point out what an artillery and every other officer ought to know reſpecting them.

The pontons are of different materials : of copper, tin, leather or ſail cloth ; and are carried with the army in carts or waggons, in order to be ready at hand if there ſhould be any rivers to paſs. They are made with flat bottoms, and the bottoms with ſeparations in the length, each ſix inches from one another ; that if there ſhould be a hole, and the water penetrate the ponton, it may not ſink and go to the bottom.

The pontons are carried reverſed, that they might not be filled with water if it ſhould rain; and that in caſe of neceſſity, the men might lie dry under them. They may alſo be uſed to cover the ammunition and other things.

Thoſe made of copper and block tin are the moſt in requeſt; the other two ſorts being more remarkable for their ſingularity than utility, they being neither ſo durable nor ſo eaſily carried.

The French, and ſome other nations, have them made of copper, and carry them on waggons; but in the Pruſſian and Dutch armies they are made of block tin; in the latter carried in carts. They were formerly carried in carts in the Pruſſian army, but at preſent in waggons, the fore-wheels of which are like thoſe of a carriage, that by turning about the wheels may go underneath.

This ſpecies of boat bridges, made of block tin, became known to the Pruſſians through the Dutch, whom they copied after in this particular. They are not approved by many perſons, both on account of the materials from which they are made, and the mode of carrying them, from which ariſe many inconveniences.*

Diſadvantage of Boat-Bridges made of Tin.

1. Block tin is not durable, and very liable to be ruſty, by which it is eaten through and full of holes; while, on the contrary, copper is more laſting, and does not ruſt ſo ſoon.†

2. If any ponton is damaged, it cannot be applied to any other purpoſe; on the contrary, in thoſe of copper, nothing is loſt but the ſhape.

3. There muſt be perſons conſtantly employed; ſuch as tinmen, to keep them in proper order.

4. As theſe pontons are carried on carts, which are more likely to overturn than waggons, they are ſooner damaged than thoſe of copper.

5. That carts are more liable to break down, particularly in going down hill, when the whole weight lies on the ſhaft-horſe, by which every thing is rendered unſerviceable.

6. That pontons are much eaſier carried on waggons, where the weight reſts on two axles, and where more ſpace is allotted for the whole carriage.

* Every one knows the many wars in which the Pruſſians have been engaged, yet they never made uſe of any other pontons but thoſe made of tin, and have made good and durable bridges over the largeſt rivers without any accident ever happening, even when the bridges have been ſome weeks in the water.

† As the pontons are painted over ſeveral times in oil colours, the tin will reſiſt the ruſt as long as the paint adheres to it; beſides, it is ſtrongly ſodered, which is, likewiſe, a preſervative againſt ruſt. Editor.

Advantages which Boat-Bridges of Tin have over thoſe of Copper.

Thoſe of Copper, on the contrary, are:

1. Much more expenſive than thoſe of tin.

2. Their weight is likewiſe much greater—therefore,

3. They cannot carry ſo many of them.

4. If theſe pontons are loſt, the loſs is much more than if they were made only of tin.

As pontons of tin, beſides other advantages, are much more commodious and better calculated for carrying heavy loads, which is what they are particularly deſigned for, and which is confirmed by experience; the abovementioned diſadvantages, except as far as relates to the carriage, are not of any great moment, and we have only to look out in what manner they may be beſt tranſported.

How bridges are made over rivers and marſhy ground, is known from the uſual practice: It will not be amiſs, however, to mention what is to be particularly obſerved in placing them.

Precautions to be obſerved in making a Ponton Bridge.

1. Boat bridges muſt not be made in thoſe parts of a river where the current is moſt rapid.

2. Such place, likewiſe, muſt be avoided where the river is very broad, or very deep; as in the firſt inſtance more pontons are requiſite, and in the other, the uſual length of the cable work for the anchors, will not be ſufficient.

3. Such places muſt be choſen where the ſhore is flat, and where trees may alſo be found to which the ropes may be faſtened that hold the bridge, otherwiſe ſtakes muſt be driven into the ground for that purpoſe, which often give way, by which means the bridge is looſened and unſafe.

4. The boats muſt not be too near each other, that the water may paſs eaſily between them without any obſtruction; and likewiſe if the enemy ſhould ſend down trunks of trees, pieces of timber, or other things to break and force away the bridge, that we may be able, by long poles or oars, to direct them ſo that they may paſs between the boats without any damage or inconvenience.

5. At both ends of the bridge, and alſo at ſome little diſtance centinels ſhould be placed to give notice if any parties of the enemy ſhould make their appearance, or if they ſhould attempt to put the abovementioned manœuvres in execution, or even to ſend

combuſtibles down the river in order to ſet the bridge or the cable work on fire; and of which they muſt inſtantly inform their officers, who muſt immediately take all poſſible precautions to prevent the enemy from obſtructing their plans.

6. In order to ſecure bridges properly, half and whole redoubts ſhould be thrown up, that the troops who are to defend the paſſage of the bridge, may, by being ſheltered behind them, be better able to reſiſt the attacks of an enemy, and defend the bridge, and theſe redoubts will be the more formidable if they are occupied by cannon. The back redoubt on the oppoſite ſhore is made, that if the troops who cover the bridge are obliged to retire on account of the ſuperiority of the enemy, they may poſt themſelves againſt it, for which reaſon the firſt intrenchment ſhould conſiſt of half redoubts only, that in caſe of a retreat no place of ſhelter may be left for the enemy.

7. During the retreat, we muſt take away the boats as quick as poſſible from the three or four pontons next the ſhore, and carry them with the pontons to the oppoſite ſide. We ſhould likewiſe take off the boards from the middle of the bridge, to ſtop the enemy, if the flatneſs of the ſhore ſhould enable them to get footing on the bridge while they are in purſuit.

The boards being thrown off, are to be heaped up before the opening, behind which as many men from the piquet are to be placed as the ſpace will admit, in order to fire at the enemy and defend the bridge, whilſt the others retreat to the back redoubt, and endeavour to force the enemy to retire by keeping up an inceſſant firing.

As, in general, no time is to be loſt in a retreat of this ſort, it would be dangerous, and take up too much time to diſengage one ponton after another, and carry them away; the beſt method is, as ſoon as the boards and timbers at the extremity of the bridge are taken off, to untie the ropes which faſten the bridge on that ſide of the river where the enemy is approaching, and to pull up all the anchors on the oppoſite ſide of the bridge, and let it drive round, as it remains, to the other ſide.

Alſo, in conſtructing the bridge, we may make uſe of this advantage, by putting it together on the ſide where we are, and then puſhing it from the ſhore, let it drive round of itſelf to the oppoſite ſide, where it muſt be inſtantly made faſt by letting go the anchors. This will enable us to work at it with more ſafety and expedition, and without being diſcovered.

Manner in which Bridges are conſtructed.

Firſt of all, if trees are not to be found on the banks of thoſe rivers where we have occaſion to throw over a bridge, we muſt drive into the ground obliquely towards the water, four ſtrong poſts at the diſtance of 20 or 21 feet according to the length of the ponton, in order to faſten the ropes to them, which are to go acroſs the river.

The pontons muſt then be taken down from the carts by ten or twelve men, and placed in between the two ropes that go acroſs the river one after another. They are put between them croſs-ways, at a proper diſtance, and parallel to each other, and then faſtened by their four rings to the principal rope that goes acroſs the river.

Formerly it was uſual to draw the principal rope that goes acroſs the river through the rings which are faſtened to the pontons, and not tie the rings to the rope, but the above method is preferable, becauſe if a ponton is damaged, it may be removed, and another put in its place, without being obliged to remove all the reſt, and looſen the whole bridge; beſides, the pontons by the method now adopted, cannot move out of their place, and get all together, when they are ſhook by the ſtream, or by any heavy weight.

The diſtance of the pontons from each other varies partly on account of the current, which, being more or leſs rapid, gives a proportionable motion to the bridge, and partly from the intention with which it is conſtructed, whether as a paſſage for infantry, cavalry or artillery.

For infantry and light baggage, and likewiſe for cavalry if diſmounted, the pontons may be ſix feet apart; but if the cavalry does not diſmount, and heavy baggage or heavy artillery is to be tranſported, the pontons muſt be only as far diſtant from each other, as they are wide, which is four feet.

When the pontons are properly arranged, according to the weight that is to be carried over, aud faſtened to the principal cable that goes acroſs, the anchors muſt then be let down in the following manner: we either take a ponton on purpoſe for this buſineſs, or that which is the laſt placed on the bridge, and putting the anchors with their cables into it, puſh off with them to a proper diſtance from the ſhore, and then throw out the anchor oppoſite to that ponton to which we intend to faſten it, we then row to the ponton, and faſten the cable to the ring, and continue in the ſame manner with the other pontons.

But if the ſtream is not deep or very rapid, we then make one anchor ſerve for two pontons which is faſtened to the middle of the rope, and both the ends are then faſtened to each of the pontons, in order to keep them ſteadier, and this muſt be done on both ſides of the bridge. In faſtening them to the anchor ropes, the pontons may be drawn in a ſtraight line, if there is a man on ſhore to direct them.

Afterwards the timbers are placed along over the pontons, and properly faſtened through their holes, and placed at a proper diſtance from each other. Each timber reaches over two pontons, and touches at its extremity the band of the third.

The number of timbers to be placed in a row with each other depends upon the width of the burden which the bridge has to ſupport, and ſometimes ſix, and even eight, or perhaps fewer, are placed along ſide each other. In order to get theſe timbers from one ponton to another, long boards are made uſe of.

When the timbers are properly placed and linked together like a chain, then the boards are laid over them, and ſecured at both ends with long boards placed lengthways and faſtened down with a few nails, that the boards which cover the timbers, and are placed croſs-ways, may not be moved out of their place by the horſes or waggons going over them; this, however, is not always done, as it is a great hindrance in removing the bridge.

To cover the bridge with earth might not be amiſs, as it would prevent the boards from being injured by the horſes feet, but as it makes the bridge ſo much heavier it is generally omitted.

Bridges of large boats or barges.

If the pontons which the army carries with them are not ſufficient, or if ſeveral bridges are to be conſtructed, and we can procure large boats or barges, the bridges may be made likewiſe with them; and for bearing heavy loads they are far better than the pontons. Anchors, cables, timbers and boards are equally neceſſary for theſe, and what we have not with us, muſt be procured from the place where the army is.

If the boats cannot be brought with ſafety by water to the ſpot where the bridge is to be erected, they muſt be carried by land on waggons.

The ſame methods are to be uſed in building bridges of large boats or barges, as if they were built of pontons, with this difference only, that if the timbers are very ſtrong they may be placed ten or twelve feet apart, and that half the number of large boats will ſuffice, and yet the bridge will be both firmer and ſtronger.

A LETTER, *on the concluſion of Monſieur l'Abbé Carlier's Work, which gained the Prize of the Royal Academy of Antiquarians at Paris; to Mr. Rey, publiſher of the Journal des Savans, at Amſterdam, July* 25, 1781.

Sir,

IN your journal of this month, page 288, a learned Abbé ſays, the ancients knew America; and, that from the little the ancient authors have left us on the long voyages of the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Marſeillois, and Vannois, there is no doubt of their intercourſe with the Americans; and likewiſe, that Julius Cæſar intended to reform the Roman Navy on the Rhodian and Vannois plan.

Though I believe eaſily in hiſtory, when it has an air of truth, yet I cannot but look on theſe aſſertions as ſtrange hypotheſes; they appear the more ſo, as the moſt experienced ſea-faring gentlemen can give no probable conjecture on ſuch matters, not even how the ancients worked their ſhips, nor the manner of managing the number of oars on their ſhips of war.

But, Sir, as I have ſome practice in the nautic arts, and know moſt of the methods for working ſhips in the known world, and what has been done for ſhortening voyages to the Eaſt Indies, and the weſtern parts of the South Seas, I make bold to hazard ſome objections on the opinion of this learned antiquarian.

I agree that the ancients built large ſhips, and ſome much larger than neceſſary, to croſs the Atlantic ocean, though not of a proper figure for that purpoſe; and that the Greeks conſtructed veſſels double the length of our firſt rate men of war, as may be ſeen by Ptolemy's ſhip of 500 feet long, and 50 broad in the mid-ſhip, with a proportionable height; (Rollin) it had 4000 men for rowing, 3000 ſoldiers, and 200 ſailors; this number proves that Ptolemy preferred oars to ſails, which in all likelihood were ſmall in proportion to thoſe made uſe of in our days, though his ſhip was double the length of our largeſt which have ſix times as many ſailors.

To give a farther proof of the largeneſs of ſome of the ancient ſhips of war, I ſhall mention what a French author ſays in his *Commerce des Egyptiens.*

" The military navy of Ptolemy was two ſhips of 32 rows of " oars, one of 12 rows of oars, four of 13 rows, fourteen of 11

" rows, thirty-nine of 9 rows, with a double number of quadri-
" remes, and others of leſs ſize."

Hiero, king of Syracuſe, had a ſhip built under the direction of Archimedes, it was of a very extraordinary ſize, and had ſuch a number of conveniences that we can have no notion of them, being ſo different from thoſe of our time.

But to ſpeak of ſhips not ſo extraordinary, and which were more proper for the Mediterranean ſea, than any of thoſe built by the Armonicans, or ancient Gauls, we have but to look on thoſe conſtructed by Demetrius for the ſiege of Rhodes, which, as far as we can conjecture, were ſuch as could contain twelve hundred men.

Here is what Plutarch ſays of thoſe veſſels: " Demetrius built
" large ſhips, which had ſo majeſtic an appearance that they faſci-
" nated the eyes of all thoſe who perceived them, and in ſuch a
" manner, that his very enemies were ſtruck with admiration when
" they ſaw this king's ſhip, with fifteen or ſixteen rows of oars,
" paſs ſo quick along the ſhore."

The learned Abbé Caſſier ſays, " That the death of Cæſar
" hindered the reform he intended to make in the Roman navy ;
" Mark Anthony, at the battle of Actium, followed Cæſar's prin-
" ciples, and it is known that he would have gained the day had
" not Cleopatra fled with her ſhips."

To ſuch aſſertions we make bold to anſwer, that ſuch a man as Mark Anthony, engaged in continual civil wars, running from Rome to the Alps, then to Lombardy, from thence to the capital, and again to Aſia, againſt the Parthians and Egyptians, and at laſt plunged into perpetual feaſtings, &c. ſuch a man, we muſt think, was very improper to make reforms in matters which had been found uſeful for many centuries, ſince we ſee, that in our days, we have been more than fifty years in finding the proper length of our naval canon.

I ſhall not pretend to decide on Cæſar's intention, but I leave you to judge if ſuch an account as Monſieur l'Abbé gives on Cæſar's intended reform is probable ; what Plutarch ſays of the battle of Axium, may be a little in favour of Anthony's preferring heavy ſhips ; but his conduct proved his wrong judgment. This ancient author ſays, " Mark Anthony had no leſs than five hundred ſhips,
" among which were ſeveral of eight and ten rows of oars ; his
" veſſels appear more fit for triumph than battle.

" Cæsar had two hundred and fifty ships, all light and easy to " work, but without the least appearance of pomp."

" Mark Anthony burnt all his small vessels, but reserved his best " and largest, from three to ten rows of oars, and sixty Egyptian " ships. When every thing was in order, he went round his fleet " in a light frigate, encouraging his men to keep their post in the " straights, and think themselves upon firm ground, from the " weight and steadiness of their ships. After much stay in the " same place, Mark Anthony's men, impatient to attack, from " the opinion they had of the strength of their vessels, made their " left wing advance, which Cæsar perceiving, made his right wing " fall back to decoy his enemy out of the straights. Anthony's " motion was very agreeable to Cæsar, as he knew Anthony had " not hands enough to move his ponderous vessels, for which rea- " son they could not strike with their beaks as was usual in sea- " fights; thus Octavius, taking the advantage he had over his an- " tagonist, gained the victory."

This battle shewed the judgment of Cæsar, and the little understanding of Mark Anthony, in what was necessary to work heavy ships; for if he had had men in proportion to the size of his vessels, he would have sunk Octavius's ships at the first shock; but what could be expected from such an imprudent man?

Let us now see if the Romans thought the Gallic ships preferable to theirs; when Julius Cæsar's fleet was built on the Loire, and had the necessary quantity of men for rowing, as well as pilots and sailors, in order to attack the Vannois, he says, " The " enemy had an advantage from the make of their ships; their bot- " toms were flatter than ours, and of course, they were less liable to " be damaged, when the tide left them on shallows: their heads and " sterns were high, and better fitted to withstand the violent waves " of the ocean: they were built with oak, their cross timbers were " a foot square, and fastened with nails of an inch thick. Their " anchor fastened with iron chains; * their sails were made with " pliable, and well prepared skins, more proper to endure the " tempestuous winds of the ocean, and give motion to such heavy " bodies. It was against such ships, (said he) our fleet was to en- " gage; but we surpassed them in quickness of motion, though " we could not hurt them with our beaks, they being too strong- " ly built for us; nor could we safely attack them, on account of " their height; for the same reason, they were not afraid of shal-

* These iron instruments prove that the Gauls had iron works.

" low water, nor being left aſhore, when the tide went off, all " which our veſſels dreaded."

To ſhew how much fitter the Roman ſhips were for their purpoſe, than thoſe of the Gauls, we ſee that when Cæſar firſt appeared on the Britiſh coaſt, the natives were aſtoniſhed at the ſhape and manner of going of the Roman ſhips, and at the effect of the Roman engines, which made them fall back, and give Cæſar's army time to land. This demonſtrates that the Roman manner of building was fitter for their purpoſe than Monſieur *l'Abbe Carlier* thinks; from which we may conclude that Cæſar thought little about changing his manner of building to copy an inferior one.

A farther proof that the Romans would never have copied the Gallic method of building ſhips is the ſlow manner in which the Gauls made their veſſels. The ancient Romans had ſure rules by which every carpenter could work properly, as may be conceived by the great number of ſhips they built when wanted, and as it appears by what theſe conquerors did on the Gallic ſhore, where Cæſar ordered his army to build * as many veſſels as they could, while he was in winter-quarters; but, as he had obſerved, " that " the waves on the ocean were leſſened, by going in and out of the " tide, he ordered his ſhips to be leſs lofty than thoſe built in the " Mediterranean, in order to have them drawn on ſhore, with " leſs difficulty; and that they ſhould be broader, in order to car- " ry more burden, and be lighter for rowing, as well as for ſail- " ing."

At Cæſar's return from winter-quarters, he found upwards of 600 ſhips and 28 gallies† built, though his men had had a hard winter; ſo deſirous were they to follow his orders.

" Cæſar, at the head of five legions, left the Gallic ſhore, with a " gentle ſoutherly wind, which fell at midnight; this made the tide " carry him to the right, and, at day-break, he perceived Britain " on his left hand, which made him tack about, to regain what he " had loſt in the night, in order to land in the ſame place which

* This ſhews that every man could work at ſhip-building, from eaſy rules, very different from our method, which is attended with an infinity of coſtly moulds.

† At firſt ſight, it is ſurpriſing how the Romans could build ſuch a quantity of ſhips in a winter; but, if it be rightly conſidered, it will be ſeen, that all the ſoldiers could make uſe of ſaws, axes, augurs, and all the neceſſary tools for working wood: and as every man who can make uſe of ſuch inſtruments can figure timber as he pleaſes, all the army could be ſhip-carpenters; and the more ſo, as the ancients had general and ſimple rules for ſhip-building, of courſe the officers, in winter quarters, filled up their time with ſuperintending thoſe works.

" had been so fortunate for his return last campaign; on this occa-
" sion, his soldiers shewed their desire to make up for lost time,
" and rowed forward the heavy transports, with as much quickness
" as if they had been gallies, for which Cæsar praised them much."

This single instance shews how the Romans could make use of oars on their ships of burden; and that the ancient vessels were made so as to employ sails and oars at the same time, and of course, to keep up to the wind, nearer than we can, in moderate weather.

The better to prove the improbability of the Romans copying the heavy Gallic ships, we have but to look at the sea-fight before Marseilles, were they had much trouble with twelve great vessels, built in thirty days after they had cut down the trees; the greenness of the wood rendering them so heavy that they could hardly be managed.

From these premises every one will conclude, that Cæsar never dreamed of changing his manner, for that of the clumsy Gallic mode, since, three centuries after, as Appian says, " the Romans
" had two thousand light ships, and fifteen hundred vessels, with
" five and six rows of oars; they had also eight hundred large
" ships, which they named Ptolemiques, for their Emperor's pomp,
carved and gilt from head to stern."

Having said something of what is most remarkable in the ancient ships of war, we must take a little notice of their mercantile vessels. As far as we can discover, their proportions were four breadths for one length, as may be seen in the Wishes of Lucian, when he mentions a large ship which carried corn from Alexandria to Rome, which, from bad weather, was driven into the Pyreum the port of Athens.

As the Grecian and Roman seas were not so extensive as those of the ocean, their ships had no need of such strong timbers as we make use of at present; for which reason, we may safely say, that neither the Grecian nor the Roman merchant ships, could cross the long space, in the Atlantic ocean, which separates Europe from America, though they went over the Black Sea, as appears by what follows.

An ancient author, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus, says, that
" from the northernmost part of the Black Sea, where the Scy-
" thians dwelt in ice and snow, ships have been seen to come, with
" a good wind, from those frozen countries, and arrive in ten days;
" after which they have been at Alexandria in four days; in ten
" days more went up the Nile into Ethiopia." *Commerce des*

Egyptiens. And thus they could run, in the ſpace of 24 days from the coldeſt regions to the hotteſt.

From what has been ſeen, ſhip-builders, in thoſe days, knew how to make their veſſels run from the north part of the Black Sea, to Egypt, in 14 days, which ſhews that the ancients had more knowledge in maritime affairs than generally our ſea-faring gentlemen think, who ſeldom give themſelves the trouble of looking into antiquity, where they would find our forefathers had ſome underſtanding in the arts as well as ourſelves. From what has been ſaid, the Romans had no need to change their ſyſtem of ſhip-building for that of the Gauls.

We allow that Monſieur l'Abbé Carlier's remarks may be curious; but, from the little which the ancient authors have ſaid on theſe matters, how could he imagine ſuch a problematic propoſition could be believed by the members of the Academy? Yet they did believe it; but, from what has been ſhewn, any body may boldly ſay, that nineteen hundred years paſt, our forefathers could never croſs the Atlantic ocean, and, of courſe, could not know America. I have heard, indeed, forty years ago, that an Iriſhman, taken by the ſavages, in America, cried out in his native language; and that the words he ſpoke had ſuch an effect upon thoſe people, that they thought there was ſome connection between the Iriſh tongue and their own, which induced them to give him his liberty. There, Sir, is one more diſcovery for your inventive antiquarians; it may lead them to the analogy of the Hibernian grammar, with that of the Americans; as well as on the arts and ſciences, manufactures, and commerce of theſe wild people.

But, to ſhew how cautious writers ſhould be in advancing hypothetical notions, the ſhorteſt way to America is more than 30 degrees in longitude, through ſtrong currents, and tempeſtuous oceans, large enough to ſwallow ten millions of Gallic flat bottom ſhips, rigged I know not how, *with pliant, well-dreſſed ſkins, and anchors faſtened to iron chains.*

Beſides they muſt have had other methods of working their ſhips, than thoſe they have left us a notion of, to navigate in thoſe dangerous ſeas, which make the boldeſt mariners tremble. But to come from that new world, how could they find their way, in latitudes where fogs are ſo thick as to hinder one man's ſeeing another half way over the ſhip.

From what you have ſeen, Sir, it muſt appear very extraordinary, that Monſieur l'Abbé Carlier ſhould conclude, ſo poſitively,

from, as he ſays, the little documents, to hint the ancient authors have left us; but it is ſtill more extraordinary, that an Academy of Antiquarians ſhould have crowned ſuch a work, eſpecially when moſt of the ſea-faring gentlemen of our days, are of opinion that all that has been ſaid of the ancients, on their ſhips of war, is fabulous.

Let theſe gentlemen remember that Julius Cæſar, in his Commentaries, is very particular in the deſcription of his engagement with the Egyptian ſhips before Alexandria.

I do not pretend to give reaſons why our writers and mariners do not believe what the ancients have ſaid, but I am perſuaded that thoſe who generally comment on ancient arts, have very little experience, in thoſe of our own times, being more converſant in ſtyle, than in the experience arts require, as may be ſeen in the Encyclopedies, which are almoſt written and copied by men, who make it their buſineſs to write on arts they have never practiſed.

From this we may conclude, that the knowledge of the ancient arts is not eaſily obtained from the works of our preſent writers, who, for inſtance, name three-banked ſhips, &c. thoſe with three rows of oars, for want of underſtanding the practical part; like thoſe tranſlators, who underſtand not the true ſtile of the language, and much leſs the technical terms of arts, which will ever put in confuſion the greateſt orator in the world, if he has not experience in the arts he ſpeaks of

As you ſee, Sir, I have given ſome reaſons to ſhew how far we are from having a thorough knowledge of the ancient maritime arts. I hope to be excuſed if I venture an opinion on what I think is very material for ſaving of ſhips, in many caſes, together with a great number of men's lives. I mean to take ſomething from the ancients, and apply it to our manner of acting, for which I ſhould propoſe a premium; "For the beſt manner of tacking "about, without fail, and with fail, to go in and out of port, back-"wards and forwards, without turning, in all weather, except "ſtorms and ſtrong winds, as the ancient Greeks and Romans "did; this to be done without obſtructing the preſent manner of "working ſhips, one thouſand pounds."

Many think the French are the beſt theoriſts in naval architecture; but their method, as well as thoſe of other nations, appears not to be founded on plain and fixed principles; for the dimenſions of their ſhips are at variance one with the other. For example, ſays a builder at Breſt, a ſhip ought to be from one hundred and ſeventy-five to one hundred and eighty feet long, by forty-ſe-

ven to fifty broad, and twenty-two to twenty-five in the hold. Veſſels of other ſizes have no better rules; a frigate of thirty-ſix guns, they ſay, ought to be one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty feet in length, by thirty-three, or thirty-four in breadth, and ſixteen or ſeventeen in the hold

I ſhall not ſay that ſuch a diverſity of dimenſions proves their not having juſt ideas of the proportions of their art, but I ſhall make bold to put a few queſtions to theſe gentlemen.

What inconvenience would there be, in making a firſt-rate ſhip, of 200 feet long, and 50 broad, with a hold of 25 feet? It would carry more ſail and go quicker. Such dimenſions are ſo ſimple, that a child could put them in practice; ſince they give four breadths for one length, and the hold half the midſhip. All ſhips ſhould be made in theſe proportions, that is, in aliquot parts; then we ſhould be certain which would be beſt for different uſes.

To build frigates of 108 or 110 feet long, for thirty guns merely for the accommodation of the metal, is like being guided by acceſſary parts, to find principles for the direction of the whole; whereas, it ſhould be the ſubject which governs the attribute. Nothing, in ſhort, is more apt to lead into difficulties than reaſoning from random principles, inſtead of founding them on harmonious rules, which lead to true maxims, and give the firſt ideas of the parts which compoſe an invention. This ancient manner of reaſoning is not eaſily to be found in the modern contrivers, who ſeldom, or never look out of the track they are in, and even offer premiums to underſtand a part more of the wrong *routine* they have been born in.

I am, my good Friend,
Your humble ſervant,
W. BLANEY.

THE SEVEN YEARS, OR THIRD SILESIAN WAR,

FROM 1756 TO 1763.

[*Continued from page* 45.]

FREDERIC wrote, ſoon after this battle, a very remarkable letter to Lord Marſhal, expreſſive of his feelings; he ſaid, "ſucceſs, my Lord, ſometimes betrays us into a fatal confidence. Twenty-three battallions were not enough to beat ſixty thouſand men out of an advantageous poſt. Another time we ſhall do it better.

Fortune ſhewed her back upon me that day. I ſhould have expected ſhe is a woman, and I am not gallant. She declared in favour of the ladies who are at war with me. What do you think of a league againſt the Margrave of Brandenburg? With what aſtoniſhment would the great Frederic William behold his grand ſon engaged in a war with Ruſſia, Auſtria, nearly all Germany, and an hundred thouſand Frenchmen. I do not know whether it is a ſhame for me to be overcome; but certain I am, that it will be but little honour to conquer me."

This philoſophical manner of thinking on a change of fortune diſarmed his cenſors and encreaſed his admirers. From this ſingle day his ſituation became dreadful; his good proſpects vaniſhed, and his deſtruction ſeemed to be inevitable.

The battle of Collin decided the fate of Prague, the ſiege being immediately raiſed. The departure of the Pruſſians was with great order, and not ſecretly. They quitted the trenches and entrenched poſts early in the morning, with colours flying and drums beating, though not without ſome loſs. A number of wounded and ſome cannon were left to the enemy; who now haſtened out of their confinement, and fell upon the retreating troops. The fatal ſituation of the latter was, however, much amended by Frederic's diſpoſition, who divided his forces ſkilfully into ſeveral ſeparate corps and miſled the enemy in that manner, facilitating thereby greatly the march of his troops over the Bohemian mountains. The king's attention was now directed towards his own provinces, which required protection: for Collin was in a manner the ſignal to the French, Ruſſians, Swedes, and the troops of the Empire, to invade vigorouſly the Pruſſian dominions; and he was now formally outlawed by the grand council of the Empire. The French, under the command of Marſhal D'Etrées, took poſſeſſion of Weſtphalia, and defeated the Hanoverians under the Duke of Cumberland. The Ruſſians entered the kingdom of Pruſſia with an army of 100,000 men, which field Marſhal Lehwald endeavoured to protect with 30,000. Prince Soubiſe, with a ſecond army of French, joined the troops of the Empire with the view of entering Saxony, and the Swedes croſſed the Baltic to invade Pomerania.

Brown was now dead, and the Auſtrian troops were under the command of Prince Charles and Daun. Theſe generals invaded Luſatia. The corps of the Duke of Bevern, which were to protect that province, being too weak to make head againſt ſuch a power,

were forced to retreat continually. The Auſtrians purſued the Pruſſians, ſtep by ſtep, through Saxony and Sileſia, to the very gates of Breſlaw. Another Auſtrian army in the mean time beſieged Zittau, one of the moſt flouriſhing manufacturing cities in Germany. The rage of the enemy was ſo great, that, in order to gain poſſeſſion of that place, which was open and only occupied by ſome Pruſſian battalions, they threw bombs and red hot balls into the town; ſo that it repreſented, after a few hours, a mere heap of aſhes; a barbarity to which they were animated by Prince Xavier of Saxony himſelf. The Pruſſian troops cut their way through the enemy that ſurrounded them, and a few only were taken priſoners.

Already in the ſpring an army of obſervation had aſſembled in the northern part of Germany, which conſiſted of Hannoverians, Heſſians, Brunſwicks, and ſome battalions of the troops of Gotha and Bukeburg. Theſe were joined by a few thouſand Pruſſians, ſo that this army was 50,000. But it was too weak to reſiſt the French army, whoſe numbers were greater. After the latter had paſſed the Weſer, taken Emden, and put Hannover under contribution, a battle enſued near Haſtenbeck between Marſhal D'Etrées and the Duke of Cumberland, in which the latter was beaten. The victory was, however, in itſelf inſignificant, and would not have had any material conſequence, if the Duke, from an apprehenſion for the archives of Hannover and other things of value, conveyed to Stade, for ſecurity's ſake, had not been diſpoſed to withdraw with his army to the north, in order to cover that town. But he was ſoon encloſed by the French, cut off from the Elbe, and put in a ſituation that left nothing to him but to capitulate, which was done the 8th of September, near Cloſter-Seeven, under the grant of the king of Denmark. The chief article of it was, "that all the troops, Hannoverian as well as Heſſian and Brunſwicks, ſhould be diſembodied." This was done. The ſoldiers went home, and their commander returned to England. Frederic loſt thereby an auxiliary army, which hitherto had occupied the French in the field, and who now could direct their whole force againſt him.

They had, beſides Hanover, likewiſe occupied the Heſſian ſtates. The French comiſſary of war, Foulon, reigned at Caſſel like a grand Vizier. The Landgrave, that he might not be a ſpectator

of the tyrannies committed in his own reſidence, was gone to Hamburgh, where he remained during moſt part of the war.

The civil proceedings of the French were, however, moderate, as long as the Marſhall D'Etrées had the chief command. He manifeſted on every opportunity his generoſity, as well as his military talents. The Univerſity of Gottingen requeſted his protection. D'Etrées' anſwer deſerves a place in this hiſtory.

" Gentlemen,

" The univerſity of Gottingen, on account of the many great " men it has produced, who have confirmed its renown, is in too " great a repute to let this opportunity eſcape, without ſhewing the " particular eſteem I entertain towards it. The univerſity may be " eaſy about the hardſhips the war carries along with it. I ſhall keep " them at a diſtance from it, as far as it depends on me. I know " very well how diſadvantageous they are to the ſciences; and I " ſhall take care that the troops do not moleſt ſo excellent an aca- " demy. With theſe ſincere ſentiments, I am, in reality,

Your moſt humble Servant,

Holzmunden, the 16th July, 1757. MARSHAL D'ETREES."

The very ſame month D'Etrées received a royal letter from Verſailles, with orders to give up the command to the duke of Richélieu, a creature of Madame de Pompadour; but he was given to underſtand that the king would be glad if he would nevertheleſs ſtay with the army. D'Etrées obeyed the order without paying any attention to the king's wiſh. He departed as ſoon as his ſucceſſor arrived.

Richelieu, therefore, reaped the fruits of the prudent meaſures of his predeceſſor, as he forced the allies to the before-mentioned capitulation. He had now formally taken upon him the command of the whole French army, and occupied Brunſwick, from whence he ſent a great part of his troops (among which were the gens d'armes) to the army of Prince Soubiſe, who now, in conjunction with the troops of the empire, marched towards Saxony. Richelieu himſelf entered the Pruſſian provinces; the towns and villages he either plundered and devaſtated, or threatened them with fire and ſword, in order to extort enormous contributions from the harmleſs inhabitants. The exceſſes of thoſe Frenchmen were ſo great, that they almoſt outbalanced the cruelties of the

Coſſacks. Many rich people were dreadfully beaten by order of the French officers, to oblige them to pay contributions for their fellow-citizens; they violated young virgins and married women, and ſported with the lives of men. Nothing was more frequent among them than hanging up innocent people as ſpies, on the moſt frivolous pretexts and groundleſs ſuſpicion, without the leaſt ſhadow of evidence. This was the fate of many hundred Germans during the war, without reſpect to rank, age, or ſituation.

The motto of the new French general, was *extortion*; not ſo much for the ſervice of his king, as for his own emolument. Protected by his royal miſtreſs, he committed the moſt ſcandalous actions; and very often arranged his military operations according to his private intereſt. Of all the generals, who commanded during the war, none, of any nation, enriched himſelf ſo much as Richelieu. He was ſo far from concealing it, that, even before the end of the war, he built, in the capital of France, a magnificent palace, which the Pariſians called, *Le pavillon d'Hannovre.*

Frederic divided his army in many corps, in order to lay obſtacles in the way of the ſeveral armies, that advanced from all parts towards Saxony, and towards the center of his ſtates. He, however, did not confine himſelf to defence only; he operated offenſively wherever an advantageous opportunity occurred. Colonel Mayer entered the Palatinate, collected contributions, paſſed the circle of Franconia, and threatened Nuremberg. The inhabitants of this city, in their anxiety, made application to the aſſembly of the circle, requeſting protection. This Franconian aſſembly manifeſted its wiſdom on that occaſion. They deſired of Colonel Mayer to legitimate himſelf about his invading Franconia; and that he ſhould make good all damages. The Pruſſian general was not provided with parchment; but he had ammunition and courageous ſoldiers. He, therefore, ſhewed to the delegates his companions in arms, and aſked them whether they required a better legitimation? after having obtained his deſign, he retreated; but took hoſtages along with him.

The Auſtrians made uſe of that diviſion of the Pruſſian troops; and General Haddick ventured with 4,000 men to the gates of Berlin. This reſidence, being without a rampart, partly without a wall, and only provided with paliſades, was then occupied only with 2000 militia, beſides a few recruits and other ſoldiers. The royal family retired to Spandau, as ſoon as they heard of the approach of the Auſtrians. They had therefore not much to fe-

from a flying corps, that was deprived of every means to disturb the Metropolis, and which had to fear the being cut off. Haddick challenged the town, attacking two gates at once. The palisades of the one were fired to the ground, and now the Austrians entered the suburbs in crowds. The inhabitants shewed themselves worthy of the name of Brandenburg—whole liveries joined and offered to repulse the enemy; but the commander, General Rochau, would not allow any such trial. At the suburbs of the gate of Copenick only, a skirmish happened between a Prussian detachment and the Austrians, but nothing decisive.

However, the news of the approach of Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau disquieted the enemy. Haddick, who knew the danger of a delay, was moderate in his demands, which at last were agreed to, not so much from fear, as from a wish to put a period to the existing troubles. They paid to the enemy 200,000 rix-dollars, with which they marched off in great haste.

In the kingdom of Prussia the scenes of war were likewise opened. The Russians arrived there to the number of more than 100,000 men under the command of Field-Marshal Apraxin, and had taken possession of Memel. Their light troops, Cossacks, Calmucks and Tartars, devastated the country with fire and sword, in a manner unknown to Europe since the time of the Hunians. Those barbarians either killed or disfigured harmless people from a diabolical pleasure. They hung many on trees, or cut of their ears and noses; of some they amputated the legs; whilst others had their bellies ripped open, and their hearts torn out. Even tombs were ransacked, and the bones of the dead thrown about in wanton cruelty. Noblemen and clergymen were terribly beaten, laid naked upon burning coals, and murdered in every possible shape which the most infernal barbarity could devise. They took children from their wretched parents and massacred them before their eyes. Married women and virgins were violated. Many a lady killed herself in order to escape the brutality of those monsters. Numbers of people fled to Dantzig, whither the royal archive from Konigsberg were carried. The Prussian General Lehwald, could oppose the enemy with 30,000 men only. He attacked them, however, on the 30th of August, near great Iagersdorf in their entrenchments. Success declared at first in favour of the smaller army, which this time did not fight for the gratification of the ambition of a monarch: they fought against barbarians for their own sake, for their lives, and for their welfare. The Prussians had al-

ready taken many Ruſſian cannon, had overturned their cavalry, and beaten one wing of the main army; when ſuddenly victory declared againſt them. The Pruſſians had ſet fire to ſeveral villages, laying within the field of battle. The ſmoke confounded them; they attacked in confuſion and were outflanked. Lehwald had here the ſame good fortune as Frederic had at Collin. He was ſuffered to depart unmoleſted. His loſs was 5,700 killed and wounded. The Ruſſians counted 7000. But their victory brought them very little advantage. They had no hopes of finding proviſion for their enormous army in that kingdom, already reduced to a deſert. Apraxin, therefore, left but 10,000 men to occupy Memel, marching off with his army a few days after the battle. This retreat was like a flight; and happened ſo precipitately, that 15000 men, ſick and wounded, eight cannon, and a quantity of war-ſtores, were left behind. The march was effected in two columns, and both the routs marked with fire, plunder, and every imaginable cruelty.—All towns and villages, where thoſe infernal hordes paſſed, were deſtroyed by fire and the roads were covered with dead bodies of men and cattle. The Pruſſian peaſants, driven to deſpair, defended themſelves, and thereby augmented their misfortunes. The beaten, but not conquered Pruſſians, purſued the Ruſſians to the frontiers of Frederic's ſtates.

At this retreat a ſingular accident happened. The King of Pruſſia received an ally, which he never could have thought of, whereby he got rid of ſome thouſands of Calmucks. This active ally was the *ſmall-pox*. The Calmucks who, in their country, had lived without the knowledge of that diſorder, became acquainted with it here, to their aſtoniſhment. Many fell a ſacrifice to it. Even their commander was attacked by it, and now nothing could retain them any longer. The whole corps of this wild people returned to their homes.

The Ruſſian generals ſuffered them to depart quietly. They were glad to get rid of thoſe monſters who were worſe than the Coſſacks, and would not be governed at all. A few only of them, guided by rapacity, quitted their countrymen, and remained with the Ruſſian army.

That nation, who, for the firſt time, came into the field againſt Germans, was the wildeſt of all Frederic's enemies; they were as unworthy to be led againſt a cultivated ſtate, as to ſupport a diſciplined army. Incapable of giving aid by their arms to any victory of the regular army, the latter rather ſuffered by their de-

vaſtations, being obliged to ſhare in the ſcandal occaſioned by the cruelties of thoſe hordes, who approached the ſtate of wildneſs nearer than that of barbarity. Thoſe Calmucks live along the Caſpian ſea, and the river Wolga. They are a free people; being, however, under Ruſſian protection, for which they are obliged to take the field whenever the monarchs of that empire require it. They have no pay; but each of them receive annually one ruble and a fur coat of ſheep ſkin. They are Monades, having neither towns nor villages. Their habitations are tents. They are continually roving about with them from place to place, wherever they find a ſituation which affords food for their cattle; for in this only conſiſts their whole wealth. They are extremely ugly; reſembling one another ſo much, that it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh them. Their faces are very flat, and almoſt ſquare. Their eyes like thoſe of the Chineſe, are very little and deep in the head, the noſe flat, mouth and ears extremely large, the latter projecting from the head. They carry bows and arrows, which they throw very far and very exact. Their religion is the heathen.

Frederic now called Lehwald from Ruſſia, ordering him to march againſt the Swedes. Theſe French allies were at that time arrived in Pomerania to the number of 22,000 men, among which they had 4000 horſe. The warlike ſpirit of that nation threatened the Ruſſians with a formidable enemy. But the honour of a crown, and the glory of brave troops, were perhaps never more expoſed than on this occaſion. The equipment of the Swediſh army, as it appeared at that time in Germany was a perfect ſatire on the modern art of war. There were ſoldiers ranged in rank and file well exerciſed, and full of eagerneſs to fight, but they were in want of every thing elſe. Without a commiſſary, without a bakery, without magazines, without boat-bridges, no light troops, no ſubordination, leaders without experience in the art of war, to whom, however, every ſtep was minutely preſcribed by the Swediſh council of war, who never were unanimous among themſelves, and at every undertaking threatened with being made anſwerable for the conſequences. In this manner it appears plain, why the warriors of this nation, which more than once decided the fate of Germany, ſword in hand, and in the Weſtphalian peace dictated laws to Europe, returned after five campaigns to their homes diſgraced and ridiculed.

The want of light troops, forced the Swedes often to relinquiſh the beſt deſigns: for the Pruſſians mocked them from all ſides and

they were conſtantly cutting off their ſupplies. For want of magazines and pontons they could not penetrate far into the Pruſſian dominions, and their junction with the French, Ruſſian, or Auſtrian armies which was their conſtant object, was always expoſed to ſo many difficulties, that they even did not once attempt it. The Swediſh theatre of war was therefore confined to a ſmall corner in the north of Germany. Thoſe troops moved about in Pomerania and a part of the Mark, without ever attempting any thing worth notice, and thus they acted during the whole war.

The king now endeavored to bring the French and the troops of the empire to action, directing, for this purpoſe, his march towards them. His ſituation was terrible—Far and near ſurrounded with enemies, who daily multiplied, his victories availed him nothing. It was like cutting off the head of the hydra; for as ſoon as he had defeated one army, two others marched againſt him.—By a decree of the empire, he was declared to have forfeited not only his dominions but alſo his Electoral dignity. The deſign and the power to overcome him entirely were ſtronger, and therefore his hopes were weaker than ever. Yet at that very moment the ſerenity of his mind was great enough to enable him to compoſe his will in French verſes. Juſt as his apprehenſions were, that he ſhould be ſubdued by numbers, he nevertheleſs took all neceſſary ſteps to conquer. His army, reduced by ſo many engagements, conſiſted only of 22,000 men; that of the enemy 60,000. The latter had already experienced a proof of Pruſſian valour near Gotha. All the French general officers, with their commander Soubiſe at their head, and a body of 8000 men, had ſelected Gotha for their place of recreation, to refreſh themſelves from the fatigues of war. The duke held a grand court-day, and mighty preparations were made at the palace for the ſuitable entertainment of thoſe great and warlike gueſts. It was dinner-time; the tables were laid and the French ſhewed great appetite, when the Pruſſian general Seydlitz appeared at the gates with 1500 horſe. The 8000 Frenchmen relinquiſhed without reſiſtance the ſmoaking diſhes, and fled out of the city. A few ſoldiers only were taken priſoners; but a number of valets, footmen, cooks, hair dreſſers, miſtreſſes, field-chaplains, and players—commodities inſeparable from a French army. The equipage of many generals fell into the hands of the Pruſſians, among which were found whole cheſts of perfumed waters and pomatums, a number of powdering gowns, hair-bags, umbrellas, night gowns, and parrots. Seydlitz left to his

huſſars that toilet-booty, and ſent back the dregs of gal[illegible] without ranſom.

The French were as much pleaſed to find themſelves once more in poſſeſſion of thoſe preſſing neceſſities they had loſt, as if they had gained a victory. Their courage for fighting increaſed ſo much, that they were ſolely concerned leſt the king ſhould eſcape them. Several of his marches and poſitions confirmed this conjecture: they knew the promptneſs of his movements, his manœuvres, and his art of war, hitherto, merely from reports; which, however, made ſo little impreſſion on their minds, that they took courage to attack him on a ground, where he had an opportunity of diſplaying his tactical knowledge. Their expectation was not only to beat him, but to take his whole army. They even ſtarted the queſtion in the French camp, whether it would be an honour to engage ſo ſmall a body? There never exiſted a more ridiculous military prejudice, and never was it more ſuitably puniſhed.

It was on the 5th of November, near the village of Roſbach in Saxony, one mile diſtant from Lutzen, where Guſtavus Adolphus fought and died for the liberty of Germany, that one of the moſt extraordinary battles was fought. The king, by a motion of retreat, drew the French out of their advantageous poſition. They thought he endeavoured to ſave himſelf from their hands, and ſtrove to fall upon his rear. Frederic, who was again encamped, depending on the alacrity wherewith he could range his troops in order of battle, viewed the movements of the enemy calmly, even without ſuffering his troops to draw out. The Pruſſian camp ſtood immoveable; and, as it was juſt dinner-time, the ſoldiers were buſy at their meals. The French ſeeing this at a diſtance, could hardly believe their own eyes: they conſidered it as a ſtupor of deſperation, in which even the idea of defence is given up. This deception, wound up to the higheſt pitch, was not a ſmall cauſe of the trifling reſiſtance, and the dreadful panic which made that day ſo renowned.

General Seydlitz at once ruſhed forwards with the Pruſſian cavalry from behind a hill, and fell like a thunder-ſtorm with a maſterly manœuvre upon the enemy, who was intoxicated with hopes. Here was performed what never before was ſeen on a field of battle. The light horſe charged and overturned the heavy one. The huſſars with their ſwift horſes had the boldneſs to attack the French gens d'armerie. Neither the courage peculiar to that corps, nor their Coloſſian horſes, were here able to decide.

All w[illegible] pulſed. Soubiſe ordered the corps-de-reſerve to advance but it no ſooner appeared, than it was beaten out of the field. At the ſame time the Pruſſian infantry, who till now had remained inactive, advanced ſuddenly in order of battle, and received the French with a tremendous fire of cannon, followed by a regular diſcharge of muſquetry, the ſame as at reviews. The French infantry were now forſaken by their cavalry, and attacked by the enemy in the flank. Soubiſe attempted French experiments in vain. His columns were eaſily diſperſed, and nothing remained but a general flight. The French, as well as the troops of the empire, threw away their arms, in order to facilitate their ſafety. A few regiments of Swiſs only fought a little longer, and were the laſt on the field. The victory was ſo quickly decided, that the vanquiſhed could not even lay claim to the honour of a ſpirited reſiſtance; on the contrary, they accuſed themſelves with being panic-ſtruck; not omitting, at the ſame time, to lay all the blame on the troops of the empire.

Schwerin died a month too ſoon, to have the pleaſure of beholding this triumph of the Pruſſians. In his opinion, which he often declared, a victory over the French was the only thing to crown the military glory of Pruſſia. Several ſingular occurrences augmented the remarkable events of that day. Frederic found on the field of battle a French grenadier, furiouſly defending himſelf againſt three Pruſſian horſemen, to whom he would not ſurrender. Frederic's command put an end to the unequal combat. He aſked the grenadier whether he thought himſelf invincible? "Yes, Sire," ſaid the grenadier, "under your command." The king walked about the field of battle, conſoling the wounded French officers; who, moved by his condeſcenſion, hailed him as the moſt accompliſhed warrior, who, not contented with having vanquiſhed their bodies, had conquered their hearts likewiſe. The booty of the Pruſſians was very conſiderable. Among other things, a number of St. Lewis' croſſes fell into the hands of the Pruſſian huſſars, who decorated themſelves with them. Seventy-two cannon, and ſeventy-two ſtandards were taken with 6,220 priſoners. The combined armies counted 3,560 killed and wounded, and the Pruſſians 300. Prince Henry of Pruſſia and General Seydlitz were among the wounded. So cheap and complete a victory over a warlike nation is a phenomenon in modern hiſtory. The ſhortneſs of the days at that ſeaſon of the year ſaved the flying army from total de-

ſtruction; for it was not a retreat, but a flight in the greateſt confuſion.

The German nations, large and ſmall, without reſpect to party and private intereſt, were ſatisfied with this victory over the French, which was looked upon as a national triumph.

Of all human tranſactions there is certainly none more ſerious than a battle where thouſands of men murder one another: but the batttle of Roſbach was conſidered as a mere farce both by friends and foes; even the Pariſians were not the laſt to entertain ſuch an opinion. Soubiſe was particularly ridiculed by the Pariſian wits who were perpetually making epigrams and ballads on him. In the French capital, where new objects were panting for, time at length nearly obliterated the humiliation of this French General: but in Germany it remained in lively remembrance; and the word Roſbach reſounded from the Baltic to the Alps, without reſpect to rank, in the ears of every Frenchman whom they wanted to inſult.

The great prepoſſeſſion of Frederic towards that nation, which manifeſted itſelf upon this occaſion, could not weaken the deriſion. Several hundred French officers were taken priſoners, who were ſent to Berlin with leave to appear at court. A few of them only had ſeen the court of Verſailles; the royal palace at Berlin was therefore to them a ſtrange region. To that came the idea of a marquis de Brandenburg, to whom, as the faſhion was at Paris, they did the honour, *de faire une eſpece de guéree.* This was the reaſon why thoſe French officers forgot Roſbach and their confinement, and conducted themſelves in that reſidence in ſo unbecoming a manner, that it was thought neceſſary to remove them. They were carried to Magdeburg.

To this circumſtance the following trait belongs: A lady at the Pruſſian court, who in the queen's apartment was preſent with a French Colonel, aſked him his opinion of Berlin. The Frenchman anſwered: "I conſider it as a large village." The lady, offended by this unexpected inſolence, had preſence of mind enough to give him the following excellent anſwer: "You are in the "right, Sir; ſince the French peaſants arrived at Berlin, it has "greatly the appearance of a village: otherwiſe, it is a very mag-"nificent city."

The news of the battle of Roſbach had ſuch an effect on the queen of Poland, in whoſe ſoul the ſtrongeſt paſſions raged, that ſhe was found dead the next morning. She had been ſickly ſometime before, but not ſo much as to create any apprehenſions of her

death. She had left her courtiers the evening before full of grief; and, when they made their appearance next morning, she had expired. Frederic lost in her an irreconciliable enemy, who, guided by fanaticism, had not a small share in that disastrous war which made her subjects so miserable.

Of the defeated French, and the troops of the empire, there was not a vestige in Saxony and the adjacent provinces. They destroyed all the bridges behind them lest they should be pursued and dispersed thereby; so that many bodies of them did not halt till they came to the Rhine—continually in dread of having the king at their heels. But Frederic was called to Silesia by the progress of the Austrians. The French army under Marshal Richelieu, which he left at the frontiers of his dominions, he hoped soon to keep in awe, with an army that began assembling in an unexpected manner.

[*To be continued.*]

LIFE OF NADIR KOULI, A PERSIAN HERO, FROM 1687 TILL 1747.

THE birth and beginning of this man, who is often called the second Alexander, are as obscure, as his actions are known, and must excite the curiosity of those who are inquisitive into the objects of history.

Nadir was born in the year 1687, probably in a tent not far from Mesched. The name of his father was Iman Kouli, who earned his bread by making sheep-skin coats, the apparel of the lowest people in Persia. Nadir himself was bred up to the employment of a shepherd. He was but thirteen years of age when Iman Kouli died, who left him in so poor a condition, that he was obliged to gather sticks in the woods, for the support of himself and his mother, and to carry them to market on an ass and a camel, which were his only patrimony. In the year 1704, when he was seventeen years old, the Ousbeg Tartars made an irruption into Khorasan; among the number of inhabitants, whom they carried into slavery, was Nadir Kouli and his mother; she died in captivity, but he made his escape in 1708, and returned to Horasan. By all accounts he lived by robbery, till the year 1712, when he entered into the service of a Beg, by whom he was employed as a courier. He was sent with dispatches of import to the Persian court at Ispahan, in com-

pany with another courier, whom he killed on the road; however, he knew how to tell his ſtory ſo well at Iſpahan, that he received preſents, and was ſent back with anſwers. His maſter, notwithſtanding, received him ſo indifferently, that Nadir ſuſpected he was diſtruſted; this, and a violent paſſion he had conceived for his maſter's daughter, whom he had aſked in marriage, but was refuſed, led him to the murder of his maſter: which done, he took the lady away, and retired into the mountains, where he again reſumed his former profeſſion of robbing. In 1714, Nadir found an opportunity of entering into the ſervice of Babulu Khan Governor of Khoraſan, three or four hundred miles diſtant from the place of his robberies. In 1717, the Ouſbegs, in a body of 10,000 men, beginning to lay waſte the fertile plains of Khoraſan, Babulu Khan collected his forces, which did not exceed 6000 men, and Nadir Kouli, who, by his genius, became a favourite of his maſter, was put at the head of them, and though much inferior in number, declared that he would pledge his life for the ſucceſs of the expedition.

The Ouſbegs were already within a few days march of Meſched. Nadir, with great application, provided every thing neceſſary, and went in ſearch of the enemy, who was almoſt double in number. The Tartars charged with great fury; Nadir choſe a proper ground, and ſtood the ſhock; and when the Tartars by their own impetuoſity were in ſome diſorder, Nadir's troops made a general attack, and falling on the enemy with their ſabres and battle-axes, put them to flight, deſtroying 3000, and retaking their plunder and captives.

Nadir returned in triumph to Meſched. His fire of ambition now began to blaze, and he demanded a confirmation in his office of general. But for one reaſon or other he did not ſucceed, and the command was given to a relation of Babulu Khan. Nadir, with a ferocity peculiar to him, declared that the Khan had not acted as a man of honour. In conſeqnence of which he was condemned to be beaten in the ſevereſt manner, on the ſoles of his feet. A man of ſo imperious a ſpirit, could not brook ſuch indignities; he therefore left Meſched, in ſearch of ſome new adventure.

The mind of a man like Nadir, could not long be idle. His uncle a chief of the Afghans, commanded at Kœlat, a ſtrong place: to him he applied, but without ſucceſs. It is probable that he had already, at this time planned a deſign of getting poſſeſſion of Kœlat; however, he retired for the third time into the mountains, and took to his old trade of robbery. He ſoon found means to collect a

a body of desperate fellows, and by robbing several caravans, he acquired riches enough to bring together a number of about eight hundred men, who laid part of Khorasan under great contribution.

The Afghans had at that time invaded Persia, and compelled Hussein to yield up his capital and his diadem. Tœhmas, his son, had nothing left him but the province of Mazauderen, where he took the title of Shah, whilst Nadir extended his lawless sovereignty in the eastern frontiers of that country, living on spoil. In 1727, Tœhmas collected a little army, but one of his generals fled from his camp, with the troops under his command, and joined Nadir Kouli, who now had under him, between 2 and 3000 men, not more than thirty leagues distant from Kœlat. Nadir's uncle, through fear, wrote to him, intimating that he and his followers had now a fair opportunity of receiving pardon of his lawful sovereign, Shah Tœhmas, by engaging in his service. Nadir relished the proposal, and the Shah being in need of so experienced an officer, immediately sent his pardon to Kœlat. Nadir Kouli entered that place with 100 of his men, and found now a good opportunity of exercising his genius in the art of treachery. His uncle meant him no harm, but Nadir was determined to revenge himself for the indignities he had received from him five years before. Having left orders that 500 of his best men should follow him the next day, and keep themselves in readiness near Kœlat; he ordered his women within the castle, on the second night, to assassinate the centries, and shut up the rest of the garrison in their barracks, whilst he went himself into his uncle's chamber and murdered him. His 500 men were let in, and he became absolute master of the place. Nadir relieved his relations and friends in that neighbourhood by his bounty; and many of the inhabitants, induced by his humanity, enlisted themselves in his service.

Nadir, thus become formidable, aspired to be the deliverer of his country, and to drive out the Afghans, who, for five years past, had treated the Persians with the utmost barbarity; but conscious that Shah Tœhmas must resent his murdering of his uncle, he resolved to atchieve some signal action in behalf of the king, in order to obliterate his conduct at Kœlat.

He prepared, therefore, for an expedition against the Afghans, who, secure in the neighbouring city of Nicabar, where they had a garrison of 3000 men, had no great danger to apprehend. Nadir, unaccustomed to sieges, made use of a stratagem to draw the enemy out of their garrison: the Afghans, to the number of 600,

were marauding, when Nadir detached ſome of his cavalry, who attacked them and cut them to pieces; upon this the governor, with his whole garriſon, made a ſally, but the Perſians retreated towards Banrahad, a defile in the mountains, this was the rendezvous appointed. The Afghans purſued them for ſeveral leagues, till they came to this defile. Nadir, in the interim, marched with 1500 of his men, and concealed them in a wood, at the entrance of the defile. The Afghans, not ſuſpecting any other enemy, followed thoſe before them with impatience to revenge the loſs they had juſt ſuſtained; and as ſoon as they had entered the defile, the Perſians faced about, whilſt Nadir with his 1500 men fell upon them in the rear, with ſuch impetuoſity, that the aſtoniſhed Afghans, ſuſpecting themſelves ſurrounded by a great army, became an eaſy prey, and few of them eſcaped the ſlaughter. Nicabar ſurrendered in conſequence of this to Nadir, of which he took poſſeſſion in the name of Shah Tœhmas. The effects of the Afghans he divided among his ſoldiers, and the humanity with which he treated the inhabitants, procured him, from them, a reinforcement of 1000 men.

Shah Tœhmas was, at this time, reduced to great extremities, and Nadir's military reputation was greatly increaſed. Tœhmas had his quarters at Farabad, and received Nadir's offer, to keep himſelf and his troops in readineſs for his ſervice, with pleaſure. Nadir was introduced to the Shah, by Tatey Ali Khan Khagar, the chief of Tœhmas's ſmall army, and matters were adjuſted to their mutual ſatisfaction. Nadir's troops now, to the number of five thouſand entered the province of Mazanderan, and joined thoſe of Tatey Ali Khan, ſo that the whole was an army of eight thouſand men. Nadir made it his ſtudy to cultivate a good underſtanding with the Khan, but not being able to bear an equal, much leſs a ſuperior, he inſtigated his creatures to complain of the conduct of the Khan, and he, himſelf, took a proper opportunity of acquainting his Majeſty with a treacherous correſpondence, carried on between the Khan and Meluck Maghmud, the rebel-governor of Meſched. Tœhmas, who had the misfortune not to be wiſer than his father Huſſein, believed the fact, and the ruin of the Khan was reſolved on. He was put to death at Court by a ſervant, and Nadir carried forth the head on a ſpear to the ſoldiers, declaring the reaſons of the Khan's death.

In 1728, Nadir having thus removed the bar to his ambition, was inſtituted Khan, and received the command of the whole army: he now began to diſplay all the talents of an able miniſter

and a great General. He was master in the art of improving advantages. One of his peculiar characteristics, was a piercing knowledge of men, and he gained the affections of the common soldiers, by an unwearied attention to every circumstance that could promote their interest. His first care was to engage his master to march his army into Khorasan, and Tœhmas made his entrance at Nicahar, the 15th of May, Nadir found no difficulty to augment the Shah's army to the number of eighteen thousand men.

Nadir prepared to march against the Abdallees, who had taken possession of Mesched; where the Shah found no resistance and retook it, and Nadir, who was personally known in that city, where Babulu Khan had some years ago treated him with indignities, was now loaded with honours. As the highest mark of dignity, which Tœhmas could confer upon him, according to Persian custom, was, to give him his own name; he ordered him to be called Tœhmas Kouli Khan; by which name we shall distinguish him, till he wrested the diadem from his master's head.

He next marched at the head of a considerable body, to reduce the other cities and towns of the province, and before the end of that year, all the vast country of Khorasan was subjected, and the Afghans obliged to retire, without daring to give battle.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan made now a proposition to reduce Herat, the inhabitants of which, had ten years ago shaken off the Persian yoke, and obtained permission to march to that province, with about 12,000 men. This city surrendered without resistance, not wishing to come to an engagement with a General of Tœhmas Kouli Khan's valour. Returning victorious, he began to form a more important enterprize.

In 1729, Ashreff, the usurper of Persia, who had hitherto dreaded no evil from the fugitive Tœhmas, and the less so, being acknowledged by the Turks, as the sovereign of Persia, began now to look about him. Shah Tœhmas was so much the ridicule of the court of Ispahan, that though the news of his success in the eastern part of the empire, did not seem to give the least alarm to the soldiers, yet he began now to change his opinion of Tœhmas Kouli, whom he had considered merely as a robber, and thought it high time to provide for the storm that threatened him.

After having made some proper dispositions, he encamped his army in the beginning of September, without the walls of Ispahan. In a few days he began his march, and at the end of the month, after a march of 400 miles, arrived in the plains of Damgoon.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan had this year collected an army of twenty five thouſand men, in the completing and diſciplining of which, he had given the higheſt proofs of his abilities. The Shah propoſed to march to Iſpahan, but his ſagacious General prevented it, by repreſenting the length of the march, and the diſadvantage of attacking the Afghans at ſuch a diſtance from Iſpahan, and the difficulty of their retreat. However, not wiſhing to bring the war into Khoraſan, it was determined to advance and meet Aſhreff. They arrived near Damgoon before Aſhreff had entered thoſe plains. This ſituation was not far from the mountains, along the ſouth coaſt of the Caſpian ſea. Tœhmas had already encamped his forces, when Aſhreff approached with his whole army. Aſhreff ſoon diſcovered from the advantageous poſition of the Perſians, that he had to do with a General of experience; he, however, made the attack with that impetuoſity, which the Afghans often found ſucceſsful. The Perſians ſtood the ſhock, ſo that the Afghans could make no impreſſion on them. Aſhreff detached two bodies, ordering them to take a circuit, and charge the enemy in rear and flank, whilſt he attacked them in front. Tœhmas Kouli Khan was prepared to receive the enemy, and repulſed them with ſuch valour, as put them into great confuſion. It was now his turn to attack; and falling furiouſly upon the Afghans, he obtained an eaſy victory. The Afghans retired by forced marches to Iſpahan, and encamped themſelves in an advantageous ſituation near Mourſchatkor.

In 1729, Tœhmas Kouli Khan's army was conſiderably augmented, and followed the Afghans; a hot battle enſued, wherein the latter were again beaten, with the loſs of 4000 men. Aſhreff, who returned with his troops to Iſpahan, took his revenge by killing Shah Huſſin, after having reigned as conqueror of Perſia ſeven years and twenty-one days, and quitted that place with about 12,000 men.

Shah Tæhmas now made his entry into Iſpahan. Going into the haram, an old woman threw her arms about his neck in great tranſports of joy; this woman was his mother, and had, ever ſince the invaſion of the Afghans, diſguiſed herſelf in the habit of a ſlave.

The army of Tæhmas amounted now to 40,000, and Shah Tœhmas yielded to the demand of Tæhmas Kouli Khan, and granted him the power of levying money for the payment of the army. Having thus obtained his point in ſo important an article, he took the field, and before the end of December, the Perſian

army began their march towards Shiraſs. The Afghans had fixed their camp in an advantageous ſituation. and the Perſians, who, on their march, were much reduced by the rigour of the ſeaſon, were impatient to give them a finiſhing ſtroke. A battle enſued the 15th of January, 1730; in which the Afghans were put to flight. Tœhmas was too circumſpect a General to ſeparate his troops in order to purſue them: too great caution may certainly bring on the ſame conſequences as too much raſhneſs, but the Khan reſolved to leave nothing to unneceſſary chance, ſince it was plain that the pride of the Afghans was much humbled.

Aſhreff made a ſudden and ſecret flight from Shiraſs, and the aunt and ſiſter of Shah Tœhmas, who were among the captives of the former, were conducted to the court of Iſpahan, and the Shah's aunt was given to Tœhmas Kouli Kahn in marriage. Aſhreff was in his flight, cut to pieces with 200 men, by a body of Baluches; and thus ended the uſurpation of the Afghans, but not the calamities of Perſia. The death of Aſhreff was but a prelude to thoſe miſchiefs which Nadir was about to bring on that country.

The Turks had, during the troubles of Perſia, conquered ſeveral Perſian dominions, and Tœhmas Kouli Kahn, whoſe ſecurity was abſolutely inconſiſtent with peaceable meaſures, directed his march towards Hamadan, where he defeated the Turks and took the town. After putting garriſons in theſe places, he marched for Tauris and Ardeville, and out-marching the Turkiſh General, who was to defend it with 40,000 men, took theſe places. The Turks demanded a truce, to which Tœhmas the more readily conſented, as his preſence was wanting near Herat, where the Abdallees had revolted, whom he, however, after a fatiguing march, in a pitched battle defeated. The Turks took advantage of the abſence of Kouli Khan, and prepared for the march of the Ottoman army. In 1731 Tœhmas Shah left Iſpahan in October, with an army of 20,000 men, and marched towards Tauris. After having joined the troops left there by his general, Tœhmas Kouli Khan, he paſſed the mountains of Armenia, and reached Erivan in February. In divers battles the Perſians were beaten. The Shah returned to Caſbin, and Hamadan fell again into the hands of the Turks. Thus the Ottoman army gained this year, what they loſt the year before. During theſe tranſactions in the field, the ſituation of affairs in Turkey was changed by inteſtine commotions. Peace was become very deſirable, the more ſo, as the return of Tœhmas Kouli

Khan might render the ſucceſs of another campaign, very different from the laſt. The 16th of January, 1732, articles of peace were ſigned.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan, being poſſeſſed of royal authority ſo as to be able to raiſe money, eſtabliſhed already a kind of independency; for the ſupport of which, he engaged in his ſervice a conſiderable number of Abdallees, Afghans, Ouſbegs, and Turkomen. Theſe were moſt likely to be at his devotion, ſo long as he paid them well. He no ſooner heard of the peaceable turn of affairs, than he wrote to his Majeſty, ſaying he ſoon would join him, with an army of victorious troops. From motives of policy, however, peace was concluded, and Tœhmas Shah deſired his General to diſband the army, and repair to Iſpahan.

He who, in lower rank of life, had been accuſtomed to follow the dictates of his own paſſion, could hardly be expected to ſhow a paſſive conduct at the head of a victorious army, entirely devoted to his ſervice. He repreſented to his chief officers the conduct of the Shah, as inglorious and impolitic, and made them ſenſible, how much ſuperior their valour and knowledge in the art of war, was to that of the Turks. To the common ſoldiers he took care to make the conſideration very ſenſible, that no particular gratuity was promiſed them on their diſmiſſion, after their great and ſignal ſervices. Under theſe circumſtances, a man of leſs art and reſolution than Nadir, might have tainted their minds with rebellious ſentiments; however, it was neceſſary to conduct his deſigns to an iſſue with great circumſpection. Of every intrigue and private commotion at court, Nadir was acquainted by his creatures, and was therefore better qualified how to act his part, when he ſhould return to court.

He had employed the end of the laſt year, and the beginning of this, chiefly in levying men, and diſciplining his army; which now amounted to ſeventy thouſand men. The government of the province of Khoraſan, he gave to his ſon Riza Kouli.

About the month of June he ſet out, making ſlow marches towards Iſpahan, where he arrived in Auguſt. He waited upon the King, and took care to extol what he had already done, and how much he had his Majeſty's intereſt at heart. The Shah did not ſuſpect any of his treacherous deſigns, but Nadir feared the more that his deſtruction was reſolved on. He acquainted the chiefs of his army, with his apprehenſions, and poſſeſſed them with an opinion, that their intereſt and ſafety, were inſeparably connected

with his own. He then communicated the project he had formed of depoſing Tœhmas, and putting that Prince's ſon Abas Myrza, an infant of ſix months, in his place. The matter being agreed to, under an engagement of ſecrecy, the Shah was invited to ſee his army in review, and the evolutions, and appearance of his ſoldiers, gave him great ſatisfaction. After the review was over, the Khan invited the Shah to a repaſt, which was the ſnare to entangle his ſovereign, who was ſoon overpowered by the infuſion of a drug; a ſmall quantity of wine intoxicated him. In this condition he ordered him to be removed to an apartment in the gardens of Hazar Jerib. His attendants were ſeized by the guards, and put under confinement.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan having corrupted the great officers of ſtate, as well as his own Generals, called an aſſembly, the iſſue of which was, that the King ſhould be removed to ſome remote part, in the eaſtern provinces of the empire. Preparations were then made, for the inauguration of the young Prince Abas. Tœhmas Kouli Khan entered Iſpahan with great pomp, and public notice was given, that the great officers of ſtate had found Shah Tœhmas incapable of holding the reins of government; and therefore had choſen his ſon Abas, the third of that name, Emperor of Perſia.

The young infant was accordingly brought out in his cradle, and the diadem fixed to the right ſide of his head, as a mark of his ſovereignty.

Kouli Khan and his creatures, now gave the blow. His eldeſt ſon, Riza Kouli, we have obſerved, was appointed governor of Khoraſan; and his ſecond ſon, Nezr Ali, was now made governor of Herat; his elder brother, Ibrahim, one of the followers of his fortune, was made a Khan, and the government of Tauris was aſſigned him; Kherman was conferred on his next brother. All this paſſed in the month of Auguſt.

Thus did this great and wicked man, under the pretence of promoting the honour and intereſt of his country, prepare the way to aſcend the heights of his ambition. The activity of his genius, ſuffered not a moment to be loſt, he publiſhed a manifeſto, diſclaiming the peace which had been lately made with the Turks. It was addreſſed to the Baſhaw of Bagdat, and conceived in theſe terms: "Be it known to you, the Baſhaw of Bagdat, that we "claim an indubitable right of viſiting the tombs of the Imans,

" Ali, Cherbellai, Mahallade, Mauza, and Huſſein *. We de-
" mand the delivery of all the Perſians, who have been taken pri-
" ſoners in the late war; and as the blood of our countrymen yet
" ſmokes, and calls upon their ſovereign for vengeance, there
" ought to be ſo much ſhed of the ſubjects of the Grand Signior, as
" theſe have ſpilt of the ſubiects of the king of Perſia. We make
" theſe our ſentiments known, that you may not accuſe us of the
' diſhonour of taking you by ſurpriſe. We are going ſoon, at the
" head of our victorious army, to breath the ſweet air of the plains
" of Bagdat, and to take our repoſe under the ſhadow of its walls."

The Turks in conſequence made preparations for war, and the troops marched to the ſuccour of Bagdat. Tœhmas Kouli Khan affected great unconcern at the menaces and preparations of the Turks, he knew that the fortune of war did not ſo much depend on numbers, as on the valour and experience of ſoldiers. He thought it, however, his intereſt to cultivate a good underſtanding with the Ruſſians, and the natural intereſt of Ruſſia, but could not render it agreable, to find that the Turks were threatened to be humbled by Tœhmas Khan.

The Perſian General collected all his forces, and engaged a body of Arabians. His army conſiſted of 80,000 men, and the firſt operation of the campaign, was the ſiege of Kermanſha, which the Shah had yielded up to the Turks, but the inhabitants opened the gates to him, and the governor was put to death. Tœhmas began his march towards Bagdat, the favourite object he had in view.

The Turks ſent detachments to guard the defiles on the Perſian ſide, which cover the plains, towards the frontiers of Bagdat; theſe, however, were eaſily forced. Traverſing the foreſt, between the cities of Mendeli and Nezerth, he paſſed the river Synce. Then coming into the plains of Bagdat, he croſſed the river Kentaul, and after a march of twenty days, arrived the 10th of April. 1733, under the walls of Bagdat.

This fortification is ſo compoſed, that under an experienced commander, it could ſcarcely be taken by an eaſtern army, any otherwiſe than by famine. Its happy ſituation on the Tigris, is an advantage which enables it to lay in a large ſupply of proviſions.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan made his advances with great confidence. However, being in want of artillery, he was not capable of making

* *Theſe are Prophets, who are held in veneration by the Perſians, and whoſe tombs are near Bagdat.*

regular approaches. His great buſineſs was, to inveſt the city and force the inhabitants to ſubmiſſion, by famine, or ſubdue them by ſtratagem. Myrza Khan was ſent with 10,000 men, a league up the Tigris, which they paſſed near the ſuburbs of Kouch Kaleſſi, where they found a piece of cannon of a very great ſize, which the Baſhaw had neglected to bring away. This was the only battering cannon in the Perſian army, and was by no means ſufficient to make a breach.

Bagdat was now cloſely blocked up, on both ſides the Tigris, by an army of 80,000: The Turkiſh garriſon, within the walls, conſiſted of about 20,000 men. Tœhmas expected now to oblige Achmed Baſhaw to a ſurrender by famine; nor could he well have failed, if his vanity had not got the better of his prudence.

Topal Oſman Baſhaw was appointed Seraſkier of the Ottoman army; but as the ſuccours and reinforcements were ſent in a very irregular manner, he was obliged to remain ſeveral months in a ſtate of in-action. The blockade laſted three months, and the place was on the point of falling into the hands of a cruel and enraged enemy.

Tœhmas having advice of the march of the Turks, detached 30,000 men, moſtly cavalry, to ſurprize them; but as he underſtood that Topal Oſman had an army of 100,000 men, he marched immediately at the head of his forces, near 70,000, leaving a conſiderable body of his men before Bagdat.

The 18th of July, the advanced guard of the Turkiſh army, met a detachment of the Perſians, and a ſkirmiſh enſued. The Turkiſh general, having reached the plain, ranged his forces in line of battle, dividing them into five different bodies. Tœhmas divided his men into ten different columns. The Turkiſh cavalry advanced with great fury, but were repulſed as far as their infantry; but theſe were ſo firm, that the fury of the Perſians was ſtopped. The battle was for ſome time undecided, till a body of Arabs, bribed by the Turks, fell on the main body of the Perſians in flank. The Perſians could not ſupport the ſhock, a total rout enſued. Their loſs was not leſs than 30,000 men, with all their baggage. The Turks, however, paid dear for this victory, for they loſt near as many men as the Perſians, In the mean time the garriſon of Bagdat made a ſally, and the Perſians were obliged to yield to numbers.

Tœhmas Kouli Khan retired with the remains of his army to Hamadan, from whence he wrote to the governor of Bagdat, ſay-

ing, he was determined to make war like a generous enemy, therefore acquainted him, that he might be prepared; for, that early next year he would take the field with a more numerous army, and meet him once more at Bagdat.

His real design was, however, to return as soon as possible; and he ordered his son, Nezr Ali, governor of Herat, to join him with all his forces, and thus soon completed again a formidable army.

Topal Osman, on his part, was in want of every necessary for his army. He sent, however, a Bashaw with 6000 men, to take post at the pass of Takayer, but the already advanced Afghans, drove them from thence. Topal Osman entrenched his army, consisting of near 100,000 men, in the plains of Aronia, in an advantageous situation. Tœhmas marched towards them, and came within sight of their army the 21st of October. The next day a part of the Turkish army sallied from their entrenchments, and the Persians were routed with the loss of 4000 men.

The Persian General now prepared for a decisive stroke. He fought the first battle in his own name, as General; the second in the name of the young king, Shah Abas III. Both these being unsuccessful, the army began to be superstitious. Kouli Khan resolved to make his decisive blow in the name of Shah Tœhmas. The 26th of October he advanced, and the two armies were soon near enough to one another, so that the battle became general, in which the Persians were victorious, and Topal Osman slain. The Turks lost all their baggage and artillery, and near 40,000 men. Tœhmas Kouli was preparing to besiege Bagdat again, when the news arrived, that Seesle Mahomed Khan governor of Shiraz, had collected an army of 30,000 men, and proclaimed Shah Tœhmas their lawful king. Tœhmas Kouli marched back into Persia, with forced marches, and put them to flight; Mahomed Khan, who fell into Tœhmas' hands, hanged himself in prison. Tœhmas Kouli Khan returned to Ispahan, where he remained till the next spring. In the mean time the Ottoman court made all preparation possible, to defend themselves against this formidable enemy.

Kouli Khan having recruited his army to near 100,000 men, opened the campaign this year, by marching directly to Tauris, from whence he sent his son, Nezr Ali, with a body of forces, to the banks of the Keira, to drive the Lesgees back again into their

mountains, which ſoon was accompliſhed, but he himſelf penetrated into Georgia, as far as Teflis. Kouli Khan, in the exultation of his heart, declared that he would carry his victorious arms to the Helleſpont, with a more formidable power than that of Xerxes. All the dominions of the Grand Signior, did, indeed, tremble at his name. Georgia and Armenia, fell a prey to him, and towards October he came before Ganja, which place, though well provided and garriſoned, ſoon ſubmitted at diſcretion. From thence he directed his courſe to Shamakie, a very flouriſhing place, the inhabitants of which he drove into the mountains, and the place he razed.

The Turks deſired peace, but Kouli Khan proudly deſpiſed any accommodation, and the Ruſſians yielded up to the Perſians, all the diſtricts ſituated on the coaſt of the Caſpian Sea, which had been conquered by Peter the Great. The Grand Signior gave orders to the new Seraſkier Couproli, who received great reinforcements, to give battle to Kouli Khan.

On the 10th of June, Tœhmas Kouli Khan appeared with 55,000 men, in the valley of Arpakari. The Seraſkier had an army of 80,000. At the approach of the Turks, the Perſian General broke up his camp, with a ſeeming precipitation, retired to Erivan, and concealed a body of men in a wood, whilſt another party was covered in a valley. In this ſituation he prepared to receive the Turks. The van of the Turkiſh army ſaw themſelves at once attacked in flank and rear, by the Perſians. The action was very bloody. The Seraſkier was killed with twenty thouſand men, and every thing fell into the hands of the Perſians. The Turks were again anxious for peace, and Kouli Khan was deſirous of engaging Ruſſia in a war with the Turks, as the moſt effectual means of promoting his own ſchemes.

If we conſider to what a wretched ſtate Perſia had been reduced, ſix years before, when Kouli Khan appeared at the head of its forces, we muſt impute this rapid ſucceſs to his military genius and fortune.

1736. The beginning of this year ripened the plot. The young Prince Abas died. The 10th of March, Kouli Khan aſſembled all the governors of the provinces, and the generals of his army, and in a long ſpeech, paſſed many encomiums on the ſervice he rendered his country, and how neceſſary it was now to chooſe a proper ſucceſſor to the throne, and deſired their anſwer in three days. Theſe being expired, the deputies waited on the General,

and declared him king. The next day, being the 11th of March, he was proclaimed under the name of Nadir Shah.

Thus did this aſpiring genius reach that point, which Cæſar could not obtain. He being arrived at the ſummit of his ambition, began to exert that boundleſs authority with which he was inveſted.

The coins which he cauſed to be ſtruck, had theſe inſcriptions:

Nadir, King of Kings, and glory of the age.

The aſſembly were diſmiſſed, and the firſt arbitrary ſtep he took, was to appropriate the revenues, and lands of the church, to the ſupport of the army. Meſſengers were ſent to Peterſburgh and Conſtantinople, and Nadir was acknowledged as ſovereign of Perſia; all the conquered provinces were yielded back to that empire, and a full permiſſion was granted for the Perſians to viſit the tomb of Mahomed. Nadir recruited his armies, and his ſecret deſigns againſt India was ſoon conſpicuous. He nominated his ſon, Riza Kouli Mirza, regent of Perſia.

In reviewing the expedition of Nadir Shah into India, the reader will indulge the inclination of making ſome compariſon between this undertaking and that of Alexander the Great.

It appears that theſe ravagers of the eaſtern world, Alexander and Nadir, were actuated by the ſame predominant paſſion. Alexander had the ſtrongeſt deſire of fame and glory; Nadir added to this, an inſatiable thirſt of accumulating riches. The one reigned by right of birth, the other by an uſurped power; Alexander was moſt beloved; Nadir moſt feared. Both appear as objects of terror and aſtoniſhment. Alexander, born as a Prince, ſoon was led and inſtructed to his deſtination; but Nadir, born and brought up in the loweſt ſtate, formed himſelf, and found his military and tactic ſkill, meerly within himſelf.

It is now 2144 years ſince Alexander made his expedition into India. In the month of December, 1736, Nadir began his march with a ſtrong army, and his firſt expedition was the taking of Kandahar. He puſhed on to Cabul, which is eſteemed the gates of India, on that ſide, and which place he took by ſtorm, in the month of June. From hence he marched through the large tract of country, between this place and Peiſhor. After having taken this place, he prepared to paſs the Indus. The Mogul's court, ſtruck with terror, reſolved to prepare for reſiſtance. Nadir Shah advanced to the bank of the Indus, and paſſed it the beginning of January 1739. He then traverſed many ſmall rivers, till he reached the Indian army, which was ſoon put to the rout.

Mahomed Shah, the Indian monarch, commanded his army in perſon, advanced towards his enemy, and after ſlow marches pitched his camp in the plains of Karnal. The pomp of the Imperial army was great. It was one of the moſt numerous and brilliant, that had for many ages appeared in the eaſt; conſiſting of near 200,000 fighting men.

After a march of 25 months, and 1850 miles, Nadir arrived with his army in the neighbourhood of Karnal. We muſt notice here his method of paſſing rivers. He made uſe of two iron chains, to which he fixed the ſkins of beaſts blown up; theſe floating upon the ſurface, ſupported the ſeveral parts of a ſmall bridge of timber, which he carried with him. The chain, being ſecured on both ſides of a river, ſerved alſo to hold a regular bridge of boats.

Nadir's army amounted to 160,000 men. They came ſoon to an engagement with the Indians, in which 17,000 of the latter were ſlain. A peace enſued, and by this treaty, Nadir, whoſe object was gain, got all the jewels, military cheſts, and every thing elſe belonging to the Indian camp, that was worth his taking.

Nadir now continued his march towards Delhie, the gates of which were opened to him. His advanced guard conſiſted of 4000 men, who eſcorted his haram; and 20,000 of his beſt cavalry guarded them at a proper diſtance. About two miles behind followed Mahomed Shah, the Indian Monarch, attended by his courtiers, and eſcorted by 12,000 Perſians. The Indian Lords, at the head of their troops, marched at the diſtance of a mile from each other, having great bodies of the Perſians between them. Nadir himſelf brought up the rear, with the reſt of his army; the whole compoſed a number of near 350,000 men, who covered near twelve miles of ground in length, and three in breadth. In this manner they proceeded five days march till they came to Sonput. This and many other places on the way were plundered by the Perſians. From Sonput they advanced to the gardens of Shalemar; here a very ſolemn entry was made, and the articles of peace were regulated, in which all the countries, to the weſt of the Indus, were yielded up to Nadir. After this he gave again the Indian diadem to its legal poſſeſſor, having firſt raiſed enormous contributions, in which all the barbarities imaginable were committed.

The treasure amassed by Nadir is estimated as follows :

	Crores.	
Jewels taken from the Great Mogul, and the Indian Lords.	25	£. 31,250,000
The Peacock throne, with nine others, garnished with precious stones, value	9	11,250,000
Gold, silver, plate, and money	30	37,500,000
Rich manufactures of many kinds	2	2,500,000
Cannon, warlike stores.	4	5,000,000
		sterling 87,500,000

Besides this he took back with him 300 elephants, 10,000 horses, an equal number of camels, many of which were loaded with spoil. Most of the gold and silver was melted into large ingots, and slung over the backs of camels, horses, and mules. If we reckon one half part of the 30 crores to be in gold, and the other in silver, it would require 5700 camels, and 2050 horses and mules to carry it.

Let us compare the two eastern heroes a little further, I mean Alexander and Nadir. What just reason can be assigned for the invasion of India by Alexander, which happened 2144 years ago? Though his conquest of Darius may be censured by historians as rash and extravagant, as not guided by experience, and unsupported by wisdom ; yet if we consider the events previous to it, we shall find his conduct correspondent with the rule of Princes in latter ages. The expedition of Xerxes, and other attempts made to enslave the Grecian republics, could not be easily forgotten. To prevent any future design of the same nature, was to take the first favourable opportunity of humbling the Persians. There was no other way to silence their scruples, to gratify their jealousy, or appease their resentment.

The Persian monarchy, in the reign of Darius, began to sink under its own weight. Luxury and corruption contributed to the effeminacy of the people, and if the unhappy circumstances of Persia, at that time, were a concomitant motive to Alexander's invasion, it did not invalidate the stronger reasons of self-preservation.

Nadir had been less criminal, if the same motives had carried him into India, but his expedition was certainly founded as much in avarice as ambition, or a fond notion of glory.

Alexander abandoned India entirely, probably because he could not keep it; but Nadir received a considerable share, on a

preſumption that he could keep it. He now prepared to march back into his own country; he repaſſed the Indus, and by ſome pretext or other, took from the officers in the army, all their jewels and riches acquired in the Mogul's country. His diſcipline was rigorous, and his barbarities unparalleled. At the ſiege of Cabul, to convince the Indians of his determined reſolution to preſerve the excellent diſcipline, he cauſed eighty of his ſoldiers to be ripped up, for being preſent when one of their comrades forced an Indian woman; and when at Delhie, he delivered up the city without limitation to ſlaughter and pillage. A place taken by ſtorm never exhibited a greater ſcene of horror. The Perſian ſoldiers ſpread themſelves, broke open houſes and palaces, ſlaughtering with an unbridled fury, with very little diſtinction of either age or ſex. The carnage laſted from eight in the morning to three in the afternoon. The unhappy Indians fought bravely, but being unaccuſtomed to the uſe of arms, had only the ſatisfaction of dying ſword in hand. Four hundred Perſians were killed, but of the citizens not leſs than eleven thouſand. Many, who were jealous of their honor, killed their wives, others committed murder on themſelves; numbers were burnt in their houſes, nor did the ſword ſpare the infant at its mother's breaſt. Horror and deſpair had plunged the inhabitants into ſuch diſtreſs, that near ten thouſand women threw themſelves into wells.

Nadir, though returning in triumph, loaded with ſpoils, was now to ſuffer one of the bittereſt calamities; as if Providence had ordered it as a puniſhment. His eldeſt ſon, Riza, whom he loved, entered into a conſpiracy againſt his life. Nadir was ſhot at in a narrow paſs, by a man, who had dug a pit to conceal himſelf, that he might take the better aim. He was ſhot in the left hand. A reward was offered to apprehend the aſſaſſin, and he was taken. It was ſoon diſcovered that his ſon was the perſon who hired this man to commit the murder. Riza being brought before his father, was intreated by him to repent of his crime, to aſk pardon, and promiſe obedience for the future. "Conſider "(ſays Nadir) I am your general, your ſovereign, your friend, "and your father. Conſider the duty you owe me in theſe ſeve- "ral relations. Reflect on the ſmall acknowledgement I aſk. "You are in my power, but I would not have you periſh. Live, "be happy, and a king, whenever Providence ſhall take me from "the earth." But Riza, who was of his father's diſpoſition, re- "plied, You are a tyrant, and ought to die. The moſt you can

" do to me is to kill me, I am prepared." The afflicted parent, between rage and tenderneſs, ſaid, " No, I will not take your " life, but I will make you an example to all the princes and the " earth, I will put out your eyes." This was accordingly done.

It was in February, 1740, that the Shah arrived again with his army in the neighbourhood of Iſpahan, and he employed now ſome time in reducing the neighbouring tribes, who revolted in his abſence. In 1741, he marched againſt the Leſgees, and was repulſed.

1742. The good underſtanding, ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt between Nadir Shah, and the governor of Bagdat gave the Turks no ſmall inquietude; but the check Nadir met with from the Leſgees, brought the Ottoman court to an opinion, that Nadir was not ſo powerful an enemy as they thought. War againſt him was again determined on, and their army on the banks of the Euphrates were ſtrengthened. The Perſians began hoſtilities, and Baſſorat and Bagdat were inveſted. During this, rebellions were excited in all parts of Nadir's dominions. He found means, however, to reduce ſome of them, but the flames of civil war ſpread themſelves like a torrent.

1744, The fortune of this eaſtern ſpoiler ſeemed now faſt to decline. He abandoned, for the preſent, his deſigns againſt the Turks and returned into the plains of Hamadan; but ſoon returned to the Turkiſh frontiers, and ſo divided his forces, that the revolts he had moſt to fear, were no longer dangerous to his deſigns.

1745. The Turks prepared vigorouſly for a new campaign, and at the end of July, the Perſian army, about eighty thouſand, and the Turkiſh army, above one hundred thouſand ſtrong, arrived in the neighbourhood of Erivan. A hot battle enſued, which laſted from morning till night, in which the Perſians at laſt were victorious. Nadir proceeded in this action with the utmoſt caution, and diſplayed all the talents of a prudent and learned general. The loſs of the Turks was enormous.

1746. Nadir ſaw too well the danger impending from inteſtine commotions in Perſia, to entertain any thoughts of purſuing his victories againſt the Turks: he rather choſe to enter into as ſpeedy an accommodation with them as poſſible. The greater part of this year paſſed in negociations, till at length peace was concluded, on the foundation of that of Amurath IV. The Court of Peterſburgh now thought proper to ſend a formal embaſſy to Nadir, who

gain got new buſineſs on his hands, for he received the intelligence that rebellion was breaking out on the borders of Khoraſan, and that the Georgians were ready for the ſame.

1747. In this critical ſituation of affairs, Nadir took the reſolution of marching to Meſched, where he arrived about the end of May, and left tokens of his barbarity and avarice every where. He next marched into the plains of Sultan Meydan, a day's journey from Meſched. Here he ſummoned ſome of the chiefs of the Ouſbegs, Tukomans, and other Tartars, who compoſed a great part of his army, and having ſworn them to ſecrecy and obedience diſcloſed his deſign of putting to the ſword all the Perſians in his camp, ſaying, he would play off a ſky-rocket at twelve at night, as a ſignal to begin the maſſacre: that when this work was done, he would load the Tartar chiefs with money and great honours; propoſing, when he had erected a huge pyramid of Perſian heads, to retire and end his days at Kœlat.

A Georgian ſlave, in Nadir's tent, overhearing ſome part of the conference in which this bloody plot was reſolved on, diſcovered the ſecret to a principal Perſian officer, who ſent for ſeveral others, and communicated the intelligence. Under this fatal extremity, what reſolution could be taken, but that Nadir himſelf ſhould die?

Saleh Beg, an officer of great intrepidity, and colonel of the body guard of Afghans, offered his ſervice for this purpoſe, and demanded only four choſen men as his followers. The uſual time of Nadir's going to reſt being paſt, and a few hours before the ſignal for the intended maſſacre, Saleh Beg, and his followers, under a pretence of urgent buſineſs, paſſed the guard, and ruſhing into the outward partition of the haram, met a eunuch, whom they diſpatched. Thence they proceeded into the haram, where they met an old woman, whom they alſo killed. They were yet at a loſs in which of the tents Nadir ſlept, till by the light of a lamp they diſcovered ſome jewels; here they ruſhed in and found him. Either he had not yet ſlept, or was awakened by the cries of the woman, and roſe from his bed. When the aſſaſſins approached, Nadir drew his ſabre, and demanded what buſineſs they had. Saleh Beg made no anſwer, but immediately cut him with his ſabre on the left ſide of the collar-bone. This did not prevent the Shah's collecting ſufficient force, to kill two of the ſoldiers, who came up to him to finiſh their leader's buſineſs. He was then retiring out of his tent, when the cords of it tripped him up, and

Saleh Beg gave him a mortal wound. Nadir cried, "mercy, and "I will forgive you all:" to which this officer replied, "You "have not ſhewn mercy, and therefore merit none."

Saleh Beg having performed this important buſineſs, cut off Nadir's head.

The Tartars, no ſooner heard that he was killed, than they took to their arms, upon which a general pillage and confuſion enſued: ſo that before day light, above five thouſand men on both ſides were ſlain.

The whole army diſperſed, after a continued campaign of eighteen years.

Thus fell this ſcourge of the eaſtern world, at the age of ſixty-one, after a reign of eleven years and three months; leaving a fatal proof how much it is in one man's power, to plunge a whole nation into an abyſs of miſery.

The actions of this uſurper made ſuch a ſplendid figure in the European world, that it was doubtful, for many years, on what principles he acted; but time took off the diſguiſe, and it was found to be ambition and avarice. To him, however, Perſia was indebted for her deliverance from the Afghans. To him ſhe owed the reſtoration of her legal ſovereign, and, by his valour and conduct, the Perſian monarchy recovered, in little more than eight years, the ſeveral dominions which had been torn from her; but it is plain from the iſſue, that he was influenced by motives which eclipſe his laſt actions.

He was a ſtrong, robuſt, handſome man, ſix feet high; had a voice ſo ſtrong and ſo ſonorous, as had great effect with his ſoldiers and enemies, and proved one great ſtep to his advancement to regal power. His ſtrength was not leſs inſtrumental to his fortune. He reſtored to uſe the battle-axe, and this weapon in his hand carried with it inevitable death. No part of his character was more diſtinguiſhed than that of a general. He had lived in the field in the ſeveral characters of peaſant, captive, ſervant, robber, ſoldier, general, and King. He was forward, bold, and enterpriſing. His intrepidity eauſed wonder, but his ſucceſs confirmed his abilities. He was never wounded, but when ſhot by the aſſaſſin; and in the height of his grandeur he would, upon an immergency, out-march his baggage, and ſuffer any hardſhip incident to a common ſoldier. His quickneſs of obſervation, where his forces were weakeſt, and his preſence of mind in ſuccouring them, ever made him ſuperior to his enemies. His reſolution ſeemed to in-

ſpire his people with a determined purpoſe, either to conquer or to die; nor did even his officers behave ill with impunity. In action he generally tired many horſes, being never long miſſing, where his preſence was needful. On theſe occaſions, he was accuſtomed to addreſs his men in ſuch familiar terms as ſeemed to demonſtrate an opinion, that a ſoldier will never perform his duty well, when he has no regard for his general. He found it indiſpenſably neceſſary to keep his army always in motion, in order to prevent thoſe conſpiracies, for which a great part of his ſoldiers were always ripe. By this means alſo, the people in the remoteſt parts of the empire were kept in awe, and he was ready to oppoſe the invaſions of his neighbours, or make conqueſts. Never was a man more indefatigable, in perſonal application and attendance to every duty of a commander. He was punctual in the payment of his army, and took ſurpriſing care to ſupply his camp with the neceſſaries of life. In the conduct of his wars he ever preferred ſtratagem to force. His marches were always rapid, and his progreſs ſo contrary to the ordinary rule of war, that he confounded his enemies. Thus he often defeated their beſt laid ſchemes, and attacked them where they were leaſt able to defend themſelves. Yet, in matters of the greateſt moment, his reſolutions were generally ſo good, and ſurpaſſing ordinary apprehenſions, that it ſeemed doubtful whether they were the effects of a ſolid judgment, or a blind temerity.

As to religion, it was uncertain what his notions were. Before a battle it was his conſtant cuſtom to proſtrate himſelf for a minute, and make an ejaculatory prayer. His mind was ſtrongly backed with the notions of predeſtination, and this made him the more dauntleſs.

In his politics he was unfathomed, particularly in puniſhing; petty crimes he often chaſtiſed with heavy puniſhments, whilſt offences of the blackeſt die eſcaped with impunity. But, as there is no good character without ſome ſhades and mixture of vice, ſo there is no bad character without ſome portion of virtue. Nadir had his vices and his virtues too, but unfortunately for himſelf and his people, the former were too predominant. But great was the corruption of the Perſians, and this corruption was foſtered and encouraged by the corruption of the monarch.

From his example we may learn, that the moſt ambitious prince can never arrive at the power of doing much miſchief, till a people are devoted to a vain and luxurious life, corrupt to an extreme, and loſt to all ſenſe of virtue. Perſia could not have groaned un-

der such a world of miseries, but by the iniquity of the Persians; that iniquity became the instrument of their tyrant's power; and never will there want a tyrant in any country, where the people are arrived to such an extreme of venality and corruption.

THE SEVEN-YEARS, OR THIRD SILESIAN WAR, FROM 1756, TO 1763.

[*Continued from page* 99.]

THE French gave to king George the Second the best opportunity to break the convention of Closter Seveen. The Hannoverians flattered themselves with a kind of neutrality, according to that treaty: but they found themselves sadly deceived. The country was treated like a conquered province, and was termed so in the French edicts. Richelieu exacted not only large contributions in money and all sorts of necessaries for his troops, and likewise enormous sums for himself; but, besides this, a farmer-general was sent from Paris, to take the whole Electorate in farm, after the French custom; and thus to plunder it methodically.

This farmer general was also appointed over the German provinces which might be conquered. A French royal extraordinary edict of the 18th of October, 1757, published this resolution; in consequence of which the Frenchman Gautier erected his farming shop at Hannover. These procedings drove the Hannoverians almost to despair. George had more love for his Electorate than for his kingdom; he was assisted by the British parliament, and decisive resolutions were taken. The convention was in England considered as broken; and the battle of Rosbach turned the scale. The Hannover troops, hitherto dispersed, were drawn together; and the Landgrave of Hessia was easily prevailed on to join them with his army, the French having given him great reason to complain. At first he was inclined to adhere to the convention of Closter Seeven, and recal his troops; the route of the march was even arranged: but Richelieu caused a change in that determination. He insisted upon their being totally disarmed, refusing to let them march off on any other condition. The Landgrave remonstrated in vain, that his soldiers, being free, armed, and provided with every thing, should not be considered as prisoners of war, whose arms might be taken away at pleasure. The Duke of Cumberland wrote on that account to the French general; and the

Daniſh ambaſſador, Count Lynar, by whoſe mediation the above mentioned convention was concluded, went in perſon to the French head quarters. He propoſed removing the Auſtrians into Holſtein, in order to make the French court eaſy on that ſubject. The landgrave conſenting to it, Richelieu wrote to Verſailles about it; but the French miniſters refuſed this expedient, inſiſting upon the diſarming.

The court of England put an end to the diſpute by declaring that it would renounce keeping the Heſſian troops in pay, if the landgrave would not immediately leave them to the diſpoſition of the king of great Britain.

This prince heſitated now no longer giving his 12,000 Heſſians to the diſpoſal of king George. and expoſed himſelf thereby to the whole fury of the French. A courier was ſent from the French head quarters with the moſt dreadful menaces. They threatened that the reſidential palace at Caſſel ſhould be blown in the air, the city burnt, and the whole country deſtroyed by fire and ſword, ſo that it ſhould for centuries repreſent a deſart. The landgrave deſpiſed theſe threats, went away, and the moſt terrible extortions commenced. Strange it was, that an Auſtrian commiſſary of the name of Chriſtiani appeared at Caſſel, in order to ſhare with the French the contributions. Orders were given that within four and twenty hours all perſons ſhould deliver up their gold and ſilver coin. The arſenals were emptied; and the colours, kettle drums, and other trophies of Heſſian bravery of former wars, depoſited there were reduced to aſhes.

Meanwhile the army of the allies began to form itſelf. The Hannoverians and Heſſians were joined by the troops of Brunſwick. The cavalry not being proportionable to the infantry, they were joined by ſome regiments of Pruſſian horſe. Frederic could not ſpare many ſoldiers to give them; but he provided a general equal to an whole army.—Duke Ferdinand of Brunſwick; one of thoſe extraordinary men, in whom ſuperior talents, greatneſs of mind, a generoſity of heart, were united to an extraordinary degree, and added luſtre to the human character. Richelieu threatened in vain to reduce all Hannover into a heap of rubbiſh, and even to deſtroy the royal palace, if the leaſt inimical meaſure ſhould be taken. Ferdinand anſwered very laconically, he would wait the conſequences, and give a more diſtinct explanation at the head of his army. Immediately after this the operation of the allies began. Two French corps were attacked and

beaten. Richelieu became raving, and gave orders to plunder the city of Zelt and to burn the ſuburbs. The inhabitants ſupplicated for the preſervation of the Orphan Houſe only, but to no purpoſe; it was reduced to aſhes. The inclemency of the ſeaſon obliged at laſt both parties to go into winter quarters.

Frederic had in the mean time entered Silſia. The Duke of Bevern, who with 25,000 men endeavoured to cover that province was unable to reſiſt the whole power of Auſtria, which was here united to conquer that country. A Pruſſian corps, with which general Winterfeld had maintained the communication between Sileſia and Saxony, had, after a very hard engagement, been obliged to relinquiſh its poſt, and to retreat. This misfortune was heightened by the mortal wound which that general received, who was Frederic's favourite, a man of great talents, and one who poſſeſſed a noble heart. His crowned friend, the army, and the whole country, lamented him, and conſidered his death as a national loſs.

The Auſtrian General Nadaſti advanced now towards Shweidnitz, and took that fortreſs by ſtorm, after a ſiege of ſixteen days, which the Duke of Bevern could not prevent. The garriſon of 6000 men, was taken priſoner, a large quantity of all ſorts of ſtores, with 200,000 florins in caſh, fell into the hands of the Auſtrians. This conqueſt facilitated the communication of the Auſtrians with Bohemia; and Nadaſti joined the grand army near Breſlaw.

The Pruſſians were here encamped. The Auſtrian generals thought it adviſeable to attack them before the arrival of the king, who was on the march thither with his victorious army. The battle happened the twenty ſecond of November. The Pruſſian entrenched camp was bombarded like a fortreſs, with the heavy artillery taken at Schweidnitz; and the attack happened on five different places at once. On both ſides the combat was ſuſtained with great bravery. Night approached—The fate of the day was not decided—The Duke expected the attack to be renewed at day break, and was concerned about the conſequences, on account of the ſuperior force of the enemy, he therefore marched during the night through Breſlaw, and left the field of battle to Prince Charles of Lorrain, the Auſtrian General, much againſt his expectation. The army of the latter amounted on the day of battle to above 80,000 men; that of the Pruſſians to only 25,000. The Pruſſians had 6,200 killed and wounded, the Auſtrians 5,800. Of the Pruſſians 3,600 were taken priſoners. The Duke of Bevern himſelf was made priſoner two days after, when reconnoitring. He had no guard with him; and a great ſuſpicion was therefore

excited that he had formed the design to avoid being responsible for what had happened.

General Zieten took the command, and led the remainder of the beaten army towards the king. The result of this retreat was the taking of Breslaw; which surrendered without resistance. A free march was allowed to the garrison of 3,000 Prussians. Frederic was so much dissatisfied with General Lestwitz, the commandant, that he punished him with imprisonment in a fortress. The Austrians gained a very considerable booty of provision, ordnance, and especially ammunition.

Silesia seemed now to be as good as lost to the king of Prussia. The Austrians formed great expectations: they had gained a battle, taken two forts, were in possession of the capital of the country, had a prodigious army to retain what they had conquered. and therefore the finest prospect of making in a short time an end of the war according to their own wishes. Such was the fortunate situation of the Austrians at the end of November. The winter season which had begun, was thought to have set limits to the farther operations of the Prussians. and the winter quarters were already the chief consideration; when, on a sudden, the whole scene changed, to the astonishment of all Europe. The approach of Frederic was looked upon as the last feeble effort of a despairing man, and his little army was among the Austrians called the parade-guard of Berlin. The Silesians of the Prussian party were without hopes; those of the Austrians totally without care.

Of this general opinion, Shafgotsh the Bishop of Breslaw gave a very glaring example. Frederic had axalted this priest to the rank of a prince, creating him a Bishop, and loading him with favours. He had been often a companion to the king at Potsdam, was honoured with the order of the Black Eagle, of which from the first year of his reign to the day of his death, Frederic was less liberal than of any thing else. All this was forgot by that ingrate, who now considered his benefactor as lost, and wanted to gain the favour of his enemies; he even set the most common forms of prudence and decency aside, scandalizing the king, tearing off and stamping upon the black Eagle; a behaviour at which even the Austrian officers revolted, and which drew upon him general detestation. He soon after fled to the mountains of Bohemia, to hide his shame; from thence he went to Vienna, where he met with contempt, and Theresa as well as the Emperor Francis highly disgusted with his conduct, denied him an audience. At Rome, where he was hated for his loose morals, he found likewise neither protection nor compassion; and now he lives in Bohemia as an exile.

The conquerors had already made many regulations for the government of the country, and a number of civil officers had profeſſed their allegiance to the Empreſs Maria Thereſa, when the Berlin parade-guard, as it was called, advanced near the Capital of Sileſia. Frederic had upon the march joined the army of Bevern, that was fled; but they were always obliged to encamp at a certain diſtance, in order not to damp the ſpirit of his victorious troops. They daily approached nearer to the enemy, who was entrenched near Breſlaw; when the king called all his generals and ſtaff officers together, delivering to them a ſhort but very energetic ſpeech. He repreſented to them his perilous ſituation; calling to their memory the bravery of their anceſtors, the blood of the warriors, who fell in the defence of their country, which ought to be avenged, and the glory of the Pruſſian name; declaring at the ſame time his firm reliance on their courage, their zeal and love for their country at a time when he was going to attack the enemy and to wreſt from them the advantages they had gained. This ſpeech inſpired his warriors with an enthuſiaſtic ardor. Some ſhed tears; all were moved. The moſt eminent of the generals anſwered in the name of that body of heroes, promiſing the king to conquer or to die. This animation ſoon diffuſed itſelf through the whole of the Pruſſian army; and as they learnt that the Auſtrians had left their advantageous poſition, in order to meet the Pruſſians, they conſidered the enemy already as good as vanquiſhed.

It was on the 5th of December that this battle, the greateſt in this century was fought, near the village of Leuthen. The ſituation of the two armies were in every reſpect different: the Pruſſians were only 30,000, the Auſtrians 90,000 ſtrong. The latter full of confidence in their great power, their Coloſſian alliance, and the poſſeſſion of Sileſia which they had already half conquered; the former, on the contrary, full of reliance on their ſuperior ſkill in military tactics, and on their great leader. In the one army reigned plenty through the ſupplies, which without interruption could be brought from Bohemia; but in the other was the want of many neceſſaries. The one had enjoyed a long reſt, the other was much fatigued by a long forced march. The Auſtrians were on this memorable day ſitted out with only common warlike ſpirits; the Pruſſians inſpired with heroiſm.

Thus both armies met on a plain, a better than which Frederic could not have deſired. The Auſtrians ſtood in mighty lines, which the eye could not meaſure; and could hardly believe their ſenſes, when they ſaw the ſmall Pruſſian army advance to the attack. But now

Frederic's great genius broke forth. He chose the oblique order of battle, which gained the Grecians so many victories and by the help of which Epaminondas vanquished the almost invincible Spartans; a position that belongs to the master-pieces in the art of war, and rests upon that rule to bring more soldiers on the chief point of attack than the enemy, and thereby, as it were, to force the victory. Frederic made feint movements towards the enemy's right wing, whilst his design was directed on the left. He ordered a particular manœuvre, which other troops, have attmpted to imitate, but which to this day has been executed by the Prussians only with the requisite order and alacrity. The art of that evolution consists in dividing a line into many bodies, to join those bodies close together, and thus to cause the whole mass of men to move on. Frederic invented that method. It was an imitation of the Macedonian Phalanx, which marched and fought in sixteen ranks, and was for many ages considered as invincible, till the sword of the Roman legions destroyed it, so that nothing but the name of it is remaining. This so contrived body of soldiers takes but a small space in proportion and shews at a distance a most confused lump of men promiscuously huddled together. However it requires but one signal of the general, to untie the knot with the greatest order, and with such rapidity that it represents the breaking out of a storm.

Thus Frederic attacked and overpowered the left wing of the enemy. Reinforcements came to the assistance of the beaten troops, but no time was given them to form: they no sooner appeared than they were repulsed. One Austrian regiment fell upon the other, and the confusion was inexpressible. Many thousand of Austrian troops could not come to a shot, but were carried along with the torrent. The strongest resistance was in the village of Leuthen, which was occupied by many Austrian troops and artillery. To those came a great number of fugitives, who filled all the houses and corners of the place, and made a desperate defence. At last they were obliged to give way. Terrible as the confusion was in the defeated army, some of their best troops endeavoured to form again under favour of the ground; but the Prussians soon put them to flight, and their cavalry, breaking in on all sides, made prisoners by thousands. At Collin it was neither skill nor bravery, but the iron vomiting machines, placed on inaccessible heights, that decided the fate of the day: but at Leuthen victory was determined by tactics and valour only. Twenty one thousand prisoners were made on the field of battle, 6,500 were killed and wounded, and 6,000

more went over to the conquerers after the battle. The loſs of the Pruſſians was 5,000 killed and wounded.

The immediate conſequence of that day was the ſiege of Breſlaw, which was left to its fate by the defeated army, after they had ſtrongly garriſoned it. There were gibbets erected in town for thoſe who ſhould talk of a ſurrender; however in a fortnight it was given up after the Pruſſians had made every preparation for a ſtorm; and the garriſon, conſiſting of 13 generals, 700 officers, and 18000 men, were obliged to lay down their arms. The Pruſſians made here a booty of a conſiderable magazine, a vaſt quantity of proviſion-waggons, and 144,000 florins in caſh. General Zieten, who was purſuing the enemy, made beſides, 2000 priſoners, and took 3000 waggon. Thus the Auſtrians loſt in two weeks, nearly 60,000 men; and the reſt of their army, a few weeks before ſo formidable, preſented only a corps of fugitives, who, without cannon, colours, or baggage, oppreſſed with want, and petrified with cold, were creeping over the Bohemian mountains in ſearch of a home.

The king's principal military talents conſiſted in repairing errors, and making the beſt uſe of advantages. The recovery of Sileſia, which he had nearly loſt, and more than 40,000 priſoners, would not have been ſufficient to impede the victorious career of that reſtleſs general, had not the advanced winter ſeaſon, and the deep ſnow put a ſtop to his farther progreſs. Even the ſiege of Schweidnitz was obliged to be deferred till the ſpring. The laſt operation in this campaign was the re-taking of Liegnitz. The garriſon of 3500 men obtained a free march; but a large magazine of proviſions and ammunition was left behind for the Pruſſians.

Frederic had at the end of this year the ſatisfaction of ſeeing all his dominions cleared from the enemy. The Auſtrians haſtened to the Imperial hereditary countries to recover from their dreadful defeat. The Ruſſians had evacuated Pruſſia; the French were driven from the frontiers of Brandenburgh, and in poſſeſſion of ſome ſmall remote provinces of Weſtphalia only. The troops of the Empire were ſent home, and the Swedes driven out of Pruſſian Pomerania by general Lehwald, whereby even Swediſh Pomerania fell into the hands of the Pruſſians, who likewiſe took poſſeſſion of Mecklenburgh, taking winter quarters in Saxony without interruption.

Thus ended a campaign unparalleled in the annals of the world. In this one year, ſeven capital battles were fought beſides a number of great ſkirmiſhes, of which in paſt times many would have been

conſidered as battles. Great generals, who were among the phenomena of nature, Frederic and Ferdinand, appeared at once on the theatre of war, to perform actions, worthy the imitation of the warriors of future ages. Henry, the hereditary prince of Brunſwick and Laudon, had alſo unfolded here the genius of ſuperior talents; and ſome others, though leſs great, yet of abilities ſufficient to found the military fame of a nation at any other peririod: Seydlitz, Keith, Fouquet, Bevern, Etrées, Broglio, Haddick, Romanzow. Wunſh, Zieten, Werner, and many other celebrated commanders of different corps had here the firſt opportunity of diſplaying their extraordinary capacities. Three other generals, renowned for the trophies they had gained, whoſe memory ſtands immortal in the journals of warlike achievements, fell in that ever memorable campaign; Schwerin, Brown, and Winterfield, ſealed their glorious actions with their blood. More than 700,000 warriors had been in arms. And of what nations? Not of enervated Aſiatics, who in former times covered the fields with numberleſs hordes, and afforded the Grecians, the Romans, and the Britons an opportunity of obtaining ſingular triumphs. They were not Cruſadors promiſcuouſly collected, who, like graſhoppers, overflowed whole provinces in monſtrous ſwarms, fought without order, and murdered men from a fanatic zeal. No: they were all warlike nations, who fought here on German ground; none of them unworthy the high culture of the eighteenth century, and ſome of them equal to the moſt valiant nations of ancient times, and more than one of them by itſelf able to give laws with the ſword to a great part of the world.

The extraordinary revolutions which happened within the ſhort ſpace of that campaign, were ſuch as to bid defiance to all human precaution and experience, and ſeemed to deviate from the natural courſe of things. At the beginning of the year we ſaw the king of Pruſſia triumphant; the power of Auſtria almoſt annihilated; a large army blocked up in a city on the point of ſurrendering; the Imperial metropolis itſelf not ſecure; and Thereſa's hopes almoſt annihilated. At once the ſcale of Auſtria ſinks again.—The Auſtrians are victorious, gain battles, and make conqueſts—On the contrary, Frederic is beaten, driven from Bohemia, forſaken by his allies, ſurrounded by enemies on all ſides, and on the point of deſtruction. But ſuddenly he riſes again to triumph more than ever. The armies of the Ruſſians, the Swedes, the troops of the empire, the French and the Auſtrians, partly beaten and partly deſtroyed; whole armies are taken priſoners; and Si-

lesia, that was half lost, regained in the midst of the winter by one stroke of the sword. The Russians are victorious in Prussia and fly: they leave many thousands of their sick and wounded behind, and the beaten Prussians pursue them to the frontiers of Poland. The warlike Swedes, on their arrival in Pomerania, find no enemy; their soldiers pant for dangers, and their officers for glory. The fate of Berlin is in their hands. Nothing is done; and, soon after, they are forced to seek for safety under the cannon of Stralsund. The French army is in quiet possession of all the provinces between the Elbe and the Weser. The Hannoverians take up arms; Ferdinand puts himself at their head; and that mighty enemy flees, leaves considerable magazines behind, and is locked up in a corner of Northern Germany.

The Britons hitherto would hear nothing of a war by land; however, Hanover suffering in their cause, and the exploits of Frederic, which were no where more esteemed than among that nation, changed their former sentiments. The king of Prussia became quite the idol of the English. They celebrated his birth day in London, and in the provinces like that of their own beloved monarch. The parliament granted him an annual subsidy of 670,000 pounds sterling. It was agreed to send British troops to Germany; and the great Pitt, who soon after took the rudder of the state into his hands, and governed by the power of his great genius the British empire like a dictator, laid it down as a principle, that America was to be conquered in Germany.

(1758.) Both belligerant powers now had new hopes and new designs; both had gathered new strength; and so the campaign of 1758 was opened. The Russians were the first on the theatre of war. Apraxin was recalled, Fermor received the command with positive orders to take Prussia in possession, which he performed in the midst of winter. Frederic, not doubting but this enemy would advance farther, and having again recruited his armies, which were by so many battles greatly reduced, and having likewise provided them abundantly with every thing, was wishing to undertake something against the Austrians before he attempted any thing against the former. He therefore turned his views towards Moravia, beginning his operations with the siege of Schweidnitz. This fortress with its garrison of 5000 men, which was blockaded all the winter, surrendered to the Prussians after a defence of sixteen days. It was now his turn to besiege Olmutz. This fort was provided with a strong garrison, and all necessaries to hold out a long siege. To this fort came as the commander, General Marshal, a man of

experience, courage, and reſolution; ſo that they had every reaſon to expect a vigorous reſiſtance.

The many difficulties attending an invaſion into Moravia were not a little augmented by the diſtance of the Pruſſian magazines from Olmutz, which was 82 miles. However, all obſtacles were ſurmounted. The king made ſigns as if he intended to enter Bohemia; but deluded the enemy, and forced his way into Moravia. The enemy's corps, who attempted to ſtop the undertaking, were repulſed; and the ſiege was formally commenced. The commander took the moſt effective meaſures for defence, repaired the fortifications ſpeedily, augmented his ſtore of proviſions, diſburthened himſelf of all uſeleſs inhabitants, and demoliſhed the ſuburbs. Field marſhal Keith commanded the beſieging corps. But the firſt meaſures they took augured an unfortunate reſult. Balby, the Pruſſian colonel of engineers, a Frenchman, committed the moſt extraordinary blunders whereby every thing was protracted. The firſt trench of the beſiegers was 1500 paces from the fort, a diſtance which rendered all firing fruitleſs. They advanced by degrees in ſpite of the ſallies and the vehement fire of the beſieged, and the place was cannonaded with 50 pieces of ordnance.

The wants, in commencing and continuing a ſiege, according to the modern art of war, are immenſe; at this there was daily occaſion for ſeveral hundred waggon loads of powder and balls. The neceſſary ſupplies for the Pruſſians were daily brought in large and ſmall tranſports. They generally arrived ſafe; but the ſiege required much more; all depended, therefore, on a large tranſport, which was expected from Sileſia by the way of Troppau, conſiſting of more than 3000 waggons loaded with ammunition and proviſions. To prevent its arrival was Daun's chief deſign, in order to ſave Olmutz without engaging the king, to which he very ſeldom inclined; precaution being his leading character. He made uſe of the ſtrength of his army, ſending different corps to occupy the roads and environs through which the tranſports were to paſs, many ſkirmiſhes happened. Fortune alternately declared in favor of both; but, on the whole, nothing was decided.

Frederic did every thing that his ſituation as beſieger, and the weakneſs of his army would permit, to obtain the tranſports ſafely, on which all depended. Colonel Moſel, an experienced officer, commanded the convoy. This corps was 9000 men ſtrong; and with this aſtoniſhing train he began a very tedious and difficult

march. From the rain and the continual paſſage, the roads were ſo much injured, that the waggons almoſt every moment ſtuck in the mud, and the train was thereby retarded and ſeparated. Moſel was obliged to halt from time to time, notwithſtanding which one third of the train was left behind. He could not wait for them, but proceeded on his march which led through hollow ways and near the enemy's batteries. Here Laudon was waiting for them, His Croats, poſted in a wood, attacked the Pruſſians with great heat; but they puſhed on into the wood, repulſed the enemy and made ſeveral hundred priſoners.

During this engagement the train was put into the greateſt confuſion. The peaſants, who drove the waggons, were ſo frightened at the firſt cannon-ſhot, that they left every thing, and diſperſed. Many took off their horſes and haſtened away. A great part of them never appeared again, but fled directly home. Even many waggons wheeled about regularly and returned to Troppau. Moſel made the beſt of this ſhocking diſaſter, and continued his march. The king detached general Zieten to meet him, who was lucky enough to join him; but there was not the half of the waggons, and many of thoſe could not proceed for want of drivers, who were diſperſed. A freſh halt was abſolutely neceſſary, and this precious time the Auſtrians uſed to poſt 25,000 ſelect troops amongſt the buſhes near Darmſtadel. Laudon and Ziſkowitz were their commanders. The train had hardly reached thoſe mountaneous paſſes, when they were attacked on all ſides. They fired with cannon at the waggons, killed the horſes, blew up the powder waggons, and put every thing in the moſt dreadful confuſion. However, the Pruſſians did not loſe courage, defending themſelves more than two hours in the moſt diſadvantageous ſituation. They were divided in ſeparate parties to cover the immenſe line of waggons; but the enemy could draw together at pleaſure, making their attack in whole columns. The Pruſſians were at laſt overcome, and the whole tranſport ſeparated. Zieten was cut off with a ſmall part of the convoy, and obliged to retreat to Troppau under continual fighting. General Krowkow collected the remaining troops, and 250 waggons, with which he ſafely arrived at the king's camp. Amongſt thoſe were 37 waggons laden with money of which none fell into the enemy's hands.

All the bravery of the Pruſſians was fruitleſs in an engagement ſo unequal, for it was not difficult to deſtroy a tranſport which formed a line of waggons from fifteen to twenty miles, and where the troops were ſeparated at the diſtance of a league. In this ſitu-

ation the Pruſſians did every thing that could be expected of the braveſt warriors. A number of recruits were with the tranſports eighteen and twenty years old, drawn from the cantons of the Mark, and Pomerania, who never had ſeen an enemy, and who fought here like Romans. Out of 900, but 65 were taken priſoners, the bodies of the remainder were left on the field of battle.

[*To be continued.*]

THE INFLUENCE OF THE SCIENCES ON THE ART OF WAR.

"THE experience we may acquire from hiſtory, is the "beſt inſtruction; for it enables us, at all times, and under all "circumſtances to form a correct judgement of whatever is "good."

AN ancient ſtate,* which ſeemed to have a predilection, that it was one day deſtined by the ſword of Mars, to become the regent of the earth, took the heroic reſolution, to dedicate its life wholly to the fatiguing labours of warlike exerciſes. Convinced that in war not the mind but the body is moſt affected; the arts and ſciences, which ſeemed only to contribute to the cultivation of the mind, and not to be in an immediate connection with military operations, were here deſpiſed, neglected, and even expelled. Accordingly they became what they endeavoured to be; Soldiers without troubling themſelves with geometry, philoſophy and the arts.

The life of this ſtate was a perpetual chain of war and victory. Its triumph over beaten enemies, over conquered cities and provinces are innumerable. If we add the great liſt of its renowned generals, the number of its old and experienced ſoldiers, whoſe bodies were covered with wounds and ſcars, (glorious marks of their victories!) we have glaring evidences of the uncommon war experience of that nation. Yet this military ſtate with all its experienced generals and ſoldiers, made not one progreſſive ſtep in the improvement of the art of war. At the end of five warlike centuries, this art was at Rome on the ſame contracted ſcale on which it was at its beginning. Fabulous as this may appear, it is confirmed by hiſtory.

* *Rome.*

What was it then, we may aſk, that kept the warlike ſpirit of that nation in ſo narrow a compaſs? was the greatneſs of thoſe deſpiſers of the ſciences, founded on chance only? or upon their always having had enemies to oppoſe, who were more ignorant than they? But let us ſee what ſlight military tactics took among that nation,* who adored Minerva both as the goddeſs of wiſdom and of the art of war; and who ſet out with the ſame degree of knowledge, but with different principles.

Geometry, philoſophy, eloquence, hiſtory and poetry were at home among thoſe people. They were the inſtruction of the youth, the ſtudy of the more advanced, and the entertainment of the experienced ſoldier. The officers cultivated by thoſe ſciences, regarded war with the ſame philoſophical eye as Newton looked upon nature. Military objects were to them what phyſical appearances are to the mathematician. In the combat for their country and for liberty, they meaſured the effect of power were the common ſoldier thinks on nothing but killing and on avoiding being killed. Accuſtomed, in every campaign, to write down their experiences and obſervations, to deduct from them concluſions and rules for poſterity, to them no event was loſt, no misfortune without utility, no event without conſequences. And ſo was the art of war, among that nation, at an early period raiſed to a ſcience, and was publicly taught in their ſeminaries. The notions which they connected with the inſtruction of the art of war in their ſchools may beſt be conceived from ſome expreſſions of Socrates, who, at that time, was a common Athenian ſoldier, but who, upon the field of battle knew to obſerve with the eye of a ſage, and to give even to generals uſeful leſſons. Being informed that a certain Dioneſidor had arrived at Athens, in order to give lectures on the art of war, he took an opportunity of thus addreſſing one of his young friends: "It would be a ſhame, if one who aimed at "occupying the ſtation of a commander in the army, ſhould let "this fine opportunity eſcape to ſtudy the art of war. The fate "of a country, during a war, depends on the general; therefore, "any one that ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be elected to ſuch a poſt "without having acquired the requiſite knowledge, ought to be ſe-"verely puniſhed."

This diſpoſed the young man to take leſſons of the beforementioned inſtructor. Socrates, ſome time after, meeting the young man again in company, addreſſed them in the following manner: "Is not this youth, in your opinion, more venerable ſince he has

* *Greece.*

" ſtudied the art of war? For, as a man may be a phyſician with-
" out practiſing his art, this young man is now a general, even
" though he ſhould not have one voice at the election to the com-
" mand; whilſt, on the contrary, another who knows nothing of
" the art of war does not become a better general by having ſuf-
" fered himſelf to be elected."

Xenophon, who relates this anecdote, and who moſt likely was the very man alluded to, has, by his example, juſtified the judgment of Socrates. He was afterwards among the corps of ten thouſand Greeks, as a volunteer without command. The terrible ſituation of that body of troops, after the loſs of a battle, in the centre of the Perſian empire, is well known. Before them an enraged monarch, whoſe empire and life they intended to take away, who could raiſe millions of men to his vengeance; in their rear large rivers, impracticable mountains, paſſes occupied by inimical nations, many hundred miles from their own country, without a guide, without the means to paſs rivers, without proviſions, without commanders. Who was it that in this perilous ſituation knew to give advice, take the neceſſary precautions, point out the road, the order of march, determine the attack and defence, and to conduct the whole corps ſafely to their home? It was the youngeſt of the five new elected generals—the ſcholar of Socrates.

The Greeks philoſophiſed in the field and arranged battles in their ſtudies; extending thereby their knowledge, and at every new war they made progreſs in tactics. In leſs than two hundred years they brought the art of war to the higheſt perfection; and after three hundred years they became the inſtructors of the Romans, who, with all their perpetual wars and victories, looked upon tactics as a trade, they having ſuffered this art to degenerate upon their field of Mars into a mechanical ſameneſs.

An evident proof of the perfection of the Grecian tactics towards the end of the firſt period, is Alexander the Great; who from the 20th to the 25th year of his age, in his Aſiatic campaign, already made uſe of all the tactical arts, which in the preſent century Frederic II. of Pruſſia has ſo excellently diſplayed. In the paſſage over the Granicus, in the battle of Arbela; in the paſſage over the Hydaſpes, we behold the models of the battles of Prague, of Leuthen, of Collin, and of Crefeld. It is, therefore, not leſſening the knowledge of Alexander if we aſſert that he had only weak Aſiatics to combat; it ſuffices, that his plans were ſo wiſe that he might have adopted them againſt any nation on earth; his enemies poſſeſſed ſo much tactical knowledge that they oppoſed to

him the ſame, and often better manœuvres, as in the beforementioned battles, the Auſtrians to the Pruſſians, and the French to the allies.

A ſtate may neglect or deſpiſe the arts and ſciences, and the art of war, which always keeps equal pace with them; they at laſt prevail, and take a terrible vengeance of their opponents. This is what Rome experienced, to which we now return again. They already began to rank Regulus among his great predeceſſors, having beaten in their own country the army of Rome's powerful rival, Carthage; a ſtate, which inſignificant as its beginning was, now reigned over numerous provinces and ſeas, and which by the extent of its commerce, and its indefatigable induſtry, poſſeſſed immenſe riches, when the pride of the Roman warriors became humiliated, and the theory of the art of war, accompanied by the other ſciences, began to ſhine in the occident with the ſame brightneſs as it had hitherto done in the orient.

At that time there was at Carthage a man, of a mean appearance; but he was educated in that warlike ſtate, where they were accuſtomed, before every battle, to bring offerings to the amiable Muſes, the protectors of the ſciences. Xanthippus, who never before was heard of having been at the head of an army, was bold enough to declare among his friends, that the Carthagenians were not beaten by the art of the Romans, but by the ignorance of their own generals. The Senate, in their deſpair, placed the fate of the ſtate and their army into the hands of this man. All were aſtoniſhed, when they ſaw how he divided the undiſciplined troops into ſpartan legions, and inſtructed them before the town in war manœuvres. All now were eager to combat under the lead of ſuch a commander. The army of the Romans was beaten, and the proud Regulus taken priſoner.

Xanthippus, to avoid jealouſy, the ſure companion of merit, retired to his native country; but he left among the Carthagenians a light in the art of war, which afterwards ſpread death and deſtruction in Italy. He left his ſcholar, the Carthagenian Hamilkar, a worthy ſucceſſor in his office, and heir of his arts. That able tactician, who defeated the rebels of the ſtate by a ſkilful manœuvre on the river Macar, and who, according to the expreſſion of Polybius, proved how great the difference was between generals who are maſters of the tactics, and thoſe of mere mechanical practice.

This zealous deſpiſer of the Romans did all in his power to inſpire his ſon, Hannilal, with the ſame ſentiments of hatred againſt the Romans. When a boy of nine years old, he made him ſwear at the altar of jupiter, an eternal enmity againſt them.

Inflamed by hatred againſt the Romans, and inſtructed by a ſecond Xanthippus, Hannibal, though not above 27 years old, was bold enough to declare war againſt the ſtate of Rome. The greatneſs of this enterprize we ſee by conſidering the then ſituation of Rome. During 500 years ſhe had carried on innumerable wars, and finiſhed them all victoriouſly. They had 150'000 infantry and 6000 horſe for the defence of their capital. Their whole force, with thoſe of their allies, was 700,000 infantry, and 70,000 horſe. Hannibal entered Italy, againſt all thoſe forces, with leſs than 20,000 men.

Such an enterprize can be equalled only by the fortitude with which Hannibal performed this march, the moſt difficult that ever was made. Nothing was capable of impeding his courſe, neither rapid rivers, nor numerous foes. They endeavored in vain to anihilate his army between the precipices of mountains. Nature had, in vain, fortified Italy with the Alps, whoſe rocks and mountains, covered with ſnow, are loſt in the clouds. In the midſt of winter, and the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, he broke through theſe rocks and mountains of ſnow, a road never before trodden by man or beaſt.

When he arrived in Italy, the fortune of war among the Romans, their valour and experience melted away before him like bad metal in the refiner's furnace. Evidences of this are the great battles on the river Trebia, on the lake of Traſimene and of Cannae, in each of which he annihilated almoſt a Roman army. Rome was plunged into grief. In vain they recalled to their minds their former brilliant triumphs; they only ſerved to augment their conſternation. The moſt experienced generals ſeemed to have loſt all preſence of mind; Fabius alone acquired the praiſe of his countrymen, by having found out that it was impoſſible to attack Hannibal upon a ground favorable to war manœuvres. He ſaved his army by marching them on the ſide of Hannibal over mountains and almoſt impaſſable ground, while the latter devaſtated the fertile plains of Italy with fire and ſword. But to conquer Hannibal, remained a ſecret to him as well as to his calleagues, who little knew that the art of war muſt be ſtudied, and was not to be learnt by mere mechanical practice.

Archimedes, whoſe writings we ſtill poſſeſs, and who laid the foundation of almoſt every modern diſcovery in mathematics, prepared, at this time, death and deſtruction to another Roman army. Archimedes, who thought practice to be the ſlave of theory, was often requeſted by king Hiero, his relation, to ſhew the utility of his ſtudies by practical application. But now, the place of his

nativity being beſieged by the Romans, he manifeſted it by inventions of war machines of all kinds. Sometimes he prevented the aſſault of a Roman army by a torrent of ſtones and arrows. Sometimes he annihilated the Roman veſſels with rocks thrown by machines. Sometimes he deſtroyed thoſe, who, by favor of the night, had approached the wall, by other machines, like drawing wells. With theſe he drew the boats, with the men in them, out of the water, and plunged them back into the abyſs. Marcellus, the Roman general, in vain made uſe of all his forces during three years before Syracuſe, a city, which he thought to conquer by one ſingle aſſault. All his ſkill and force availed him nothing againſt one ſingle mathematician, till at laſt on a faſt day, by the negligence of the guard, they were ſuffered to mount the walls, and Archimedes, amidſt his mathematical inſtruments, in his ſtudy room, was killed by a Roman ſoldier.

Though the examples of Xanthippus, Hannibal, and Archimedes, and the loſs of ſo many armies, gave to the Romans evident proofs of the influence which the ſciences have over the art of war; yet they would not have found out their error, if one of their fellow citizens had not by an indiſputable example, opened their eyes. To oppoſe Haſdrubal in Spain, a general was to be elected. The moſt experienced officers trembled at the idea of generalſhip in a country where death ſeemed particularly to perſecute the leaders. Scipio alone (a young man of 24 years,) was not diſcouraged. From his infancy, according to the example of the Greeks, he had addicted himſelf to philoſophy, elocution, poetry, the Greek language, and the ſtudy of their tactical writings, and was preſent at ſeveral campaigns. He was elected to the command of the Roman army in Spain, in conſequence of an eloquent addreſs to the people

His firſt endeavor was to exerciſe his army in the grand manœuvres, which he had learned from the hiſtory of the Punic war; the leſs important manœuvres only being hitherto known at Rome in the ſame manner as they were at Carthage before Xanthippus, and in the preſent century before Frederic the ſecond. The happieſt conſequences were the reſult of his ſkill and activity. He defeated the Carthagenian army in Spain, and formed the important project of paſſing over to Africa with his army, and attacking the Carthagenian ſtate in its very boſom. He proceeded with the caution of a veteran general, paſſing a whole year in Sicily in making preparations for his African campaign, and in exerciſing his troops. At the review, the Roman inſpectors beheld new evolutions by

land and by sea. Scipio safely landed his troops in Africa. The Carthagenians were defeated in several bloody engagements; and, beginning to be terrified at the fame of Scipio's successes, they recalled Hannibal out of Italy, to oppose the Romans at home; but nothing could resist the skilful manœuvres of Scipio. Even Hannibal was unable to stand against him. He who was sixteen years the terror of Rome, and their instructor in military manœuvres, was now, in a decisive battle, on which the fate of Carthage depended, defeated by his scholar.

This battle closed the second Punic war, the end of that powerful combat between theory and practice, which had lasted since the time of Xanthippus, and was decided in favor of the former. They began now to be convinced at Rome, what the mind of one man who is enlightened by the sciences, can do in war. Scipio's enemies were no longer able to lessen his actions and his merits. His triumphal entry into Rome was the triumph of the sciences. From the history of Scipio, as well as that of Alexander and Hannibal, it became evident that a young man, assisted by theory, and a few years experience, may take the command of an army to more advantage than any old general, whose knowledge is the result of practice only. Then they were convinced, says Sallust, that in war, the mind does more than the body.

The Roman youth, and particularly those who had formed pretensions to higher military posts, now endeavored to cultivate their minds by the sciences. We still have to regret the loss of the works of Cincius, Dimentus and Cato. The latter, as he declared himself, was more proud of his writings than of the many victories he gained as a Roman general.

The result, which was dearly bought with the ruin of so many flourishing provinces, with the blood of millions of men, with enormous expences, was, that the mind of the officer was to be cultivated by study as well as the body of the common soldier by exercises and manœuvres.

It is true, that common soldiers, who never had a scientific education, often distinguish themselves in war by a noble conduct. But who knows by what secret way the sciences often shew their influence? And even if we allow that a man may bear with fortitude the greatest hardships of war, be active in his enterprizes, and valiant in danger, without taking, like Charles XII, Alexander as a pattern; nay, without even knowing that Alexander ever existed; yet the presence of mind and the resolution of a leader, as

far as we diſtinguiſh it from bluntneſs, depends entirely on the theory he poſſeſſes of the art of war, ſo as that theory pre-ſuppoſes a mind cultivated by the ſciences. To deny that, would be the ſame as to aſſert, that the narrower a phyſician's notions are of the ſymptoms of diſeaſes, the better he would be able to diſtinguiſh the diſeaſes themſelves; and that the leſs he has taken notice of what other phyſicians have found ſerviceable in ſimilar caſes, the greater would be his abilities to preſcribe ſuitable remedies.

It is true, they want to ſupply all that by experience; as if a man would acquire a perfect knowledge of phyſic by viſiting the patients for ſome time in company with a phyſician, without having previouſly ſtudied medicine. Is the experience in war, on which many a one values himſelf ſo much, of another complexion? Do we know the ſituation of an enemy? Does the general communicate to us his intentions? Are we acquainted with all the ſprings, which he puts in motion? Do we know what in reality, has decided the action? Is the art of war ſo ſimple a thing, that we may penetrate the whole at one view, and fooliſhly imagine that from a few caſes at which we were preſent we can judge of all its extent? Can it be poſſible, for any one to have the opinion of himſelf that he could ſupply all by the greatneſs of his own genius, when even Frederic the ſecond, declares his great experience and exalted talents to be inſufficient? The art of war, ſays that Monarch after he had aſtoniſhed all Europe by his military exploits, "the art of war is "not born with us. And even if nature has beſtowed upon us the "moſt extraordinary talents; yet a profound ſtudy and a long ex- "perience are required to bring them to perfection." I venture to add, that a profound ſtudy is the more neceſſary, the leſs liberal nature has been in her gifts. For no one is more in need to ſtudy the invention of others, and thereby, as it were, to make them their own, than thoſe who have not the gift of invention. And many a one, who ſeemed to be without talents, became by continual application, a luminary which enlightened the world.

The many writings of Frederic the ſecond, evince how much he was addicted to ſtudy, how many nights he muſt inevitably have paſſed among his books. But did that prevent him from ſurpaſſing the moſt active general in activity, the firmeſt in fortitude, and the moſt determined in reſolution? Or was not all that a conſequence of his ſtudies? The Pruſſian tactics, in the ſpace of 15 years, came to as high a degree of perfection as the Macedonian, in which the greateſt geniuſes, the moſt renowned generals, and the moſt learned men of Greece, employed almoſt 200 years. It was

the influence of the ſciences that produced this aſtoniſhing progreſs. And even the Romans were at laſt convinced by the example of their fellow citizen, and were excited to ſtudy. All theſe examples ought to attract our attention, and excite immitation.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CHARACTER AND MILITARY TALENTS OF CHARLES XII. KING OF SWEDEN, BY THE LATE KING OF PRUSSIA.

I HAVE endeavoured, merely for my own information, to obtain a juſt idea of the character and military talents of Charles XII. I eſtimate his worth neither by the picture which have been drawn by his panegyriſts, nor his critics. Occular witneſſes, and memoirs, which are, by all authors, acknowledged to be authentic, have been my guides. We ought to ſuſpect all thoſe particular, and minute relations, which we too often find in hiſtory. Of a multitude of fictious and ſatyrical remarks, few things preſent themſeves which are worthy of notice.

Among the many turbuleut ſpirits, which have been devoured by the paſſion of reigning, thoſe rulers, who have ſought to render nations happy, or to ſubject them to the yoke of ſervitude, none deſerve to fix our attention, except ſuch whoſe genius was capable of embracing all things, whoſe vaſt plans produced great actions, and whoſe powers of mind created circumſtances, as it were, from nonentity, or profited by the moſt advantageous of thoſe which preſented themſelves, to effect eſſential changes in the relations which exiſt between ſtates.

Such was the genius of Cæſar. The ſervices he had rendered the republic, his great defects, his ſtill greater virtues, and his fortunate victories, all united to raiſe him to the empire of the world. Guſtavus, Turenne, Eugene, and Marlborough, in a ſphere more confined, were animated by the ſame ſpirit. Some of theſe great men made their operations conform to the plan which they intended to purſue during the campaign; others connected all their labours, all the operations of various campaigns. with the plan of the war they carried on; and the end they endeavoured to attain is diſcovered, when we with attention purſue their enterprizes, which were conducted with prudence and ſeconded by audacity, and which often were crowned with ſplendid ſucceſs.

Such was the plan of Cromwell, that ambitious aſſaſſin of a king, and of Richelieu, that adroit prieſt. who, in conſequence of

his perſeverance, obtained the power by which he governed the grandees of the kingdom, with the iron ſceptre of deſpotiſm, almoſt extirpated the proteſtants, and humbled the monarchs of Auſtria, who were the irreconcileable enemies of France.

I do not intend to examine by what right Cæſar overthrew the republic, of which he was a member; nor is this the place to decide whether the cardinal, during his adminiſtration, did good or harm to France; nor yet to queſtion how far Turenne merited reproaches for having ſerved the Spaniards againſt his country. We ſhall here only ſpeak of the real value of great qualities, and not of the proper or improper manner in which they have been employed.

The violent paſſions of Charles were, it is true, often obliged to cede to the eſtimates and ſage meaſures of politics; but this king is, nevertheleſs, one of thoſe ſingular apparitions that have excited the fear and aſtoniſhment of Europe. The grandeur and ſplendour of his actions ſurpaſs the expectation of the moſt ardent and determined warrior. King of a valiant nation, and arbitrator of the north, his ſucceeding misfortunes were exceſſive. Obliged to ſeek an aſylum among barbarians, by whom he was finally made priſoner: he merits obſervation both during his good and ill fortune; neither of which can be indifferent to warriors.

My intention is not to diminiſh the worth of this hero. I only mean to obſerve him with greater accuracy, that I may exactly determine in what he ought to be imitated, and propoſed as an example.

To imagine a man, who has attained the perfect knowledge of any ſcience whatever, would be as ridiculous as to pretend that fire quenches thirſt, and that water ſatisfies hunger. To inform the hero that he has been guilty of an error, is but to make him recollect he is a man. Kings, generals, miniſters, authors, in a word, all you who are obliged to appear on the great theatre of the world, you are equally ſubject to the deciſion of your cotemporaries, and to the ſentence of unpardoning poſterity.

The tooth of criticiſm can only make an impreſſion on excellence; bad writings are not worthy the trouble. It is the ſame with all the paths which lead to the temple of fame. Common mortals are ſuffered to paſs on without attracting attention; but the penetrating eye is fixed on thoſe who endeavour, with uncommon talents, to open to themſelves new roads.

Charles XII. is, from many conſiderations, excuſable in not having poſſeſſed all the perfection in the art of war. This diffi-

cult art is not innate with man. Though nature ſhould have beſtowed upon us ſuperior genius, profound ſtudy and long experience are not the leſs neceſſary for the improvement of the moſt auſpicious qualities. It is requiſite the warrior ſhould begin his career under the guide of a great captain, or be taught the principles of his trade at much expence and peril, and after having received many ſevere leſſons. We cannot poſſibly deceive ourſelves when we ſuppoſe all the capacity of a great general did not exiſt in a youth who was a king at ſixteen.

Charles XII. firſt ſaw the enemy when he firſt ſaw himſelf at the head of his forces.

I ſhall here take occaſion to remark, that all thoſe who have commanded armies in their early youth have imagined that courage and raſhneſs only were neceſſary to victory. Of this Pyrrhus, the great Condê, and our hero, are examples.

But ſince the diſcovery of gun-powder has changed the art of war, the whole ſyſtem has in conſequence been changed likewiſe. Strength of body, the firſt of qualities among the heroes of antiquity, is at preſent of no eſtimation. Stratagem vanquiſhes ſtrength, and art, courage. The underſtanding of the general has more influence on the fortunate or unfortunate conſequences of the campaign, than the proweſs of the combatants. Prudence prepares and traces the route which valor muſt purſue; boldneſs muſt direct the execution; and abilities, not good fortune only, will acquire us the applauſe of the well informed. Our young officers may learn the theory of this difficult ſcience, by the ſtudy of ſome claſſical works, and form themſelves by frequenting the ſociety of men of experience.

Theſe were reſources which the king of Sweden wanted. Whether it were to amuſe him, or to inſpire him with a love of the latin tongue, which he hated; he was obliged to tranſlate the ingenious romance of Quintus Curtius; and it is poſſible, that this book awakened in him the deſire to imitate Alexander; but it could not ſupply him with thoſe rules which appertain to a more recent military art. Charles indeed, generally ſpeaking, owed nothing to art, but all to nature. His genius was not reſplendent with acquired knowledge, but his mind bore the ſtamp of audacity to exceſs, and fortitude not to be ſhaken, ſo that it was capable of forming the greateſt reſolutions. Fame was the idol to which all was ſacrificed. His actions, ſingly, gain, when they are more nearly examined, in proportion as his plans ſuffer loſs. The firmneſs with which he oppoſed misfortune, his indefatigable activity

in all his enterprizes, and an heroical courage, which was blind to danger, were certainly the characteriſtic traits of this extraordinary monarch.

By nature deſtined to be a hero, the young king followed the irreſiſtable inclination which hurried him along, at the moment that the cupidity of his neighbours provoked him to war. His character, which, till then, had been miſtaken, ſuddenly diſplayed itſelf. But it is time to follow the hero on his various expeditions. I mean to confine my remarks to his nine firſt campaigns, which open a vaſt field for obſervation.

The King of Denmark made war on the Duke of Holſtein, who had eſpouſed the ſiſter of Charles. Inſtead of ſending troops into Holſtein, where they could only have aided in completing the ruin of the country he wiſhed to protect, he ordered eight thouſand men into Pomerania. He, himſelf, with his fleet, proceeded into Zealand, repulſed the enemy's troops that guarded the coaſt, beſieged Copenhagen, the capital of his foe, and, in leſs than ſix weeks, obliged the King of Denmark to conclude a peace, which was very advantageous to the Duke of Holſtein.

The plan and its execution were equally admirable. By this firſt eſſay, Charles raiſed himſelf to the rank of Scipio, who tranſported the war into Africa, that he might oblige Carthage to recall Hannibal out of Italy.

From Zealand I ſhall attend the young hero into Livonia, whither his troops marched with incredible ſpeed ; and the veni, vidi, vici of Cæſar, were perfectly applicable to the whole campaign. The ſame enthuſiaſm which inſpired the King in his enterprizes, animates our imagination, at the recital of the memorable victory he gained.

The conduct of Charles was ſagely audacious, and by no means raſh. It was neceſſary to ſuccour the town of Narva, which the Czar beſieged in perſon ; and for this purpoſe he was obliged to attack and to vanquiſh the Ruſſians. Their army was numerous, but it was only a ſwarm of ill-armed barbarians, without diſcipline, and deſtitute of commanders. The Swedes, therefore, might expect to gain the ſame advantages over the Muſcovites, as the Spaniards obtained over the ſavage nations of America. Their ſucceſs was perfectly correſpondent to their hopes, and Europe heard with aſtoniſhment, that eight thouſand Swedes had beaten and diſperſed eighty thouſand Ruſſians.

From this triumph, I ſhall accompany the hero to another victory, on the banks of the Duina, the only action in which he em-

ployed ſtratagem, and by which he profited like a conſummate General.

The Saxons were on the oppoſite ſhore, and Charles deceived them by an artifice, of which he himſelf was the inventor. He concealed his manœuvres by the thick ſmoke of wetted ſtraw, under favor of which, and an uninterrupted cannonade, he cauſed his troops to paſs the river before old general Heinau, who commanded the Saxons, had time to ſuſpect an action of ſuch a nature. Scarcely were the Swedes on the oppoſite ſide of the water, before they were formed, in order of battle, to fall on the enemy. The cavalry made ſome attacks, and the infantry a few diſcharges, and the Saxons were diſperſed and took to flight.

How ſplendid was ſuch conduct! On paſſing the river, how great was the preſence of mind, the activity which Charles diſplayed, while he put his troops in order of battle, at the very moment they progreſſively landed! What valour he demonſtrated in gaining the victory ſo rapidly, and with ſo much honour! Meaſures taken and executed after this manner, merit the praiſes of all ages, and of all nations.

But it is inconceiveable to recollect, that we are obliged to ſeek maſter ſtrokes of Charles in his firſt campaigns. Was it that he was ſpoiled by the interrupted favour of fortune? Or could he ſuppoſe that a man whom nothing reſiſted, had no need of art? Or did his courage, as admirable as it was aſtoniſhing, ſo far miſlead him, as to entail on him the defects of thoſe warriors, who poſſeſs no virtue but raſhneſs?

Hitherto Charles had turned his arms only againſt foes whom he was obliged to combat, in his own defence. But after the battle of Duina, we loſe ſight of the clue by which he was conducted. We perceive a great number of enterprizes, without connection and without deſign, intermigled with brilliant actions, but which in no manner contributed to produce that great effect, he might have reaſonably propoſed to himſelf in making war.

The Czar, paſt contradiction, was the moſt puiſſant and moſt dangerous enemy of Sweden. Should not the hero have returned in ſearch of him, immediately after the defeat of the Saxons? The remains of the army beaten at Narva were not yet reunited.

Peter I. had haſtily aſſembled thirty or forty thouſand new raiſed men, who were not of greater worth than the eighty thouſand, whom Charles diſarmed. He ought therefore again vigorouſly to have attacked him, to have driven him out of Ingria, and not to have given him time to recollect himſelf, but have profited by this ſituation, and have forced him to peace.

Auguſtus who had recently been elected, but not unanimouſly, beheld himſelf ſeated on a tottering throne. Deprive him of the aid of Ruſſia and he muſt fall. Or Charles might dethrone him whenever he ſhould pleaſe, ſuppoſing this to be a real advantage to Sweden. But inſtead of acting thus prudently, the king ſeems to have forgotton the Czar, and the Ruſſians at bay, that he might give chaſe to I know not what Poliſh-magnate of the contrary party. The purſuit of individual vengeance made him neglect real advantages, and loſe ſight of the principal object.

After he had ſeized on Lithuania, his army entered Poland like a torrent which overflowed and inundated the whole kingdom. The king was to-day at Warſaw, to-morow at Cracow, and the next day at Lublin or Lemberg. His troops ſpread themſelves through Poliſh Pruſſia, again appeared at Warſaw, dethroned king Auguſtus, purſued him into Saxony, there peaceably to take up winter quarters.

We muſt recollect that theſe campaigns, which I haſten over, afforded Charles employment during ſeveral years. Here I ſhall ſtop a moment to examine his conduct. Let me however remark, that, during the interval of theſe marches and counter marches, the victory of Cliffow was gained, for which he was indebted to an able manœuvre to take the Saxons in flank.

The method which Charles purſued in the war of Poland, was certainly very defective. The conqueſt of Poland, which is every where an open country without fortreſſes, is a thing of no difficulty; but its preſervation as Marſhal Saxe well obſerves, is very precarious. The eaſier it is to be conquered, the more difficult it is for a conqueror there to fix and maintain himſelf; the method the Marſhal propoſes, no doubt appears to be ſlow, but it is the only one which can be followed by thoſe who would act with ſafety.

The king of Sweden was by nature much too haſty to make profound reflections on the country in which he made war, and on the diſpoſitions ſuitable to his military efforts. Had he firſt eſtabliſhed himſelf in Poliſh Pruſſia, had he progreſſively ſecured the Viſtula and the Bog by throwing up entrenched places of arms, at the confluence of the rivers, or in other proper places; had he acted in the ſame manner on the other rivers which traverſe Poland, he would have obtained points at which to rally, would have guarded the conquered diſtricts, and the places he occupied would have enabled him to raiſe contributions, and form magazines for the army. By this conduct the war would have become more regular, and he would have preſcribed bounds to the inroads of the Ruſſians

and the Saxons. The posts well fortified, would have obliged his enemies, if they would act effectually, to undertake distant sieges, to which it would have been very difficult to transport the artillery necessary, on account of the badness of the roads in that country. His situation never could become desperate, should misfortune happen; his rear would have been open, and by his posts he would have gained time to repair the loss, and to retard a victorious enemy.

By a contrary conduct which Charles preferred, he was only master of the country which his troops occupied; his campaigns were continual marches; and the least unfortunate accident endangered the loss of his conquests. He was obliged to fight innumerable battles, and by the most glorious victory, only gained the uncertain possession of provinces, from which he had long before expelled the foe.

We insensibly approach the period when fortune began to declare against our hero. It is my intention to be still more circumspect than I have been, in judging events, the termination of which was so unfortunate.

We ought not to pass judgement on the goodness of the plan, by the issue of the undertaking. Let us carefully guard against placing that reverse of fortune, which happens in execution, to the account of want of precaution. It may be produced by invisible causes, which the multitude calls blind fatality, and which notwithstanding their great influence over the destiny of men, from their obscurity and complication, escape the most profound and most philosophic spirit of remark.

We cannot in any manner accuse the king of Sweden, of having been himself the cause of all the misfortunes which befell him. The success which had seconded his enterprizes, during the war in Poland, did not permit him to observe, that he often departed from rules of art; and, as he had not been punished for his errors, he was unacquainted with the danger to which he had been exposed. His constant good fortune rendered him so confident, that he did not even suspect it was necessary to change his measures.

In what relates to his projects on the duchy of Smolensko and the Ukrain, it appears, he may be accused of not having taken the least precaution. Supposing he had dethroned the Czar at Moscow, the execution of his plan would not have done him any honour; since success would not have been the work of prudence, but the effect of chance.

The subsistence of his troops should be the first care of a general. An army has been compared to an edifice, the basis of which is the

belly. The negligence of the king in this eſſential point, was what moſt contributed to his misfortunes, and moſt diminiſhed his fame. What praiſe would the general merit, who in order to vanquiſh, muſt have troops that have no need of nouriſhment, ſoldiers that are indefatigable and heroes who are immortal?

Charles XII. is accuſed of having too inconſiderably depended on the promiſes of Mazeppa, but he was not betrayed by the Coſſack. Mazeppa on the contrary, was himſelf betrayed by a fortuitous concourſe of unfortunate circumſtances; which he could neither foreſee nor avoid. Beſides, minds of the power of that of Charles, are incapable of ſuſpicion, and are never diffident, till they have been taught the wickedneſs and the ingratitude of mankind by repeated experience.

But I return to examine the plan of operations which Charles intended to execute, during his campaign. True it is, I cannot ſay, with Corregio, "I alſo am a painter," yet I will venture to preſent my ideas to the connoiſſeur in the art of war.

That he might repair the error he had committed, in having ſo long neglected the Czar, it appears to me, that the king ſhould have penetrated into Ruſſia, by the moſt eaſy route, as the moſt certain means of overwhelming his all powerful adverſary. This route, undoubtedly was not that of Smolenſko, nor the Ukrain. There were in both, impracticable marches, immenſe deſerts, and great rivers to paſs, before a half cultivated country could be entered, and the army arrive at Moſcow. By taking either of theſe routes, Charles deprived himſelf of all the ſuccour he might have received from Poland or Sweden. The farther he advanced into Ruſſia, the farther he found himſelf from his kingdom. To complete ſuch an enterprize required more than one campaign. Whence was he to obtain proviſions? By what road were his recruits to march? In what Muſcovite or Coſſack avenue could he eſtabliſh a place of reſerve? Whence could he obtain arms and clothing which are continually to be renewed in an army with numerous other things of leſs value, but which are abſolutely neceſſary?

So many inſurmountable difficulties, ſhould have taught him to foreſee that the Swedes were undoubtedly expoſed to periſh by fatigue and famine, and that they muſt diminiſh and melt away, even if victorious. If, therefore, the aſpect of ſucceſs was thus gloomy, how dreadful muſt be the picture of poſſible misfortune! A loſs eaſy to be repaired, in a different ſituation, muſt become a deciſive cataſtrophe, to an army abandoned to chance, in a deſert country, wihoutt ſtrong holds, and conſequently without retreats.

Inſtead of expoſing himſelf to ſo many difficulties, with ſo much temerity, inſtead of braving ſo many obſtacles, a much more natural plan preſented itſelf, which might have been conceived and executed without effort. Charles ſhould have proceeded immediately to Peterſburg, through Livonia and Ingria. The Swediſh fleet, and the neceſſary traſports, with a ſupply of proviſions, might have followed by the gulph of Finland; the recruits and other things neceſſary, might have been ſent on board this fleet, or marched through Finland. The king would thus have covered his beſt provinces, and not have removed from his frontiers Succeſs would have been more ſplendid, and the utmoſt adverſity would not have rendered his ſituation hopeleſs. Should he have ſeized on Peterſberg he would have deſtroyed the new ſettlement of the Czar; Ruſſia would have loſt ſight of Europe, and the only link which connected that empire, with the quarter of the globe we inhabit, would have been broken.

This point gained, he would have been able to profit by ſucceſs, and proceed farther; though I do not perceive it was any ways eſſential, he ſhould ſign the articles of peace at Moſcow.

Let me be permitted, for my own information, to compare the conduct of the king of Sweden, during theſe two compaigns, to the rules which the great maſters of the military art have given.

Thoſe rules are that a general ſhould never endanger his army; nor advance with any corps which is not ſufficient ſuſtained. Charles, as it were, buried himſelf in the duchy of Smolenſko, without thinking of preſerving a communication with Poland. Our inſtructors have eſtabliſhed it as a law, that we ſhould form a defenſive line of communication, and cover it by the army, that our rear may be open, and our magazines in ſafety. The Swedes found themſelves near the town of Smolenſko, with only proviſions ſufficient for a fortnight; they drove their enemies before them, beat their rear guard, and purſued them at a venture, without exactly knowing whither the fugitive enemy was leading them.

We know of no precaution which the king took for the ſubſiſtence of his army, except that he ordered general Lowenhaupt to follow him with a conſiderable convoy. He, therefore, ought not to have this convoy, which the army could not do without, ſo far in the rear; nor to have begun his march to the Ukrain before its arrival; for the farther he removed from it, the more he expoſed himſelf to defeat. He ſhould rather have choſen to return with his forces into Lithuania. He, on the contrary, continually puſhed forward, and thus accelerated the loſs of his army.

To such a conduct, so opposite to all the rules of the art of war, and which alone was sufficient to incur ruin, misfortunes were added, which can only be attributed to fatality. The Czar, thrice attacked Lowenthaupt, and at length obliged him to destroy a great part of his convoy.

The king of Sweden, therefore, was ignorant of the views and motions of the Russians. If this were negligence on his part, he ought bitterly to have reproached himself; but if it were occasioned by invincible obstacles, we must once again place this disaster to the account of inevitable destiny.

When war is made in a half barbarous and almost desert country, it is necessary to build fortresses in order to keep possession. These are, in some sort, creations. The troops must aid in constructing roads, mounds and bridges, and in raising redoubts, according as each shall become requisite; but a method so tedious, was little correspondent to the impetuous and restless spirit of the king. It has been rightly remarked, that, in what depended on bravery and promptitude, he was incomparable; but he was no longer the same man on occasions when regular plans or slow measures were to be observed, which time only could reform.

These considerations prove how necessary it is that a warrior should be master of his passions, and how difficult it is to unite, in a single person, all the talents of a great general.

I shall pass over the battle of Holofzin, as well as other combats of that campaign, because they were as ineffectual, relative to war, as they were fatal to those who fell the sorrowful victims. Charles, in general, was prodigal of the blood of men. There are, now doubt, occasions on which it is necessary to fight; as, when more may be gained than lost, when an enemy discovers negligence in his camp, or on his march, or when a decisive blow may oblige him to make peace; but many generals only fight because they do not know how, otherwise, to rid themselves of their embarrassment; therefore, such conduct is not attributed to them as a merit, but rather to the want of genius.

At length we approach the decisive battle of Pultawa. The errors of great men are exemplary lessons to those possessed of less abilities, and there are few generals in the world to whom the fate of Charles may not teach prudence, circumspection, and wisdom.

Marshall Keith, who afterwards commanded in the Ukrain, as a Russian general, and who has seen, and examined Pultawa, has assured me, that the fortifications of that place were only of earth, surrounded by a bad ditch. He was persuaded that the Swedes,

on their arrival, might, without further preparations, have carried it ſword in hand, had not the king purpoſely prolonged the ſiege, in order to attract, that he might vanquiſh, the Czar.

It is certain that the Swedes did no there diſcover the ſame ardour and impetuoſity for which they were famous, it muſt alſo be allowed, they did not make an attack till Menzikoff had firſt thrown ſuccours into the town, and till he had encamped near it, on the banks of the Worſhla. But the Czar had a conſiderable magazine at Pultawa. Should not the Swedes, who were in want of every thing, have ſeized, with all poſſible expedition, on this magazine, that they might, at a blow, have taken it from the Ruſſians, and have abundantly ſupplied themſelves? Charles XII. had undoubtedly the moſt powerful reaſons to puſh the ſiege with vigor, and he ought to have employed every means to have rendered himſelf maſter of this trifling place, before the arrival of ſuccour.

Without including the rambling Coſſacks of Mazeppa, who, on the day of battle, did more harm than good, the king had no more than 18,000 Swedes. How was it poſſible he ſhould think of undertaking a ſiege, and giving battle at the ſame time, with ſo ſmall an army?

On the approach of the enemy, it was requiſite either to raiſe the ſiege, or to have left a conſiderable corps in the trenches; the one was diſgraceful, and the other much diminiſhed the number of his combatants. This enterprize, which was totally contrary to the intereſt of the Swedes, was highly advantageous to the Czar, and ſeems unworthy of our hero; it ſcarce could have been expected even from a general, who had ever made war with reflection.

Without ſeeking to diſcover ſtratagems where there were none; without attributing to the king views, which he never entertained, we ought rather to recollect, that he was very often uninformed of the march of his enemy. It is to be preſumed that he had no intelligence of the march of Menzikoff, nor of the approach of the Czar; and that, conſequently, he did not think it neceſſary to haſten the ſiege, becauſe he immagined Pultawa could not but ſurrender. Let us further remember, that Charles always made war in the open field, that he did not underſtand making ſieges, and that he never had opportunities of acquiring knowledge by experience; when we conſider too, that the Swedes lay three months before Thorn, the works of which were no better than thoſe of Pultawa, we may, without injuſtice, pronounce what their abilities were for carrying on a ſiege.

When Mons, Tournay, and the works of Cohorn and Vauban, ſcarce impeded the progreſs of the French for three weeks; and

when, on the contrary, Thorn and Pultawa occupied the Swedes for ſeveral months, may we not well conclude the latter did not underſtand the art of taking towns? No place could reſiſt them, if it were poſſible to carry it by aſſault, ſword in hand; but they were ſtopped by the moſt inſignificant fortreſs, before which it was neceſſary to open trenches.

Should theſe proofs be inſufficient, I will aſk, would not Charles, hot and impetuous as he was, have beſieged and taken Dantzick, that he might have made the city feel the whole weight of his wrath, on account of an offence which he had received; or would he have been ſatisfied with a ſum of money, if he had not ſuppoſed the ſiege to be an enterprize above his ſtrength?

But let us return to the principal object of this eſſay. Pultawa was beſieged, and the Czar approached with his army. Charles ſtill had it in his power to chuſe his poſt, and there to wait for his arrival. This poſt he might have taken on the banks of the Worſkla, either to diſpute the paſſage of the river, or, the foe having paſſed it, immediately to have attacked the Czar. The ſituation of the Swedes demanded quick determination. Either they muſt fall on the Ruſſians, the moment they arrived, or entirely abandon the project of attack. To ſuffer the Czar to chuſe his poſt, and to give him time neceſſary to put himſelf in a ſtate of defence, was an irreparable fault; he already had the advantage of numbers, which was not a little; and he was allowed to acquire the advantage of ground, and of military art, which was too much.

A few days before the arrival of the Czar, the king was wounded in viſiting his trenches; the greateſt blame, conſequently, fell on his generals. It nevertheleſs appears, that as ſoon as he was reſolved to give battle, he ought to have abandoned his trenches, that he might have been able to attack the enemy with more vigor. Were he victorious, Pultawa would ſurrender itſelf; were he vanquiſhed, he would equally be obliged to raiſe the ſiege.

So many miſtakes united, announced the iſſue of the unfortunate battle, the approach of which was daily perceived.

It ſeemed as if fate had previouſly diſpoſed every thing to the diſadvantage of the Swedes, and thus prepared their ruin. The wound of the king, which prevented him from perſonally heading his troops as uſual, and the negligence of the generals, who, by their erroneous diſpoſitions, ſufficiently ſhewed that they were unacquainted with the poſition of the enemy, or at leaſt that their knowledge was imperfect, greatly contributed to that remarkable cataſtrophe. The attack, alſo, was begun by the cavalry; whereas

it was the buſineſs of the infantry, and of a well directed artillery.

The poſt of the Ruſſians was very advantageous by its ſituation, and was made ſtronger with redoubts. A part of their front only could be attacked, and the ſmall plain, on which it was poſſible to form for the aſſault, was flanked by the croſs fire of three rows of redoubts. One wing of the Ruſſian army was covered by an abbatis, behind which there was an intrenchment and the other was defended by an impracticable marſh.

Marſhal Keith, who perſonally examined this ſo famous ground, maintained that, even with an army of an hundred thouſand men, Charles could not have vanquiſhed the Czar thus poſted, becauſe the various difficulties that were ſucceſſively to be overcome, muſt have coſt an infinite number of men, and it is known, that the braveſt troops at length loſe courage, after a long and murderous attack when they are oppoſed by new and unceaſing impediments.

I know not what were the reaſons, which induced the Swedes, in a ſituation ſo critical as they then were, to hazard an attempt ſo dangerous. If their neceſſity was abſolute, the error of obliging themſelves to riſk a battle in their own deſpite, and under the moſt diſadvantageous circumſtances was great.

All that might well have been predicted happened: a conſiderable army diminiſhed by labour, want, and even victory, was led to the ſlaughter. General Creutz, who by a circuitous rout was to have taken the Ruſſians in flank, loſt himſelf in the woods, and never appeared on the field.

Thus twelve thouſand Swedes attacked a poſt, defended by eighty thouſand Muſcovites, who no longer were that multitude of barbarians whom Charles had diſperſed at Narva; they were metamorphoſed into well armed and well poſted ſoldiers, commanded by able foreign generals; well intrenched, and defended by the fire of a formidable train of artillery.

The Swedes led their cavalry againſt the batteries, and, as might have been expected, were obliged to retreat in valour's deſpite.—The infantry advanced; and though it was received by a moſt dreadful fire from the redoubts, they ſeized on the two firſt of them. But the Ruſſians attacked the Swediſh battallions at once, in front, flank, and rear; repulſed them ſeveral times, and obliged them to relinquiſh the field of battle. Diſorder then ſpread through the army; the king being wounded, was unable to rally his troops, and there was no perſon who could collect the fugitives ſoon enough, becauſe the beſt generals had been made priſoners at the beginning

of the battle; and, as the Swedes had no place which covered the rear of their army, it was their fault that these troops, who fled as far as the banks of the Borysthenes, were obliged to surrender at discretion to the conqueror.

An author of considerable wit, but who probably studied the military art in Homer or Virgil, imagines the king of Sweden ought to have put himself at the head of the fugitives whom general Lowenhaupt had collected on the banks of the Borysthenes; and pretends that the fever which his wound received, and which, as he truly observes, was little calculated to inspire courage, was the reason that he neglected the only means which, according to him, remained for repairing his loss.

Such a determination might have been proper in ages when men fought with the sword and the club; but after a battle, the infantry is always in want of powder. The ammunition of the Swedes formed a part of the baggage, which the enemy had already taken; therefore, if Charles had been unwise enough to have headed these troops, destitute as they were of powder and bread, two things which oblige even fortresses to surrender, the Czar would soon have had the pleasure of giving audience to his brother Charles, for whom he waited with great impatience; consequently, in a situation so desperate, the king, had he been in perfect health, could do nothing better than to take refuge among the Turks.

Monarchs, no doubt, ought not to fear danger; but their dignity equally induces them carefully to avoid being made prisoners; and less from personal consideration than from the dreadful consequences which result to their state. French authors should recollect the considerable injury which their nation suffered by the captivity of Francis I. The wounds which France then received still bleed, and the venality of state dignities, which was inevitable, in order to raise the sum for the royal ransom, is a double monument of that disgraceful epocha.

In flight, itself, our hero is worthy of admiration. Any other man would have sunk under a blow so severe; but he formed new plans, found resources even in misfortune, and, when a fugitive in Turkey, meditated to arm the Porte against Russia.

It is with pain I behold Charles degrading himself to the rank of a courtier of the Sultan, begging a thousand purses; and perceive with what headlong, what inconceivable obstinacy he persevered in wishing to remain in the states of a monarch, who would not suffer him there to remain. I could wish the strange battle of Bender might be blotted from his history. I regret the precious time he

loſt in a barbarous country, feeding on deluſive hope, deaf to the plaintive voice of Sweden, and inſenſible of his duty, by which he was ſo loudly ſummoned to the defence of his kingdom, which he, in ſome manner, ſeemed, while abſent, voluntarily to renounce.

The plans which are attributed to him after his return into Pomerania, and which certain perſons have made originate with count Van Goertz, have always appeared to me ſo indeterminate, ſo monſtrous, and ſo little conſiſtent with the ſituation and exhauſted ſtate of his kingdom, that my readers will permit me, in behalf of the fame of Charles, to leave them in ſilence. That war ſo fruitful in fortunate and unfortunate events, was begun by the enemies of Sweden; and Charles, obliged to reſiſt their plan of aggrandizement, was only in a ſtate of defence. His enemies attacked him becauſe they miſunderſtood and deſpiſed his youth. While he was ſucceſsful and appeared to be a dangerous enemy, he was envied by Europe; but when fortune turned her back, the allied powers ſhook the throne of Charles, and parcelled out his kingdom.

Had this hero poſſeſſed moderation equal to his courage, had he ſet limits to his triumphs, had he reconciled himſelf to the Czar, when an opportunity of honorable peace preſented itſelf, he would have ſtifled the evil deſigns of his enemies; but, as ſoon as they had recovered from their panic, they only thought of the means of enriching themſelves by the ruin of his monarchy. Unfortunately the paſſions of Charles were ſubject to no controul, he wiſhed to carry every thing by force and haughtineſs, and deſpotically to lord even over deſpots. To make war, and to dethrone kings was to him but one and the ſame act.

In all the books which treat of Charles XII. I find high ſounding praiſes beſtowed on his frugality and continence; but twenty French cooks in his kitchen, a thouſand courteſans in his train, and ten companies of players in his army, would not have occaſioned his kingdom the hundredth part of the evils brought on it by his ardent thirſt of glory, and deſire of vengeance. Offences made ſo deep and ſo durable an impreſſion on the ſoul of Charles, that the moſt recent effaced all traces of thoſe which had preceded. It may be ſaid, we ſee the different paſſions which agitated the irreconcileable mind of this prince with ſo much violence, diſcloſe themſelves by degrees, when we obſerve and attend him at the head of his armies.

He began by making war on the king of Denmark; he afterwards perſecuted the king of Poland without meaſure or limits; preſently, the whole weight of his anger fell on the Czar; and at

length his vengence selected the king of England as its only object; so that he forgot himself, so far, as to lose sight of the natural enemy of his kingdom, that he might course a shadow, and seek an enemy who was become his foe by accident. or rather by chance.

If we collect the various fruits, which charcterize this extraordinary man, we shall find him less intelligent than courageous; less sage than active, less attentive to real advantage, than the slave of his passions; as enterprising, but not so artful, as Hannibal; rather resembling Pyrrhus than Alexander; and as splendid as Condé at Racroi, Friburg, and Nordlingen. But he could not at any time be compared to Turenne, if we observe the latter at the battles of the Downs, near Dunkirc, and at Colmar; and especially during his two last campaigns.

Though the actions of our hero shine with great brilliancy, they must not be imitated, except with particular caution. The more resplendent they are, the more easily may they seduce the youthful, headlong, and angry warrior; to whom we cannot often enough repeat that valour, without wisdom is insufficient; and that the adversary, with a cool head, who can combine and calculate, will finally be victorious over the rash.

To form a perfect general, the courage, fortitude and activity of Charles XII. the penetrating glance and policy of Marlborough, the vast plans and art of Eugene, the stratagems of Luxemburg, the wisdom, order, and foresight of Montecuculli, and the grand art which Turenne possessed, of seizing the critical moment, should be united. Such a phœnix will with difficulty be engendered. Some pretend that Alexander was the model on which Charles XII. formed himself. If that be true, it is equally so, that the successor of Charles is Prince Edward; and if unfortunately the latter should serve as an example to any one, the copy, at best, can only be a Don Quixote.

But what right have I to judge the most celebrated and the greatest generals? Have I myself observed the precepts I have just prescribed? I can only reply, that the faults of others, on the slightest effort of the memory, start to view, and that we glide lightly over our own.

American War.

(*Continued from page* 74.)

BEFORE the end of that memorable year, lord Dunmore, the governor of Virginia, gave proofs that he was but illy fitted to be at the helm in this tempeſtuous ſeaſon. This province, though there was not a ſingle Britiſh ſoldier within its limits, was, by his indiſcretion, involved, for ſeveral months, in difficulties but little ſhort of thoſe to which the inhabitants of Maſſachuſetts were ſubjected. In common with the other provinces, they had taken effectual meaſures to prepare their militia for the purpoſes of defence. Lord Dunmore, about this time, engaged a party belonging to a royal veſſel in James' River, to convey ſome public powder from a magazine in Williamſburg on board their ſhip. This alarmed the inhabitants—They aſſembled with arms, and demanded its reſtitution. Extremities were prevented; and, for this time, the affair ended in a negociation.

Lord Dunmore, however, thought proper to ſend his lady and family on board the Fawey man of war, in Jame's river, and to fortify his palace. The aſſembly, who then was convened, appointed a committee to examine the ſtate of the magazine. They found moſt of the remaining powder buried; the muſkets deprived of their locks, and ſpring guns planted in the magazine. Theſe diſcoveries irritated the people, and the governor privately retired on board the Fawey man of war. The royal government in Virginia from that day ceaſed. An armed force was now raiſed, and other meaſures taken for putting the colony in a ſtate of defence. Lord Dunmore, whoſe paſſions predominated over his underſtanding, was precipitated into farther follies. With the aid of ſome tories, run-away negroes, and ſome frigates that were on the ſtation, he eſtabliſhed a marine force. By degrees, he equipped and armed a number of veſſels of different kinds and ſizes, in one of which he conſtantly reſided, except when he went on ſhore in a hoſtile manner. On the 25th of October, he made an attempt to burn Hampton; but the crews of his veſſels were ſo annoyed by rifleмen from the ſhore, that they were obliged to quit their ſtation. Soon after, lord Dunmore, after having proclaimed liberty to the ſlaves, was joined by ſeveral hundreds, both whites and black, at Norfolk, and having once more got footing on the main, he amuſed himſelf with hopes of acquiring the glory of reducing one part of the province by means of the other. The pro-

vincials had now an object againſt which they might direct their arms. An expedition was therefore concerted againſt the force which had taken the poſt at Norfolk. Lord Dunmore conſtructed a fort at the bridge, on the Norfolk ſide, and furniſhed it with artillery. The provincials, alſo, fortified themſelves near to the ſame place, with a narrow cauſeway in their front. On the 9th of December, the royaliſts commenced an attack. Captain Fordyce, at the head of about 60 men paſſed the cauſeway, and boldly marched up to the provincial entrenchments with fixed bayonets. They were expoſed to the fire of the provincials in front, and enfiladed by another part of their works. The Captain and ſeveral of his men fell, the Lieutenant with others were taken, and all who ſurvived were wounded.

The royal forces, on the enſuing night, evacuated their poſt at the bridge, and Lord Dunmore ſhortly after abandoned Norfolk, and retired with his people on board his ſhips. Many of the Tories, ſought the ſame aſylum. The Provincials took poſſeſſion of Norfolk and the fleet with its new incumbrances, moved to a greater diſtance. The people on board, cut off from all peaceable intercourſe with the ſhore, were diſtreſſed for proviſions and neceſſaries of every kind. At length on the arrival of the Liverpool man of war from England a flag was ſent on ſhore to put the queſtion, whether they would ſupply his Majeſty's ſhips with proviſions? An anſwer was returned in the negative. It was then determined to deſtroy the town. This was carried into effect, and Norfolk was reduced, to aſhes. The whole loſs was eſtimated at 300,000 Pounds ſterling. The provincinals, to deprive the ſhips of every reſource of ſupply, deſtroyed the houſes and plantations that were near the water, and obliged the people to move their cattle, proviſions, and effects, farther into the country. Lord Dunmore, with his fleet, continued for ſeveral months on the coaſt and in the river of virginia. His unhappy followers ſuffered a complication of diſtreſſes, which induced him ſometimes after to burn the leaſt valuable of his veſſels, and to ſend the remainder amounting to 30 or 40 ſail, to Florida, Bermuda and the weſt Indies.

While theſe tranſactions were carrying on, another ſcheme, in which Lord Dunmore was a party, in like manner miſcarried. This ſcheme was formed by one Conolly a Penſylvanian. The firſt ſtep of his plan was, to enter into a league with the Ohio Indians. He ſet out, and actually ſucceded in his deſign. On his return he was diſpatched to general Gage, from whom he received a Colonel's commiſſion. The plan was, that he ſhould return to the Ohio,

were by the assistance of the British and Indians in these parts, he was to penetrate through the back settlements into Virginia, and join Lord Dunmore at Alexandria. But by an accident he was discovered and taken prisoner.

In South Carolina, regiments were raised—forts were built—the Militia trained, and every necessary preparation made for that purpose. Lord W. Campbell, the royal governor, having endeavoured to form a party for the support of British government, was obliged to take up his residence on board of an armed vessel in the harbour. Governor Martin of North Carolina, who was also very zealous for the royal interest likewise consulted his safety, retiring on board a sloop of war in Cape Fear river. He attempted to raise the back settlers, consisting chiefly of Scots Highlanders, against the Colony. He sent commissions among them for raising and commanding regiments; and he granted one to Mr. M'Donald to act as their general. Upon the first intelligence of their assembling, Brigadier-General Moore, with some provincial troops and militia, and some pieces of cannon, marched to oppose them. He took possession of Rock Fish bridge, and threw up some works. He had not been there many days when M'Donald approached and endeavoured to join governor Martin, but colonel's Tillington and Caswell, with about 1000 militia men, took possession of Moore's creek bridge, which lay in their way, and raised a small breast work to secure themselves.

On the next morning, the Highlanders attacked the militia, posted at the bridge; but M'Leod, the second in command, and some more of their officers being killed at the first onset, they fled with precipitation. General M'Donald was taken prisoner, and the whole of his party broken and dispersed.

At the end of the year 1775, there was a general termination of royal government, and Britain beheld the whole of America united against her in the most determined opposition.

Second Campaign, 1776.

AT the beginning of this year, the vast possessions of Great Britain in the western world, that now form the fifteen United States, were reduced to the single town of Boston, in which her troops were suffering the inconvenience of a blockade. From the 19th of April, they were cut off from those refreshments which their situation required. Their supplies from England did not

reach the coaſt for a long time after they were expected, and were partly taken by the American cruiſers.

In the month of February, the American army before Boſton was, by reinforcements, augmented to 17,000 men. General Waſhington ſtated to his officers that he had not powder ſufficient for a bombardment; and aſked their advice whether, as reinforcements might be daily expected to the enemy, it would not be prudent, before that event took place, to make an aſſault on the Britiſh lines. The propoſition was negatived; but it was recommended to take poſſeſſion of Dorcheſter Heights. To divert the attention of the garriſon, a bombardment of the town, from other directions, commenced, and was continued for three days. The night of the 4th of March was fixed upon for taking poſſeſſion of Dorcheſter Heights. A covering party of about 800 men led the way; theſe were followed by the carts with the intrenching tools, and 1200 of a working party, commanded by general Thomas. In the rear there were more than 200 carts, loaded with faſcines and hay in bundles. While the cannon were playing in other parts, the greateſt ſilence was kept by this working party. The provincials completed lines of defence by the morning, which aſtoniſhed the garriſon. The admiral informed general Howe, that if the Americans kept poſſeſſion of theſe Heights, he would not be able to keep one of the king's ſhips in the harbour. An engagement was hourly expected—It was intended by general Waſhington, in that caſe, to force his way into Boſton with 4000 men, who were to have embarked at the mouth of Cambridge river. They were reminded that it was the 5th of March, and were called upon to avenge the death of their countrymen killed on that day. But general Howe did not intend to attack till the next day. In order to be ready for it, the tranſports went down in the evening towards the caſtle. In the night a moſt violent ſtorm, and towards morning a heavy flood of rain, came on, A carnage was thus providentially prevented, that would probably have equalled the fatal one on the 17th of June at Breed's-Hill. In this ſituation, it was agreed by the Britiſh, in a council of war, to evacuate the town as ſoon as poſſible.

General Howe iſſued a proclamation, ordering all woollen and linen goods to be delivered to Mr. Crean Bruſh. Shops were opened and ſtripped of their goods. A licentious plundering took place; much was carried off, and more was wantonly deſtroyed. Theſe irregularities were forbidden in orders, and the guilty threatened with death, but nevertheleſs, every miſchief which diſappointed malice could ſugge ſt was committed.

The Britiſh, amounting to more than 7000 men evacuated Boſton, leaving their baracks ſtanding, a number of cannon ſpiked and ſtores to a high amount. On their departure, a great number of the inhabitants, afraid of public reſentment, followed them. From Boſton, they ſailed to Halifax; but all their vigilance could not prevent a number of valuable ſhips from falling into the hands of the American privateers. Some of the veſſels which they captured, were laden with arms and warlike ſtores. Some tranſports, with troops on board, were alſo taken. Theſe had ran into the harbour, not knowing that the place was evacuated. The embarkation of the Britiſh troops was ſcarcely completed, when general Waſhington, with his army, marched into Boſton, where he was received with marks of approbation more flattering than thoſe of a triumph.

The progreſs of general Montgomery in Canada, induced congreſs to reinforce the army under his command. There was a fair proſpect of expelling the Britiſh from thence, and of annexing that province to the United Colonies. While this was in agitation, the army in which they confided was defeated, and the general whom they adored was killed. This, however, did not extinguiſh the ardour of the Americans. Congreſs reſolved that nine battallions ſhould be kept up, and maintained in Canada. The colonies of Maſſachuſetts, Connecticut, and New-Hampſhire were requeſted to raiſe three regiments, and forward them to Canada. It was alſo reſolved to raiſe a corps of artillery for this ſervice, and to take into the pay of the colonies one thouſand Canadians, in addition to colonel Livingſton's regiment; Moſes Hazen of Maſſachuſetts, who had reſided many years in Canada, was appointed to the command of this new corps.

Though congreſs and the ſtates made great exertions to ſupport the war in Canada, yet from the fall of Montgomery, their intereſt in that colony daily declined. Their unſucceſsful aſſault on Quebec made an impreſſion, both on the Canadians and the Indians, unfavourable to their views.

The ſmall force which arrived at Quebec early in May, was followed by ſeveral Britiſh regiments, together with the Brunſwick troops, in ſuch a rapid ſucceſſion, that in a few weeks the whole was eſtimated at 13,000 men.

The Americans, in their retreat from Quebec, marched to the Sorel, at which place they threw up ſome ſlight works for their ſafety. They were there joined by ſome battallions coming to reinforce them. About this time general Thomas died, and the

command devolved at first on general Arnold, and afterwards on general Sullivan. An attack was now projected on the British post at the Three Rivers. With this view, a detachment of 600 men was put under the command of colonel St. Clair. At their head he advanced to the village of Nicolette. When every thing was ready for the enterprise, intelligence was received that six transports, escorted by two frigates from Quebec, had arrived, and brought a large addition to the late force at the Three Rivers. This caused some new movements, and a delay till more troops could be brought forward. General Thompson then came on with a reinforcement, and took command of the whole. It was determined to make the proposed attack in four different places at the same time. One division, commanded by colonel Wayne, was to gain the eastern extremity of the town; one under colonel Maxwell was to enter from the northward, and the other two divisions, commanded by colonels Sinclair and Irvine, were to enter from the westward. The whole having embarked at midnight, landed at the Point du Lac, about three hours before day. At some distance from this Point there are two ways of approaching Three Rivers. Intelligence was brought to general Thompson, soon after his landing, that a party of three or four hundred men were posted at three miles distance. The troops were instantly put in motion to dislodge them. The intelligence proved to be false, but it had carried the detachment some distance beyond the point where the roads separated. To have returned would have consumed time that could not be spared, as the day was approaching. It was, therefore, resolved to proceed in a diagonal direction towards the road they had left. They arrived at a morass which seemed impassable. Here the day broke, when they were six miles from their object. General Thompson, reversing his march, again reached the road by the river. He had not advanced far when he was fired upon by two armed vessels. All expectation of succeeding by surprise was now at an end; it was, therefore, instantly determined to make an open attack. They advanced with the greatest alacrity—the van struck into a road on the left, which also led to the town, and was covered from the fire of the ships. This last road was circuitous, and led through a vast tract of woodland at that season almost impassable. They nevertheless entered the wood, and the rest of the detachment followed. After incredible labour, they gained the open country north of the village. There they discovered a party of the English between them and the town. Colonel Wayne immediately attacked them. The onset was vigorous, but the

conteſt was unequal. The Americans were ſoon forced to retreat. The Britiſh being then diſcovered on the river road, advancing in a direction to gain the rear of the Americans, a retreat of the main body was ordered. This was made by treading back their ſteps through the ſame diſmal ſwamp by which they had advanced. The Britiſh marched directly for the Point du Lac with the expectation of ſecuring the American batteaux. On their approach, major Wood retired with them to the Sorel. At the Point du Lac the Britiſh took a very advantageous poſition, and a party of them purſued the Americans, who, at their arrival near the place of their embarkation, found a large party of their enemies poſted in their front at the ſame time that another was only three quarters of a mile in their rear. There was an immediate neceſſity either to lay down their arms, or attempt, by a ſudden march to turn the party in front, and get into the country beyond it. The laſt was thought practicable, and the greateſt part of the detachment arrived ſafe at the army of the Sorel.

The Britiſh forces having arrived, and a conſiderable body of them having rendezvouſed at the Three Rivers, a ſerious purſuit of the American army commenced:—The diſtreſſes of the retreating army were great. General Sullivan, who conducted the retreat, nevertheleſs acted with ſo much judgment and propriety, that the baggage and public ſtores were ſaved, and the numerous ſick brought off. The American army reached Crown Point on the 1ſt of July, and at that place made their firſt ſtand.

General Gates was about this time appointed to command in Canada, but on coming to the knowledge of the late events in that province, he concluded to ſtop ſhort within the limits of New-York. The ſcene was henceforth reverſed. Inſtead of meditating the re-commencement of offenſive operations, that army which had lately excited ſo much terror in Canada, was called upon to be prepared for repelling an invaſion threatened from that province. It was therefore reſolved to erect works of defence, eaſt of Ticonderoga, and eſpecially by every means to endeavour to maintain a naval ſuperiority on Lake Champlain. In conformity to that reſolution, general Gates, with about 12,000 men, which were collected in the courſe of the ſummer, was fixed in command of Ticonderoga, and a fleet was conſtructed at Skeneſborough. This was carried on with ſuch rapidity, that in a ſhort time there were afloat in Lake Champlain, one ſloop, three ſchooners, and ſix gondolas, carrying in the whole 58 guns, 86 ſwivels, and 440 men. Six other veſſels were alſo nearly ready for launching at

the ſame time. The fleet was put under the command of general Arnold. and he was inſtructed by general Gates to proceed beyond Crown-Point, down Lake Champlain, to the ſplit rock; but moſt peremptorily reſtrained from advancing any farther, as ſecurity againſt an apprehended invaſion was the ultimate end of the armament.

The expulſion of the American invaders from Canada was but a part of the Britiſh deſigns in that quarter. They urged the purſuit no farther than St. John's, but indulged the hope of being ſoon in a condition for paſſing the lakes, and particularly through the country to Albany, ſo as to form a communication with New-York. Before they could advance with any proſpect of ſucceſs, a fleet, ſuperior to that of the Americans on the lakes, was to be conſtructed. It was ſo late as the month of October before their fleet was prepared to face the American naval force on Lake Champlain. The former conſiſted of the ſhip Inflexible, mounting 18 twelve pounders, one ſchooner, mounting 14, and another of 12 ſix pounders; a flat bottomed radeau, carrying ſix 24, and ſix 12 pounders, and a gondola with ſeven 9 pounders. There were alſo twenty ſmaller veſſels with braſs field pieces, and ſome long boats; beſides a vaſt number of veſſels detained for the tranſportation of the army, its ſtores, artillery, &c. The whole was put under the command of Capt. Pringle. The naval force of the Americans was far ſhort of what was brought againſt them.

The Britiſh proceeded up the lake and engaged the Americans. The wind was ſo unfavorable to the Britiſh, that their ſhip Inflexible, and ſome other veſſels of force, could not be brought to action. This leſſened the inequality between the contending fleets ſo much, that the principal damage ſuſtained by the Americans was the loſs of a ſchooner and gondola. At the approach of night the action was diſcontinued. The vanquiſhed, during the night, made their eſcape, but the wind becoming more favorable, the Britiſh, next morning, overtook the Americans, when a ſmart engagement enſued, which was well ſupported on both ſides for about two hours. Some of the American veſſels eſcaped to Ticonderoga. One of the gallies was taken, and general Arnold, determined that his people ſhould not become priſoners, ran the Congreſs galley, a fine gondola, on ſhore in ſuch a poſition as enabled him to land his men and blow up the veſſel.

The American naval force being nearly deſtroyed, the Britiſh had undiſputed poſſeſſion of Lake Champlain, which terminated the northern campaign of 1776.

The Britiſh had cleared Canada of its invaders, yet from impediments thrown in their way, they failed in their ulterior deſigns. General Gates, by well contrived delays, retarded the Britiſh for ſo great a part of the ſummer, that by the time they had reached Ticonderoga, their retreat on account of the approaching winter became immediately neceſſary. On the part of the Americans, ſome men and a few armed veſſels were loſt, but time was gained, their army ſaved, and the frontier of the adjacent ſtates ſecured from a projected invaſion. On the part of the Britiſh, the object of the campaign, in which 13,000 men were employed, and near a million of money expended, was rendered, in a great meaſure, abortive.

In the ſeſſion of Parliament, between the 26th of October, 1775, and the 23d of May, 1776, the ultimate plan for reducing the Colonies was completely fixed. They were declared out of the royal protection, and the king entered into treaties with the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, and the Duke of Brunſwick, for about 16,000 men, who were to be ſent to America to aſſiſt in ſubduing the Colonies. The parliament alſo paſſed an act, forbidding all intercourſe with America, and declaring all American property on the high ſeas, forfeited to the captors.

It was reſolved to open the campaign with ſuch a powerful force as would look down all oppoſition, and effectuate ſubmiſſion without bloodſhed, and to direct its operation to the accompliſhment of three objects. The firſt was the relief of Quebec, and the recovery of Canada. The ſecond, was a ſtrong impreſſion on ſome of the ſouthern Colonies. The third and principal was, to take poſſeſſion of New-York, with a force ſufficiently powerful to keep poſſeſſion of Hudſon's river, and form a line of communication with the royal army in Canada, or to overrun the adjacent country.

The firſt part of this plan was partly executed, and the execution of the ſecond was committed to general Clinton and Sir Peter Parker, the latter of whom had ſailed with his ſquadron directly from Europe and formed a junction with general Clinton at Cape Fear. They concluded to attempt the reduction of Charleſton, having 2,800 land forces, which they hoped, with the co-operation of their ſhipping, would be fully ſufficient.

For ſome months paſt, every exertion had been made to pu the Colony of South Carolina, and eſpecially its capital, Charlestown, in a reſpectable poſture of defence. Works had been erected on Sulivan's Iſland, which is ſituated ſo near the channel leading up to the town, as to be a convenient poſt for annoying veſſels approaching it.

The 28th of July Sir Peter Parker attacked the fort on that Iſland, with two 50 gun ſhips, four frigates, each of 28 guns, 2 ſloops of 20 guns and 2 of 8 guns each. On the fort were mounted 26 cannon, 24, 18, and 9 pounders. The attack commenced between ten and eleven in the forenoon, and was continued for upwards of ten hours. The garriſon conſiſting of 375 men, under the command of Colonel Moultrie, made a moſt gallant defence. The ſhips were almoſt torn to pieces, and the killed and wounded on board exceeded 200 men. The loſs of the garriſon was only 10 men killed, and 22 wounded. General Clinton had landed with a number of troops on Long Iſland, but his croſſing over the narrow paſſage which divides the two Iſlands, and attacking the fort in its unfiniſhed rear was prevented by Colonel Thomſon, who with 700 men was ſtationed at the Eaſt end of Sulivan's Iſland. The firing ceaſed in the evening and before morning the ſhips had retired about two miles from the Iſland. A few days after the troops re-embarked, and the whole ſailed for New-York.

By the repulſe of this armament, the ſouthern ſtates obtained a reſpite from the calamities of war for two years and a half. The effect of this victory, in animating the Americans, were great. It diſpelled the gloom which overſhadowed the minds of many of the coloniſts, on hearing of the powerful fleets and numerous armies which were coming againſt them.

On the 9th of June, a motion for declaring the Colonies free and independent, was made in Congreſs. The debates on that ſubject were continued for ſome time, and after a full diſcuſſion, the propoſed meaſure was, on the 4th of July, approved by nearly an unanimous vote, which was expreſſed in the following words :

" When in the courſe of human events, it becomes neceſſary for one people to diſſolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to aſſume among the powers of the earth, the ſeparate and equal ſtation to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent reſpect to the opinions of mankind requires that they ſhould declare the cauſes which impel them to the ſeparation.

" We hold theſe truths to be ſelf-evident, that all men were created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among theſe are life, liberty, and the perſuit of happineſs; that to ſecure theſe rights, governments are inſtituted among men, deriving their juſt powers from the conſent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes deſtructive of theſe ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to aboliſh it,

and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by aholishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of those Colonies and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present king of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object, the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

" He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

" He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

" He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature; a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.

" He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable,, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

" He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.

" He has refused, for a long time after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining, in the mean time, exposed to all the danger of invasion from without, and convulsions within.

" He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these states, for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.

" He has obſtructed the adminiſtration of juſtice, by refuſing his aſſent to laws for eſtabliſhing judiciary powers.

He has made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their ſalaries.

" He has erected a multitude of new offices, and ſent hither ſwarms of officers to harraſs our people and eat out their ſubſtance.

" He has kept among us, in time of peace, ſtanding armies, without the conſent of our legiſlatures.

" He has affected to render the military independent of, and ſuperior, to the civil power.

" He has combined with others to ſubject us to a juriſdiction foreign to our conſtitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his aſſent to their acts of pretended legiſlation:

" For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

" For protecting them, by a mock trial, from puniſhment for any murders which they ſhould commit on the inhabitants of theſe States:

" For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world:

" For impoſing taxes on us without our conſent:

" For depriving us, in many caſes, of the benefits of trial by jury:

" For tranſporting us beyond ſeas to be tried for pretended offences:

" For aboliſhing the free ſyſtem of Engliſh laws in a neighbouring province, eſtabliſhing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, ſo as to render it at once an example and fit inſtrument for introducing the ſame abſolute rule into theſe colonies:

" For taking away our charters, aboliſhing our moſt valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments:

" For ſuſpending our own legiſlatures, and declaring themſelves inveſted with power to legiſlate for us in all caſes whatſoever.

" He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war againſt us.

" He has plundered our ſeas, ravaged our coaſts, burnt our towns, and deſtroyed the lives of our people.

" He is, at this time, tranſporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, deſolation and tyranny, already begun with circumſtances of cruelty and perfidy ſcarcely paralleled in the moſt barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.

" He has conſtrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high ſeas, to bear arms againſt their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themſelves by their hands.

" He has excited domeſtic inſurrections amongſt us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the mercileſs Indian ſavages, whoſe known rule of warfare is an undiſtinguiſhed deſtruction of all ages, ſexes, and conditions.

" In every ſtage of theſe oppreſſions we have petitioned for redreſs in the moſt humble terms: our repeated petitions have been anſwered only by repeated injury. A prince whoſe character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

" Nor have we been wanting to our Britiſh brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts made by their legiſlature to extend an unwarrantable juriſdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumſtances of our emigration and ſettlement here. We have appealed to their native juſtice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them, by the ties of our common kindred, to diſavow theſe uſurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correſpondence. They, too, have been deaf to the voice of juſtice and conſanguinity. We muſt, therefore, acquieſce in the neceſſity which denounces our ſeparation, and hold them as we hold the reſt of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

" We, therefore, the Repreſentatives of the United States of America, in General Congreſs aſſembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of theſe colonies, ſolemnly publiſh and declare, That theſe United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, FREE and INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are abſolved from all allegiance to the Britiſh crown; and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally diſſolved; and that as Free and Indepent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, eſtabliſh commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent States may of right do. And, for the ſupport of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our ſacred honour."

From the promulgation of this declaration, every thing aſſumed a new form. The Americans no longer appeared in the charac-

ter of subjects in arms against their sovereign, but as an independent people, repelling the attacks of an invading foe. The people were encouraged by it to bear up under the calamities of war, and viewed the evils they suffered only as the thorn that ever accompanies the rose.

The American army received the declaration of independence with unfeigned acclamations of joy. Though it was well known that Great Britain had employed a force of 55,000 men to war upon the new formed states, and that the continental army was not equal to one half that number, and only engaged a few months, and that congress was without any assurance of foreign aid, yet both the American officers and privates gave every evidence of their hearty approbation of the decree which severed the Colonies from Great Britain, and submitted to the sword, whether they should be free states or conquered provinces. "Now," said they, "we know the ground on which we stand; now we are a nation; no more shall the opprobrious term of *rebel*, with any appearance of justice, be applied to us. Should the fortune of war throw us into the hands of our enemies, we may expect the treatment of prisoners, and not the punishment of *rebels*. The prize for which we contend is of such magnitude that we may freely risque our lives to obtain it."

The command of the force which was designed to operate against New-York, in this campaign, was given to Admiral Lord Howe and his brother Sir William. To this service was allotted a powerful army, consisting of about 30,000 men. This force was superior to any thing that America had heretofore seen.

A few days after the declaration of independence, general Howe, arrived off Sandy Hook, which he had previously commanded at Boston, and was soon after joined by admiral lord Howe, with part of the reinforcement from England. The British general, on his approach, found every part of New-York island, and the most exposed parts of Long-Island fortified and well defended with artillery. It had early occurred to general Washington, that the possession of New-York would be with the British a favourite object. General Lee, while the British were yet in possession of Massachusetts, had been detached from Cambridge to put Long-Island and New-York into a posture of defence. Works were then erected in and about New-York, on Long Island, and the heights of Harlem. These, besides batteries, were field redoubts, formed of earth, with a parapet and ditch. The former

were ſometimes fraiſed, and the latter palliſadoed, but they were in no inſtance formed to ſuſtain a ſiege. Slight as they were the campaign was nearly waſted before they were ſo far reduced as to permit the royal army to penetrate into the country.

The American army in and near New-York amounted to 17,200 men. Theſe were moſtly new troops, and were divided into many ſmall unconnected poſts, ſome of which were fifteen miles removed from others. General Waſhington had early in April fixed his head quarters in New-York. The Britiſh force was increaſing by frequent ſucceſſive arrivals from Halifax, South Carolina, Florida, the Weſt-Indies and Europe. But ſo many unforeſeen delays had taken place that the month of Auguſt was far advanced before they were in a condition to open the campaign.

The royal commiſſioners, admiral and general Howe, thought proper before they commenced their military operations to try what might be done in their civil capacity, towards effecting a reunion between Great-Britain and the colonies. Lord Howe firſt ſent aſhore a circular letter to ſeveral of the royal governors in America informing them of the late act of Parliament "for reſtoring peace to the colonies, and granting pardon to ſuch as ſhould deſerve mercy," and deſiring them to publiſh a declaration which accompanied the ſame. Here, however, congreſs ſaved him trouble, by ordering his letter and declaration to be publiſhed in all the newſpapers "that every one might ſee the inſidiouſneſs of the Britiſh miniſtry, and that they had nothing to truſt to beſides the exertion of their own valour.

Lord Howe next ſent a letter to general Waſhington; but as it was directed "to George Waſhington, Eſq." the general refuſed to accept of it as not being directed in the ſtyle ſuitable to his ſtation. Some time after adjutant-general Patterſon was ſent by general Howe, with a letter addreſſed to general Waſhington, &c &c. a polite reception was given to the bearer, but general Waſhington replied, that a letter directed to any perſon in a public character ſhould have ſome deſcription of it, otherwiſe it would appear a mere private letter; that it was true the *&c's* implied every thing, but they alſo implied any thing, and that he ſhould therefore decline the receiving any letter directed to him as a private perſon, when it elated to his public ſtation. A long conference enſued, in which the adjutant-general obſerved, that the commiſſioners were armed with great powers, and would be very happy in effecting an accommodation." He received for anſwer, "that from what appeared

their powers were only to grant pardon; that they who had committed no fault wanted no pardon."

The Britiſh commanders then reſolved to make their firſt attempt upon Long Iſland. They landed between Utrecht and Graveſend, The American works protected a ſmall peninſula having Wallabout Bay to the left, and ſtretching over to Red-Hook on the right, the Eaſt-River being in their rear. General Sullivan with a ſtrong force, was encamped within theſe works at Brooklyne. From the eaſt ſide of the Narrows runs a ridge of hills, covered with thick wood, about five or ſix miles in length, which terminates near Jamaica. There were three paſſes through theſe hills, one near the Narrows, a ſecond on the Flatbuſh road, and a third on the Bedford road, and they are all defenſible. Theſe were the only roads which could be paſſed from the ſouth ſide of the hills to the American lines, except a road which led round the eaſterly end of the hills to Jamaica. The Americans had 800 men on each of theſe roads, and Colonel Miles was placed with his battalion of riflemen, to guard the road from the ſouth of the hills to Jamaica, and to watch the motions of the Britiſh.

General de Heiſter, with his Heſſians, took the 26th of Auguſt, poſt at Flatbuſh. In the following night the greater part of the Britiſh army commanded by general Clinton, marched to gain the road leading round the eaſterly end of the hills to Jamaica, and to turn the left of the Americans. He arrived about two hours before day, within half a mile of the road. One of the parties fell in with a patrole of American officers, and took them all priſoners, which prevented the early tranſmiſſion of intelligence. At the break of day general Clinton advanced and took poſſeſſion of the heights over which the road paſſed. General Grant, with the left wing, advanced along the coaſt by the weſt road near the Narrows; but this was intended chiefly as a feint.

The guard which was ſtationed at this road fled without making any reſiſtance. A few of them were afterwards rallied, and lord Stirling advanced with 1500 men, and took poſſeſſion of a hill about two miles from the American camp, and in front of general Grant.

On the 27th of Auguſt an attack was made very early in the morning by the Heſſians from Flatbuſh, under general Heiſter, and by general Grant on the coaſt, and was well ſupported for a conſiderabe time on both ſides. The Americans who oppoſed Heiſter, were firſt informed of the approach of general Clinton, who had come round on their left. They immediately began to retreat to

their camp, but were intercepted by the right wing under general Clinton, who got into the rear of their left and attacked them with the light infantry and dragoons while returning to their lines. They were driven back till they were met by the Heſſians. They were thus alternately chaſed and intercepted between general Heiſter and general Clinton. Some of their regiments nevertheleſs found their way to the camp. The Americans under lord Stirling, who were engaged with general Grant, fought with great reſolution for about ſix hours. They were uninformed of the movements made by general Clinton, till ſome of the troops under his command had traverſed the whole extent of country in their rear. Their retreat was thus intercepted, but ſeveral, notwithſtanding, broke through and got into the woods; many threw themſelves into the marſh, ſome were drowned, and others periſhed in the mud, but a conſiderable number eſcaped by this way to their lines.

The loſs of the Britiſh and Heſſians was about 450. The killed, wounded, and priſoners of the Americans, including thoſe who were drowned or periſhed in the woods or mud, exceeded a thouſand. Among the priſoners of the latter were two of their general officers, Sullivan and lord Stirling, and ſeveral other officers of diſtinction.

General Waſhington called a council of war, to conſult on the meaſures proper to be taken, after which diſpoſitions were made for an immediate retreat. This commenced ſoon after it was dark, from two points, the upper and lower ferries, on Eaſt River. The intention of evacuating the Iſland had been prudently concealed from the Americans, that they knew not whither they were going, but ſuppoſed to attack the enemy. The field artillery, tents, baggage, and about 9000 men, were conveyed to the city of New-York over Eaſt River, in leſs than 13 hours, and without the knowledge of the Britiſh, though not 100 yards diſtant. Towards morning an extreme thick fog came up, which hovered over Long Iſland, and by concealing the Americans enabled them to compleat their retreat. In about half an hour the fog cleared away, and the Britiſh entered the works which had juſt been relinquiſhed.

General Sullivan, who was taken priſoner, was immediatly ſent on parole, with the following verbal meſſage from Lord Howe, to congreſs "that though he could not at preſent treat with them in that character, yet he was very deſirous of having conference with ſome of the members, whom he would conſider as private gentlemen; ſetting forth at the ſame time the nature and extent of his powers as commiſſioner. Congreſs replied, that the repre-

ſentatives of the free and independant ſtates of America could not with propriety ſend any of their members to confer with Lord Howe in their private characters, but that ever deſirous of eſtabliſhing peace on reaſonable terms, they will ſend a committee of their body, to know whether he has any authority to treat with perſons authorized by congreſs for that purpoſe, on behalf of America, and what that authority is; and to hear ſuch propoſitions as he ſhall think fit to make reſpecting the ſame." They elected Dr. Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, their committee for this purpoſe. They were very politely received by lord Howe, but the conference proved fruitleſs, lord Howe's commiſmiſſion not containing any other authority than that expreſſed in the act of parliament—namely, that of granting pardons. Lord Howe ended the converſation on his part, by expreſſing his regard for America, and the extreme pain he would ſuffer in being obliged to diſtreſs thoſe whom he ſo much regarded. Dr. Franklin thanked him for his regard, and aſſured him, that the Americans would ſhew their gratitude, by endeavouring to leſſen as much as poſſible all pain he might feel on their account, by exerting their utmoſt abilities in taking good care of themſelves."

A council of war recommended to act upon the defenſive, and not to riſk the army for the ſake of New-York. The public ſtores were moved to Dobb's ferry about 26 miles from New-York; 12,000 men were ordered to the northern extremity of New-York iſland, and 4,500 to remain for the defence of the city, while the remainder occupied the intermediate ſpace. Before the Britiſh landed, it was impoſſible to tell what place would be firſt attacked: this made it neceſſary to erect works for the defence of a variety of places as well as of New-York. Though every thing was abandoned when the criſis came, that either the city muſt be relinquiſhed or the army riſked for its defence, yet from the delays occaſioned by the redoubts and other works, a whole campaign was loſt to the Britiſh and ſaved to the Americans. Congreſs had determined to raiſe 88 battalions, to ſerve during the war. To wear away the campaign with as little misfortune as poſſible, and thereby gain time to raiſe a permanent army againſt the next year, was to the Americans a matter of the laſt importance.

On the 15th of September, general Howe began to land his men under cover of five ſhips of war, between Kipp's-Bay and Turtle-Bay. As the different diviſions landed, they poſted themſelves on the high grounds that ſtretch in an aſcending direction from the ſea ſhore. At the ſame time a detachment of Heſſian

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troops advanced to New-York, and in their way fell in with a party of the Americans retreating by the pass at Blooming Dale. A skirmish ensued, in which the Hessians were victorious. About the same time, another detachment of the British troops made a movement to the right, in order to attack a body of the Americans, who however retreated to the main body posted on Morris's Heights. No attempts being made to defend New-York, it was taken possession of by the English. They had been a few days in possession, when a dreadful fire broke out and consumed a thousand houses.

After the Americans had evacuated New-York, they retired to the north end of the island on which the city is erected. On the morning of the 16th of September a detachment was sent out from the main body of the Americans, to a wood facing the left flank of the enemy. The British in order to dislodge them, dispatched three companies of light infantry, and three companies of Hessian riflemen. An action ensued, which was carried on by reinforcements on both sides, and became very warm. Many were killed on both sides, but the advantage was on the side of the Americans.

General Washington while retreating from New-York, posted his troops so as to make a line of small detached and intrenched camps on the several heights and strong grounds from Valentine's hill on the right, to the vicinity of the White-Plains on the left. The British troops employed themselves in throwing up a chain of redoubts on M'Gowans Hill to cover New-York, and to render it capable of a vigorous defence. As soon as the redoubts were compleated it was determined to attempt the rear of the Americans, by the New-England road, from which they received the most of their supplies On the 18th of October the British troops reimbarking proceeded along the coast to Pell's Point, and disembarked there without difficulty. Soon after they landed a skirmish happened in an attempt to dislodge the Americans from a narrow pass, at which they had taken post with a strong corps. The later retired. On the 20th of October the main division of the British army moved to New-Rochelle situated on the Sound that divides Long-Island from the continent. There they were joined by the second division of foreign troops, from England, under the command of general Knyphausen. The American army stretched along the ground parallel to that on which the British troops were marching; from Kings Bridge on the right, to White Plains on the left. The two armies were separated by the river Brunx, the

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The Engagement on the **WHITE PLAINS** *the 28th of October 1776, between the* American & British Forces.

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rear of the Britiſh was covered by the Sound, not far diſtant. With this relative arrangment the armies moved ſlowly towards the White Plains, where on the eaſtern ſide of the Brunx, a detachment had been fortifying a camp for the Americans, which camp they occupied with their whole army conſiſting of about 18,000 men, on the 26th. (See plate No. III. *a*)

The Britiſh army, 13000 ſtrong, early in the morning of the 28th of October, in two columns marched from its encampment near Ward's houſe, on the banks of the Brunx, the left being commanded by general Heiſter, accompanied by general Howe. Sir Henry Clinton commanded the right. As they approached the White Plains the right column fell in with ſeveral bodies of the Americans whom they drove back to their works. The Americans were encamped on a long ridge of hills the brow of which was covered with lines lately thrown up. A bend of the Brunx protected their right flank, and by another turning in its courſe enveloped alſo the rear of their right wing. The point of the hill on their right, was exceedingly ſteep and rocky, and was covered by a ſtrong abbatis in front of the entrenchment. Their left was poſted in very broken ground, difficult to be aſſailed. The weakeſt part was the centre. The ſlope of the hill was very gradual in the direction of the road by the Court-houſe. The lines were by no means formidable, not being fraized; and the rockineſs of the ſoil prevented the ditch from being made of any troubleſome depth.

* The Americans on the approach of the enemy, kept up a ſharp cannonade, which the Britiſh returned, but the diſtance was ſo great, that there was little effect on either ſide. Part of the Britiſh columns formed behind ſome riſing ground, nearly parallel to the front of the Americans but the right wing of the Britiſh did not extend beyond the centre of the American lines. That part of the poſition of the Americans did not ſeem to be conſidered; all the attention of the Britiſh commander being fixed on another part of the field. A large party of Americans were poſted on a hill (*c*) in a line with the right of their camp, but ſeparated from it by the Brunx.† Againſt this hill all the efforts of the Britiſh army

* *Had an aſſault been made on the centre of the American works defeat would have been deſtruction to the Americans. The whole of their right muſt have fallen into the power of the Britiſh; for the Brunx not being paſſable in that part, cut off their retreat.*

† *The reaſon of the Americans occupying this poſture is inexplicable, unleſs it be that they could not be contained within the works of their*

were directed. A part of the left wing passed the ford, which was intirely under command of their cannon. Previous to their attack, Col. Rall, commanding a brigade of the Hessians, on the left passed the Brunx, and gained a post which enabled him to annoy the flank of M'Dougal's corps. The Americans were drove from the hill. While they were engaged the American baggage was moved off, in full view of the British army. The main army of the Americans remained tranquil in their entrenchments.

On the night of 28th of October the British troops lay on their arms, and encamped next day with the left wing on the field of battle, and the right extending from the other side of the Brunx, which position enabled them to make a front parallel to a certain extent to that of the Americans. In the mean time the latter employed themselves in strengthening their lines. General Howe having been reinforced by four battallions from York Island and two from Mharonneck Post made dispositions for attacking the American lines early on the last of October. This resolution however, was abandoned, on account of rainy weather. On the 31st the weather proved fine about noon, but the British commander did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution. The Americans had rendered their lines sufficiently strong to resist an attack, but being informed by a deserter that the British army would march against them the next morning, they evacuated their lines on the morning of the first of November, and retired across the Crotton river to North Castle. Their position was now so advantageous, that any attack on them must have proved very unsuccessful, for the river Crotton stretched along their front, and their rear was defended by woods and heights.

camp. The possession of that hill would not enable the British to annoy their camp, for it rose so gradually from the Brunx that its crest was not within random cannon shot, as was proved by many of the British battallions lying upon it on their arms the whole evening after the action: nor had general Washington to apprehend that, from that quarter, an attack might be made on his rear, since the Brunx, deep and impracticable, would have been still between the two armies.

Though we should never judge on the merits or demerits of military dispositions from resulting events, yet the placing of a considerable body on that hill effectually disposed general Howe to commit the blunder of not assailing the centre of the American lines and to direct all his attention towards that post, which was the cause that their victory was not followed by a single advantage.

Within a few days, general Washington with part of his army, crossed the North River, and took post in the neighbourhood of Fort Lee. A force of about 7,500 men was left at North-Castle under general Lee.

The Americans having retired general Howe determined to improve the opportunity of their absence for the reduction of Kingsbridge and Fort Washington. This last post was of the utmost importance, as much as it secured an immediate intercourse with the Jersey shore to Fort Lee, and effectually obstructed the navigation of the North River. Sensible of the importance of this post, the Americans had garrisoned it under the command of Colonel Magaw.

On the fifteenth of November the British batteries being compleated a summons was sent to the garrison to surrender, the commanding officer answered that he would defend the fort to the last extremity. It was determined therefore to commence a vigorous attack upon it next morning. The army was divided into four parts. The first on the north side was led on by general Knyphausen. The second on the east by general Matthews, supported by lord Cornwallis. The third was under the direction of Colonel Stirling, and the fourth was commanded by lord Piercy. The outworks being carried by the enemy, the Americans left their lines and crouded into the fort.* The garrison finding that it was not possible to defend the fort longer surrendered prisoners of war.

The number of prisoners amounted to 2700. The loss of the British, inclusive of killed and wounned, was about 1200. Lord Cornwallis with a considerable force passed over to attack Fort Lee on the opposite Jersey shore. The garrison was saved by an immediate evacuation, but at the expence of their artillery and stores.

The term of time for which the American soldiers had engaged to serve ended in November or December, the army having been organized the preceding year, on the idea that an accommodation would take place within a twelve months.

When it was expected that the conquerors would retire to winter quarters, they commenced a new plan of operations more alar-

* *It was an error in Col. Magaw, that he suffered his troops to crowd into the fort, after quitting their lines: for had they been posted on the brow of the hill, facing the north and south, the conteſt would have been prolonged, and the aſſailants have ſuſtained a greater loſs; but the grand error was in not withdrawing the garriſon on the evening preceeding the aſſault. The poſſeſſion of that poſt was in the then ſituation of affairs, certainly no longer uſeful.*

thing than all their previous conqueſts. The reduction of Fort Waſhington, the evacuation of Fort Lee, and the diminution of the American army, by the departure of thoſe whoſe time had expired, encouraged the Britiſh, notwithſtanding the ſeverity of the winter, to purſue the remaining inconſiderable continental force with the proſpect of annihilating it. To retreat was the only expedient left. This having commenced, lord Cornwallis followed, and was cloſe on the rear of general Waſhington, as he retreated ſucceſſively to Newark, to Brunſwick, to Princetown, to Trenton, and to the Pennſylvania ſide of the Delaware.

The Britiſh took poſſeſſion of Rhode-Iſland without any loſs, and in the mean time blocked up commodore Hopkin's ſquadron, and a number of American privateers at Providence.

In this period, when the American army was relinquiſhing its general, the people giving up the cauſe, ſome of their leaders going over to the enemy, the Britiſh commanders ſucceeding in every enterprize, general Lee was taken priſoner at Baſkenridge, by lieutenant colonel Hartcourt. This cauſed a depreſſion of ſpirits among the Americans, far exceeding any real injury done to their eſſential intereſts. They had repoſed great confidence in his military talents, and experience of regular European war.

By the advance of the Britiſh into New-Jerſey, the neighbourhood of Philadelphia became the ſeat of war. Congreſs therefore adjourned themſelves on the 12th of December, to meet in eight days at Baltimore, reſolving at the ſame time, "that general Waſhington ſhould be poſſeſſed of full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and the operations of war."

With the year 1776, a retreating army was to be diſmiſſed, and the proſpect of a new one was both diſtant and uncertain. The recently aſſumed independence of the States was apparently on the verge of diſſolution. But in proportion as difficulties increaſed, congreſs redoubled their exertions to oppoſe them; they addreſſed the States in animated language, calculated to remove their deſpondency, renew their hopes, and confirm their reſolutions. They at the ſame time diſpatched gentlemen of character and influence to excite the militia to take the field. General Waſhington was empowered to raiſe and collect together in the moſt ſpeedy and effectual manner from any or all of the United States 16 battalions of infantry in addition to thoſe already voted by congreſs; to appoint officers for the ſaid battalions of infantry, to raiſe officers, and equip 3000 light horſe; three regiments of artillery, a corps of engineers, and to eſtabliſh their

pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places as he shall think proper; to dispose and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general; to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American armies.

About that time the number of troops under the command of general Washington amounted to 2 or 3000 men only. In this crisis of danger, 1500 of the Pennsylvania militia embodied to reinforce the Continental army. The merchant, the farmer, the tradesman, the labourer, cheerfully relinquished the conveniences of home to perform the duties of private soldiers, in the severity of a winter campaign. General Washington now formed the bold resolution of re-crossing into the State of Jersey, and attacking that part of the enemy which was posted at Trenton.

The British commanders in the security of conquest cantoned their army at Burlington, Bordenton, Trenton, and other towns in New-Jersey. Of all events none seemed to them more improbable than that their late retreating half naked enemies, should in this extreme cold season, face about and commence offensive operations.

In the evening of Christmas day, general Washington made arrangements for the recrossing of the Delaware in three divisions: at M'Konckey's ferry, at Trenton ferry, and at or near Bordenton. The ice in the river retarded their passage so long that it was three o'clock in the morning before the artillery could be got over. On their landing in Jersey, they were formed into two divisions commanded by general Sullivan and Green; one of these divisions was ordered to proceed on the lower or river road; the other, on the upper or Pennington road. Col. Stark with some light troops, was also directed to advance near to the river, and to possess himself of that part of the town which is beyond the bridge. The divisions having nearly the same distance to march were ordered immediately on forcing the out-guards, to push directly into Trenton, that they might charge the enemy before they had time to form. Though they marched different roads, yet they arrived at the enemy's advanced post within three minutes of each other. The out-guards of the Hessian troops at Trenton, soon fell back, but kept up a constant retreating fire. Their main body being hard pressed by the Americans, who had already got possession of half their artillery, attempted to file off by a road leading towards Prince town, but were checked by a body of troops thrown in their way. Finding they were surrounded, they laid down their

arms. The number which submitted was 20 officers, and 886 men. The detachment in Trenton consisted of three Hessian regiments, amounting to 1500 men, and a troop of British light-horse. All these were killed or captured, except about 600, who escaped by the road leading to Bordentown.

Immediately after the surprize of the Hessians, General Washington, with his prisoners, re-crossed the Delaware, which at this place is about three quarters of a mile over, and reassumed his post on the Pennsylvania side. Trenton remained unoccupied, and the enemy were posted at Princetown, twelve miles distant, on the road towards New-York.

The effects of this successful enterprize were speedily felt in recruiting the American army. About 1400 regular soldiers, whose time of service was on the point of expiring, agreed to serve six weeks longer, and reinforcements came in from several quarters to General Washington. The weather was now growing very severe, and as there were very few houses near the shore where General Washington had taken his station, the greatest part of his army remained out in the woods and fields. These, with some other circumstances, induced the general once more to pass the Delaware, and to take possession of Trenton. This was undoubtedly a bold adventure, and carried with it the appearance of defiance.

Trenton is situated on a rising ground, about half a mile distant from the Delaware, and is cut into two divisions by a small creek, sufficient to turn a mill which is on it, after which it empties itself at nearly right angles into the Delaware.

Scarcely had General Washington taken post here, and before the several parties of militia, out on detachments, or on their way, could be collected, than the British, leaving behind them a strong garrison at Princeton, marched suddenly, and entered Trenton at the upper or north east quarter. A party of the Americans skirmished with the advanced party of the British, to afford time for removing the stores and baggage, and withdrawing over the bridge.

In a little time the British had possession of one half of the town; General Washington of the other; and the creek only separated the two armies. Nothing could be a more critical situation than this; and if ever the fate of America depended on the event of a day it was now. The Delaware was filling fast with large sheets of driving ice, and was impassable; so that no retreat into Pennsylvania could be effected, neither is it possible, in the

face of an enemy, to paſs a river of ſuch extent. The roads were broken and rugged with the froſt, and the main road was occupied by the enemy.

About four o'clock a party of the Britiſh approached the bridge with a deſign to gain it, but were repulſed. They made no more attempts, though the creek itſelf is paſſable any where between the bridge and the Delaware. Evening was now coming on, and the Britiſh believing they had all the advantages they could wiſh for, and that they could uſe them when they pleaſed, diſcontinued all further operations, and held themſelves prepared to make the attack next morning.

But the next morning produced a ſcene as elegant as it was unexpected.—The Britiſh were under arms and ready to march to action, when one of their light horſe from Princeton came furiouſly down the ſtreet with an account that General Waſhington had that morning attacked and carried the Britiſh poſt at that place, and was proceeding on to ſeize the magazine at Brunſwick; on which the Britiſh, who were then on the point of making an aſſault on the evacuated camp of the Americans, wheeled about, and marched for Princeton.

General Waſhington, the better to cover and diſguiſe his retreat from Trenton, had ordered a line of fires to be lighted up in front of his camp. Theſe not only ſerved to give an appearance of going to reſt, and continuing that deception, but they effectually concealed from the Britiſh whatever was acting behind them: After this, by a circuitous march of about eighteen miles, the Americans arrived near Princetown early in the morning, and were deſcried by a party of Britiſh troops, conſiſting of about three regiments who were on their march to Trenton. They briſkly attacked the center of the Americans, who gave way in diſorder. The moment was critical; general Waſhington puſhed forward, and placed himſelf between his own men and the Britiſh, fronting the latter. The Americans encouraged by his example, made a ſtand and returned the Britiſh fire. They killed 60, wounded many, and took between 3 and 400 priſoners of the Britiſh; obliging the reſt of them to make a precipitate eſcape; ſome towards Trenton, and others to Brunſwick. The loſs of the Americans who immediately ſet off with their priſoners, was inconſiderable in point of numbers; but the fall of general Mercer rendered it important.

The Britiſh army that had abandoned Trenton, for the ſafety of their magazines at Brunſwick eighteen miles diſtant, marched for that place where they arrived late in the evening; and from

which they made no attempts to move, for near five months. The triumphant Americans retired to Morristown. General Washington divided his army into small parties, so as to be able to re-unite them on a few hours warning, and thereby covered the country, and re-possessed himself of all the important places.

The campaign of 1776 did not end till it had been protracted into the first month of the year 1777, the British had counted on the complete and speedy reduction of their late colonies, but they found the work more difficult of execution than they supposed. They wholly failed in their designs on the Southern States. In Canada they recovered what in the preceding year they had lost—drove the Americans out of their borders, and destroyed their fleet on the Lakes, but they failed in making their intended impression on the north western frontier of the States. While their main army was successful in the Jerseys, a party undertook an expedition against Rhode-Island. The Americans abandoned the island, and the English took possession of it; but the acquisition was of little service, perhaps was of detriment. For three years several thousand men stationed thereon for its security, were lost to every active co-operation with the royal forces in the field, and the possession of it secured no equivalent advantages. The British succeeded against the city of New-York and the adjacent country, but when they pursued their victories into New-Jersey, and subdivided their army, the recoiling Americans soon recovered the greatest part of what they had lost.

The war, on the part of the Americans, was but barely begun. Hitherto they had engaged with temporary forces for a redress of grievances, but towards the close of this year they made arrangements for raising a permanent army to contend with Great Britain for the sovereignty of the country. To have thus far stood their ground with their new levies was a matter of great importance, because to them delay was victory, and not to be conquered was to conquer.

The third Campaign, 1777.

THREE months which followed the actions of Trenton and Princeton, passed away without any important military enterprise on either side. It was matter of astonishment, that the British suffered the dangerous interval between the disbanding of one army and the raising of another, to pass away without attempting

something of consequence against the remaining shadow of an armed force.

Hitherto there had been a deficiency of arms and amunition, as well as of men; but at the beginning of this campaign a vessel of 24 guns arrived from France at Portsmouth in New-Hampshire, with upwards of 11,000 stand of arms, and 1000 barrels of powder. Ten thousand stand of arms arrived about the same time in another part of the United States.

Before the British army took the field, two enterprizes for the destruction of American stores were undertaken. Col. Bird landed with about 500 men at Peek's-Kill, March 23, fifty miles from New-York. The few Americans who were stationed as a guard at this place on the approach of the British, fired the principal store houses, and retired. The loss of the provisions was considerable. On the 26th of April, major gen. Tryon, with a detachment of 2000 men, embarked at New-York, and passing through the Sound, landed between Fairfield and Norwalk. They advanced through the country without interruption, and arrived in about twenty hours at Danbury. The few Americans who were in the town withdrew from it, and the British burnt and destroyed 18 houses, 500 barrels of pork and beef, 800 barrels of flour, 2000 bushels of grain, 1700 tents, &c. In returning from this expedition, however, the British were greatly harrassed by the Americans under generals Arnold, Wooster, and Sullivan; but they made good their retreat, with the loss of 170 killed and wounded. On the American side, the loss was likewise considerable; general Wooster was killed and Arnold in the most eminent danger. Soon after the Americans destroyed the enemies stores at Sagg Harbour, on Long-Island, and made prisoners of all who defended the place.

As the season advanced the American army in New-Jersey was reinforced by the successive arrival of recruits; but nevertheless at the opening of the campaign, it amounted only to 7,272 men.

Towards the latter end of May, general Washington, quitted his winter encampment at Morristown, and took a strong position at Middlebrook. General Howe endeavoured to provoke him to an engagement and left no manœuvre untried that could induce him to quit his position, but without success. General Washington knew the full value of his situation, and was well apprised that it was not the interest of his country to commit its fortune to a single action. General Howe, thought it to be too hazardous to attempt passing the Delaware, while the country was in arms, and

the main American army in his rear; he therefore paſſed over to Staten Iſland, reſolving to proſecute the objects of the campaign by another route.

About this time, the Americans found means to make amends for the capture of general Lee, by that of general Preſcot, who was ſeized in his quarters with his aid de camp, in much the ſame manner as general Lee had been. This was very mortifying to the general himſelf, as he had not long before ſet a price upon general Arnold, by offering a ſum of money to any one that apprehended him, which the latter anſwered by ſetting a lower price upon general Preſcot.

The deſigns of general Howe were involved in great obſcurity. Though the ſeaſon for military operations was advanced as far as the month of July, yet his real object could not be aſcertained. General Waſhington received intelligence, that Burgoyne was coming in great force towards New-York from Canada, which favored the idea that a junction of the two royal armies, near Albany was intended. General Waſhington therefore detached a brigade to re-inforce the northern diviſion of his army. Some movements were likewiſe made towards Peek's Kill, and on the other ſide towards Trenton, while the main army was encamped near the Clove, in readineſs to march either north or ſouth, as the movements of general Howe might require. At length the main body of the Britiſh army, conſiſting of 36 battalions with a regiment of light horſe, and a body of loyaliſts, raiſed at New-York, and a powerful artillery, amounting in the whole to about 16,000 men, departed from Sandy-Hook. After a week's ſailing they arrived at the mouth of the Delaware; but, for reaſons that do not obviouſly occur, general Howe gave up the idea of approaching Philadelphia by aſcending the Delaware, and reſolved on a circuitous route by the way of the Cheaſapeak.

The navigation from the Delaware to the Cheaſapeak took up the beſt part of the month of Auguſt. At laſt they aſcended the bay and landed at Turkey Point: intelligence thereof in a few days reached the American army, and diſpelled that cloud of uncertainty in which general Howe's movements had been enveloped. The American troops were put in motion to meet the Britiſh army. The real effective force of the former did not exceed 8000 men. They were poſted near Newport. The royal army advanced till they were within two miles of the American army. General Waſhington then changed his poſition, and took poſt on the high ground near Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine Creek,

with an intention of disputing the passage. It was the wish, but by no means the interest of the Americans to try their strength by an engagment. The opinion of the inhabitants however, imposed a species of necessity on the American general to keep his army in front of the enemy, and to risk an action for the security of Philadelphia. This took place the 11th of September at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, a small stream which empties itself into Christmas Creek, near its conflux with the river Delaware.

The British army advanced at day break, in two colums; commanded by general Knyphausen, and lord Cornwallis. The first took the direct road to Chad's Ford and made a shew of passing it in front of the main body of the Americans; at the same time the other column moved up on the west side of the Brandywine to its fork, and crossed both its branches about two o'clock in the afternoon; and then marched down on the east side thereof, with a view of turning the right wing of their adversaries. This they effected, and compelled them to retreat with great loss. General Knyphausen amused the Americans with the appearance of crossing the ford, but did not attempt it, until lord Cornwallis having crossed above, and moved down on the opposite side, had commenced his attack. Knyphausen then crossed the ford, and attacked the troops posted for its defence. These, after a severe conflict, were compelled to give way. The retreat of the Americans soon became general, and was continued to Chester, under cover of general Weeden's brigade, which came off in good order. General Washington was by a small circumstance, prevented from executing a bold design; to effect which, his troops were actually in motion. This was to have crossed the Brandywine, and attacked Knyphausen, while generals Sullivan and Stirling should keep Earl Cornwallis in check. In the most critical moment general Washington received intelligence which he was obliged to credit, that the column of lord Cornwallis had been only making a feint, and was returning to join Knyphausen. This prevented the execution of a plan, which, if carried into effect, would probably have given a different turn to the events of the day. The killed and wounded of the British army were 600; the loss of the Americans was above 1000. In the list of their wounded, were two of their general officers, the marquis de la Fayette, and general Woodford; the former was a French nobleman, who, animated with the love of liberty, had left his native country, and offered his service to congress.

The bulk of the Britiſh army being left in German-Town, general Howe with a ſmall part, made his entry into Philadelphia. Congreſs, which after a ſhort reſidence at Baltimore had returned to Philadelphia, were obliged a ſecond time to conſult their ſafety by flight. They retired to York-Town.

The firſt care of the Britiſh general was to cut off, by means of ſtrong batteries, the communication between the upper and lower parts of the river. The American frigate Delaware, of 32 guns, ſeconded by ſome ſmaller veſſels, commenced a heavy cannonade upon the batteries, but upon the falling of the tide ſhe ran aground, and was then ſoon compelled to ſurrender, and the other American veſſels retired. The next undertaking of the Britiſh commander was to open a communication by ſea. A vaſt number of batteries and forts had been erected, and machines formed like *chevaux de frize*, ſunk in the river to prevent its navigation. As the fleet was ſent round to the mouth of the river in order to co-operate with the army, this work, after ſurmounting great difficulties, was at laſt accompliſhed.

General Waſhington having been reinforced by 2,500 men from Peek's-Kill and Virginia; and having been informed that general Howe had detached a conſiderable part of his force for reducing the forts on the Delaware, conceived the deſign of attacking the Britiſh poſt at Germantown. It was reſolved that the attack ſhould be ſudden and vigorous. On the 4th of October, the Americans began their attack about ſun-riſe, on the 40th regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, which were poſted on the Cheſnut Hill road, three quarters of a mile advance. Theſe two corps were obliged to retreat; but the morning being extremely foggy, it concealed the true ſituation of the parties, and made ſo much caution neceſſary as to give the Britiſh time to recover from the effects of their firſt ſurprize. From theſe cauſes the early promiſing appearances on the part of the aſſailants were ſpeedily reverſed, the Americans were forced to leave the field, and all efforts to rally them were ineffectual. The loſs of the Britiſh army, dead, wounded and priſoners, was about 500. Among their ſlain were brigadier general Agnew, and lieutenant col. Bird. The loſs of the Americans, including 400 priſoners was about 1000. Among their ſlain were general Naſh and his aid de-camp, Major Witherſpoon.

Soon after this action the Britiſh left German-Town, and as there ſtill remained two ſtrong forts on the Delaware to be reduced,

they turned their principal attention towards them. Theſe were Mud-Iſland and Red-Bank. The various obſtructions which the Americans had thrown in the way, rendered it neceſſary to bring up the Auguſta, a ſhip of the line, and the Merlin frigate, to the attack of Mud-Iſland; but, during the action, both the Auguſta and Merlin took fire and were burnt to aſhes. At laſt the Britiſh general found means to convey a number of cannon, and to erect batteries within a gunſhot of the fort by land, and bringing up three ſhips of the line. The garriſon, after making a vigorous defence, from the latter end of September to the 4th of November, perceiving that preparations were making for a general aſſault abandoned the place in the night. Three days after Mud-Iſland was evacuated, the garriſon was alſo withdrawn from Red-Bank, on the approach of lord Cornwallis who at the head of a large force prepared to aſſault it. Some of the American gallies and armed veſſels eſcaped by keeping cloſe in with the Jerſey ſhore, to places of ſecurity above Philadelphia, but 17 of them were abandoned by their crews and fired.

Thus the campaign of 1777, in the middle ſtates, concluded, upon the whole, ſucceſſively on the part of the Britiſh. In the North, however, matters wore a different aſpect.

(To be continued.)

REMARKS ON THE ANCIENT AND MODERN METHOD OF FORTIFYING.

From the "Fortification Perpendiculaire" of the Marquis de Montalembert.

[WITH A PLATE.]

IN every period of the world it has been the practice of all nations to contrive ſuitable means for defending themſeves againſt the tyranny of power. But it ſeems that men have greater abilities for deſtroying than for preſerving; as no ſufficient means have been hitherto found out, whereby we might confine in proper limits the ſpirit of conqueſt which animates the ambitious princes, of the earth, whoſe exiſtence is too often a misfortune to mankind.

By well erected forts we might probably beſt attain this object and impede the progreſs of an enemy; but in the preſent day they are a weak obſtacle, and ſeem to exiſt only to heighten the enemy's triumph. If the iſſue of a battle has been once fortunate

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

for the one or the other party; the conqueror purſues his advantages with avidity, and ſtrong towns ſurrounded with walls and ditches, leave to him hardly ſo much time as he wants, to doubt of its ſubmiſſion. They cannot ſend deputies ſoon enough to ſolicit the favour of their new maſter. Towns with bulwarks and half-moons, beſides all other outworks, hardly wait till the *Saps* of the beſiegers have reached the *Glacis*, and their batteries are erected upon the *Crete* of it, to open their gates to the conqueror. A ſiege of two or three weeks is in our day a very long and obſtinate one. Only capital forts, which are ſurrounded by a double and triple line of works, the fortifying and keeping of which have coſt enormous ſums, and to the garriſoning of which a ſmall army is requiſite—ſuch forts only may hold out a regular ſiege: and, if they are well defended; the ſiege laſts about ſix weeks or two months after the opening of the trenches. * But this is all that we can expect of them. Nevertheleſs it is certain that they lay great obſtacles in the enemy's way. If they were better fortified; they would be capable of interrupting the conqueſts of the moſt formidable and powerful enemy. Men of experience know how great is the trouble, and, how enormous are the expences requiſite to get to the places, all the utenſils belonging to a ſiege, if the fort is of importance. Perhaps we have attained the higheſt degree of perfection, and of force in the attack of forts. In a ſiege a ſtill greater number of arms and a ſtill longer time, are neceſſary by which an enemy might at laſt find himſelf compelled to leave the moſt part of his arms behind, when an advanced ſeaſon does not permit him to continue the ſiege.

Forts, built on true principles, would therefore protect whole provinces againſt devaſtations, which are but too often the conſequences of war. A ſtate, whoſe frontiers are ſecured by forts, the beſieging of which would cauſe great difficulties to an enemy, would be but ſeldom drawn into a war; for it frequently happens that the facility of the conqueſt firſt prompts the ambitious neighbour to become a conqueror. But no art deſerves our attention more, than that on the perfection of which depend the quietneſs, and the domeſtic felicity of the nation of which we are members. As the annals of all centuries teach us, that force can only be reſiſted by force, that a greater power only is able to put limits to the injuſtice of men; let us ſearch after means of defence which will compel the rapacious neighbour to be at leaſt equitable

* *The ſiege of Gibralter is a great exception to this rule.*

Thoſe reaſons have diſpoſed me to make ſome examinations on the means of making the defence of our forts perfect. The importance of the object alone can outbalance the diſagreeableneſs which is connected with conſiderations of that kind. What I learned in my youth of the fortifying of towns according to the principles of the moſt renowned engineers, had given me a ſincere averſion againſt that ſcience. The knowledge which we gain thereon diſcovers to us the principal faults of all the methods of fortifying, without pointing out a remedy to us. The more we get acquainted with the univerſally-adopted theory of fortification, the more we ſee the impoſſibilty of meliorating the fortifying of our towns, if we adhere to that theory and to the ſtale prejudices which it produces. If we conſider the ſmall difference which exiſts between the (ſo named) different manners of fortifying, we ſhould think that the inventors of theſe ſyſtems have but given different names to one and the ſame method. Hence it follows: that the impoſſibility lies within the narrow circle in which they have ſo long time acted, and in the thing itſelf; as ſo many great men have in vain made eſſays in that branch. All the methods of fortifying conſiſt of Faces (*a*), Flanks (*b*), and Curtains (*c*), which connect the flanks; Some have given the commanded angle (*f*,) (angle flanqué,) a greater or ſmaller number of degrees, according as they have adopted the perpendicle (*d*) ſmaller or greater. Others have combined the length of faces, flanks, and curtains in all manners poſſible, lengthened ſome of theſe lines, and ſhortened others. Particularly the flanks were the object of the moſt ample enquiries, and the cauſe of the moſt violent and the bittereſt literary diſputes. One of the firſt ſyſtem-forgers, Errard, put his flank perpendicular on the face (as *gh*), that the flank might be denied to the fire of the beſiegers, without conſidering, that, if it is not ſeen by the enemy, it cannot ſee the enemy neither, and fire at it very little. That conſequently the flank, muſt become by this quite uſeleſs. In order to mend that fault, chevalier de *Ville* put his flank *(gi)* perpendicular on the curtains, and thereby ameliorated its poſition. However count de *Pagan* rightly diſcovered that chevalier de Ville had not done enough; and that the flank on the lengthened Face, the Foſſe of which it is to defend, muſt be perpendicular. This diſpoſed him to draw this flank *(gk)* on the line of defence *(fk)* perpendicular. In reality his was the beſt ſituation which he could give to the flank, as the perpendicular defence is inconteſtibly the moſt advantageous. The outworks which lay before the baſtions and curtains are then only of uſe

when they defend themſelves perpendicular: and we have hitherto been contented with an oblique defence for that reaſon only as we did not know any means to give to the ſaid works a perpendicular defence. The ſituation of the flank propoſed by count de Pagan ſhould therefore have ended the conteſt; but they aſſerted, that, as he wanted to approach the appointed aim too near; he had ſtept over it; that the *whole* flank at the lengthened face of the oppoſite bulwark ſhould not be perpendicular; that this could be ſaid of the point (*k*) of the flank; and that all the other points of the flank, had towards the face an inward bended ſituation. Finally they made againſt the poſition of the flank, propoſed by Pagan, the following ſingular objection: As the commanded angle (*f*) is the moſt important point, which is to be taken into conſideration; ſo the flank muſt be drawn ſo, that it can beſt defend this point; juſt as if the foſſe (*lm*,) where the enemy undertakes the paſſing over, did not deſerve a far greater attention! Therefore marſhal Vauban drew his flank (*gu*) ſo, that it made a pointed angle with the defence line. However this angle is not more pointed than the angle, which the flank (*gi*) of chevalier de Ville makes with the defence line.

It is not a little aſtoniſhing that ſo great a man as Vauban, has occupied himſelf with ſo trifling a thing, as the difference of the poſition of his flank with that propoſed by Pagan. In order to defend the commanded angle ſtill more, he made his flank (*p q*) concave, by which likewiſe the deſign was attained that it could leſs be hurt by ricochets. At laſt he adopted the Orillon (*r*), what was known before him, and ſacrificed the third part of his flank that both the other parts of it might be better ſecured againſt the batteries of the beſiegers, and that he might have a place for a cannon, which from the ſide of the field could not be ſeen, as the cannon itſelf only ſees the face of the oppoſite bulwark.* The concave flanks provided with Orillions were therefore applied at ſeveral places and approved of by many of the newer engineers. However here likewiſe they have made ſome alterations, in the length and inclination of the flank towards the curtain. For in order to have a pretenſion to the honour of being the inventors of a new ſyſtem, it was at leaſt neceſſary to ſhorten or lengthen the faces, flanks and curtains of ſome toiſes.

* *This as well as all other cannon which ſtand along the flank, may be caught at their wheel-work by the enemy's Riochets and may be diſmounted.*

But if the different situation of the flanks have for a long time divided the opinions of the most able engineers; they have had no less violent disputes on the advantages and disadvantages of the second flanks. Second flank is called that part of the curtain which can defend the face of the opposite bulwark, if the defence line reaches to one point of the curtain, but not to the end of it. If therefore the defence line *(fc)* cuts off the part of *(nc)* of the curtain; so this part of the curtain is called the second flank, as, though in a very oblique direction, it commands the face *(a)* of the opposite bastion. Against second flanks they have made the following two objections. First, they say, they command the face, *(a)* only in a very oblique direction; and the true greatness, of the second flank cannot be judged of by the greatness of the line *(nc)*, but, on the contrary by the greatness of the line *(no.)* But even from that it is clear that this is no well founded objection against the second flank; for the face *(a)* can indisputably be better defended by the flank *(go)*, than by the flank *(gn)* as the first is longer than the second. The second objection is: In order to get second flanks we should adopt the commanded angle *(f)*, sharper pointed. But as all the authors on the subject, have agreed that this angle may be augmented from 60 to 110 or 120 degrees, without causing the least disadvantage; and as we can have second flanks in all polygons, the pentagon excepted, without being obliged to adopt the commanded angle less than of 60 degrees; so it follows from hence, that this second objection against the second flank, is as little founded as the first; and that there is no ground, why this method, like the once adopted system, has not been followed more generally.

This is a short account of the most important disputes on those matters. It would be renewing them, were we to say more on the subject; and it may suffice to have briefly signified their nullity.

I trust it will not be concluded from hence, that I do not do justice to the talents of those who have written on these matters. Some authors have done all that could ever have been done by the once adopted system; and have given, in divers works, particular proofs of Genius. But as they contented themselves with only mending the very faulty methods of their predecessors, the end of their endeavours was only, that their methods were less defective. Had Cohorn never seen the works of count de Pagan, he would not have adopted his system, and would not have confined him-

ſelf merely improving thatſyſtem.* He would, and we could, have expected as much of ſo great a man as Cohorn, have invented ſomething eminently good, if Vauban had not been ſo much prepoſſeſed in favour of the art of fortifying with bulwarks, he would not have contented himſelf to invent only the (ſo named) Tours baſtionnées, and contre gardes with flanks, of which the latter are nothing but ſeparated bulwarks. Thoſe counter gardes were made with a deſign to have a ſecond line of works, by which the fort would be encloſed. But it does not ſeem that this intention was crowned with ſucceſs. People, who underſtand it, have obſerved, that the bulwarks are not ſufficiently ſecured by the contre gardes, and that the enemy may build batteries on the crete (ſummit or top) of the glacis, with which he may lay breaches into the chief wall. If therefore a breach can be made into the chief wall at the ſame time that it can be done into the contre gardes, it is not neceſſary to raiſe new batteries and to fire a breach into the contre gardes. Then we have nothing to do but to extend the lodgement to the right and the left as far as the flanks, and to undertake from thence the ſtorm on the chief ramparts, and this, the ſo named Tours baſtionnées, are, as we eaſily ſee, not able to prevent. Many able authors have ſhewn the faults of that ſyſtem; among others, the Chevalier de St. Julien, in his military architecture.

Marſhal de Vauban, who poſſeſſed ſo much ſkill in the attack of ſtrong places, has therefore not thrown a great light on the art of defending forts. Perhaps he would have been more ſucceſsful had he ventured to go out of the common road. All thoſe who ſet out from the ſame principles, muſt neceſſarily come to the ſame reſults. Therefore, though much pains were taken to perfect the art of fortifying cities, yet it is certain, that it remained far beneath the degree of perfection on which it was before the invention of gunpowder. With the opinions that reign at preſent, this aſſertion will excite ſurpriſe; but, I hope, the following will evince that it is well founded; and if the eſſays I have made, to open a new road, may produce ſome advantageous alterations, the deſign of this work would be, in ſome meaſure, already attained; particularly, if men of knowledge ſhould thereby be animated to make examinations into an art which has the peace and ſecurity of all nations for its object.

* *Cohorn's firſt ſyſtem is entirely like that of Pagan. The former has only applied at every Orillion a tower with caſemats, in order to defend the high faces of the bulwark.*

OF THE STRONG PLACES, AND THEIR DEFENCE BEFORE THE INVENTION OF GUNPOWDER.

IF ſociety owes its origin to a deſire of promoting the general intereſt; ſo the deſire of ſelf preſervation, has given riſe to the art of fortifying our abodes, and of ſecuring ourſelves againſt any ſudden attack. At firſt this art was very ſimple indeed: all fortifications conſiſted, perhaps of a ditch, provided with palliſadoes. But as ſoon as the habitations of men became more conſiderable they were obliged to have recourſe to invention for ſomething leſs vulnerable. The care ſo natural to every one, for the preſervation of wives, children and property, muſt ſoon lead to the means, how this great aim might beſt be attained. They therefore erected high walls, to the foot of which they gave a ſide defence by towers, which were erected from diſtance to diſtance; and before thoſe wall they made a large deep ditch. Though this manner of fortifying was ſimple yet it did not merit contempt; if we conſider the times in which they were uſed, and the attacks then in uſe which they were to reſiſt. At that time they had nothing to fear for the foot of the wall, as long as the ditch was not filled up. In comparing this manner of fortifying with the modern one, we muſt particularly take this circumſtance into conſideration. The great height of the walls and towers was therefore advantageous to the beſieged. The towers, particularly the round ones, which were ſtrongly built, forced the beſiegers to attach themſelves to that part of the wall which in courſe of time received the name of the curtain. But from this cauſe it was that the battering rams were at the front as well as at the flanks expoſed to the arrows of the beſieged. It therefore often happened that thoſe enormous machines were ruined by the beſieged, before they could effect a breach

This forced the beſiegers to erect new machines, and their building was connected with ſo much loſs of time, and with ſo many difficulties, that many places had to be thankful to thoſe wooden towers for not having been ruined. Not to reckon the difficulties to which the building of thoſe machines were ſubjected, it required infinite labour and pains to get them at the foot of the wall.

Ancient hiſtory has handed down to us many examples of towns which have withſtood the moſt impetuous attacks, and the greateſt perſeverance to ſubdue them. That renowned Carthagenean, the brave Hymilcan, who defended Lilibaea with ſo much valour and

art, and converted all the beſieging machines of the Romans into a heap of cinders, forced them at laſt to raiſe the ſiege, and to blockade the town merely. The ſieges of Jeruſalem, of Tyrus, Carthage, Numantia, Rhodus, and Marſeilles will remain for ever memorable in the annals of the hiſtory of war on account of the obſtinacy with which they were defended. Not to mention the ſieges of Troy, that of Veya deſerves our whole attention, which town was not conquered till after a ſiege of ten years: and had not Camillus conceived the lucky thought of making a ſubterraneous paſſage from the Roman camp into the town as far as under the Temple of Juno, the Romans would not have made themſelves maſters of the place. When the Roman Conſul ſaw at the ſiege of Ambracia that he could effect nothing with a viſible force; he took to the like ſcheme of a ſubterraneous paſſage. But as the beſieged gueſſed what was going foward; they made a large foſſee behind the wall oppoſite the place where the beſiegers were at work; and made from that ditch a gallery directly towards the gallery of the beſiegers. Here one of the bloodieſt combats enſued; at laſt the Romans were forced to retire, as the beſieged had ſet fire to the wood of which the Roman mine was compoſed.

If therefore we read the hiſtory of that era with attention, we ſhall be perfectly convinced of the goodneſs of the ancient manner of fortifying; for a thing is good or bad ſo far as it promotes more or leſs the deſign which we ſeek to attain; and if thoſe methods of fortifying often enabled the beſieged, to delude every endeavour of the beſieger's (though the latter may have been far ſuperior in number to the former) we muſt do them juſtice, and give them our entire approbation.

We can on the contrary by no means oppoſe, that the forts of the ancients had held out ſo long ſieges on account of the ignorance of the beſiegers, and that they conducted their attacks without courage. We have had in our times no ſieges, where under the walls of the forts had happened more lively and more repeated combats, than at the ſieges which the ancients undertook; and, beſides we can by no means compare the labours of the ſieges of the ancients with the works which our trenches and batteries require. Thoſe works are ſubject to a few rules only which can be underſtood by every one; where, on the contrary, the buildings of thoſe machines, and every thing requiſite to put them in motion preſuppoſed great knowledge in him who ordered the work and great abilities in the workmen. The grand effect of the Balliſta

and Catapultae muſt alſo be merely attributed to the manner of making them, as we have not been able to give that power (elaſticity) to thoſe machines, which in our days have been made as an imitation of the Ballifts and Catapultae. We therefore muſt allow that the ancients have carried on their ſieges with as much art and ſcience, as courage and reſolution, and as they ſhowed great perſeverance in their undertakings, it evinces, that walls, which could reſiſt all thoſe powerful means, were a manner of fortifying which did not leave much to be wiſhed for. How well would it be if we could ſay the ſame of our modern art! but it is too true, that it has loſt that aſcendency over the art of attack.

Before the invention of gun powder, there was a ſort of equilibre between the attack and defence of forts; and we may even aſſert that the defence often had an aſcendency over the attack, if we take into conſideration the want of victuals, which often forced the forts to ſurrender. But ſince this epoch, or rather ſince the time of Marſhal de Vauban, the attack has gained ſuch an aſcendency and the defence is ſo much neglected, that forts, can no more be conſidered as forts;* for the longeſt ſieges, which happened ſince the before mentioned epoch, did not laſt longer than 40, 50, or 60 days, after the opening of the trenches. Ryſſel one of the beſt forts in France, was defended in the year 1708 by a numerous garriſon which performed prodigies of valour, yet this place, after a ſiege of two months, was obliged to open its gates to the conquerors. At four places there were breaches in the chief rampart; and how many places are there which have held out a much ſhorter time? *Ath* is one of thoſe forts which Marſhall de Vauban has fortifyed with the greateſt attention. The engineer, who has kept a journal of that ſiege aſſures us, that Vauban had taken the greateſt care to give every line its moſt advantageous length. From the plan, we have of that fort, we ſee, that according to the ſyſtem he had laid down, he could do nothing better. In ſpite of all that, the fort held out but 13 days, when Vauban himſelf beſieged it in the year 1667. It is true that this general made at this ſiege the firſt uſe of his newly invented ricochet-batteries, and that, by this means, he fired at all the faces and flanks of the attacked polygon in the length, by which the garriſon was forced to quit the walls, and could therefore not ſufficiently oppoſe the

* *The war burns more fiercely than ever; and they write me from Flanders, "that the towns fall like tiles in a ſtorm."*
Vol. I. of XI lettre of Pope Clements, XIV. (Ganganelli.)

rapid advancing of the works of the beſiegers. But it is true, that the great effect of theſe ricochet-batteries ſhows the weakneſs of that manner of fortification.

At this ſiege the epocha happened, where the art to attack forts attained the higheſt degree of perfection. As at this ſiege, the place for the batteries of the beſiegers was appointed on the lengthening of the faces and flanks of the works; ſo the beſieged, could no more ſecure their heavy arms againſt the enemy's fire. But if the guns of a beſieged place are once ſilenced, the moſt valiant garriſon can defer a capitulation but a few days.

This we have ſeen in the war in Flanders in the year 1741, where the ſtrongeſt places held out but 15 to 20 days, after the opening of the trenches. The ſiege of Namur laſted 7, and the ſiege of the caſtles round it 6 days. Only the city of Bergen-op-Zoom held out a ſiege of 62 day. But he who knows the ſituation of that place, muſt naturally be aſtoniſhed that it could be conquered. If we examine cloſely the plans of the attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, which were publicly known afterwards, we do not find two batteries which were made according to Vauban's principles. The fire of the fort could therefore not be ſilenced. How did it happen then that the garriſon who was ſupported by a whole army, to which victuals could be carried by land and by water, ſuffered itſelf to be conquered? This is one of thoſe extraordinary occurrences, which we muſt not take as a pattern in like enterprizes; particularly if we ſhould operate with the ſame degree of art and precaution as were exerciſed at this ſiege.

The defence of Landau conducted by M. de Melac in the year 1702, is one of the fineſt we can alledge. It deſerves the greateſt praiſe, as this valiant commander held out in that ſmall place a ſiege of 82 days from the opening of the trenches. Within the compaſs of a hundred years, this was the longeſt ſiege. The defence of Garve in the year 1689, which did ſo much honour to the marquis of Uſelles, laſted 40 days; the defence of Duai by M. d' Albergoti, as well as the defence of Aire by M. de Gobriant in the year 1710, only 52 days. It would be uſeleſs to enter into a more ample narration of ſimilar examples.* It is well known that we dare not expect a longer reſiſtance of the beſt forts; and ſhall by no means be aſtoniſhed, if we conſider the great advantages which the modern methods of fortifying afford to the beſiegers, whereas, on the contrary they leave but few means to the beſieged. But as this important truth has never been looked upon in an exact point of view, and as even thoſe who endeavoured to improve

* *The ſhort ſieges of the preſent war confirm this.*

military architecture fell into the same errors as their predecessors, so it is necessary to place the advantages of those methods of fortifying, which were made use of directly after the invention of gunpowder, in a clear light; that we may convince ourselves that we have not improved it, and that we cannot come to a better manner of fortifying' if in future we do not proceed on other principles.

REMARK OF THE EDITOR.

If we, among other gallant defences, consider the siege of Colberg in the year 1761, where that brave Prussian commander, Hayden, with a small garrison, resisted a numerous Russian army by land, and a Russian and Swedish fleet of seven and twenty ships of the line, with a proportioned number of smaller ones, by sea, and deluded by his activity and prudence every attempt of the enemy, till after four months he was compelled by hunger to surrender; if we likewise take the gallant defence of Gibraltar from July 1779 to September 1782 in consideration, we shall find, that the assertions of Montalembert, of Virgin, and of others who pretend that the art of defence did not keep equal pace with the art of attack, will suffer some refutation. How many strong places would never have been taken, if the commander had either possessed sufficient skill and activity, to delude the enemy's endeavours, or faithfulness enough not to listen to secret proposals?

If we allow even that few forts can at present resist the art of a regular siege, the query will be, whether the art of attack has gained particular ascendancy over that of defence; for in ancient times, when hardly any strong place could be taken; the art of attack was behind that of defence; and it is therefore conspicuous, that both these arts came then upon an equal scale, as soon as the attacks have been rendered so that forts could be taken. Should new methods of fortifying be invented, of such magnitude as to defy any of the present artful attacks, then the latter is again behind the former; so that truth will ever remain indisputable, that with every invention it will depend on the skill, activity and faithfulness of the commander, to exercise with success those advantages which art or nature has given for his defence.

A Plan to inſtruct as well the officer of horſe, as the private, in the field-ſervice, and to give him, in time of peace, diſtinct notions of every thing neceſſary to be known in time of war; by a diſtinguiſhed officer in the Pruſſian ſervice.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is neceſſary, and indeed among divers armies, it is uſual, in time of peace to inſtruct the troops, and exerciſe them in every thing belonging to their duty in the field: but having often found that the cavalry has been either too little, or not ſufficiently inſtructed; after I have arranged and opened my ideas on the ſubject, I will proceed to give ſuch inſtructions, particularly to light-horſemen, from the common man to the officer, that they may have occaſion to know, in every thing neceſſary for them in the field, point out to them the advantages of ground, teach them how to make the beſt uſe of it, and enable them to act againſt their enemy, either in the day or night, as well offenſive as defenſive.

Patience is the principal and firſt thing I recommend to every one, whoſe duty it is to inſtruct his ſubordinates. The generality of young men become timid by harſh treatment; when they commit faults they loſe their zeal in the ſervice, and, to avoid puniſhment, work as machines; not indulging their own good ideas, becauſe they have not ſufficient courage to addreſs their impatient, ſurly, or proud commander on the ſubject. I ſhall have an opportunity to ſay more hereafter upon this head: at preſent I will begin with ſhewing what I expect of a troop or ſquadron, before the men are inſtructed in field manœuvres; this ſhall be, independent of inſtructions for the private, the firſt part of my plan.

The ſecond ſhall contain inſtructions for the ſubaltern officer; the third for the officer of higher rank. I write not as an author, but as a ſoldier; my words are directed to military men, and I wiſh only to make myſelf intelligible to thoſe I addreſs.

FIRST PART.—*Inſtructions for the Private.*

EVERY building muſt have its foundation; each labourer muſt know his utenſils before he begins to work; more neceſſary it is in the buſineſs of a ſoldier, that he ſhould firſt acquire a knowledge of his arms, and how to uſe them in his own defence; and that he ſhould know how to unite and apply them to his advantage, before we can expect him to act properly in the field.

The private muſt, conſequently, if he would be of ſervice in time of war, be drilled and gradually inſtructed. To this purpoſe, as I have already obſerved, he ſhould be well acquainted with his arms, and know how to make uſe of them. He ſhould firſt learn to ride well, to manage his horſe, and uſe his ſword and piſtol with effect. The light-horſe-man, particularly, where opportunity offers, ſhould practiſe ſwimming. He ſhould next know perfectly the evolutions, and manœuvres in the exerciſe of the ſquadron. This is to be learned by the officer, as well as the private, for unleſs they know this, and its uſe perfectly, they never can be very ſerviceable in the field. We muſt not therefore ſpend years merely in inſtructing them to make a good attack, and in forming the ſquadron well, teaching them merely *to wheel and to break*. We muſt give the men notions of real ſervice in the field. This depends much on the management of the time, and in the manner of exerciſing.

The greateſt objection againſt frequent exerciſe of the cavalry is the neceſſity of ſparing their horſes. But it is the objection of thoſe only who attend too much to trifles, talk much, but who know not how to make the beſt uſe of time or ground, and who never exerciſe with the neceſſary ſtrictneſs and accuracy. I have ſeen them travel faſt for ſome miles to the place of exerciſe, and back again in the ſame manner, without any attention either to time or ground; then pity their horſes, and ſay, they have been exerciſed three hours! But how? Has not time been waſted? Can we not in the march of two a breaſt at leaſt, take care that the men ride in order, and cloſe, and that they do not avoid every puddle; that they do not at one time trot, at another walk; but continue one pace, in order to uſe them to a good column march? Can we not, where ground permits, march with a large front, form ſquadrons, trot and break all together, according to circumſtances? By this mode we ſhould not be obliged to ſtay ſo long upon the place of exerciſe, and ſhould return an hour ſooner to quarters, and the horſes would be in the ſtable. But if this is not done on the place of exerciſe, it is conſidered as no exerciſe at all. Beſides, we do not accuſtom the men ſufficiently to have their eyes and ears on their commander; but merely preach to them, tell them what they have to do, as they exerciſe one day after another, teaching them by rotine, as children are taught the alphabet. It is this that makes the men not attentive to their employ; they never acquire a thorough knowledge of their duty, but act like a piece of mechaniſm, or like a clock when wound up, their

exercise being always the same, and ever explained to them before; whereas they should be taught to act according to the expediency of time and place.

The recruit should certainly first be instructed in the manual exercise, and properly disciplined, but, this done, such instructions should cease as soon as he is ranged in the squadron. And though some repetitions are necessary to those who in the spring join their regiments after some time of absence, yet it is likewise necessary, that he who is not attentive should feel it, and when the men are once used to this way of instruction, there will be fewer to punish.

Why do we not on the march also, and from the place of exercise, wherever ground permits march with van and rear-guard, and with side-patrols? Why do we not search the villages, hedges, &c. which lie in the way? Should a time be fixed for being with the squadron on the place, this may be done on returning. In one word, we may do a great deal without fatiguing men or horses unnecessarily, if we know only how to make the best use of the time.

In order to have, at every exercise the field service in view, to give the men more adroitness, what the Prussian's call *appel*, to use them to quick motions, and a prompt execution of their commands; I think it should be done as follows:

Sect. I. Exercise should never be performed after one and the same way, whereby we only lose time and fatigue the horses; the squadron should receive instruction only in that point where it is most deficient. If they know not how to make a proper attack, we should begin by this: why should they first pass by in lines, form and break? If they cannot quickly *deployer*, or extend their lines, which I should principally attend to, we may commence with that, even if nothing else should that day be done on the place. In this manner we should have sufficient time, and the horses sufficient strength to instruct the officers, as well as privates, in other things belonging to the field-service.

To make the officer, as well as the private, attentive, and to use them to every quick and unforeseen motion; the commander should sometimes, whilst the squadron is making a commanded motion, ride to another platoon, and direct another motion. For instance, if he has given the words of command, *Form the squadron*, so that all are in motion, he may ride to the first platoon, give the word of command, *the first platoon with four to the right*; go on, trot with them to the right, command, *Halt front*; and give the officer, who leads the troop, orders what further he is to do. The

other three platoons take no notice of this, but form the ſquadron, and wait for further orders. Or, during the attack, the commander may order one platoon to halt, or to turn out of the line. In this manner, the ſquadron, attentive and ready, will be more expert, and will, in occurrences before the enemy, know how to direct themſelves. Beſides, in ſuch motions, the commander ſhould always ride near the platoon, and command diſtinctly; the officer who leads the platoon, ſhould take the command from him, and go on repeating it. On the contrary, if the words of command are given for the whole ſquadron, no one ſhould, but the commander, open his mouth. If the ſquadron is once uſed to this, it will become eaſy, and be of great uſe in real action. All motions muſt be done backwards and forwards, that is, if the ſquadron, with four is wheeled to the right, they muſt be able to wheel as well in platoons, to form and break, and do every thing that is deſired of them: with one word, the firſt line, whether in front or in rear, ſhould know readily how to execute every thing.

Sect. II. To make every thing to the men as eaſy as poſſible, they ſhould not be harraſſed with many diviſions. The ſimple peaſant has ſo little thought and judgment, that it is difficult to make him underſtand the moſt neceſſary things; yet he ſhall have ſometimes four or five different diviſions to keep in his head, and make uſe of it at a proper time, without conſideration, directly after the word of command. For example, 1ſt. He is in the fourth platoon. 2d. By extending, he is No. 4. 3d. In out-flanking before the attack, when they are to trot to the *point de vue*, he is No. 5. 4th. In diſmounting, he is the ſecond man. 5th. If they are to wheel with four to the right, he is perhaps the firſt, or otherwiſe. Now I aſk, is this poor man not to be pitied, and does he deſerve to be puniſhed when he fails? It is to be conſidered, whether the following two diviſions are not ſufficient for all the abovementioned motions; that is to ſay, when the ſquadron is divided into two, *viz.* in half, and into quarter platoons?

For example: Firſt, if they are to make or extend a ſmall front in order to paſs a redoubt, a bridge, or other obſtacle, I file off with two. (N. B. as uſual out of each line) conſequently, have four men in front, not being able to get with a larger front through ſuch a paſſage. If there is no obſtacle, I file off always with half, or quarter platoons. Secondly, if we have to trot to the *point de vue*, in order to out-flank: why cannot that be done with half, or quarter platoons, as well as with a fifth or a third? If the platoon be not too great, it is done with half platoons. Here

then we wheel always with half platoons, so that the second line is continually behind the first; but not so, if done as in the second deploiement, where, *with four to the right*, the four men of the second rank come always to the right of those of the first line, consequently, they are eight in front. Thirdly, for dismounting I want no other division than by two; because I can say to the men, which will answer the purpose: in dismounting *one advance and two retreat*, instead of saying advance the first and third, and retreat the second and fourth. Fourthly, if we are to wheel by four to the right, it can always be done by half and quarter platoons. (N. B. If the platoon is less than twelve files, we wheel to the right by half platoons: in case it is above twelve, by quarter platoons, because three men wheel as well, and indeed quicker than four.) If ever I would allow another division in the squadron, it would be that of wheeling by three; that, in case a part of the squadron is to dismount, to cover the passage of a defile or a bridge, the first and third men dismount, and give their horses to the second; and in this the men must be instructed. The subaltern of the wing of the platoon remains, if possible, on his horse, and he who closes the platoon dismounts.

Sect. III. In garrison the men must be exercised in saddling and marching out, and must learn to make all kinds of forage-bundles. To this end we may order the men sometimes to prepare their saddles, and all belonging to them at a fixed hour, as it is done in camps. The officers then go into their stables, and command the men to saddle their horses in their presence as quick as possible. No one should put on his saddle, till the officer is present, at which time, the whole stable saddles together. In order to make the men more attentive to the signals, a general order should be given and never varied. If the alarm is given, by trumpet and beat of drum, the squadron marches out with bag and baggage, and each brings his comrade's horse, if his comrade is absent, to the place of alarm: but in case the sound of alarm is given only for exercise, the squadron armed and saddled, with their arms quit the stable, but leave their comrade's horses behind. I make this distinction, that the men may know directly, whether there is an alarm in reality, or whether it be merely for exercise.

Of great utility it would be, if we could use the men more to signals, that they may know from the sound of the trumpet, whether they are to advance, retreat, or draw to the right or

left; at leaſt the officers ought to know it. This is attended to among many Pruſſian regiments, particularly the Huſſars.

If, in garriſon, food is received, a party ſhould come to the magazine in their undreſs, and make ſaddle, and baggage bundles of their hay, and ſtraw in order to teach thoſe men, who were never in a campaign. The little fodder perhaps that is loſt by it, cannot be ſo much injury to the horſes, as the advantage ariſing from the uſe of it will be in time of war.

This is the general preparation. We will proceed now to a mock engagement; for this it is neceſſary that the private ſhould learn well to flank.

Sect. IV. The flanker muſt know how to uſe his arms well particularly his piſtol; to apply his ſhot, and to manage his horſe properly. All this he muſt learn whilſt a recruit. It remains then to ſhow him how he muſt draw the fire from his adverſary, how to ſave his own fire, and ſecond his friend. To this end we muſt uſe the men, ſo as that in flanking two are always together, to ſecond each other. If whole files are advanced in order to flank, two men from each file remain together, as follows: the flanker from the firſt line rides up within a piſtol ſhot of his enemy, manages his horſe well, and wheeling himſelf ſo that his enemy ſhall be on his right, takes his mark, careful to ſecure his own fire till his adverſary has fired, or till he thinks himſelf ſure of his aim. If his adverſary fires firſt, he ſhould advance a few paces more towards him, and then fire. As ſoon as the flanker from the ſecond line, who ſhould always be eight or ten paces behind the former, ſees that the one before him has fired, he ſhould advance haſtily and do the ſame: but the firſt retreats immediately behind him, and re-charges his piſtol; he never, however, ſhould ſtand ſtill, but be continually wheeling with his horſe, or ride up and down. If thoſe of the ſecond line remark that any one of his enemy's flankers ſtand ſtill, and is not attentive, they ſhould endeavour to ſhoot him with their carbine; ſo, if they can reach the enemy, the flankers of the ſecond line, ſhould fire at them with their carbines, but never forget that they are to ſecond their foreman. Of courſe, we ſhould particularly ſhew the men how to take aim with their carbines without quitting the bridle. When they fire with carbines, they muſt be always on the right of the enemy, in order to be able to preſent with the left hand. If the enemy's troop retreats, they ſhould endeavour to come up with it, as cloſe as poſſible, to be able to fire with effect, and muſt keep to

the flanks, so as not to be in the way of their own troop, in case that should mean to attack.

If the enemy retreats, some of the flankers should join and rush upon the rear of the enemy, shouting with sword in hand, or seem as if they intended to cut into the troop, in order to interrupt or force it to make front, and give their own troop an opportunity to attack it with effect.

If it is necessary to retreat, the flankers should always follow their troop at a proper distance, and never lose sight of it, in case two lines of battle are formed. In this case, they always draw behind their troop through the second line, and not make front again till their troop makes front. If the enemy should attack us during the retreat, they should briskly fall on its flank, in order to give their troop an opportunity of gaining time to get into proper positions. For all this, the men should, during their manœuvres, be well instructed. Of course, we should always, when they make these manœuvres, leave a subaltern officer with them who understands the business well, and who can teach them how to take the right point of time. If they fail, they should be punished on the place of exercise. We cannot conceive what great utility good flankers are of, in the field, particularly in a retreat.

Sect. V. This having been made intelligible to them, they are to learn their business at the head of the van and rear-guard, and that of the side patrols. He who is at the head of the van guard should be very attentive to every thing; as soon as he discovers any thing of the enemy, he is directly to report it, each by communication to the man behind him, to the subaltern, who leads the troop, but he is himself, by no means to lose sight of the enemy. He should beforehand be instructed, whether the intention is to attack or retreat. This consequently must be determined at every manœuvre. In the latter case, he directly draws back slowly, but observing always the enemy's motion. Are they to attack, he must not run directly up to the enemy, but wait the approach of the subaltern's troop, then get up to the enemy as close as possible, and attack briskly. If it is not determined which troop is to retreat (as we shall see in the continuation), and as in war, an attack is often changed into a retreat, the foremost man retreats slowly, and waits for further orders, or conducts himself according to the motions of his troop. The last of the rear must have his eyes always backwards, to see whether the enemy approaches him in the rear, in which case, he directly, if the enemy be at a distance, must give information. But should the enemy be within

500 paces of him, he ſhould fire, that his troop may put itſelf in a proper poſition.

The ſide patrols ſhould learn properly to ſearch mountains hedges, plains, villages, and give information of every thing they diſcover; but there is a difference to be made between ſeeking the enemy to attack, or wiſhing to get ſlyly by; conſequently they ſhould be inſtructed in both.

If we ſeek the enemy in order to act offenſively, the flankers ſhould ride quietly up a hill, and look round on all ſides. If we act on the defenſive only, they ſhould aſcend the hill ſlowly and ſlyly, and move ſlow when upon it, that from a diſtance, they may not eaſily be diſcovered. The ſide-patrols alſo, ſhould never ſtray ſo as to be cut off from their ſquadron; for inſtance, if a river, ditch, redoubt, or moraſs is before them, they ſhould never go round it, ſo as that ſuch river, &c. ſhould at any time be between them and their ſquadron, becauſe this river, &c. would cover their ſquadron from any unexpected attack, they ſhould at ſuch a paſſage draw towards their ſquadron and paſs the place with it. I have, to my great mortification, ſeen a number of ſubalterns and officers of higher rank thoughtleſsly following one another, and leaving moraſſes, great ditches, and ſuch like places, between them and their column—and why? becauſe they were not properly inſtructed in theſe matters; ſo have I ſeen a quantity of gun powder fired away, during the exerciſe of a regiment, to no uſe, owing to the ignorance of the officers.

If any thing unexpectedly occurs to the ſide-patrols, they ſhould inſtantly fire, in order to inform the ſquadron as quick as poſſible, of the preſence of the enemy. One principle thing is, to inſtruct the men to be always on the look out after their ſquadron, and direct themſelves according to its march; for it is impoſſible that the commander, (particularly in war) ſhould be able to call to his detached men, and that if he finds it neceſſary to alter his march, they ſhould, on ſeeing it, know how to act. In their manœuvres they ſhould be accuſtomed to this. In night-marches they are to act differently, here they are not to go ſo far from their troop, but that, if it is out of ſight, they may be within hearing; in ſhort the ear ſhould in this caſe ſupply the uſe of the eye. They ſhould ride cautiouſly, often ſtop and liſten, whether they hear the noiſe either of men or horſes; if they do, endeavour to draw up to the noiſe as ſilent as poſſible, examine it nearly, and give intelligence of the ſame; ſhould any thing approach them before the intelligence be given, they ſhould inſtantly fire and call out.

They ſhould early be taught together, in ſuch caſes, to retreat to their ſquadron, or direct their courſe another way, in order to miſlead the enemy.

If they are firſt diſcovered by the enemy, it is their buſineſs not to retreat, but ride off another way, firing frequently, ſo as to draw the enemy after them; and thus give their ſquadron an opportunity to take its own meaſures, and either fall on the flank or rear of the enemy.

They ſhould be inſtructed in certain ſignals that ſhould govern them in the dark, ſuch as for example their leader's whiſtling, or ſtriking againſt a tree, either of which may be heard at ſome diſtance, and which, by previous explanation, may direct them how to act.

The men, in time of peace, ſhould be well inſtructed, or in war we never ſhall have a good ſide-patrol, and ſhall unneceſſarily loſe many a man. If it is not requiſite to inſtruct the men in night-manœuvres, in the dark; we, at leaſt, ſhould do it in the day, and explain to them every thing diſtinctly. They ſhould learn to patrol the villages, both in day and night, be taught how to ſeparate themſelves among villages, hedges, and hollow ways, &c. and how to aſſiſt each other, ſo that no place remains unſearched.

Sect. VI. Should a troop be detached, in order to reconnoitre, the vanguard and ſide-patrol ſhould know how artfully to examine the paſſengers and country people they meet, and gain from them all the intelligence they can without diſcovering their deſign, and if they find it neceſſary, to take them before the commanding officer; how to ſeize an inhabitant, and frighten him out of information; how they are to aſſiſt each other in making diſcoveries; that one ſhould give his horſe to another to hold, whilſt he climbs a tree, a precipice, or hill, or whilſt he goes to the top of a houſe or ſteeple, in order to make a good look out; how to creep up to the fire of an enemy at night, or get near a houſe where any of the party are, to obſerve what ſort of troops they are. If this is not practiſed in time of peace, ſo as to give the men a thorough notion of it, and convince them that they are practicable things; it will be impoſſible, in time of war, to get it done. When advancing to the enemy, the obſtacles the men at ſuch a time will naturally anticipate, will prevent its being effectually done. If theſe things are practiſed in time of peace, and a ſmall reward given to ſuch as are more expert than others, they will take a pleaſure in doing it, and in time of war, will do the ſame, (even without orders,) and venture courageouſly into the midſt of danger, in

hopes of meeting their commander's approbation. At leaſt, by by ſuch a practice, an army will have men expert at this buſineſs, at the commcement of a campaign.

They ſhould be given to underſtand, that this is more practicable in real ſervice, than at exerciſe; as in the firſt caſe, the enemy will not be apprized of what they are going to do: whereas in the laſt, thoſe againſt whom their deſigns are aimed, are aware of it.

Sect. VII. The men ſhould alſo be inſtructed in every thing reſpecting a field-guard, how to examine all who come to the chain, and ſuffer none either to paſs or repaſs, more particularly at night, whom they do not know, or who have not a paſſport; how to give ſignals to each other, and paſs the watch-word; how to ſtop a trumpeter with diſpatches, blindfold him, and conduct him to the guard; how to conduct themſelves in caſe they ſee, at a diſtance, a great fire, a cloud of duſt, a glittering of arms, or a body marching, or in caſe they hear a voice at night, how to draw up to it undiſcovered, and make themſelves acquainted with what is paſſing, before they give the alarm, and finally, how to conduct themſelves in an enemy's approach.

Theſe are the things in which the privates ſhould be principally inſtructed, and which we ſhould make to them very clear and intelligible. We will now proceed to the ſubaltern.

Of inſtructions for the Non-commiſſioned Officers.

Sect. I. It ſhould be the chief view of the commanding officer of a ſquadron, particularly of light horſe, to have able, active, and well informed non-commiſſioned officers; as in war they are often left to themſelves, and employed in expedients which, though they may ſeem trifling, may, in fact, be of the utmoſt importance; we ſhould endeavour, therefore, to form them in time of peace, and improve their underſtanding as much as poſſible. For example, they ſhould be accuſtomed in private affairs to act on commiſſion, in the diſcharge of which, they ſhould be exact and adroit; by this their abilities will be better known.

Sect. II. They ſhould be able to read and write, that, in caſe of neceſſity, they may make their reports in writing. As ſoon as they can give ſome account of what they have done, *viva voce*, they ſhould be accuſtomed to do the ſame in writing; and if they cannot do it properly, they ſhould be taught; examples ſhould be laid before them to copy and ſtudy. Men that teach them ſhould do it with patience, and point out where they err, with temper.

Care ſhould be taken that non-commiſſioned, and even officers of higher rank, ſhould expreſs themſelves in their reports with preciſion, and not uſe themſelves to vague and indefinite terms; for inſtance, they ſhould not uſe the expreſſions, *on this part*, or, *the other part;* or, if ſpeaking of rivers, *the right or the left ſhore*. I have known great miſtakes ariſe from ſuch undetermined expreſſions.

They ſhould learn to make reports of the patrols, in writing; and in teaching them this, we ſhould uſe great patience, and go on with them gradually. At firſt they ſhould merely relate the way they have taken. Here they ſhould learn to determine what ſort of ground they paſſed; whether ſandy, ſtony, hilly, or boggy; how and were it changed; whether they paſſed bridges or defiles, and where and with how large bodies they could be paſſed. Whether the river could be forded or not; whether the bridge is of ſtone or wood. By this they will know the way, and be certain of making true reports.

If, for example, a manœuvre is made to reconnoitre the enemy, we ſhould uſe them to deſcribe its poſition; that is to ſay, where they found the enemy; how ſtrong they are; what ſort of troops they conſiſt of; and how and from what ſide they approached. Here again they muſt be very explicit, and not ſay, "I marched by on the other ſide of the village, and the field-guard was at the lower part of it;" but "I had the village on my left, and the field-guard being at the end of the village, the village was on its right flank." We ſhould, if poſſible, teach them to write down their own movements, and thoſe alſo of the enemy; viz. in what manner and with how many troops, the enemy made the attack or retreated; how they conducted themſelves in the buſineſs; how they followed the enemy, in what poſition, and why they did not purſue them further.

Few non-commiſſioned officers will have occaſion to put this in practice; but if ſome of them only are equal to the taſk, ſhould there be occaſion ſo to employ them, the commanding officer has it in his power. How often does it happen in war, that an officer is ſent out on a dangerous patrol, to reconnoitre; or on a buſineſs which requires choſen men; and how glad would ſuch officer be to have ſuch ſerjeants and privates with him, on whoſe prudence and experience he can rely? I will here mention a circumſtance which happened to me in the campaign of 1758. I went out on a command, and was cut off from my corps, and had neither money or victuals for man or horſe. Not being able to learn any thing

of the corps I belonged to, which had taken another route, on account of the enemy's approach; I drew up to one of our forts, in order to procure intelligence of the enemy's position and ours, and, at the same time, to get money, and provisions; but the commanding officer refused both, and would scarce allow me to take quarters in a village under his cannons, and could give me no further intelligence, than that he supposed Lieutenant General———, was with his corps about four miles off. I wrote therefore to this general, sent a serjeant, with two well mounted men, whom I directed which way to take, and instructed him in the manner in which he might get through to the place I sent him. He succeeded, and the general, who, indeed, was no friend to the cavalry was astonished at it. He desired the serjeant to point out to him on the map, the way he had taken, and how he had crept by unnoticed. The serjeant having given such an account, and such a description of the environs, as highly pleased him, he made him a present, and gave him instructions which way to return. I received a suitable answer, and every thing I wanted; was quartered in the suburbs of the fort, and joined our corps six days after.

This is a proof that a clever serjeant or corporal with four or six men, may make his way every where; whilst an officer, with 30 or 40 horses, perhaps dare not venture.

An officer would be very badly off, who with a troop of 30 or 40 horses, is appointed to a command, and in which he has something to risk, and in case of necessity, must add force to craft, if he had not at least one non-commissioned officer with him, on whom he could rely, and to whom in a case of urgency he could tell his secret, and who might share with him in the danger. How frequently does it occur, that on such expeditions, we are obliged to open our way back with sword in hand. Should the officer be killed or taken prisoner, who is to make the report to the general? Or suppose I was gone with a party to the rear of the enemy, and had detached several troops commanded by serjeants and officers, of higher rank, further into the country; with orders to shew themselves every where, to deceive and alarm the people, in order to make them believe that we were as strong again as we were; that they might carry such a false report to their army, and thus disquiet them, and make them take another position; or perhaps induce them to detach a force ten times stronger than mine against me, from which our army might draw good advantages: if this was to happen, and I had only such non-

commiſſioned officers under me as knew nothing of the ſervice, and were not able to make a report, how could I rely on them, and how could they give me a proper account of what they did, or of what they knew of the enemy? I know no greater misfortune can befal an officer on a command, than that of having none but blockheads as ſubalterns with him. It is a principal thing then in the cavalry, that non-commiſſioned officers ſhould be inſtructed in time of peace, ſo as to acquire knowledge and conſideration.

Sect. III. *How to inſtruct Non-commiſſioned Officers in a Campaign.*

It will ſeldom occur, that a non-commiſſioned officer will be left to place his field-guard according to his own plan; for ſuch field-guards are commonly detached from a larger body, or are at leaſt placed by an officer of higher rank; in which caſe they receive their orders, and their poſts are fixed; yet there is ſtill a good deal left to their own conſideration. A non-commiſſioned officer, therefore, ſhould know how to inſpect his *videttes* properly, that they may give him good intelligence of all they hear and ſee. He ſhould be able to tell them how they are to detain every one that comes towards them; how they are at night alternately to ride backwards and forwards for ſome hundred paces, and liſten whether they hear a noiſe or any thing approaching them; how they are to call to the patrol, and how diſpatch them. To this end he muſt give them the patrol or watch-word diſtinctly, and ſo as that they ſhall underſtand it; and to make them ready at this, he ſhould himſelf ride forwards ſo as to be ſpoke to, and that the watch-word may be demanded of him.

In the campaign of 1761, I was very nearly being killed by one of my own men: the non-commiſſioned officer having given him a wrong watch-word. As the circumſtance applies ſo cloſely to this ſubject, I will relate it.

The regiment was poſted in three villages; it was not half complete, having only ſeven non-commiſſioned officers fit for ſervice, who were chiefly on command and patrols; of courſe theſe only had the field-guards, and as I was in the village near the field-guard, I had the charge of viſiting them, and inſtructing and diſpatching the patrols. Having once reached the *vidette* of a corporal, and let him purpoſely call out twice, he demanded the watch-word; and on my giving it in his opinion wrong, he advanced and fired. I then called to him, and, he knowing me by my voice,

came up to me. I examined him and took him with me to the troop. He had received the watch-word in writing, and ſhewed me the paper, but the misfortune was, he could not read; and had given out the word *Caſſimir* as the watch-word, inſtead of *Girrigini*. I give this as a proof of the neceſſity of ſerjeants and corporals being better informed.

THE SEVEN YEARS WAR IN GERMANY.

(*Continued from page* 131.)

THE immediate reſult of that loſs was the raiſing of the ſiege of Olmutz. This was executed by field-marſhal Keith with the utmoſt prudence and precaution, ſo that he brought away unmoleſted all the ammunition, all the waggons with proviſions, and even the ſick, only 30 of the weakeſt were left to the generoſity of the enemy.

Frederic again revealed his fatal ſituation to his generals in a ſpeech, wherein he declared great confidence in the bravery of his troops, hoping they would conquer the enemy, though they ſhould be poſted on the higheſt mountains or buried within batteries. Daun wanted to block up the king's retreat into Sileſia, occupying all the paſſes that led thither from Moravia, thinking already to have taken the king priſoner. But Frederic turned ſuddenly, taking his march not to Sileſia but to Bohemia, dividing his army into ſeparate corps; and thus he arrived, after having ſurmounted the greateſt difficulties, in thoſe pathleſs mountains and at laſt in Sileſia by the way of Glatz, after many hot ſkirmiſhes. Keith covered the artillery of the ſiege, and about 4000 waggons. This immenſe train alſo paſſed ſafely the high mountains and a chain of defiles, though the enemy purſued them. The offenſive war againſt the Auſtrians was for the preſent at an end, for the Ruſſians having penetrated to the center of his dominions, called for the moſt ſpeedy meaſures to repel them.

They had already at the beginning of the year returned to Pruſſia under the command of general Fermor, and finding the kingdom void of troops they took poſſeſſion of it without a ſhot. Fermor made a triumphal entry into Konigſburg, trumpets and kettle-drums were heard all day long from off the church ſteeples.

The inhabitants, bearing in mind the former cruelties of the Ruſſians, ſupplicated the protection of the empreſs. The general's anſwer is remarkable. He ſaid: "It is fortunate for you, gentlemen, that my moſt gracious monarch has taken poſſeſſion of this kingdom, you will be happy under her mild ſceptre and I will take care to ſupport in their former courſe all regulations, which I find perfectly good, and admitting of no amendment." He immediately diſpatched a courier to Peterſberg with the keys of the city, and gave audience to the nobility; after that, pompous entertainments followed. From that period the Ruſſians conſidered the kingdom of Pruſſia as their property, which they would peacably keep; and it muſt be confeſſed, that they treated it with exemplary forbearance during the remainder of the war.

The members of all the royal colleges were obliged to ſwear allegiance in the church, to do nothing contrary to the intereſt of the empreſs of Ruſſia, either public or private. The ſick members took their oaths at their dwelling-houſes. The conſiſtory received orders to pray in the churches for the empreſs, and a form of prayer was added. At laſt the nobility as well as the citizens were forced to ſwear allegiance in the churches appointed for that purpoſe. Ruſſian officers conducted them thither, and preſided at the ceremony. The Ruſſian court feaſt-days were publiſhed to be celebrated with devotion and ceſſation of labour, and every meaſure taken to preſerve, uninterrupted, the commerce, the poſts, and other regulations of public utility.

The Ruſſians obtained at Konigſberg and Pillau 88 iron cannon, with a conſiderable quantity of balls and bombs, likewiſe ſeveral hundred barrels of powder. Never was a kingdom eaſier conquered than Pruſſia, and never barbarous ſoldiers conducted themſelves with more moderation. The court of Vienna, to reward this unconteſted conqueſt, created Fermor a count of the empire, and the Ruſſian monarch confirmed all his regulations.

The inhabitants of Pruſſia, by this unexpected moderation, ſeemed to forget their king, and ſubmitted quietly to the yoke of his enemies. At Konigſberg, eſpecially, more was done than required. On the 21ſt of February (the birth-day of the prince of the crown) they illuminated the city, diſplayed fireworks, and the univerſity aſked leave to read a public oration on that occaſion. Such illuminations, at the expence of the people of Konigſberg, and other pompous ſhews, were uſual at the Ruſſian court-feaſts; and though policy had a greater ſhare than choice in thoſe doings, yet Frederic could not forget that behaviour, and he never after-

wards set his foot in his kingdom of Prussia. Every thing went on quietly. The administration of all the branches of government was continued without alteration. The revenues fell to the conquerors. However, the chiefs of the departments, as in Saxony, found means to give to their monarch effectual proofs of their loyalty and zeal. This remained a secret to the Russians. Fermor at last quitted Prussia with his army, which was supplied with provision on 20,000 sledges, taking his march towards Pomerania and the Mark. But the conquerors, were not, as in Prussia, restrained by superior orders, and therefore pursued their last year's practice, by marking their footsteps in these unfortunate provinces with fire and blood.

The army of Dohna before the arrival of the Russians had driven the Swedes into a narrow compass, and kept even Stralsund blockaded. But these advantages were soon frustrated at the approach of this enemy. The operations of that army were much retarded by the transports of provision and the establishing of magazines. It was not sufficient for the Russians to be masters of the Weichsel; they aspired to be masters of the Warthe also. They took possession of Posen, the capital of Great Poland, of Elbing, and Thorn. Even Danzig they wanted to occupy and to establish there the magazines, but they failed. The inhabitants of that place, being then very much concerned for Prussia, declared themselves formally against this design, to deliver up their outworks to the Russians; and they made preparations to repel them by force in case of necessity. However, it did not come to that. The Russians had no time to lose. Their view was directed to the interior part of the Prussian states, whither Fermor directed his march. He entered Pomerania and the New Mark with 80,000 men, and besieged Custrin, which Dohna could not prevent with his small army. The system of these troops was fire and destruction, after the manner of barbarous hords. The unfortunate town was the very first day reduced to a heap of ashes, and a large magazine destroyed. The inhabitants, bereft of every thing, had scarcely time to save their miserable lives. They fled across the Oder, and beheld with grief the smoke ascending to the clouds from the fire which consumed their all. Many inhabitants of the adjacent country, and some from a greater distance, had brought their most valuable effects into that fort, to save them from the rapacity of the Cossacks; so that an astonishing quantity, of great value, was consumed by the flames. The enemy's design was that the inha-

bitants ſhould preſerve nothing; for they continued throwing red hot grenades, when the fire had already raged in every corner of the place. Towards evening they ceaſed the fruitleſs bombardment. Fermor himſelf gave orders to throw the remainder of the grenades into the city, ſaying, "they would not be wanted any more this campaign, but the cannon balls ſhould be reſerved for the battle." After five days the commandant was, for the firſt time, ſummoned to ſurrender, becauſe it now and then came into the head of the Ruſſian general to act in the ſtile of civilized nations: and even that ſummons denotes the ſavage. He threatened with a ſtorm, and to put the whole garriſon to the ſword, if the fort was not immediately ſurrendered. The commandant anſwered, "the city, it is true, is no more than a heap of ſtones; the magazines are burned; but the fort is ſtill in the beſt ſtate, and the garriſon has ſuffered nothing: I ſhall therefore defend myſelf to the laſt man." He defended himſelf upon the heap of rubbiſh, but without ſhewing much ſkill. The king, to whom he afterwards made an excuſe, anſwered: "It is my fault; why did I make you a commander?"

The threatened ſtorm of Cuſtrin, however, did not take place; for the approach of the king engaged all the attention of the Ruſſians. Dohna came to the aſſiſtance of this narrowly encloſed fortification before the king's arrival, and opened thereby a communication, ſo that the garriſon could conſtantly be relieved.

The king had left the greateſt part of his army in Sileſia: he took but 14,000 men, and began with them a very forced march. This ſmall army burned with a deſire to be revenged of an enemy whom they had never ſeen; but whoſe cruelties and devaſtations, well known by report, called for ſtreams of blood. Their courage increaſed when they ſet foot on provinces where they ſaw nothing but ruins and aſhes ſtill ſmoking. So great was the devaſtation, that they could hardly diſtinguiſh their native country. All fatigues were deſpiſed. They drank, in this ſultry time of the year, the water out of ſtanding pools. In twenty four days Frederic ended a march of 60 German miles (300 Engliſh), arrived the 21ſt of Auguſt near Cuſtrin, and joined the army of Dohna. He paſſed the Oder at a place where it was not expected. Fermor's deſigns were now totally fruſtrated. The ſiege of Cuſtrin was raiſed. Both armies approached each other, and prepared for battle. Perhaps there never was an army that wiſhed more for a battle than did that of the Pruſſians this time. The dæmon of war ſeemed to have inſpired them. Frederic himſelf, moved to compaſſion by the numberleſs heaps of ruins, and the

fugitives wandering about deprived of every thing, forgot every paſſion but that of revenge. He gave orders that no quarters ſhould be given to the Ruſſians. Every preparation was made to cut off the retreat of the enemy, and to drive them into the moraſs along the Oder. Even the bridges, which might have favoured their flight, were burnt down. This the Ruſſians learned juſt as the battle commenced: "The Pruſſians give no quarters." "Neither will we," was the echo of the Ruſſians.

Frederic's ſituation was again deſperate, and every thing depended on the event of a battle. The enemy were on the point to unite and to cut him off from the Elbe and the Oder. The French and the troops of the empire were on their march to Saxony, whither Daun had likewiſe marched with the main army of the Auſtrians. The Swedes, having now no enemy before them, proceeded towards Berlin, which is not fortified; and, above all, the Ruſſians, who had "DESTRUCTION" for their motto, were in the heart of his ſtates.

The well-meditated diſpoſition of Frederic's army was not only directed to a victory, but to the total annihilation of the enemy's army: reſerving to himſelf, however, a retreat towards Cuſtrin in caſe of a misfortune. This great battle was fought the 25th of Auguſt, near Zorndorf. The Ruſſians were 50,000 and the Pruſſians 30,000 ſtrong; the latter began the attack with a lively cannon fire. The poſition of the Ruſſians was a bulky ſquare, uſed in the wars againſt the Turks, in the midſt whereof was their cavalry, their baggage, and the reſerve corps. The cannon-balls had a terrible effect on the Ruſſian maſs of men ſo badly poſted. By one cannon-ball 42 men of a grenadier regiment were thrown down; they created beſides a horrid confuſion among the baggage, the horſes ran away with their waggons, and broke through the ranks ſo that they were obliged to clear the ſquare from that incumbrance. Meanwhile the Pruſſian left wing advanced ſo fiercely that they expoſed a flank. This circumſtance the Ruſſian cavalry made uſe of to penetrate into the Pruſſian infantry, and to beat ſeveral battalions out of the field. Fermor who thought already the victory was ſure, ordered the ſquare to be opened on all ſides, in order to purſue the enemy. This happened with loud ſhouts of victory, but the Ruſſians were not advanced far, when they became involved in great confuſion. General Seidlitz at that time came foward with the Pruſſian cavalry and overturned that of the Ruſſians, driving them back on their own infantry. Ano-

ther body of Pruſſian horſe attacked the Ruſſian infantry furiouſly; they cut down without mercy whatever their ſwords could reach. Some regiments of Pruſſian dragoons, not reſtrained by the fire that raged in the village of Zorndorf, rode through the midſt of the flames towards the Ruſſians; and Seidlitz, who by that time had quite done with the enemy's cavalry, followed this new road to victory. The Ruſſian infantry was now attacked on all ſides in the flank in the front and rear, and dreadful was the carnage. Theſe warriors preſented to the Pruſſians ſcenes of battle, they never ſaw before. After having ſpent all their ſhot, they ſtood in their ranks like ſtatues. However here it was not valour, worthy of admiration, ariſing from ambition or partriotiſm, to maintain their poſt to the laſt moment; for they did not defend themſelves at all. It was a kind of ſtubborn inſenſibility to ſuffer themſelves to be killed where they ſtood. If whole lines were ſtretched to the ground, new ones appeared, ſeemingly wiſhing to be diſpatched in the ſame manner. It was eaſier to kill them than to put them to flight. Even a ſhot through the body was not ſufficient to bring them to the ground. The Pruſſians had therefore nothing to do but ſlaughter all that would not give way. The whole right wing of the Ruſſians was partly cut to pieces, partly driven into the moraſs. A number of the fugitives came amongſt the baggage; the waggons of the ſutlers were plundered, and the brandy ſwallowed with brutality. In vain did the Ruſſian officers break the caſks, the ſoldiers threw themſelves in full length on the ground to ſip their favourite liquor out of the duſt. Many vomited out their ſouls, others maſſacreed their own officers, whole crouds ran raving about the field, without any attention to the calls of their commanders.

Such was the ſtate of things on the right wing of the Ruſſians. It was noon. On the left wing little was done hitherto; but now the Pruſſians attacked it likewiſe: however, the regiments that might have put the ſeal on the already gained victory, did not ſhew their uſual valour. They forgot the fame of the Pruſſian name; they loſt their ſtrength in the moſt deciſive moment; and fell back, in the preſence of their king, before the weakened and already half-beaten enemy. The diſorder was great, and all the valiant actions of the Pruſſian left wing ſeemed to be loſt, when Seydlitz came flying with his cavalry from the victorious wing, advanced into the opening that was made by the retreating infantry; held out a very heavy muſket and grape-ſhot fire; and then broke in, not only upon the Ruſſian cavalry, but alſo upon that

part of the infantry which had kept ground, and drove the advanced enemy, who had already gained ſome batteries, into the moraſs. This grand manœuvre of the cavalry was excellently ſupported by the flower of the Pruſſian infantry, conſiſting of the regiments, Prince of Pruſſia, Forcado, Kalkſtein, Aſſeburg, and ſeveral grenadier battallions, all troops which the king had brought with him. Thoſe veterans had, without regard to the battalions that were retreating near them, conſtantly been advancing, and with the cavalry fell on the Ruſſian infantry with fixed bayonets. The firing ceaſed every where; ammunition began to fail; bud-ends of guns, bayonets, and ſwords, were now the weapons wherewith they were beating and puſhing about each other. The animoſity was on both ſides beyond expreſſion. The Pruſſians, grievouſly wounded, forgot their own preſervation, and were thinking only on the murder of their enemies. The Ruſſians did the ſame. One was found mortally wounded lying upon a dying Pruſſian, gnawing him with his teeth: The Pruſſian, ſtruggling with death, and unable to move, was forced to ſuffer that gnawing, till one of his comrades came and perforated the cannibal.

The regiments of Forcade and Prince of Pruſſia fell upon the Ruſſian baggage and the military cheſts, of which they took the greateſt part. The total weakneſs of both parties, and night breaking in, put at laſt an end to the ſlaughter: only the Coſſacks were ſwarming about the field of battle, killing the defenceleſs wounded. Both armies remained during the night under arms. The Ruſſians were in the moſt dreadful confuſion; all their troops were like a confuſed chaos. They would have willingly yielded to the Pruſſians the honour of the victory, had not their retreat been blocked up, the bridges over the rivers having all been deſtroyed. In this diſorder general Fermor demanded, on the very evening of the battle, a truce of two or three days. His pretext was the burial of the dead. To this extraordinary demand general Dohna replied, "Since the king my maſter has gained the battle, by his command the dead will be buried, and the wounded taken care of;" giving him thereby to underſtand, that a ceſſation of hoſtilities was a very uncommon thing after a battle. The following day nothing happened but cannonading. The king thought to renew the battle formally: but want of ammunition among the infantry, and the great fatigue of the cavalry, who had fought with the utmoſt exertion of their ſtrength, made neceſſarily an end of the battle, and afforded the Ruſſians an opportunity of

extricating themſelves from the labyrinth in which they were involved. They retired by the way of Landſberg upon the Warthe. This defeat coſt them 19,000 killed and wounded, beſides 3000 priſoners, 103 cannons, many colours, their military cheſt, and a quantity of baggage. The Pruſſians had 10,000 killed and wounded, and 1400 priſoners or miſſing; they likewiſe had loſt 26 cannons by the giving way of their right wing.

This ſmall number of cannon, the few priſoners, and the circumſtance that part of the Ruſſian army in ſcattered crouds had remained on the field of battle, induced the Ruſſians to aſcribe to themſelves the victory. The Ruſſian general Panin, was however honeſt enough to ſay, "we have, it is true maintained the field of battle, but it has been by thoſe that were ſlaughtered, wounded, and intoxicated. Notwithſtanding it was Fermor himſelf, who ſolicited permiſſion to bury the dead, he ſent couriers with the news of the victory to all the courts and armies of the allies. Never was more uſe made of martial bravados than in the ſeven years war; but the Pruſſians deſpiſed ſuch tricks. If they were really beaten they owned it freely, with the ſure confidence to repair the loſſes by future exploits. That was the ſentiment of Frederic, and of all the leaders of his armies. They left it to the conquered, to amuſe themſelves with imaginations and falſe accounts; and made good uſe of the victory. The king, maſter of the field of battle near Zorndorf, purſued his flying enemies to Ludſberg. He was ſo convinced of their preſent impotence that he ordered them to be obſerved only by a part of his army under the command of general Dohna: he detached again a corps againſt the Swedes, and with the remainder of his army he marched to Saxony, where his preſence was highly neceſſary.

The king was generous enough to acknowledge the extraordinary merit of general Seidlitz; he declared publicly, that the battle was won by that general. He however, was not ſparing of his own perſon, having entered ſo far among the Ruſſian fire that all his adjutants and pages around him were either killed or wounded.

The enormities committed by the Ruſſians being ſtill in the memory of the Pruſſian ſoldiers and peaſants, ſuppreſſed in them for a ſhort time every feeling of humanity, ſo that many laying wounded and helpleſs on the field, were, together with the dead bodies, thrown into one hole and buried alive. Theſe unfortunate wretches endeavoured in vain to crawl from under the dead; other

corps were thrown upon them, which soon prevented their feeble motions.

In the mean time the Austrians did all in their power to make good use of the king's absence. They now were able to act offensively, and from the superiority of their numbers they had to expect the most brilliant success. Every thing depended on a quick execution. In Silesia there were, an account of the number of fortresses and occupied posts, many obstacles in their way, the removal of which required time. In Saxony they expected, to gather laurels easier. The whole army of Daun was there, and the duke of Deux-Ponts had also arrived in Saxony with the army of the Empire. The loss of that country, so useful to the Prussians, seemed to be inevitable. Prince Henry of Prussia, who covered the country with a small army, was compelled to yield to superiority of numbers, and to retire to Dresden. Daun's plan was to take this royal residence, and to annihilate the Prussians or at least to drive them out of Saxony, and to cut off the king from the river Elbe. The execution of all this depended on detaining that formidable general long enough in his own dominions. Daun therefore, in a letter warned general Fermor, not to enter into an engagement with the king, a cunning enemy, whom he did not know, yet, advising him at the same time to act rather on the defensive till Saxony was freed from the Prussians. The courier with that letter fell into the king's hands; who after the battle of Zorndorf, sent in Fermor's name to Daun the following answer: "You have reason to warn general Fermor to take care of a cunning enemy, whom you know better than him; for he stood his ground and was beaten."

Prince Henry, relying on Frederic's activity, endeavoured to maintain, by divers operations his post against the numerous enemies, and, he succeeded. The troops of the Empire besieged the fort of Sonnenstein. The Prussian commandant lost courage, and surrendered the place with 1400 men. Daun made a trial of taking Dresden. He approached that residence, which was weakly garrisoned, and not strongly fortified. But the prudence and resolution of the commandant count Smettau, made up those deficencies. He made arrangements for burning the magnificent suburbs, where the houses are six and seven stories high, and project over the ramparts. This design put the count and the whole city in the greatest consternation: An universal lamentation took place, when the Prussians began filling the houses with combustibles. Smettau alledged necessity and his

duty to defend himself. He declared that the Saxons could not expect of him as the enemies of his king, any consideration for their royal residence, whilst their allies designedly did the same. Daun, threatened to avenge in the most barbarous manner the burning of the suburbs; and after taking the place, never to give quarter to any Prussian. Smettau in his turn declared to defend himself from street to street, to make the royal palace his last castle, and to bury himself under its ruins. He resolved to carry a quantity of gunpowder into the palace, to assemble there by force the nobility and the first men of the court, and then in the apartment of the Electoral prince, in the midst of the dejected royal family, to expect the final enterprises of the enemy. Such a menace, uncertain as its execution might have been, was too well meditated, and so congenial to the circumstances, that the effect could not fail. Daun relinquished his intention upon Dresden, and Smettau left the suburbs undisturbed. The combustibles were taken out of the houses, and the inhabitants became quieted.

The enormous superiority of the Austrians and troops of the Empire, however, disposed the allies to new and important plans They intended to surround prince Henry, attack him at once in front and in rear, and to annihilate his army. The generals of the different armies, already had conference on the project, and measures for its execution were taken, when the *thundering word*: Frederic is drawing near! defeated all at once the whole plan. He arrived and formed a junction with prince Henry. His desire was immediately to come to a battle, in order to drive the Austrians into Bohemia, and then to march to the assistance of Silesia, which being but weakly provided with troops was in great danger. The enemies levied contributions in that province and besieged at once the forts of Neisse and Cosel. General Fouquet stood intrenched with a body of four thousand Prussians near Landshut. He could throw difficulties in the way of the enemy, but could not prevent their operarions. Daun carefully avoided a battle endeavouring to protract Frederic's march to Silesia by well posted corps. His camp near Stolpen was one of the strongest in Saxony. It was upon steep hills, covered by ditches, morasses, forests and ravines. The general as well as his troops were courageous, in good spirits and devout. On account of the imagined victory of their allies near Zorndorf they sang the *Te Deum* accompanied by martial music, and the firing of cannon and small arms. Those among them, however, that were not void of reason, doubted that victory, which was sufficiently refuted by the arrival of the

king and the alteration in all their great plans. Several Auſtrian corps were driven from their poſts, and ſkirmiſhes became frequent. The way to Sileſia became open, but Daun remained unmoveable in his camp. Nevertheleſs the king did not loſe the hopes of driving him back to Bohemia by cutting of his proviſions and deſtroying his magazines. About the troops of the Empire he was quite unconcerned, whoſe departure he was certain of, they already ſuffering by want of proviſion and forage. He, therefore, encamped near Bautzen. His troops who for eight weeks were daily in motion, wanted ſome reſt. The ſeaſon had already commenced to be rough; he ordered therefore his infantry to build huts, and his cavalry ſtables of branches of trees. Of the then ſituation of the king and his army we may judge from a letter which he wrote at the beginning of October to lord Marſhal. He there ſays: "Until the fall of ſnow, I ſhall be obliged to dance upon "the rope. How often would I give the half of that glory of "which you write, for a little reſt."

Both armies, at laſt, altered their poſitions. Daun took again a ſtrong camp at a little diſtance from his former, and the Pruſſians encamped near Hochkirch. A fault, committed by the Pruſſian general, Retzow, in leaving a mountain unoccupied, was here the cauſe of a great event, which brought the king to the very brink of deſtruction, ſhewed his heroic genius in its brighteſt light, and belongs to the moſt extraordinary ſcenes of this war.—The neglected hills were immediately occupied and fortified by the Auſtrians. The advantages they gained thereby were ſo great, that they excited in Daun, cautious as he was, the idea of ſurpriſing the king in his camp. Every thing favoured this deſign: The armies were ſo near each other, that the right wing of the Pruſſians was but a cannon-ſhot from the enemy's camp. The vaſt number of light troops in the Auſtrian army was particularly favourable to a ſurpriſe, and, ſkirmiſhes continuing day and night, they were able to cover more important plans. The Pruſſians, accuſtomed, under Frederic's lead, always to attack firſt, did not dream even of a poſſibility of an attack from the cautious Daun, whoſe camps hardly ever could be made ſtrong enough when he knew Frederic to be in his vicinity.

The king, however, was ſenſible of his poſition being diſadvantageous; yet he thought it to be diſhonourable, and not abſolutely neceſſary to retreat. Field-marſhal Keith obſerved to the King, "if the Auſtrians leave us tranquil in our preſent camp, they deſerve to be hanged." Frederic replied, "we muſt hope,

that they are more afraid of us than of the gallows." Nevertheleſs he reſolved to alter his poſition as ſoon as the army could be afreſh ſupplied with proviſions. The night from the 14th to the 15th of October was ſelected for the removal of the camp.

But the Auſtrian columns had already, in the night of the 13th quitted their camp, in order to ſurpriſe the Pruſſians. General Odonel led the van, conſiſting of four battallions and thirty-ſix ſquadrons; they were followed by thirty-four battallions, under the command of generals Sincere and Fortgatſh. The corps of general Laudon, which was poſted almoſt in the rear of the Pruſſian camp, was reinforced by four battallions and fifteen ſquadrons, which afterwards were joined by the whole Auſtrian cavalry of the left wing. The infantry of that wing was led by field-marſhal Daun himſelf. All thoſe troops, and ſome ſmaller corps were deſtined to attack the Pruſſian right wing, their front and rear; the duke of Aremberg, with twenty-three battallions and thirty-two ſquadrons, was to obſerve the Pruſſian left wing, and to attack, then only, when the defeat of the enemy was completed every where elſe. In their van they had volunteer grenadiers, who mounted behind the dragoons, but diſmounted before the Pruſſian camp, formed and puſhed forwards.

The tents remained in the Auſtrian camps, and the uſual fires were carefully continued. A number of labourers were employed the whole night in felling trees, conſtantly calling out to each other; whereby they intended to prevent the Pruſſian out poſts from obſerving the march of the troops. But the vigilant Pruſſian huſſars diſcovered the enemy's movements, and informed the king of it. At firſt he doubted the movements; but they being confirmed by repeated reports, he gueſſed at every other cauſe but that of a formal attack. Generals Seidlitz and Zieten were with the king, endeavouring to remove his doubts in this critical moment; they ſucceeded at laſt ſo far, that orders were ſent to ſeveral brigades to riſe. But this order was countermanded towards morning, and the ſoldiers now yielded to a profound ſleep.

But day light had not yet appeared, and the clock ſtruck five in the village of Hochkirch, when the enemy appeared before the camp. Whole crouds of Auſtrian ſoldiers arrived at the Pruſſian out poſts, announcing themſelves as deſerters. Their number encreaſed ſo rapidly that they were ſoon able to overturn out poſts and field guards. The Auſtrian army, divided into ſeveral corps, followed their van cloſely, and now entered, in columns, the Pruſſian camp. Many royal regiments were firſt waked from

their ſleep by their own cannon; for the enemy, who had left moſt of their great guns behind, found at the ſurpriſed field-guards and batteries, cannon and and ammunition, with which they fired into the Pruſſian camp.

Never an army of brave troops was in a more terrible ſituation than thoſe Pruſſians, careleſsly ſleeping under the ægis of Frederic, who now at once were attacked in the interior of their camp, and wakened by fire and ſword to the ſleep of death. It was yet night, and the confuſion beyond expreſſion. What a ſight for thoſe warriors, reſembling a nocturnal viſion! the Auſtrians, as if riſen from out of the earth, in the midſt of their camp. Many hundreds were ſlain in their tents before they could open their eyes; others ran half naked to their arms: few could get their own: each laid hold on what firſt fell into his hands, and flew with it into line and rank. Here the advantages of an excellent diſcipline appeared in a ſtriking light. In this terrible ſituation, where reſiſtance ſeemed almoſt to be madneſs, and where flight and ſalvation muſt be the thought of every ſoldier, a total deſtruction would have been the fate of the army of any other nation whatever; courage availed here little, *diſcipline did all.*

The war cry ſpread like a torrent through the Pruſſian camp; all ran from out of their tents, and in a few moments, notwithſtanding the great confuſion, the moſt part of the infantry and cavalry ſtood in line of battle. The manner of attack obliged the regiments to act ſingly. They oppoſed the enemy every where, and repelled them in ſome places, but in moſt they were forced to yield to ſuperior numbers. The break of day did not ſerve to leſſen the confuſion, for a thick fog was hovering over the ſurface. The Pruſſian cavalry, led by Seidlitz, flew about in ſearch of the enemy: Wherever, in the dark, their ſwords could reach them, the cut down every thing before them. The dragoon regiment of Schoneich, alone, overturned a whole line of Auſtrian infantry, and took 500 priſoners.

The village of Hochkirch was in flames, yet the Pruſſians defended it bravely. Victory ſeemed to depend on its poſſeſſion, wherefore Daun renewed the attack continually with freſh troops. Only 600 Pruſſians remained here to be conquered, who, after having ſpent their ammunition, endeavoured to cut their way through their numerous foes. A ſmall party of them effected it, the others were killed, wounded, or taken priſoners. Whole Pruſſian regiments advanced and drove the enemy again out of the village. The bloodieſt combat took place here. A cannon-ball

took away the head of prince France of Brunſwick; field-marſhal Keith was ſhot through the breaſt; prince Moritz of Deſſau was mortally wounded. The Pruſſians, attacked in front and rear, were forced to yield. The king in perſon now advanced with freſh troops, and forced the Auſtrians again to retreat, but the Auſtrian cavalry regained loſt advantages.

The fog now diſperſing both parties beheld the field of battle covered with dead bodies. Both parties formed new lines of battle. Daun, his advantages notwithſtanding, did not think of having conquered an army, that had deluded all human expectations; which, though ſurpriſed in the night in the midſt of ſleep, had combated ſo many hours with bravery in darkneſs, which had loſt many of its leaders, and yet ſtood ready to renew the attack. This was Frederic's intention, when the duke of Aremberg under cover of the fog approached with his ſtrong corps the king's left wing and attacked it. Several thouſand men were here overturned and a Pruſſian battery taken. But here the victory ended. The king who had now enemies in front and rear, aſſembled his troops in the midſt of this murderous tumult, and made after a deſperate combat of five hours a retreat which ever will be memorable in the annals of wars. The Auſtrians were in too great a confuſion to interrupt this retreat.

Frederic's march was but ſhort. Two miles diſtant from the field of battle he encamped with his troops, who had loſt moſt part of their artillery and baggage, had their ſhort coats for a cover, and the ſkies for a tent. They even were in want of powder and balls. A new battle would have been renewing the ancient method of fighting, where every one depended on his fiſt. However the kings poſition was ſo advantageous, his means to defy dangers ſo various, and his troops even after their defeat ſtill ſo formidable, that Daun would not venture a new attack. The Pruſſian army loſt on this unfortunate day beſides their baggage, above 100 cannon and 9000 men. The Auſtrians loſt 8000.

The king had ventured into the hotteſt fire; a horſe was killed under him, and two pages were ſhot on his ſide. He was in the greateſt danger of being taken priſoner. The enemy had already ſurrounded him but he eſcaped by the valour of the huſſars that accompanied him. He was preſent wherever the combat was the moſt bloody. His great talents never appeared in ſo glaring a light as on that night, which, inſtead of diminiſhing his fame, heightened it in the extreme. Not the king, who in the midſt of warlike tumult governs his dominions the ſame as in time of

peace by his own regulations; who in hours of dangers plays on the flute, and soon after gives the wisest orders; who on the day of a decisive battle, makes French verses, gives laws and inspects accounts; not the victor at Lissa, who on Silesian fields performs Grecian tactics, and annihilates a whole army of warlike nations; not this extraordinary man is so venerable to the philosopher, the historian and the thinking man, as the king who is surprised near Hochkirch, beaten, but not conquered, who calls his sleeping warriors together, opposes them to a valiant and more numerous enemy, which is already in the midst of their camp, killing Prussians with Prussian balls; who in those terrible moments loses his bosom friend, all his best generals, and now, left to himself, takes by the power of his genius the most salutary measures; converts the chaos of his army in the midst of death and destruction into harmony, combats five hours and retires with the greatest order; who in that desperate situation, without cannon, without ammunition and baggage, still inspires the enemy with fear, and soon after is able to dislodge besieging armies. Such a prince forces the admiration of all nations and of all centuries.

(To be continued)

POETRY.

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER.

[*A PICTURE FROM THE LIFE.*]

DEEP in a vale, a stranger now to arms,
Too poor to shine in court, too proud to beg,
He who once war'd on Saratoga's plains
Sits musing o'er his scars and wooden leg.
Rememb'ring still the toil of former days,
To others' hands he sees his earnings paid;
They share the due reward—*he* feeds on praise,
Lost in the abyss of want, misfortune's shade.
Far, far from domes where splendid tapers glare,
'Tis his from dear-bought PEACE no wealth to win,
Remov'd alike from country cringing 'squires,
The great man's levee, and the proud man's grin.
Sold are those arms that once on Briton's blaz'd,
When flush'd with conquest to the charge they came.
That power repell'd, and Freedom's fabric rais'd,
She leaves her soldier—FAMINE and a NAME!

MILITARY MEMOIRS AND MAXIMS.

THE DISPOSITION OF AN ARMY.

YOU muſt chuſe wide and open ground, if you are ſtrong in cavalry; and cloſe and narrow, if your ſtrength be in your foot.

Reconnoitre well your ground, and know the ſpace the movements you deſign to give your army will take up.

Each general officer ſhould aſſiſt at the council of war, and be well informed of the General's deſigns, the means he intends to uſe, and the retreat he chuſes; which ſhould be always well ſecured, in caſe you ſhould loſe the battle.

He muſt make good uſe of his troops, according as time and place offers, and not ſuffer them to lie idle.

Wind, duſt, rain, the ſun, fogs, are things that may be ſerviceable to you; but you muſt not truſt to them too much, they being liable to change.

Hollow ways and moraſſes in your front may be of great uſe. You ſend out troops advanced before them, who may hide themſelves from the enemy; and when they approach, your troops retire by paſſages made on purpoſe, you employ them elſewhere, and the enemy's troops remain uſeleſs on that ſide.

Poſt your beſt troops on your wings.

Cover your flanks, at leaſt front your wings, with an impenetrable ſituation, as a moraſs, a river, a mountain, or fortify it with your chevaux de friſe, waggons, great trees cut down, and the like: and if one wing has moraſſes or very ſtrong ground before it, you may ſend the greateſt part of your cavalry to the other wing.

Let your infantry and cavalry be ſo diſpoſed, as to be able to ſupport and reinforce one other, according as you have more of one than the other: and obſerve to mix ſome foot by platoons with your horſe.

Appoint general officers to be on the wings, in the centre, and every where if you can, even in the rear, to animate and rally thoſe who give way.

Be ſure to have a good reſerve, to return to the charge, and ſupport the broken troops. That army who keeps moſt troops together at the end of a battle is always victorious. The troops of reſerve are poſted in the rear of the infantry in the centre: they are of uſe to ſupport the troops who give way, to poſſeſs the ground the others have loſt, and to march to any place where the General thinks they may be wanted.

You divide your artillery, and poſt the cannon where you think they may do moſt execution; and avoid halting under the cannon of the enemy: or if you are obliged to it, it is no diſgrace, but prudent, to order your men to lie on their arms, in rank and file; it may ſave the lives of many men, and they can get up in an inſtant when commanded.

When you command brave and faithful ſoldiers, you ſhould not let the chance of war depend on a ſingle battle. But if you ſuſpect your troops, and you are obliged to fight, let them know they muſt conquer or die.

Begin by endeavouring to take ſome priſoners and examine them, ſeverely, in order to get the beſt intelligence you can of the ſtate and ſituation of the enemy; but take but few of them, leſt they encumber you in time of battle.

When it is reſolved to fight the enemy, your troops ſhould be weakeſt where the ground is ſtrongeſt; and ſtrongeſt, eſpecially in cavalry, where the ground is openeſt.

And therefore it is of the utmoſt importance for a commander to know well the ground between him and his enemy; ſuch as moraſſes, rivers, rivulets, thick hedges, large ditches, &c. behind which the infantry only is of uſe; and to have near him thoſe who can inform him whether they are paſſable for horſe and foot, the better to take his advantages from them.

The General is not to act by conſtant rules and methods, but to vary as he ſees occaſion; remembering what the great *Turenne* often ſaid, *viz. Q'un ſot l'embarraſſoit quelquefois plus qu'n habile homme:* That a blockhead had ſometimes perplexed him more than an able General.

As ſoon as a General has an opportunity of giving the enemy battle to advantage, he ſhould do it immediately if he has day-light for it. This gives ſpirit to his men, and fear to the enemy, and prevents their intrenching themſelves.

In good ſucceſs puſh the advantages as far as you poſſibly can: in bad, find all the remedies in your power.

A General is more to be eſteemed for preſerving a country after the loſs of a battle, than he is who gains it, and does not know how to make uſe of the advantages of it.

Actions ought more to be prized for their conſequences than for themſelves. In field expeditions it is impoſſible exactly to preſcribe to an army or ſeparate body how to govern itſelf in each action, becauſe every different motion of the enemy, and the various accounts a man has of them, ought to make him alter his meaſures; and there is no giving a commander other than general rules, the reſt depending on his own conduct and behaviour of his troops.

When a man boaſts of never having committed errors in war, it is a ſign he has not been long a general officer.

If your army is ſuperior to the enemy in goodneſs, ſpirit or number, it is beſt to attack them in the morning: you have the whole day to drive them before you, and make your advantage of the victory. But if there be a neceſſity of giving them battle in other circumſtances, do it in the evening: if your army is victorious, it is well; if not, you have the night to favour your retreat.

Remember always to begin the attack, and keep your fire till the enemy have given theirs; then march briſkly up with recovered arms, and you will find they will fly before you. When you have gained the battle, keep moving after the enemy, and ſend a good body of light horſe to continue in ſight of them. This keeps up their fear, not knowing but your whole army is at hand; and thus they may abandon a whole country to you, if no fortified town or river is in your way; and if the latter, you may drive many of the enemy into it, take their baggage, and, it may be, their cannon.

After the battle is gained, and the enemy fly before you, forget not to ſend bodies of horſe immediately to ſummon the towns to ſurrender which the enemy leave behind them; and leave ſmall detachments at the roads leading to them, to prevent your ſtragglers from miſtaking their way, and being taken by their garriſons.

When a project of importance is to be executed, chuſe the commander you think beſt qualified for it; and as duty is done by ſeniority and rotation, ſend thoſe officers who are

before him on other commands, to prepare the way for the officer you have your eye on. Thus will your ſchemes proſper, and your officers jealouſy of your partiality be prevented; for it is highly neceſſary that all Generals and officers ſhould gain the eſteem of their inferiors.

If it is neceſſary to intrench a poſt of great uſe to your army, ſee that it be done effectually, that your foſſé be large and deep, that your works be ſteep and give a good flank fire, that you be well ſtockaded and paliſaded; make advanced foſſés and out-works if you have time; and, in a word, make it defenſible againſt the whole force of the enemy, till your army can come to your relief; and have good communication with them by ſeveral bridges over the rivers between you.

If a river is between you and the enemy, in the field, or in winter-quarters, and they have the poſſeſſion of the bridges over it, ſend a ſmall guard of horſe every twenty-four hours to watch them, and give you intelligence if any bodies of men are coming over, that you may not be ſurprized.

It is not always neceſſary to fight in two lines with a corps de reſerve; for if the enemy be more numerous than you, and the ground open, ſo that they may out-flank you, care muſt be taken to extend your front (though you fight in one line) equal to the front of the enemy: but if your right and left wing be well covered with rivers, moraſſes, thick woods, or other ſtrong ground, your front need only to extend to them; the reſt of your troops ſhould be diſpoſed ſo as beſt to ſupport the front line, or to force the enemy where the ground is openeſt.

When you attack, march up to the enemy with as quick a pace as good order will allow: it gives ſpirit to your troops, and fear to the enemy: a ſlow motion allows too much time for reflection, damps their courage,* and expoſes them too much to the enemy's fire. But take care to march in even front.

When your troops are inferior in number and goodneſs, chuſe to give your enemy battle in ſtrong or cloſe ground; if you are ſuperior, in as open ground as poſſible.

* The French practiſe it, but the Germans and Hollanders march with a ſlow pace.

If you command a body of foot in a plain, and are like to be attacked by a ſuperior number of horſe, throw your foot into a ſquare; let your officers and ſerjeants be in the front ranks on each ſide, with their pikes and halberts ready to preſent to the enemy; the ſoldiers with their bayonets fixed, cloſing their ranks and files, ſo as to make the whole body as compact as the uſe of their arms will allow. Thus march, and thus receive the enemy's charge, who will ſoon reſpect and grow weary of having to do with you.*

Chevaux de friſe are of great uſe on the above and many other occaſions. The *Ruſſians* never march without them; though if the foot make a cloſe compact body, and a good front every way, they need them not; for we have often ſeen large bodies of cavalry pay great reſpect to leſs bodies of foot, and let them march quietly off, without riſquing their lives, or (which is almoſt as dear to them) their horſes.

Have your eye on the enemy's motions in time of battle; if they draw off troops from one wing to reinforce the other, do ſo too; or immediately attack the weakened wing, if the ground permits; if not, be always ſtrongeſt where the ground is openeſt, and intermix bodies of foot with (or have them at hand to ſupport) your cavalry on your wings.

There is nothing ſo weak as the flank or rear of cavalry: if they are thus attacked, they make no reſiſtance; but bodies of foot can make a reſpectable front every way.

Cavalry ſhould always attack ſword in hand: there is little hope from thoſe who begin with the fire of their carbines. Therefore their ſwords ſhould have weight and length, be of the beſt metal, and a full yard in the blade. As this is the weapon moſt to be depended on, they cannot be too well choſen.

* Charles XII. the brave King of Sweden, with 8000 horſe, himſelf at the head of them, attacked a body of between five and ſix thouſand Saxon foot, commanded by General Schulenburg, in the plains of Poland, drawn up in one ſquare body. He firſt gave a furious charge to one front only, and was gallantly repulſed: after that, the King attacked every front at once with the greateſt vigour, but was again beaten off. This gave the King and his cavalry enough of it; and Schulenburg, by the favour of the night, paſſed a rivulet, and leaving ſome foot in a mill, the fire of which ſtopt the enemy, he made a ſafe retreat.

In open countries you muſt have large bodies of cavalry. In woody countries, as America, or hilly, as Switzerland, cavalry is of little uſe.

When your wings are in the air, that is, when they have no cover, and may be attacked in flank, the uſual method has been to draw your wheel-carriages, cut down trees, and plant chevaux de friſe on the wings. By theſe you make as good a cover as you can: but remember, where your wings are expoſed, the beſt method is to ſtrengthen your flanks with good bodies of foot,* which alone are capable of reſiſting the efforts of horſe, or the torrent with which they drive your broken ſquadrons.

Your centre ſhould likewiſe be well ſupported; for an army broken in the centre we may pronounce defeated, and and the battle irrecoverably loſt.

General officers ſhould keep the poſts aſſigned them, or which their rank gives them; and not leave them, to go where their curioſity or a diſtant fire invites them; and to have it ſaid in print, *Such a one was every where:* when really they ſhould remember, that he that is every where is no where; and that he is the beſt officer, who is found where the duty of his poſt requires his preſence.

As every thing depends upon the ſtrength and good reſiſtance of the front line, it ſhould be made much ſtronger than the ſecond; and therefore care ſhould be taken to have good bodies of foot in the rear of both wings of horſe, and in the rear of the centre and both wings of foot.

Horſe ſhould never be ſent againſt an enemy, without a proportionable body of foot for their ſupport.

Never begin the attack with part of your army, if the reſt are not at hand to ſuſtain you.

Never give the command of a briſk and important attack to a ſlow officer.

When horſe are ſent to attack the rear of a retreating army which is near you, let them take foot behind them. They ſhould not grumble at it, for they will find great uſe from them.

Take care in all ſtrong or incloſed ground to make large openings in the hedges, on the flanks of each regiment, that

* The wings being thus ſecured, there is little to fear, though you ſhould be out-flank'd by the enemy's ſquadrons.

the battalions may have a free and eaſy communication with each other from right to left of your army.

Avoid encamping in ſwampy bottoms, or where great torrents of water from haſty rains may ſweep away the baggage, forage, and tents of the army.

Be ſure let your camp have the advantage of water, for the health and convenience of your men and horſe: a good river in front or flank will ſtrengthen your camp, and refreſh both.

Keep your camp clean, and order the malefactors of each regiment to bury all dead horſes, dogs, &c. that are found in front or rear of their regiment.

When you are near the enemy, and reſolve rather to fight than quit your camp, chuſe the ground, and be ready in an inſtant to form in order of battle on it; and that, before the enemy can come up to you.

Try and reconnoitre well, and as ſoon as poſſible, the rivers, rivulets, moraſſes, ditches, &c. which are between you and the enemy; and prevent as much as you can their doing it.

Always endeavour to be maſter of the bridges between you and the enemy, and ſecure each head of them with good works well guarded; and encamp not too far from them.

If before a battle you judge it neceſſary to take poſſeſſion of the villages in your front, let them not be much advanced or too far from you, but rather in a line with your front. Open their flanks largely, and make good communications within, that you may ſuſtain them, and they within, one the other.

Leave nothing for chance to do, but what wiſdom cannot effect.

Let no inferior officer officiouſly attack any poſt or part of the enemy's army without orders.

If you find it difficult to diſlodge an enemy from an advantageous poſt, ſend ſome troops with trumpets and drums into the incloſed ground on their flank or rear: their ſounding and beating a march will often make them believe they are to be attacked there, as well as in front, and ſo cauſe them to quit their poſt.

If the enemy lay ſiege to an important place, do not attempt the raiſing it, till by the length of the ſiege, fatigue, death, and deſertion, which is frequent on theſe occaſions, the enemy's army is leſſened and diſpirited.

And to approach their army, and be afterwards forced to retire, would be attended with very ill consequences both to your army and the town besieged.

If you resolve to besiege a place where the enemy's army may possibly cut off your provisions and communication with your magazines, take care before you open your trenches, to be well provided with all necessaries for the duration of the whole siege.

When you detach from one wing to strengthen and make a grant effort with the other, if possible do it so that the enemy may not perceive it, lest they attack immediately your weakened wing and defeat you.

When any part of the first line is broken, the nearest regiment of the second should instantly march up, repulse the enemy, and make good the line; and give time to the broken regiments or squadrons to form in their room.

Consider well before you come to an engagement with the enemy, the situation and circumstances of their army; and whether you may not gain more by temporising, cutting off their provisions, or otherwise distressing them, than by giving them battle, and the chance of a victory over you.

If their means of continuing the war be scanty, and yours otherwise, it is best to dally with them, and come to nothing decisive, though your army should be superior. Want of forage, bread, or other necessaries, will often oblige an enemy to quit their camp, when your whole force could not have done it.

If you chuse to give the enemy battle, let the circumstances of it be such, that if you lose it, it may not be decisive on your part, but may be so to the enemy if you gain it; and never give or engage in battle, but when there is much more to be gained by victory, than lost by being beaten.

Always encamp your army, if near the enemy, in the manner you intend they shall fight.

When an enemy would attack you, and you have rivers, rivulets, or morasses, &c. before you, draw up your army so near them, as that if they pass, they may not have room or time to form, but be overset and driven into them as fast as they come over.

If your right wing beat the enemy's left, so as that they break and fly before you, and seem to be quite routed, yet pursue them not too far, but with your troops in good order

wheel to the left, and charge the remaining enemy in flank, whilſt your left wing is buſying them in front: ſo will you eaſily defeat them.*

A General ſhould always endeavour to make his war become offenſive. His troops will often be quiet in their camp, while the enemy are inſecure and harraſſed.

A commander in chief ſhould never be prevailed on to drink to exceſs: that might give the enemy a terrible advantage over him.

Prevent gaming among the troops as much as poſſible. Soldiers have often deſerted when they have loſt their pay, and are indebted to the company, which gaming is frequently the cauſe of.

Take care your army never wants bread; other neceſſaries of life will follow of courſe; for as all victuals in an army are paid for in ready money, butchers, bakers, wine merchants, &c. will flock to you. But you muſt make your communications with your magazines as ſecure as poſſible, and have them in more places than one, that if one ſhould be cut off, others may ſupply you.

It is of the greateſt importance that your ſoldiers be inſtructed in the beſt and moſt adroit method of loading and firing their firelocks. Without this their manual exerciſe is but ornament and ſhew. The French do not cut the neck from their ball, but tie their cartridge to it as it comes from the mould: the paper being thin, when the cartridge is uncapp'd and put into the barrel, the bullet at the end of it, by a ſtamp of the piece, and the weight of the ball, drives down the paper, ſo that the firelock is charged and wadded expeditiouſly, and without drawing the rammer. This ſeems worthy of imitation.

At the ſame time that you are obliged to puniſh your ſoldiers with ſeverity, take care not to loſe their affections.

Let none fear you but the enemy, and the evil doers: get that reſpect from the reſt of your troops which is conſiſtent with their love.

See that there be ſubordination in your army; for he that knows not how to obey, will not know how to command.

Carefully find out and imitate what the ſoldiery eſteemed in your predeceſſor, and avoid what they diſliked in him.

* There are many inſtances where battles have been loſt by not obſerving this maxim.

Let not any pique or ill-will to your ſuperior officer divert you from doing all the real ſervice you can to your country.

Regulate all your actions by a ſtrict regard to your duty.

Inſtead of wiſhing for a war that you may make a greater figure, endeavour nothing ſo much as the good and tranquillity of your country.

Be more anxious to gain the love of your troops, than to heap up riches; and ſpare not one to gain the other.

In a word, do every thing for the good of the ſoldier, that is conſiſtent with your ſervice to your Country.

It is better to march up to the enemy, than to expect them; and endeavour to move up to them in good order before they are ready to receive you: charge them briſkly, and let your artillery keep a continual fire on them: attack their ſquadrons in flank by ſmall detached bodies; and never attack a ſquadron without breaking or putting it in diſorder.

You muſt be ready at all times to ſuccour and refreſh your troops who ſeem to be moſt fatigued; and take care that thoſe who are repulſed do not put your ſecond line into diſorder. For this end make large interval in the ſecond line, by doubling the files of each battalion.

You muſt not march too far forward, nor ſeparate your troops in the purſuit of the enemy, unleſs the victory is fully declared for you; and even then it is beſt to keep your troops together, and in good order, as much as poſſible.

In the rear of the regiments you poſt your ſurgeons, and ſome officers, to take care of the wounded.

If you are beaten, aſſemble your troops where they may be in ſafety; let your militia betake themſelves to arms; furniſh your ſtrong places well, and the poſts and paſſes of your frontier; break down your bridges; ſtop up your ways, by cutting, or laying great trees croſs them.

Put your army immediately in good order and reinforce it.

THE SEVEN YEARS WAR IN GERMANY.

(*Continued from page* 224.)

DAUN never was more cautious than after a fortunate event. He now fortified himſelf in an almoſt impregnable ſituation, and neglected every meaſure to hurt the King. Frederic made good uſe of that precious time. He pro-

cured in haſte from Dreſden, as well as from the army of Prince Henry, ammunition and proviſions, ordered new tranſports, and was joined by a reinforcement of 6000 men, which Prince Henry ſent him, and made preparations to march to Sileſia. He ſaid; "Daun has let us eſcape; the game is not loſt; let us take repoſe for ſome days, and then march to free Neiſſe." But there were yet many obſtacles to ſurmount. The camp was full of ſick and wounded, for whoſe ſafety they had to provide. Saxony was to be covered, the field bakery taken care of, and the enemy, who occupied the roads to Sileſia, was, by countermarches, to be deluded. All this was executed, and on the 25th of October, eleven days after the battle, Frederic was again on his march to Sileſia, with ſuch advantages, that Daun himſelf gave up all hope to prevent it. He however detached a ſtrong corps after the King, to throw at leaſt ſome difficulties in his way. Laudon ſhewed in this expedition his ſkill. Sometimes he threw light troops into hollow ways, in order to obſtruct the Pruſſians; ſometimes he cannonaded them from advantageous ſituations; ſometimes he burſt like a ſtream from out of the foreſts, attacking the marching enemy. But nothing eſſential was thereby gained; a few Pruſſian pontoons and baggage waggons only were taken.

The Auſtrian General, Harſh, beſieged Neiſſe, which, like all Pruſſian forts, was weakly garriſoned, on account of the troops being wanted in the field. The hope of conquering that important place was great, on account of the King's abſence. By the battle of Hochkirk, the loſs of Neiſſe ſeemed to be inevitable. To diſlodge a beſieging army is the natural conſequence of a victory, or other fortunate events; but that Frederic, after being beaten, ſurrounded by large armies, at the diſtance of near 200 miles, could haſten to the aſſiſtance of Neiſſe, was an event that ſurpaſſed the expectations of all Europe. After a march of 13 days, he arrived on the 5th of November, three miles diſtant from that fort. More was not requiſite, to gain the end; for on the ſame day Marſh raiſed the ſiege, left a large quantity of ammunition and proviſions behind, and retired to Moravia. He had blockaded that place ſince the 4th of Auguſt, and bombarded it ſince the 5th of October; but all his attacks became nugatory by the gallant defence of the garriſon.

The fortreſs of Coſel, which was hitherto blockaded by the Auſtrians, was alſo freed, and Sileſia evacuated by the enemy. The campaign was at an end in this province, but in Saxony, where Daun remained with the main army, and which was but weakly covered, this General hoped to make important conqueſts before the winter. All Europe looked for the fruits of the victory of Hochkirk, of which no ſign had yet appeared. They were however not backward in forming plans. Dreſden, Leipzic, and Torgau, were to be taken by different corps at one time. Daun himſelf approached the capital. There was but a ſmall corps of Pruſſians in Saxony, under the command of General Fink, but great activity reigned among them. They took the moſt effectual meaſures againſt the great ſuperiority of the enemy, and reinforced the garriſon of Dreſden. The Commandant, General Smettau, was now under the ſorrowful neceſſity of burning the ſuburbs, which were, from their manner of building, equal to the moſt magnificent cities of Europe.

Daun made preparations to beſiege Dreſden in the regular way; but the bad news from Sileſia, the raiſing of the ſiege of Neiſſe, the retreat of the Auſtrians to Moravia, and Frederic's march towards Saxony, again made his plan nugatory. He retired. In the Auſtrian account of that event, it is ſaid, that from a certain important reaſon the plan was altered. But that important reaſon was nothing elſe than Frederic's approach. The plans upon Torgau and Leipzic met with the ſame fate. Both theſe places were relieved by the Pruſſian Generals Dohna and Wedel. Nothing remained to the Auſtrians and the troops of the Empire, but to march to Bohemia; even the fort of Sonnenſtein was given up. Daun endeavoured to divide his armies in their winter quarters in ſuch a manner as to form an enormous chain of troops, ſuch as never was heard of in Europe. It commenced on the frontiers of Sileſia and Saxony, and ended on the confines of Switzerland.

The Ruſſians, who after the battle of Zorndarf were ſomewhat relieved by Frederic's abſence, reſolved to beſiege Colberg. The ſea port of that place promiſed them on account of the tranſports great advantage, and from the weakneſs of the garriſon, they expected an eaſy conqueſt. The fate of all Pomerania depended upon 700 men militia under the command of a major of invalids of which the garri-

ſon of Colberg was compoſed. But the commandant Hayden, was not of the common claſs of warriors. He took the beſt meaſures for defence and diſplayed great courage and reſolution. General Palmbael beſieged the fort with 10,000 Ruſſians, and after five days the covered way was in his hands. The conqueſt now ſeemed to be certain, but the valour, of the commandant and his armed citizens, put a ſtop to all farther progreſs. The beſiegers were daily reinforced from their main army, and renewed then their attacks with freſh troops. But they could not ſucceed and were after a 19 days ſiege compelled to retire. The Ruſſians, after this miſcarriage evacuated Pomerania and Brandenburg, taking their winter quarters in Poland and Pruſſia.

The operations of the Swedes were in this campaign as inſignificant as in the preceding. In the month of october whilſt Brandenburg was totally without troops, they marched towards Berlin, and were but 20 miles from it when General Wedel with a ſmall corps advanced and made them retreat. The Pruſſians did not ſtop till they had driven the enemy under the cannon of Stralſund.

The campaign was now every where at an end. In the midſt of December there were no more enemies in Sileſia, Saxony, Brandenburgh and Pomerania. Frederic, beaten in October, was now maſter of Saxony of the rivers Elbe and Oder. In the ſpace of ſeven weeks he marched from Saxony to Sileſia, thence back to Saxony and again to Seleſia; during which time the forts of Neiſe, Coſel, Dreſden, Leipzic, Torgau and Colberg were freed from their beſiegers. If theſe operations aſtoniſhed people ignorant in tactics, they ſurpriſed ſtill more the warriors who knew the difficulties of ſuch continued movements in their full extent. The Auſtrians in Moravia and Bohemia were now making new plans; the Ruſſians in Poland and Pruſſia endeavoured to fill their Magazines; the troops of the Empire in their winter quarters in the heart of Germany enjoyed reſt; and the Swedes, who now ſaw their own part of Pomerania in the hands of the Pruſſians did not think themſelves ſecure under the cannon of Stralſund.

This year's campaign of the allies againſt the French, was alſo very remarkable; at the beginning of the year Richelieu was obliged to yield the chief command to the Count of Clermont. This commander was a clergyman,

who never had seen an army, even not at a review. This choice of a commander surprized all Europe, and Frederic said on receiving the news: "I hope the archbishop of Paris will soon relieve him."

Clermont found the troops, confided to him in the most deplorable situation; he made to his King the following singular report: "I have found your Majesty's army divided into three very different parties. The one is above ground, clothed in rags and composed of thieves and marauders; the second party is below ground, and the third in the hospitals;" he therefore begged for orders, whether to lead the first back to their own country, or whether to stay till they were united with the two latter parties.

The Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick gave him no time to mend his situation: he advanced towards Hanover. The French fled in every direction, leaving their cannon and baggage behind. At Hoya on the Weser, they made a stand, but the hereditary Prince now reigning Duke of Brunswick, after a lively engagement routed them and made 1500 prisoners. This was the first action of that young prince, who soon after was ranked among the first generals of the age. The French retired over the Rhine.

As soon as the troops, during the short winter quarters, had refreshed themselves, Duke Ferdinand opened the campaign with the design to carry the war into France, but as the French army was advantageously posted on the banks of the Rhine, the passing of that large river was connected with extraordinary difficulties. They however were by prudent measures surmounted, and the allied army effected in the night of the first of June a passage over the Rhine near Cleves. Clermont with his far superior army strongly intrenched himself near Rhinefelden. Nothing remained to Ferdinand but to manœuvre the enemy from out of their strong camp. In this he succeeded and a few days after he attacked the whole French army, in the plains of Crefeld. The battle was obstinate and bloody, but the French were forced to retreat with the loss of 7500 men. The allies counted 1500 wounded and dead.

The consequence of this victory, was the siege of Dusseldorf, where the French had their head quarters. On the 8th day the place was surrendered, and the conquerors obtained an enormous quantity of ammunition, cannon and pro-

visions. This new loss caused disquietude in France; the Bastille became filled and Clermont was recalled. The command on the Rhine was now given to the experienced Marshal of Contades, and Soubise received orders to penetrate at any hazard into Hessia. Ferdinand being distant, they counted upon an easy conquest of that province, which likewise would draw the army of the allies from the Rhine. Soubise advanced, and though his van was beaten by the Hessian Militia, he penetrated with 30,000 men into the heart of the province, which now again experienced all the hardships of war.

England was by the battle of Crefeld and Ferdinand's progress on the Rhine determined to combat the French by land as well as by sea. Parliament resolved to send 18,000 men to Germany. If this had been done sooner, Ferdinand would have been able to maintain himself on the other side of the Rhine. But now his situation was critical, he had an army of 80,000 men under the command of an experienced general against him; provisions began to fail and a long continued rain had ruined the roads and made the rivers overflow. Hanover which was threatened by Soubise, was in need of immediate assistance; and the English troops, which were to land in the north of Germany, and could easily be cut off, required protection. These considerations compelled Ferdinand to recross the Rhine; but the difficulties of effecting this were great, the enemy being in the vicinity with a powerful army. The allies erected a bridge near Rees, which general Imhof was to protect with 3000 men. A French corps of 10,000 men attacked him, and Ferdinand not being able to send any assistance, he was left to his own valour. His camp was covered by diches and hedges. The enemy was unacquainted with the ground, and Imhof, not waiting their attack, advanced and in less than half an hour routed them. They left eleven cannon, their waggons, ammunition, and 300 prisoners behind. Such was the hurry of that French corps, so much superior in number, that on the way most of them threw away their arms. On the road to Wesel above 2000 muskets were found.

Insignificant as this event was in so bloody and active a war, yet it had the same effect as the most signal victory; for it decided the fate of the large magazine at Emmeric and the pontoon bridge, without which it would have been im-

poſſible for Ferdinand to croſs the Rhine. On the 10th of July the whole allied army paſſed the river, and General Imhof was ſoon after detached with a corps to meet the Engliſh troops, who had landed at Emden. They formed a junction at Crefeld.

Ferdinand, in order to give ſome reſt to his troops, took advantageous poſitions, on the river Lippe, whereby he covered Hanover. General Oberg was to cover Heſſia with 20,000 men. He occupied a ſtrong camp near Sanderſhauſen, and did every thing to provoke Soubiſe, who with 30.000 men ſtood oppoſite him, to an attack. The latter avoided it, and endeavoured to gain Oberg's rear. This drew Oberg out of his camp, who was now attacked on all ſides by the ſuperior enemy near Lutternberg. The Heſſians defended themſelves bravely, and forced the enemy's infantry to retreat, but were in the moment of victory taken in flank and rear by the French cavalry. The want of horſe in the Heſſian army augmented this misfortune, and compelled them to retreat, with the loſs of 1500 men dead and wounded, beſides 28 cannon.

This victory procured Soubiſe the Marſhall ſtaff. He now began to make inroads into the neighbouring provinces, and to exact heavy contributions. Ferdinand's marches and poſitions, however, prevented their making farther progreſs. The French evacuating Heſſia, both parties went into winter quarters. The French under Contades between the Meuſe and the Rhine, and thoſe under Soubiſe along the borders of the Rhine and the Mayne. The allies occupied Heſſia and Weſtphalia.

(1759.) The belligerent powers made preparations for a new campaign. Frederic reſolved to act on the defenſive, without however neglecting an opportunity to make himſelf formidable. During this winter, the Poliſh Prince Sulkowſky took, without reſpect to the neutrality of the republic of Poland, an active part in the war. He raiſed troops, and erected magazines for the Ruſſians. To Frederic's repreſentations he gave haughty anſwers, continuing zealouſly his preparations to the advantage of the Ruſſians. He reſided in the town of Reiſen, in Poland, at a conſiderable diſtance from the frontiers of Sileſia. He had ſoldiers and cannon of his own, and beſides thought himſelf protected by his republic. But Frederic, without any political conſiderations, detached

General Woberſnow with a corps to Poland. Reiſen was ſurprized without a ſhot, the Prince taken priſoner, and his ſoldiers diſarmed. The magazines were ruined, and all cannon, horſes, waggons, and ammunition carried to Sileſia. The ſoldiers were forced into the Pruſſian ſervice, and the Prince was ſent to the fort of Glogau, where he remained priſoner to the end of the war. Another ally of that kind was a newſpaper writer at Erlangen, who relying on his ſovereign, had in his papers declared war againſt the Pruſſians. His papers were filled with lies and ſcurrility. A Pruſſian officer took upon himſelf to chaſtiſe this newſpaper hero. He took with him two corporals, and after having in a military manner applied to his back a good portion of ſtrokes, he forced the patient to give a formal receipt in writing for the number of ſtrokes received.

The Pruſſian troops never were more active than during this winter. They took Erfurt, deſtroyed a number of magazines, and beat a ſtrong corps of the Auſtrians. Prince Henry, the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, and the ſterility of the mountains notwithſtanding, advanced into Bohemia, forced the paſſes, and diſperſed the enemy. General Halſen defeated the Auſtrian General Reinhard, made 2000 priſoners, and took large magazines. Againſt the troops of the Empire alſo diverſions were made from Saxony. Prince Henry detached into Franconia ſeveral corps, and the troops of the Empire fled. The Swedes alſo had no reſt during this winter. Five places which they had occupied were taken from them, with 2700 priſoners, and a large quantity of proviſions and warlike ſtores.

The Ruſſians, during this time, had aſſembled in Poland, threatening the Pruſſian States with a new attack. Frederic detached towards them a ſtrong corps under Dohna, in order, if not to prevent, at leaſt to make difficult their march. Want of ſubſiſtence compelled the Pruſſians to draw towards the river Oder, and the Ruſſians, from the ſame reaſon, followed them thither. Field Marſhal Zoltikow was now in Fermor's place, who had reſigned the command. Frederic, being diſcontented with Dohna, gave the command to General Wedel, who was totally unacquainted with the ſtrength of his enemy, and with their manner of fighting. He however had ſtrict orders to attack the Ruſſians without delay, if he could not prevent their junction with the Auſtrians by other

means. Laudon was for that purpoſe on the march with 30,000 men. Wedel ſoon came to an engagement with the Ruſſians, who were much ſuperior, and with conſiderable loſs forced him to retreat. Nothing now prevented the Auſtrian and Ruſſian armies from joining. They fortified themſelves, 80,000 ſtrong, on the borders of the Oder. Wedel did all in his power to make their paſſage over this river difficult.

The King had contented himſelf with acting on the defenſive in Saxony. He remained encamped for ſome time near Landſhut, in order to wait a favourable opportunity. Daun, who with the main army was encamped oppoſite him, was alſo waiting a favourable opportunity to advance, or to engage. To delude this hope, and to drive the Auſtrians into Bohemia, the King did all he could to make their ſubſiſtence difficult. But the march of the Ruſſians altered the plan entirely.

The unfortunate battle near Zullichau diſpoſed the king to haſten to his States of Brandenburg. Henry detached a great part of his army from Saxony to reinforce that on the Oder, and went himſelf to Sileſia, to take the command of the army that Frederic had left behind. Even the corps under General Fink received orders to march to the Oder.

Frederie's march was ſucceſsful. Near Guben he met with an Auſtrian corps under General Haddick, which he attacked, made 2000 priſoners, and took 500 waggons with flour; after which he formed a junction with Wedel's army.

He reſolved without delay to give battle. His army was 40,000 and that of the Ruſſians and Auſtrians above 70,000 ſtrong. The latter ſtood between Frankfort and Kunnerſdorf upon heights in an intrenched camp, defended by an enormous artillery. Their right wing was covered by the Oder, and their left by ſwamps and hedges. Before the front there were ditches and broken ground. All thoſe advantages notwithſtanding the King reſolved, to attack them on the 12th of Auguſt. He formed his army in a wood, whence his line attacked the enemy's left in colums, with great impetuoſity. It was Frederic's plan to attack the enemy at once in the flanks and in front and rear. But he was not well enough acquainted with the ground. The march of his troops was interrupted by unexpected great ditches. They made great round about ways, whereby the troops became fatigued, and the precious time loſt. At laſt the

Pruſſians approached the Ruſſian entrenchments, and canonaded them briſkly from three batteries, which the Ruſſians anweſred by an hundred cannon, from their left wing. The King ordered an aſſault on the batteries. The grenadiers worked themſelves through barricadoes, advanced through broken ground, aud at laſt gained the heights, whence the Ruſſians made a murderous fire. They however did not looſe courage, mounted the batteries and drove the enemy from their intrenchment. The whole left wing of the Ruſſians fled, leaving all their artillery behind. Victory ſeemed to be decided, and couriers were already diſpatched from the field of battle to Berlin and Sileſia, when all at once the fate of war turned in the moſt extraordinary manner.

The Pruſſian infantry had done all, but the victory could not be purſued, as the Pruſſian cavalry was on the other wing, and the cannon could not follow ſo quick. At laſt they brought ſome cannon upon the heights, but too few in number to accompliſh the defeat. Meanwhile the King advanced with the other wing towards the Ruſſians. The ſame did the corps of Gen. Fink. But their march was every moment impeded by the badneſs of the ground. The troops had ſometimes to paſs over ſmall bridges, ſometimes to go round large ditches. The Ruſſians made uſe of that delay, aſſembling and bringing their heavy artillery to bear. Laudon, who had not yet taken any part in the combat now put his troops in motion. The King ordered his cavalry to advance, which under the lead of Seidlitz paſſed between the ditches, formed under the Ruſſian cannon fire, and dvanced, but the ſtream of grape-ſhot was too inceſſant from the Ruſſian line, that it ſtretched whole platoons of man and horſe to the ground, put the courageous cavalry into confuſion, and forced them to retreat.

However the Pruſſians had not loſt any thing yet. The Ruſſians, being preſſed together 80 and 100 men deep, formed a chaos; but that chaos, was covered by fifty cannon. The Pruſſians were fatigued in the extreme by a march of almoſt 40 miles, by their great exertions and the intenſe heat of the day. The battle was gained and the loſs of the Ruſſians ſo great, that in all probality they would retreat during the night. But Frederic was of opinion, that the Ruſſian army ſhould not only be beaten, but totally annihilated, as they always returned to renew their devaſtations. The Pruſ-

ſian generals, amongſt whom was Seidliz, rep reſented to the King the extreme fatigue of the troops, and the King was on the point of deſiſting from any further operation, when an other general approached, whoſe opinion the King aſked, and who, being a courtier, agreed with the King, to continue the battle. March! was now the order.

To complete the victory it was neceſſary to conquer a height called the Spizberg. This height was extremely ſteep and occupied by Laudon's beſt troops. The Pruſſians endeavoured to climb up the hill, but whoever reached the ſummit met with immediate death. All courage availed nothing. The inceſſant fire of the Ruſſians and Auſtrians fell like a torrent upon the Pruſſians, and ſtretched every thing to the ground. Frederic expoſed himſelf to the greateſt danger, but all attemps to drive the enemy from the heights were fruitleſs. The troops came into diſorder, and now Laudon, advanced from behind the right wing with freſh troops, and attacked the Pruſſians in flank and rear. The battle was ſoon after decided.

Frederic's fortitude was never more ſhaken, than on that unfortunate day. In a few hours, the fate of war precipitated him from the height of victory into a complete defeat. His lively imagination painted to him in the firſt moments, the conſequences of this event, in a terrible light. From the ſame field of battle whence a few hours before he diſpatched couriers with the news of victory, he now ſent orders to Berlin, to remove the royal family, the archives, and every thing valuable. Nothing he thought could hinder the enemy from marching to his reſidence. His troops were dirperſed in ſuch a manner, that the day after the battle he had but about 5000 men together. Not only all the cannon taken from the Ruſſians, but alſo an hundred of thoſe of the Pruſſians were loſt. General Wunſh, who commanded a ſmall corps of Pruſſians on the other ſide of the Oder, had arrived towards the end of the battle, at Frankfort, and had taken the Ruſſian garriſon priſoners; but the battle being loſt he was obliged to withdraw. The approaching night was favourable to the King. He retreated with his army, and gained ſome heights, which the enemy did not venture to attack.

This battle was the moſt murderous that had hitherto been fought. The Pruſſians had 8000 dead, and above 12.000

wounded, of which however a few only were taken prisoners. Almost all the Prussian Generals and officers of rank were wounded. The Russians had, according to their own account, 16,000 dead and wounded. General Soltikow, in giving to the Empress of Russia information of the battle, says, "Your Majesty will not be astonished at the great loss, "knowing that the King of Prussia sells his defeats always "very dear. If I gain another such victory, I shall be obliged to bring myself an account of it, with a stick in my "hand, to Petersburg."

The day after the battle, Frederic passed the Oder, assembled his scattered troops, formed a junction with Wunsh, called General Kleist with 5000 men from Pomerania, and procured in haste cannon from his arsenals. The Russians, who, his defeat notwithstanding, were afraid of him, entrenched themselves. The King, by a speech to his troops, again inspired them with courage; and in a few weeks Berlin was out of danger, his army provided with every thing, and reinforced in such a manner, that the Electorate of Hanover could be covered, and General Wunsh was able to march with his troops to Silesia.

(*To be continued.*)

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF CUDALORE, IN THE EAST INDIES, IN THE YEAR 1782.

(Written by an Hanoverian Officer.)

ON the morning of the 13th of June before day-break, the whole army formed into lines. The second was composed chiefly of battalions of seapoys, some of which were placed between the European regiments according to the custom in India. We, Hanoverians, took post with the 101st regiment in the centre, under the brigade of Colonel *Elphinston*. The 78th regiment, and three regiments of seapoys, were on our right, under the brigade of Colonel *Stewart*, the 73d, the Madras regiment, and three battalions of seapoys, were to our left, under Colonel *Gordon*; and to cover the whole left flank, Colonel *Kelly* was placed with three battalions of seapoys, from the Grenadier corps of Colonel *Cathcart*.

We were under arms the evening before, and mustered by

General *Bruce*, who was lately come from Europe, and had ſerved in the American war. On both wings, were well occupied batteries of eighteen pounders, as well as in the centre, where the head quarters were.

The firſt attack was made, about five in the morning after the whole army had advanced in front: however, a ſmall wood of cocoa trees ſeparated us from the enemy. The canonade ſoon became general, with very briſk firing; after a few hours, ſeveral French batteries, on both the wings were taken.

We were forced to advance with the 101ſt regiment, and a batallion of ſeapoys, about ten in the morning, under the batteries of the head quarters, where we ſtood above two hours, expoſed to a very heavy fire of the enemy's cannon, as well as muſketry: we did not, however, ſuffer much on this occaſion, as their batteries were pointed too high. At one o'clock, we received orders to ſtorm the largeſt French redoubt, which was oppoſite to one of our batteries, that mounted 21 guns. The men had firſt ſome rum and biſcuit diſtributed among them, and afterwards a ſignal from head-quarters was made to begin the ſtorm.

We advanced in front with the uſual march, until we came near the ſmall wood, were we took our fuzees in the right hand, and held them *en balance*, haſtening forward, with quick ſteps, through the wood, which was interſected with ditches and barricadoes. The heat on that day, as well as the fire from the muſketry, and which we were in the reach of, was intolerable. Not only cannon balls, but twigs and branches, which were torn by them from the trees, were continually ſhowering down upon us. Whole ranks dropped down at once, either dead or wounded.

One of the firſt who was killed, was our worthy friend, Major *Varenius*: and, at his ſide, fell lieutenant M——. However we got through the wood, behind which at about 40 paces diſtant, was the above mentioned battery called *Siegtum*, which kept up a very briſk firing upon us; but to the unſpeakable aſtoniſhment of us all, we ſaw the 101ſt *regiment had not advanced with us*; and that we, Hanoverians, were left quite alone, expoſed to the fire of the enemy.

Our men, however, were extremely reſolute. When we came out of the wood we were obliged to form afreſh. The French were entrenched up to their chin; we, however,

now kept up a regular and brisk firing, and then advanced, with fixed bayonets, until we came up to the parapet.

The great superiority in numbers of the enemy, prevented the success of our first attack; but, as we retreated in good order, to the wood, and formed again, we attempted a second, although we had been pursued by some hundreds of the French, who anoyed us very much as we fell back.

With the assistance of a batallion of sepoys, we renewed the attack, with an intrepidity that entirely deranged the enemy; who, on their commanding officer being shot, quitted the fort, and retreated, with the utmost precipitation, to Cudalore.

We took possession of it, with 17 pieces of cannon, and some artillerymen, who were wounded; we also found many killed. The troops in the fort consisted of 1,500 men, belonging to the regiments of *La Marc* and *Austrasia*.

Such was the end of that memorable hot day. We also got possiession of that important redoubt at Bondsbridge. Our killed and wounded amounted to near 300; among the latter of which were ten Hanoverian officers.

ANECDOTES.

FIRMNESS.

AT a skirmish near Saratoga, a Bat-man of General Frazer's rescued from the Indians an officer of the Americans, one Captain Van Swearingham, of Colonel Morgan's Virginia rifle-men; they were on the point of stripping him, which the man prevented, and recovered his pocket-book from them containing all his papers of consequence, and his commission

The Bat-man brought him up to Gen. Fraser who interrogated him concerning the enemy, but could obtain no other answer, than that the American army was commanded by Generals Gates, and Arnold. General Fraser, exceedingly provoked that he could gain no intelligence, told him if he did not immediately inform him as to the exact situation of the enemy, he would *hang him up* directly;

the officer, with the moſt undaunted firmneſs, replied, "You may if you pleaſe." The general perceiving he could make nothing of him, rode off, leaving him in the cuſtody of Lieutenant Dunbar of the artillery.

HEROISM.

IN the courſe of the action of Saratoga, Lieutenant Hervey, of the Britiſh, a youth of ſixteen, and nephew to Gen. Hervey, received ſeveral wounds, and was repeatedly ordered off the field by Col. Anſtruther; but his ardor would not allow him to quit the battle, while he could ſtand and ſee his brave lads fighting beſide him. A ball ſtriking one of his legs, his removal became abſolutely neceſſary, and while they were conveying him away, another wounded him mortally. In this ſituation the ſurgeon recommended him to take a powerful doſe of opium, to avoid a ſeven or eight hours life of moſt exquiſite torture: this he immediately conſented to, and when the Colonel entered the tent with major Harnage, who were both wounded, they aſked whether he had any affairs they could ſettle for him? "His reply was, that being a minor, every thing was already adjuſted;" but he had one requeſt, which he had juſt life enough to utter "Tell my uncle I died like a Soldier!"

THE Pruſſian Field Marſhal *Schwerin*, died, as is well known, the death of a hero, in the battle near Prague. His body after the battle, was carried to a neighbouring convent, where ſoon after, appeared Princes, Generals, and officers of all ranks of the Pruſſian army, to pay the laſt reſpect to this immortal General. They entered the room where the lifeleſs corps was lying—and, impelled by a profound reſpect, all, at once, pulled off their hats, as if this great man *ſtill was* preſent, and alive; and ſeemed to wait, as if they were ſtill expecting his orders. The monks of the convent, though, leſs moved at it, admired with a ſilent attention, the great impreſſion, which true greatneſs and merit muſt make on noble minds, when even the view of a dead body could inſpire ſo much veneration.

THE AMERICAN WAR.

(*Continued from page* 186.)

CAMPAIGN, OF 1777 IN THE NORTH.

TO effect a free communication, between New-York and Canada, and to maintain the navigation of the Lakes, was a principal object with the Britiſh, for the campaign of 1777. An expedition in that quarter had been projected, by the Britiſh miniſtry, as the moſt effectual method that could be taken, to cruſh the colonies at once. They conſidered the New-England people, to be the ſoul of the confederacy, and promiſed themſelves much by ſevering them from all free communication with the neighbouring ſtates. They hoped, when this was accompliſhed, to be able to ſurround them ſo effectually with fleets and armies, and Indian allies, as to compel their ſubmiſſion.

For this purpoſe an army of 4000 Britiſh and 3000 German troops, excluſive of the corps of artillery, were put under the command of General Burgoyne. Their train of artillery was perhaps the fineſt, that had ever been allotted to ſecond the operations of an equal force. Gen. Burgoyne was furniſhed with picked and experienced officers. The moſt eminent of theſe were Gen. Philips, Fraſer, Powal, and Hamilton; the German generals, Riedeſel, and Specht. This large body of veteran troops, was to be kept together as much as poſſible. In order to produce this effect, the inhabitants of Canada, were commanded to furniſh men ſufficient to occupy the woods on the frontiers, to prevent deſertion, to procure intelligence, and to intercept all communication between the Americans and the malcontents in the province. They were alſo required to provide men, for the completion of the fortifications, at Sorel, St. John's, Chamblee, and Iſle Aux Noix, for the carriage of proviſions, artillery, and ſtores, and for making roads Gen. Carleton was ordered to uſe his intereſt with the Indians, to perſuade them to join in this expedition.

The Americans had been early attentive to their ſecurity in that quarter. Ticonderoga is ſituated on the weſtern ſhore, a few miles to the northward of that narrow inlet, which unites Lake George, with Lake Champlain. Crown Point lies more northward than Ticonderoga, and is ſituate on an

angle of land washed on two sides by water flowing over rocks. A deep morass covered the third side, except in a small part, where formerly the French had erected lines, and which still continued. These the Americans had strengthened by additional works. Opposite to Ticonderoga, on the eastern shore the Americans had with great industry fortified a high hill called Mount Independence. On the top of it, which is flat, a star-fort had been erected, containing extensive barracks well supplied with artillery. Themount ain stretched in a sloping direction into the water, strongly intrenched to its base, supplied with heavy artillery. Midway up the mountain, another battery was erected to cover the lower works. With infinite labour the Americans had united Ticonderoga and Mount Independence by a strong bridge of communications over the inlet. Twenty-two sunken piers supported the bridge, at equal distances. Between the piers, floats were placed, fastened together with chains and rivets, and bound to the sunken piers. On the Lake Champlain side of the bridge, a boom, composed of very large timber, was erected, fastened together by rivetted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and half square. They strengthened Fort Schuyler and erected other fortifications, near the Mohawk River, requisitions were made by the commanding officer, in the department for 13,600 men, as necessary for the security of this district. The adjacent states were urged to be in readiness for an active campaign.

Col. St. Leger, with a body of light troops and Indians amounting to between seven and eight hundred men, having been previously detached by the way of Lake Ontario, and the Mohawk river, in order to make a diversion in favour of the British army, General Burgoyne set out from St. John's on the sixteenth of June, 1777. The naval force, under the command of Commodore Lutwych, preceded the army, and opened the way for its advances, detachments of Indians having been previously made from the river Bouquet. Their fleet proceeded without any opposition, and under its protection the troops were landed about the middle of June, and encamped at a small distance from Crown Point, on the north side.

At this place General Burgoyne thought proper to give the Indians a war feast, and to make a speech to them. The

purport of it was, to induce them to refrain from cruelty, and to mitigate their natural ferocity.

Gen. Burgoyne, before he advanced to Ticonderoga, iſſued a manifeſto, in which, with an ill judged policy, he threatened to puniſh, with the utmoſt ſeverity, thoſe who refuſed to attach themſelves to the Britiſh cauſe, magnifying at the ſame time the ferocity of the ſavages. Having remained at Crown Point a few days, the whole army proceeded to Ticonderoga.

This place, notwithſtanding its apparent ſtrength, had one diſadvantage to contend with. To the ſouthward of the bridge of communications, which effectually prevented any attack by water from the northern ſide, was a hill called Sugar Hill, which overlooked and commanded both the works at Ticonderoga and on Mount Independence. This hill the Americans were unable to fortify, on account of the want of men; Gen. St. Clair, who commanded at Ticonderoga, not having above 3000 men.

The Britiſh army advanced with great circumſpection and prudence on both ſides of the lake, the fleet keeping in the centre till the army had encloſed the Americans on the land ſide. The royal army proceeded with great expedition in conſtructing works neceſſary for the inveſtment of that place. By the 5th of July theſe works were completed, and a road made to the top of Sugar Hill for the conſtruction of a battery there. In theſe circumſtances Gen. St. Clair reſolved to evacuate the poſt. The ſituation of this officer was embarraſſing. Such was the confidence of the States in the fancied ſtrength of this poſt, and of the ſuppoſed ſuperiority of force for its defence, that the retreat without riſking an action, could not fail of drawing on him the execration of the multitude. To ſtand ſtill, and, by ſuffering himſelf to be ſurrounded, to riſk his whole army for a ſingle poſt, was contrary to the true intereſt of the States. In this trying ſituation, with the unanimous approbation of a council of war, he adopted the reſolution of ſacrificing perſonal reputation to ſave his army. In conſequence of this determination, the retreating army embarked as much of their baggage and ſtores as they had any proſpect of ſaving, on board batteaux, and diſpatched them, under the convoy of five armed gallies, to Skeneſborough. The army took the Caſtle-Town road, in order to reach Skeneſborough by land. The dawn of day,

on the 6th of July, diſcovered this retreat. The Britiſh immediately began removing the immenſe work of framed timber ſunk in the water, and, after having cleared their way, purſued the Americans with a brigade of gun-boats. They came up with them near the falls of Skeneſborough, engaged and captured ſome of the largeſt gallies, obliging the Americans to ſet the others on fire, together with a conſiderable number of their batteaux. The grand diviſion of the army under General Burgoyne, in gun-boats and two frigates, followed and landed at South Bay. The Americans, after ſetting fire to their works, left Skeneſborough. Gen. Fraſer, at the head of the advanced corps, preſſed hard upon the rear of that diviſion of the Americans which had taken the route of Hubberton, and which he overtook at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th of July. He attacked the Americans, who maintained their poſt with great reſolution.

Victory for a long time was doubtful, but the arrival of a reinforcement under the German General Riedeſel decided the fate of the day. The Americans, after ſuſtaining conſiderable loſs, were obliged to give way.

The deſtruction of the gallies and batteaux of the Americans, and the defeat of their rear, obliged General St. Clair to turn off from Caſtleton to the left, fearful of being intercepted at Fort Anne. After a diſtreſſing march of ſeven days, he joined General Schuyler at Fort Edward. In the mean time a party of the Americans took the road by Wood Creek, in order to proceed beyond Fort Anne. The ninth regiment of the Britiſh having been detached to take poſt near that fort, overtook them. A warm engagement immediately commenced, which, with various ſucceſs, laſted above two hours, but at laſt the Americans, after ſetting fire to Fort Anne, were obliged to retreat to Fort Edward. The combined ſtrength of this place did not exceed four thouſand four hundred men, including militia.

The artillery loſt, by the evacuation of the northern poſts, and taken or deſtroyed in the armed veſſels at Skeneſborough, amounted to 128 pieces. The loſs of proviſions was alſo very conſiderable.

Such was the rapid torrent of ſucceſs, which in this period of the campaign ſwept away all oppoſition from before the Royal army. They were highly elated with their good

fortune; conſidered their toils to be nearly at an end; Albany to be within their graſp, and the conqueſt of the adjacent provinces reduced to a certainty. Before we proceed, it may not be improper to relate here a well contrived ſtratagem. General Schuyler took out of a canteen, with a falſe bottom, a letter from a perſon in the intereſt of the Americans to Gen. Sullivan, and prepared an anſwer to it, drawn up in ſuch a ſtrain as to perplex and diſtract Gen. Burgoyne, and leave him in doubt what courſe to follow. This letter, which fell, as was intended, into the Britiſh General's hands, had the deſired effect; for he was completely duped and puzzled by it for ſeveral days, and at a loſs whether to advance or retreat.

General Burgoyne, after remaining ſome days at Skeneſborough, left that place with an intention of taking the road that leads to Hudſon's river, and thence to Albany, in order to open a communication with Lake George, on which he had embarked the heavy artillery and baggage. In this undertaking the difficulties which the royal army had to encounter were infinite;* but all obſtacles were ſurmounted ſo that after making every exertion poſſible, it reached Fort Edward, on Hudſon's river, the 30th of July.

Gen. Schuyler, who at this time commanded the Northern American army, had poſted himſelf, immediately after the affair of Hubberton, as already obſerved, at Fort Edward. On the advance of the Britiſh army he retreated down Hudſon's river to Saratoga, where he iſſued a proclamation calculated to counteract the effect intended to be produced by the manifeſto publiſhed by Gen Burgoyne.

While the Britiſh were retarded in their advance by the combined difficulties of nature and of art, events took place, which proved the wiſdom and propriety of the retreat from Ticonderoga. The army ſaved by that means, was between the inhabitants and Gen. Burgoyne; this abated the panic of the people, and became a center of rendezvous for them to

* This general has, with much reaſon, been blamed for adopting this difficult and tardy mode of conduct; by returning to Ticonderoga, and embarking again on Lake George, he might have eaſily proceeded to Fort George, where there was a waggon road to the place of his deſtination, Fort Edward.

repair to: On the other hand, had they ſtood their ground at Ticonderoga, they muſt in the ordinary courſe of events, in a ſhort time, either have been cut in pieces, or ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war.

While danger was remote, the preſſing calls of Congreſs for the inhabitants to be in readineſs to oppoſe a diſtant foe were unavailing; but no ſooner had they recovered from the firſt impreſſion of the general panic, than they turned out with an unexampled alacrity.

Where the Mohawk falls into the Hudſon's river about 8 miles from Albany, is an Iſland in the ſhape of a half moon, called Stillwater. On this place General Schuyler, poſted his army, in order to check the progreſs of Col. St. Leger, who, as already obſerved, had been detached by the way of Lake Ontario and the Mohawk river, to make a diverſion in favour of the main army of the Britiſh. Gen. Burgoyne ſtill remained in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward, where on account of the difficulty of bringing the ſtores from Fort Edward to Hudſon's river, his army began to experience great hardſhips. At this juncture he received intelligence that Col. St. Leger had advanced up the St. Lawrence, and had commenced his operations againſt Stanwix, a Fort ſituate on a riſing ground at the upper end of the Mohawk river. Gen. Burgoyne ſaw the neceſſity of co-operating with Col. St. Leger, and of making a rapid movement forward. The only difficulty was the want of proviſions; and this it was propoſed to remedy by reducing the American magazine at Bennington, a place about 20 miles from Hudſon's river. On this expedition the German Col. Baum, was diſpatched with about ſix hundred men, moſtly Germans, including a detachment of Riedeſel's dragoons. On the firſt day Baum, ſurpriſed a body of the Americans who had aſſembled for the purpoſe of oppoſing the progreſs of his detachment. On the ſecond day's march he captured ſome cattle, and routed a ſmall party of the Americans near a village called Cambridge. Here Baum was informed that the Americans were aſſembled from New-Hampſhire, and the borders of Connecticut, for the defence of Bennington. He halted at Walloon Creek, and tranſmitted this intelligence to Gen. Burgoyne, who ſent a detachment of five hundred Germans under the command of Col. Breyman to his aſſiſtance.

The American General Starke, with a body of one thouſand men from New-Hampſhire and Maſſachuſetts, was at this period on his route to join Gen. Schuyler. Having received intelligence, however, of the approach of Colonel Baum, he altered his courſe and haſtened towards Bennington, where joining the continental troops under Colonel Warner, he ſet out on the ſixteenth of Auguſt, and by ten o' clock in the morning, ſurrounded Col. Baum, at St. Cojek's mill, on Walloon creek. The Americans commenced a furious attack on all ſides, and forced their adverſaries to retreat into the woods, leaving their commander mortally wounded on the field of battle. The ſavages who had accompanied Baum, retreated at the commencement of the engagement. Fluſhed with this victory, the Americans advanced againſt the detachment under Colonel Breyman, who ignorant of Baum's defeat, was advancing to his relief; but the obſtacles which the roads preſented, had retarded their progreſs. Breyman came up juſt in time to join the fugatives of Baum's detachment. The Americans began a vigorous attack on him and forced him to retreat. The loſs of the Britiſh in theſe two actions, amounted to about 700 killed, wounded and taken priſoners. They alſo loſt four braſs field pieces, and four ammunition waggons. The loſs of the Americans, incluſive of their wounded, was about 100 men.

Immediately after the defeat of Col. Baum, the royal army, which had advanced to Saratoga, drew back. In the mean time Col. St. Leger had commenced his attack upon Fort Stanwix, a ſmall ſquare log fort, with four baſtions and a ſtockaded covered way, without any other out-works. It was defended by Colonels Ganſevert and Willet, and 700 men. Col. St. Leger had received intelligence that one thouſand Americans, under the command of General Harkimer, were advancing to the relief of the fort. He therefore diſpatched a party of regulars, and a number of ſavages into the woods, to lay in ambuſh. The Americans advanced incautiouſly. An unexpected fire was poured upon them from behind trees and buſhes, and the ſavages ruſhing from their concealment, made a dreadful ſlaughter. The Americans, though ſurprized, did not retreat precipitately, but recovered a riſing ground, which enabled them, by a kind of running fight, to preſerve part of their detachment. The beſieged being informed of Harkimer's approach, made a ſally

under Col. Willet, which was attended with ſome ſucceſs. Having received, however, intelligence of the defeat of Harkimer, he and another officer undertook a very perilous expedition. They penetrated, during night, through the camp of the beſiegers, and traverſed a ſpace of fifty miles, through deſerts, woods and moraſſes, in order to bring relief to the fort. The beſieged treated every propoſal for a ſurrender with contempt. Col. St. Leger received information that General Arnold, with 2000 men, and ten pieces of cannon, was advancing rapidly to raiſe the ſiege. This produced an immediate effect on the ſavages. A large party of them departed, which made an immediate retreat neceſſary. The tents were left ſtanding, and the artillery and ſtores fell into the poſſeſſion of the garriſon. General Arnold had advanced up the Mohawk river; but, in order to arrive more ſpeedily at the place of his deſtination, he had left the main body, and moved rapidly forward with a body of about 900 men. He arrived at the fort two days after the ſiege had been raiſed. His aſſiſtance being now unneceſſary, he returned with his army to reinforce General Gates, who had a ſhort time before taken the command of the American army in the north.

The arrival of General Gates at the army had given freſh vigour to the exertions of the inhabitants. The militia, fluſhed with their recent victory at Bennington, collected in great numbers to his ſtandard. A ſpirit of adventure burſt forth in many different points of direction. While General Burgoyne was urging his preparations for advancing towards Albany, an enterprize was undertaken (Sept. 13) by Gen. Lincoln, to recover Ticonderoga and the other poſts in the rear of the Britiſh army. He detached Col. Brown, with 500 men, to the landing at Lake George. The Colonel conducted his operations with ſo much addreſs, that he ſurprized all the out-poſts between the landing at the north end of Lake George, and the body of the Fort of Ticonderoga. He alſo took Mount Defiance and Mount Hope, the French lines, and a block-houſe, 200 batteaux, ſeveral gun-boats, and an armed ſloop, together with 290 priſoners. However, Col. Brown and Col. Johnſon, the latter of whom had been detached with 500 men to attempt Mount Independence, found that the reduction of either that poſt or of Ticonderoga, was beyond their ability.

Light Infantry
Brit.e Grenad.rs
Miller
Church
SARATOGA
Albany

ACTION AT STILLWATER.

GENERAL Burgoyne having at laſt collected about thirty days proviſions, and a bridge of boats being conſtructed in lieu of the bridge of rafts which had been carried away by inceſſant rains, his whole army croſſed Hudſon's river on the 13th and 14th of September, and encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga, with a vaſt train of artillery. On the nineteenth of September, they advanced in front of the Americans at Stillwater. Their right wing was commanded by General Burgoyne, and covered by Gen. Fraſer and Col. Breyman, with the grenadiers and light infantry, who were poſted along ſome high grounds on the right. Their front and flanks were covered by Indians, Provincials, and Canadians. Their left wing and artillery were commanded by Generals Philips and Reideſel, who proceeded along the great road. The nature of the country preventing the Americans from beholding the different movements of the Britiſh army, they detached a body of five thouſand men to attempt turning the right wing, and attacking Gen. Burgoyne in the rear. Being checked in their deſign by General Fraſer, they made a rapid movement, which the peculiar ſituation of the country prevented from being diſcovered, and advanced to attack the Britiſh line on the right. The engagement began at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th of September, and continued till after ſun-ſet. The conflict was only partial for an hour and a half, but then it became general. A conſtant blaze of fire was kept up, and both armies ſeemed to be determined on death or victory.

The Americans were led to the battle by General Arnold, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf in an extraordinary manner.

As day light cloſed, the Americans retired, leaving the Britiſh maſters of the field of battle. The Britiſh loſt upwards of 500 men, including their killed, wounded and priſoners. The Americans, incluſive of the miſſing, loſt 319.

No ſolid advantages, however, reſulted to the Britiſh troops from this encounter. The conduct of the Americans had fully convinced every one that they were able to ſuſtain an attack in open plains with the intrepidity, the ſpirit and the coolneſs of veterans. For four hours they maintained a conteſt hand in hand, and when they retired, it was not be-

PLAN OF THE POSITION which the ARMY under Lt. GENL. BURGOINE took at SARATOGA
on the 10th of September 1777 and in which it remained till the CONVENTION was signed.
Corps of Riflemen under Colo. Morgan
Road to Fort Miller
Where the Army crossed in their Route from Lord Edwards to Stillwater
Road from Albany
SARATOGA
Church
Ruins of Fort Hardy
The Fishkill
HUDSONS RIVER
Artillery of the Park
Breymans Redoubt
Hessian Redoubt
Hessian Grenadiers
Hessian Battalions
Brunswick Grenadiers
Brunswick Battalions
British Grenadiers
British Battalions
Light Infantry
Reidesel
Specht
Riedesel
Hamm
Fraser
Gen. Phillips
Gen. Burgoine
Gen. Reidesel
Gen. Frazer
Gen. Specht
Gen. Hamm
Gen. Breyman
Gen. Gates
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Lincoln
Gen. Poor
Gen. Learned
Gen. Nixon
Gen. Glover
Gen. Patterson
Gen. Fellows
Gen. Larned
Gen. Wilkinson
Gen. Ten Broeck
Gen. Van Rensselaer
Gen. Dearborn
Gen. Scott
Gen. Morgan
Gen. Cilley
Gen. Livingston
Gen. Brown
Gen. Warner
Gen. Whitcomb
Gen. Colburn
Gen. Hale
Gen. Stark
Gen. Enos
Gen. Ten Broeck
Gen. Van Rensselaer
Gen. Dearborn
Gen. Scott
Gen. Morgan
Gen. Cilley
Gen. Livingston
Gen. Brown
Gen. Warner
Gen. Whitcomb
Gen. Colburn
Gen. Hale
Gen. Stark
Gen. Enos
American Army
Royal Army
Scale of Yards
50 100 200 400 600
3000 Americans under Gen. Fellows
Published by C. Smith New York.

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cauſe they were conquered, but becauſe the approach of night made a retreat to their camp, abſolutely neceſſary.

This action though it decided nothing, was followed by important conſequences. Of theſe one was the diminution of the zeal of the Indians in the Britiſh army. Fidelity and honour are but feeble motives in the minds of Savages. They had been diſappointed in their hopes of plunder, and the check which the Engliſh had received at Bennington and Fort Stanwix, had chilled that ardour which they had at firſt manifeſted. They deſerted Gen. Burgoyne in the ſeaſon when their aid would have been moſt uſeful. Very little more perſeverance was exhibited by the Canadians and other Britiſh provincials. They alſo abandoned the Britiſh ſtandard, when they found, that inſtead of a flying and diſpirited enemy, they had a numerous and reſolute force oppoſed to them.

Both armies lay in ſight of each other for ſome time, each fortifying their camp, in the ſtrongeſt manner poſſible. This delay was extremely beneficial to the Americans, in as much as it enabled them to increaſe the number of men, and to obtain a powerful reinforcement of ſtores and proviſions, from the Southern States.

From the commencement of the expedition, Gen. Burgoyne had promiſed himſelf a ſtrong reinforcement from that part of the Britiſh army, which was ſtationed at New-York. He depended on its being able to force its way to Albany, and to join him there, or in the vicinity. With this expectation he had croſſed Hudſon's river and given up all communication with the lakes.

Such a diverſion was indeed made about this time. Sir Henery Clinton conducted an expedition upon the Hudſon's river. This conſiſted of about 3000 men, and was accompanied by a ſuitable naval force. They reduced the Forts, Clinton and Montgomery, in the lower parts of Hudſon's river. The Americans deſtroyed Fort Conſtitution, and ſet fire to two new frigates, and ſome other veſſels. Inſtead of puſhing forward to Burgoyne's encampment or even to Albany, the Britiſh ſpent ſeveral days in laying waſte the adjacent country. Gen. Tryon, deſtroyed a ſettlement called Continental Village, which contained barracks for 1500 men. Sir James Wallace, with a flying ſquadron of light frigates, and Gen. Vaughan, with a detachment

of land forces, continued on and near the river for ſeveral days, deſolating the country near its margin; Gen. Vaughan ſo completely burned Eſopus, a fine flouriſhing village, that a ſingle houſe was not left ſtanding, though on his approach the Americans had left the town, without making any reſiſtance. While the Britiſh by theſe wanton devaſtations, were doing miſchief to individuals without ſerving the cauſe of their royal maſter, they loſt the precious time to bring Gen. Gates's army, by puſhing forward, between two fires.

General Burgoyne's difficulties began to increaſe daily. The Americans had augmented their ſtrength in ſuch a manner as to render him diffident of the poſſibility of making good his retreat. His army was reduced to little more than 5000 men, who were limited to half the uſual allowance of proviſions. The ſtock of forage was entirely exhauſted, and the horſes were periſhing in great numbers for the want of it. In addition to theſe circumſtances, General Burgoyne had yet received no intelligence of the approach of General Clinton, or of the diverſion which was to be made. Environed thus by difficulty and danger, he reſolved to try the diſpoſition of the Americans, to examine the poſſibility of advancing, and of diſlodging them from their poſts on the left, which would enable him to adopt the melancholy reſource of retreating to the lakes. Purſuant to this determination, he detached a body of fifteen hundred men, which he headed himſelf, being attended by Generals Philips, Riedeſel, and Fraſer. The Britiſh camp was defended on the high grounds by Generals Hamilton and Specht; and the redoubts and parts adjacent to the river by brigadier Gell. This detachment had ſcarce formed, within leſs than half a mile of the American entrenchments, when the Americans made a furious attack on their left, where the grenadiers were poſted. The Americans alſo made a movement round the right of the Britiſh, to prevent their retreat; but the Britiſh light infantry and the 24th regiment inſtantly formed, in order to fruſtrate the intentions of the Americans.

The Britiſh left wing in the mean time, was obliged to retreat, and would inevitably have been cut to pieces, but for the intervention of their light infantry, and the twenty-fourth regiment. The whole detachment was now under the neceſſity of retiring; with the loſs of ſix pieces of artillery. Scarce had the Britiſh troops entered their

lines when they were again impetuouſly attacked by the Americans, who, notwithſtanding a moſt heavy fire, began a furious aſſault upon their intrenchments. They were led by Gen. Arnold, who attacked Lord Balcarra's light infantry with great eagerneſs. The reſiſtance was firm, and the engagement for a long while doubtful. A wound which Arnold received, at length gave the victory to the Engliſh, and the Americans were repulſed from this quarter. In another however, they were more ſucceſsful. The intrenchments defended by the German troops under Colonel Breyman were carried ſword in hand. The Colonel was killed, and his troops retreated, with the loſs of all their baggage, artillery, &c. Night cloſed the dreadful ſcene. The Britiſh officers ſuffered this day more than their common proportion. Among their ſlain, were Gen. Fraſer, Colonel Breyman; and ſeveral other officers of note, beſide a conſiderable number of wounded. The Americans took upwards of two hundred officers and privates priſoners, beſides nine pieces of braſs artillery; and the encampment of the German brigade with all their equipage. But what was of the greateſt conſequence, they obtained from the ſpoils of the field, a large ſupply of ammunition, under a ſcarcity of which they had long laboured.

General Burgoyne was now moſt critically ſituated; he could not continue in his preſent poſition without a certainty of deſtruction; he therefore reſolved to make a total and immediate change of poſition. With great ſecrecy and ſilence the whole army removed, with all their baggage and artillery to the heights above the hoſpital during the night. This movement reduced the Americans to the neceſſity of making a new diſpoſition. On the ſucceeding day, the eighth of October, the Britiſh made ſeveral attempts to induce the Americans to hazard a battle. They were however ineffectual, and the whole day was occupied in continued ſkirmiſhes.

The Americans had refuſed to hazard a battle becauſe they were preparing to carry meaſures into execution which would have immediately completed the ruin of the Britiſh army. Theſe were to turn General Burgoyne's right, which if effected would have encloſed him on all ſides. The Britiſh General, however diſcovered theſe intentions before they were carried into execution. An inſtant retreat there-

fore to Saratoga was now the only alternative left, which was effected without any obstruction on the part off the Americans, but it was impossible to carry off the sick and wounded from the hospital. General Gates, however, behaved with his wonted humanity, and the unfortunate tenants of the hospital were treated with all imaginable tenderness. When the British arrived at the fords of Fishkill Creek, which is somewhat towards the northward of Saratoga, they found the watchful Americans already occupying them, but on the approach of the retreating army, they retired over the river Hudson,to a larger force, which had been detached thither to obstruct the passage of the royal troops.

An attempt was now made to retreat to Fort George. Gen. Burgoyne detached a body of artificers under a strong escort before the army, in order to repair the bridges, and open the road to Fort Edward. The appearance of the Americans, however prevented the artificers from effecting their purpose, and they were under the necessity of making a precipitate retreat, on account of the desertion of their escort. The Americans stretching along the farther shore of the river Hudson, annoyed the batteaux of the royal army in such a manner, that they were forced to land the provisions and convoy them to the camp up a steep hill; the Americans pouring, during the whole time, a most tremendous fire on the men employed in this service. Surrounded in this manner by destruction, Gen. Burgoyne resolved to attempt a retreat by night to Fort Edward, each soldier carrying his provisions on his back. Their artillery was to be left behind. But even this sad alternative was rendered impracticable. While the British army were preparing to march, they received information that their enemies had already possessed themselves of the road to Fort Edward, and that they were well provided with artillery.

The situation of the royal army had now attained the climax of difficulty and danger. Abandoned in the most critical moment, by their Indian allies, unsupported by their brethren in New-York, enervated by incessant toil, and greatly reduced in their numbers by repeated battles, they were invested by a numerous army, without a possibility of retreat, or of procuring provisions. A continual cannonade

pervaded their camp, and rifle and grape ſhot fell in many parts of their lines.

Every hope of relief being now at an end, on the 13th of October, 1777, General Burgoyne ordered an exact ſtatement to be made of the ſtock of proviſions, which was found not to exceed ſeven or eight days ſubſiſtence for the troops. The Britiſh General inſtantly called a council of war, at which not only field officers, but every Captain, was ordered to aſſiſt. Their unanimous opinion was, that their preſent ſituation juſtified a capitulation on honourable terms.

After various meſſages between General Burgoyne and General Gates, the ſubſequent articles of Convention were ſettled.

1. The troops under Lieut. General Burgoyne to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments to the verge of the river where the old fort ſtood, where the arms and artillery are to be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

2. A free paſſage to to be granted to the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne to Great-Britain, upon condition of not ſerving again in North-America during the preſent conteſt; and the port of Boſton to be aſſigned for the entry of tranſports, to receive the troops, whenever General Howe ſhall ſo order.

3. Should any cartel take place, by which the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void, as far as ſuch exchange ſhall be made.

4. The army under Lieut. General Burgoyne is to march to Maſſachuſetts Bay, by the eaſieſt and moſt expeditious and convenient route; and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as poſſible to Boſton, that the march of the troops may not be delayed when tranſports arrive to receive them.

5. The troops to be ſupplied on the march, and during their being in quarters, with proviſions, by Major General Gates's orders, at the ſame rate of rations as the troops of his own army; and, if poſſible, the officers, horſes, and cattle are to be ſupplied with forage at the uſual rates.

6. All officers to retain their carriages, bat-horſes, and other cattle, and no baggage to be moleſted or ſearched; Lt. General Burgoyne giving his honor, that there are no pub-

lic ſtores contained therein. Major General Gates will of courſe take the neceſſary meaſures for the due performance of this article: ſhould any carriages be wanted during the march, for the tranſportation of officers baggage, they are, if poſſible, to be ſupplied by the country at the uſual rates.

7. Upon the march, and during the time the army ſhall remain in quarters, in the Maſſachuſett's-Bay, the officers are not, as far as circumſtances will admit, to be ſeparated from their men. The officers are to be quartered according to their rank, and are not to be hindered from aſſembling their men for roll-callings, and other neceſſary purpoſes of regularity.

8. All corps whatever of Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne's army, whether compoſed of ſailors, batteaux-men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army, of whatever country, ſhall be included in the fulleſt ſenſe and utmoſt extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every reſpect as Britiſh ſubjects.

9. All Canadians, and perſons belonging to the Canadian eſtabliſhment, conſiſting of ſailors, batteaux-men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular deſcription, are to be permitted to return there: they are to be conducted immediately, by the ſhorteſt route to the firſt Britiſh poſt on Lake George, are to be ſupplied with proviſions in the ſame manner as the other troops, and to be bound by the ſame condition of not ſerving during the preſent conteſt in North-America.

10. Paſſports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of Captains, who ſhall be appointed by Lieut. General Burgoyne, to carry diſpatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great-Britain by the way of New-York; and Major General Gates engages the public faith, that theſe diſpatches ſhall not be opened. Theſe officers are to ſet out immediately after receiving their diſpatches, and are to travel by the ſhorteſt route, and in the moſt expeditious manner.

11. During the ſtay of the troops in the Maſſachuſetts-Bay, the officers are to be admitted on parole, and are to be permitted to wear their ſide arms.

12. Should the army under Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne find it neceſſary to ſend for their clothing and other baggage from

Canada, they are to be permitted to do it in the moſt convenient manner, and neceſſary paſſports to be granted for that purpoſe.

13. Theſe articles are to be mutually ſigned and exchanged to-morrow morning at nine o'clock; and the troops under Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne are to march out of their entrenchments at three o'clock in the afternoon.

HORATIO GATES, Major-General.

To prevent any doubts that might ariſe from Lt. Gen. Burgoyne's name not being mentioned in the above treaty, Major General Gates hereby declares, that he is underſtood to be comprehended in it, as fully as if his name had been ſpecifically mentioned.

HORATIO GATES.

Camp at Saratoga,
October 16, 1777.

The number of men who ſurrendered, amounted, including Canadians and Britiſh Provincials, to near ſix thouſand. The ſick and wounded in the hoſpitals amounted to ſix hundred; and it was computed that their loſs in killed, taken, and deſerted, ſubſequent to the capture of Ticonderoga, was near three thouſand men. The ſtores which the Americans acquired were conſiderable. The captured artillery conſiſted of 35 braſs field-pieces. There were alſo 4647 muſkets, and a variety of other uſeful and much wanted articles, which fell into their hands. The Continentals in Gen. Gates's army were 9093, the militia 4100; the number of militia, however, was conſtantly fluctuating.

Such was the melancholy event of a campaign from which the Britiſh expected the moſt important benefits. The capture of General Burgoyne was the hinge on which the revolution turned. While it encouraged the perſeverance of the Americans by well grounded hopes of final ſucceſs, it encreaſed the embarraſſments of that Miniſtry which had ſo ineffectually laboured to compel their ſubmiſſion.

In a ſhort time after the Convention was ſigned, General Gates moved forward to ſtop the devaſtations of the Britiſh on the North river. But on hearing of the fate of Burgoyne, Vaughan and Wallace retired to New-York.

Immediately after the ſurrender of the troops, commanded by General Burgoyne, they were marched to the vicinity of

Boſton. From the general unwillingneſs of the people to oblige them, it was impoſſible to provide immediately for ſo large a number of officers and ſoldiers, in ſuch a manner as from the articles of the Convention they might reaſonably expect. The officers remonſtrated to General Burgoyne, that ſix or ſeven were crowded together in one room, without any regard to their reſpective ranks, in violation of the 7th article of the convention. Gen. Burgoyne forwarded this account to General Gates, and added, "the public faith is broken." This letter corroborated an apprehenſion, previouſly entertained, that the captured troops, on their embarkation, would make a junction with the Britiſh garriſons in America. The declaration of the General, that "the public faith was broken" while in the power of Congreſs, was conſidered by them as deſtroying the ſecurity which they before had in his perſonal honour: for in every event he might adduce his previous notice to juſtify his future conduct. They therefore reſolved, "That the embarkation of General Burgoyne and the troops under his command, be poſtponed till a diſtinct and explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga be properly notified by the Court of Great-Britain to Congreſs.

EUROPEAN PROCEEDINGS CONNECTED WITH THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

THE conſequences which the capture of Burgoyne's army produced in Europe were of great moment. In Great Britain the moſt ſanguine expectations had been raiſed from the Canada expedition, the rapid ſucceſs of which, in its firſt ſtages ſeeming to promiſe the moſt fortunate iſſue. A junction of the northern army with that of New-York was confidently expected; it was hoped that by this junction a deciſive blow would be given to the rebellion, by cutting off the northern from the middle and ſouthern ſtates. The Britiſh nation, elevated with ſuch hopes, and encouraged to cheriſh them by the firſt intelligence from Canada which brought an account of the almoſt inſtantaneous reduction of Ticonderoga, and the deſtruction or capture of the American naval force in the Lake Champlain, ſuffered proportionate diſappointment upon hearing of the ultimate failure of the ex-

pedition, and the total loſs of the army. But if the diſappointment of the Britiſh nation was great, that of the miniſtry was ſtill greater; and in a fit of deſpondency it would ſeem, they determined, for the ſake of peace, and of getting rid of a troubleſome and expenſive war, to give up every thing for which they had orginally contended. To the ſurprize of all and to the no ſmall mortification of thoſe who had hitherto zealouſly ſupported the meaſures of adminiſtration, the miniſter in the month of February 1778, introduced two bills into the Houſe of Commons, which were paſſed through both houſes of parliament with great diſpatch, and received the royal aſſent on the 11th of March. By the firſt of theſe the duty payable on tea imported into America, which was the original cauſe of diſpute, was repealed and a legiſlative declaration was made, that the King and parliament of Great Britain would not in future impoſe any tax or duty whatſoever payable in the colonies, except only ſuch as ſhould be neceſſary for the regulation of trade, and in ſuch caſe that the nett produce of the duty ſo impoſed ſhould be applied to the particular uſe of that colony in which it ſhould be collected in the ſame manner as other duties collected under the authority of the aſſemblies. By the other of theſe acts, authority was given to the King to appoint commiſſioners with full powers to treat, conſult and agree, with any aſſemblies of men whatſoever in America and even with individuals, concerning any grievances exiſting in the goverment of any of the colonies; or in the laws of Great Britain extending to them, concerning any contribution to be furniſhed by the colonies, and concerning any other regulations which might be for the common good of both countries; with a proviſo, however, that ſuch agreement ſhould not be binding until ratified by parliament. But in the following inſtances the commiſſioners were to be inveſted with abſolute power, exerciſeable however, according to their diſcretion, for proclaming a ceſſation of hoſtilities by ſea and land, for opening an intercourſe with the mother country, for ſuſpending the operations of all acts of parliament relating to the North American colonies, paſſed, ſince the tenth of February 1763, and for granting pardons to all deſcriptions of perſons.

This moment of deſpondency, humiliation, and debaſement was ſeized by the court of Verſailles, to give a fatal blow to

the over grown power of her rival. Ever ſince the commencement of the revolution the Americans had been encouraged in their oppoſition to Great Britain, by ſecret aſſurances of aſſiſtance from the court of France, and by ſupplies of money, arms, and ammunition, clandeſtinely conveyed to them. The French were in the mean time making preparations; and their original deſign was, probably, to abſtain from an open declaration, until Great Britain and the American States had mutually weakened each other in their civil contention. But the diſaſter which happened to Gen. Burgoyne's army, and the conſequent conciliatory meaſures about to be adopted by the Britiſh cabinet, at laſt obliged them to throw of the maſque. They knew that the Americans, notwithſtanding their ſucceſs at Saratoga, ſtill labour-ed under very great difficulties; and that for want of internal reſources, whilſt their foreign trade was almoſt annihilated by the Britiſh cruiſers, it was impoſſible for them, without aſſiſtance to keep a reſpectable army in the field, for any length of time; and they dreaded, leſt under ſuch unpromiſing circumſtances, they ſhould be induced to accept the terms which they knew were to be offered to them. To prevent this, and to defeat the effect of the conciliatory meaſures about to be adopted by the Britiſh cabinet, two treaties were now entered into between the French King and the Thirteen United States; one of commerce, and another of defenſive alliance; which were finally ſigned at Paris, the 6th of February 1778, by the Chevalier Gerard, in behalf of the French King, and by Dr. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, in behalf of the American States. The firſt of theſe, as its title imports, was intended to regulate the commerce to be carried on between the countries of the contracting parties; and the principal object of the other was to ſecure the ſovereignty and independence of the colonies; it being ſtipulated, that if a war in conſequence of this treaty ſhould break out between Great Britain and France the two contracting parties ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other, according to their power and ability, and that peace ſhould not be made without the conſent of both, nor until the ſovereignty and independence of the colonies, both in matters of government and commerce, ſhould be expreſsly or tacitly acknowledged by the King of Great Britain.

Intelligence of the engagements between France and America was quickly tranſmitted by the Britiſh Ambaſſador at Paris, Lord Stormont, to the Britiſh miniſtry; and this was the cauſe why the conciliatory bills were paſſed with ſo much diſpatch through the two houſes of parliament. It was hoped that they might reach America, before the Congreſs had received intelligence of what had been done in France, and, that they might be appriſed of what was intended, even before it was compleated, rough drafts of the bills, as ſoon as they were introduced into parliament, were immediately diſpatched to the Britiſh commander in chief in America, to be forwarded to Congreſs. On their arrival in America, they were ſent to Congreſs then at York-Town. When they were received, on the 21ſt of April, Congreſs was uninformed of the treaty which their deputies had lately concluded at Paris. A committee was appointed to examine theſe bills and report on them. Their report was brought in the day following and adopted. The Britiſh plan for conciliation being wholly founded on the idea of the ſtates returning to their allegiance, it was utterly rejected. The Britiſh commiſſioners for peace, who ſometime after arrived in America, were not more ſucceſsful. They received an anſwer of Congreſs, which ſhewed that all negociation, except upon the ground of acknowledging their independence, would be unavailing, and that nothing but conqueſt could reunite the colonies to the Britiſh Empire.

On the 2d of May, Silas Deane arrived at York Town, with copies of the treaties already mentioned, entered into by the French King and the American Plenipotentiaries which were received with heartfelt joy.

Somewhat more than a month previous to the ſailing of the Britiſh commiſſioners, the French ambaſſador, by order of his court formally notified to that of London, the nature of the engagements entered into between his ſovereign and the United States of America, and ſome days after quitted London, and returned to France, about the ſame time that the Britiſh Ambaſſador quitted Paris. This notification was conſidered as amounting to a declaration of war, and although war was not actually declared both kingdoms rigorouſly prepared for open hoſtilities.

We now return to the two armies which we left towards the cloſe of the preſent campaign in Pennſylvania.

General Washington, soon after the surrender of the British northern army, received a considerable reinforcement from the army under the command of General Gates. With this increased force he took a position near White Marsh, which in a military point of view was admirable. On the 4th of December, General Howe, who had new enterprizes in view, marched out of Philadelphia with almost his whole force, expecting to bring on a general engagement. He marched to the right of the Americans, and made every appearance of an intention to attack the American camp. Several days passed away, during which some skirmishes took place. A general action was hourly expected, but after various marches and counter-marches, the British filed off from their right, in full march for Philadelphia. Soon after these events, Gen. Smallwood, with a corps, was posted at Wilmington, on the banks of the Delaware, and General Washington, with the main army, retired to winter quarters at Valley Forge, sixteen miles distant from Philadelphia. This position was preferred to distant and more comfortable villages, as being calculated to give the most extensive security to the country adjacent to Philadelphia. Some hundreds of the Americans were without shoes, stockings, or blankets. Whilst the British enjoyed all the conveniences which an opulent city afforded, the former had to sit down in a wood, in the latter end of December, and to build huts for their accommodation. The cheerfulness with which the General and his army submitted to spend a severe winter in such circumstances rather than leave the country exposed by retiring farther, demonstrated as well their patriotism as their fixed resolution to suffer every inconvenience in preference to submission.

FOURTH CAMPAIGN, 1778.

THE winter and spring passed away without any more remarkable events in either army, than a few successful excursions of parties from Philadelphia to the neighbouring country, for the purpose of bringing in supplies, plundering or destroying property.

The first active measure of this campaign, on the side of the British, was the evacuation of Philadelphia, and the retreat

of their army to New-York. Through the interference of a hoſtile maritime power, the command of the ſea was about to be diſputed by the contending parties. Hence greater circumſpection became neceſſary in the choice of ports for the Britiſh army. It was uncertain where the French might attempt to ſtrike a blow; whether upon the continent of America, or in the Weſt-Indies. It was therefore neceſſary that the Britiſh army ſhould occupy a ſtation from which reinforcements might be ſent with eaſe and expedition wherever they ſhould be required. Philadelphia being an hundred miles diſtant from the ſea, and communicating with it only by a winding river, was not adapted to ſuch a purpoſe. Orders were therefore ſent from England for the evacuation of Philadelphia, which was effected at three in the morning, on the 18th of June, the Britiſh army retiring to the point of land below the town formed by the confluence of the Delaware and the Schuylkill, where the boats and veſſels belonging to the Britiſh navy were ready to receive them. They paſſed the Delaware unmoleſted, and were encamped on the Jerſey ſhore, by ten in the forenoon.

General Waſhington having penetrated into the deſign of the Britiſh commander to evacuate Philadelphia, had previouſly detached General Maxwell with a brigade into New-Jerſey, with orders to aſſemble the militia, break down the bridges, and by every means in his power impede and harraſs the Britiſh troops in their retreat, until he, with the main army, ſhould croſs the Delaware, and fall upon their rear.

The route of the Britiſh army was along the eaſtern bank of the Delaware, as high as Trenton. General Waſhington therefore was obliged to make a conſiderable circuit to croſs it higher up. A little to the left of the moſt northerly road leading from Trenton to New-York, the country of New-Jerſey becomes high and mountainous. This country Gen. Waſhington entered when he paſſed the Delaware at Correll's Ferry. The ſlow movement of the Britiſh army indicated a deſign in Sir Henry Clinton, who now commanded the Britiſh army, to draw General Waſhington from his advantageous ſituation, and either force an engagement in the level country, or, by a rapid movement, gain the high grounds which the Americans had quitted. This, Gen. Waſhington guarded againſt, by keeping for ſome time a cautious diſtance, ſending forward detachments of light troops to watch

the motions of the enemy, and hang on its flanks and rear. The courſe of the Britiſh army now pointed from the Delaware, and the farther it advanced in this new direction, the more General Waſhington ſtrengthened his detachments.

BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.

WHEN Sir Henry Clinton had advanced to Allen-town, he determined, inſtead of keeping the direct courſe towards Staten-Iſland, to take the road which led to Sandy Hook, as that which preſented the feweſt impediments to obſtruct his progreſs. Along this road, therefore, the Britiſh army was ordered to march; and having proceeded ſome miles, they encamped on the 27th of June, on ſome high grounds in the neighbourhood of Freehold court-houſe, in the county of Monmouth. General Waſhington had ſo powerfully reinforced his advanced detachments, that the Marquis de la Fayette firſt, and afterwards General Lee, were in ſucceſſion ſent to take the command of them. They had taken poſt at Engliſh Town, a few miles in the rear of the Britiſh army. General Waſhington, with the main body of the American army, encamped about three miles in the rear of his advanced corps.

Such was the diſpoſition of the two armies, on the evening of the twenty-ſeventh of June. The American General reſolved to make an attack the following morning, before the Britiſh troops ſhould reach an advantageous poſition, about twelve miles in their front. Orders were accordingly ſent to Gen. Lee, to begin the attack with the advanced corps as ſoon as the Britiſh army ſhould be in motion, with an intimation that Gen. Waſhington with the main body of his army would advance and ſupport him. Sir Henry Clinton ſenſible of the approach of the Americans made a new diſpoſition in order more effectually to protect his baggage. The Britiſh army marched in two diviſions; the van commanded by Gen. Knyphauſen, and the rear by Lord Cornwallis; but the whole of the baggage was now put under the care of Gen. Knyphauſen's diviſion, that their rear diviſion, under Lord Cornwallis, being diſencumbered, might be ready to act with vigor, as circumſtances ſhould require.

This arrangement being made, Gen. Knyphauſen's diviſion, conſiſting of the German troops, the yagers excepted, the ſecond battalion of light infantry, with the baggage, marched at break of day on the 28th of June, whilſt the other diviſion, headed by Sir Henry Clinton, did not move till near eight, that it might not preſs too cloſe upon their baggage, which was ſo enormous as to occupy a line of march of near twelve miles in extent. The rear guard of the Britiſh army had ſcarcely deſcended from the heights of Freehold into a plain of three miles in length and one in breadth, when the advanced corps of the American army appeared, deſcending into the plain from the ſame heights which the Britiſh army had juſt before quitted. Sir Henry Clinton, about the ſame time, was informed that large columns of the Americans were ſeen marching on his flanks, which confirmed him in his firſt opinion, that the deſign of the enemy was upon his baggage; and as that was now engaged in defiles which would continue for a conſiderable diſtance, no other mode of affording relief to Gen. Knyphauſen's diviſion appeared to him ſo eligible, as that of making a vigorous attack upon the corps which appeared in his rear, which, if ſucceſsful, would compel the American commander to recall the detachments ſent forward on his flanks.

The Britiſh made a diſpoſition for commencing the attack in the plain; but before it could be carried into execution the Americans retired and took poſt on the high ground, from which they had before deſcended.* The Britiſh troops, aſcended the heights and attacked the Americans with ſo much ſpirit, that they were obliged to give way. In this critical moment Gen. Waſhington came up with the main body of his army, and took poſſeſſion of ſome ſtrong ground

* The conduct of General Lee, on this day, which was ſo ſeverely arraigned by the Americans, was worthy of applauſe. He had been betrayed acroſs ſome narrow paſſes of a marſh, by the perſuaſion, that he had to deal with a rear-guard of only two or three battalions. When he ſuddenly perceived ſix thouſand men, forming to receive him he retired with ſuch quickneſs and deciſion, though not attacked, that he repaſſed the marſh before the Britiſh line was in readineſs to move. Had he, in expectation of ſupport, maintained his ground on the plain, until the enemy had attacked him, he muſt have been overpowered, and would not have had any retreat.

behind a defile, over which the Britiſh troops muſt neceſſarily paſs in purſuit of the retreating corps, by this judicious poſition, he probably ſaved his advanced corps from total ruin. The check the Britiſh received afforded time to make a diſpoſition of the left wing, and ſecond line of the American army in the wood, and on an eminence to which Lee was retreating. On this, ſome cannon were placed by Lord Sterling, who commanded the left wing. Gen. Green, took an advantageous poſition, on the right of Lord Sterling. The Britiſh now attempted to turn the left flank of the Americans, but were repulſed. They alſo made a movement to the right, but Gen. Green with artillery diſappointed their deſign. Gen. Wayne, now advanced with a body of troops, and kept up a ſevere and well directed fire. The enemy retired and took the poſition which Lee had before occupied. Here their flanks were ſecured by thick woods and moraſſes, while their front could be approached only through a narrow paſs. Night put a ſtop to any further operations. Gen. Waſhington, intended to renew the action the next day, but the Britiſh commander being confident that the end was gained, for which the attack had been made, marched his troops ſilently away in the night, leaving behind him four officers and about forty privates, all ſo badly wounded, that they could not be removed.

In the different engagements of this day, the loſs of the Britiſh army in killed, wounded and miſſing, and thoſe who died of fatigue, amounted to three hundred fifty eight men, including twenty officers. Such was the extreme heat of the day, that three ſergeants, and fifty ſix men, dropped dead without a wound. The loſs of the Americans in killed and wounded was about two hundred and fifty, including thirty officers. The miſſing amounted to one hundred thirty, but many of them, having only dropped through heat and fatigue ſoon joined the army.

The Britiſh army proceeded on its march, until, the baggage having reached Sandy-Hook, there was no farther apprehenſion for its ſecurity. The Britiſh fleet from the Delaware was there ready to receive it; and whilſt preparations were making, by a bridge of boats for tranſporting the Britiſh troops acroſs an inlet of the ſea, which ſeparates Sandy Hook from the continent, Sir Henry Clinton, with the army

under his command, lay for two days encamped at the diſtance of ſome miles in the country, expecting an attack from Gen. Waſhington. But the American army, after the action of Monmouth, marched to the North River. The Britiſh General proceeded from his camp to Sandy Hook, where his army was embarked on the fifth day of July, and the ſame day landed at New York.

Gen. Waſhington, with his army, encamped at the White Plains, a few miles beyond Kingſbridge, where the Britiſh, though only a few miles diſtant, did not moleſt them. They remained in this poſition from an early day in July, till a late one in the autumn, and then the Americans retired to Middle-Brook in Jerſey, where they built themſelves huts in the ſame manner as they had done at Valley Forge.

The Britiſh having departed from Philadelphia, Congreſs, after an abſence of nine months, returned to the former ſeat of their deliberations, and ſoon after gave a public audience to M. Gerard, the Miniſter Plenipotentiary from the Court of France. It afforded ample materials for philoſophic contemplation, that the ſame ſpot, which, in leſs than a century, had been the reſidence of ſavages, ſhould become the theatre on which the repreſentatives of a new, free, and civilized nation, gave a public audience to a Miniſter Plenipotentiary, from one of the oldeſt and moſt powerful kingdoms of Europe.

The French, as ſoon as they had determined to take an open and active part in behalf of the Americans, began immediately to arm by ſea. At Toulon they equipped a Fleet of twelve ſhips of the line and ſix frigates; which, with a conſiderable number of troops on board, ſailed from thence on the thirteenth of April, under the command of the Count d'Eſtaing; but from adverſe winds, did not paſs the Straits of Gibraltar till the fifteenth of May, and arrived on the coaſt of Virginia on the 5th of July, the ſame day on which the Britiſh army had embarked at Sandy Hook. Had he found the Britiſh fleet in the Delaware, and their army in Philadelphia, it is not eaſy to determine what might have been the conſequence of a joint operation between him and General Waſhington.

The Britiſh Miniſtry, who were not unapprized of the equipment of the French fleet under the command of Count D'Eſtaing, got ready a fleet of an equal number of ſhips, the

command of which was given to Vice Admiral Byron. This fleet ſailed from Plymouth on the ninth of June.

The Count D'Eſtaing, diſappointed in his firſt ſcheme by the evacuation of Philadelphia, of which he received intelligence whilſt he lay off the mouth of the Cheſapeak, coaſted along the American ſhore to the northward, and on the eleventh of July appeared off Sandy-Hook.

The Britiſh fleet then in the harbour of New-York, altho' much inferior to the fleet under D'Eſtaing, was nevertheleſs reſpectable; the ſhips being well manned, and ably officered. It conſiſted of ſix ſhips of the line, and four of fifty guns, with a number of frigates and ſmaller veſſels. The ſight of the French fleet raiſed all the active paſſions of their adverſaries. Irritated againſt the French, for interfering in what they called a domeſtic quarrel, the Britiſh diſplayed a ſpirit of zeal and bravery which could not be exceeded. A Britiſh fleet blocked up in one of its own ports was ſuch a phœnomenon as filled them with indignation.

The French fleet continued without the Hook for eleven days, during which time the Britiſh had the mortification of ſeeing the blockade of their fleet, and the capture of about twenty veſſels under Engliſh colours. On the twenty-ſecond, the French fleet appeared under weigh. The long meditated attack, it was now ſuppoſed, was inſtantly to be made; and ſo confident were all, that it would prove abortive, in conſequence of the preparations made for defence, that the critical moment which was to decide, not only the fate of the Britiſh fleet, but of the army, was waited for with impatience. But the count D' Eſtaing, as ſoon as the ſhips had weighed anchor, inſtead of attempting to enter the harbour made ſail to the Southward, and was ſoon out of ſight. Whether he ever ſeriouſly intended to make an attempt upon the harbour of New-York, but after reconnoitering its ſituation, with the diſpoſitions made for defence, relinquiſhed the deſign as impracticable, or whether his appearing before that harbour was only a feint to draw the attention of the Britiſh commanders from the place where his attack was really intended, is uncertain. After quitting New-York, and ſtanding to the ſouthward as far as the mouth of the Delaware, he changed his courſe, and ſteered for Rhode-Iſland, before which he arrived on the twenty-ninth of July.

By his departure, the Britiſh had a ſecond eſcape, for had he remained at the Hook but a few days longer, part of the fleet of Vice Admiral Byron muſt have fallen into his hands. That officer, as already obſerved, ſailed from England on the ninth of June, to counteract the deſign of Count D'Eſtaing. This ſquadron, on the third of July, was diſperſed and ſeparated by a ſtorm. It now arrived ſcattered, broken, ſickly, diſmaſted, or otherwiſe damaged. Within eight days after the departure of D'Eſtaing, four ſail of the line arrived ſingly at Sandy Hook.

The expulſion of the Britiſh troops from Rhode-Iſland, of which they had been in poſſeſſion ſince December, 1776, had been in the contemplation of the Americans for ſeveral months paſt. In the ſpring of this year, General Sullivan was ſent to take the command in its neighbourhood, and made preparations for invading it. Such was the eagerneſs of the people to co-operate with their new allies, that ſome thouſands of volunteers engaged in the ſervice. The royal troops on the iſland, having been lately reinforced, were about 6000, and General Sullivan's force was about 10,000.

The Britiſh commander at Rhode-Iſland, General Pigot, perceiving the object of his adverſaries, projected about the end of May two different enterprizes into Providence Plantation, in order to retard the operations of the Americans. In the firſt, under Col. Campbell, ſeveral houſes at Briſtol and Warren, filled with military and naval ſtores, ſome gallies and armed ſloops, and one hundred and twenty-five boats, which were built on the Hickamuck river, for the purpoſe of the invaſion, were burnt and deſtroyed; and eighteen pieces of ordnance, were rendered unſerviceable. And in the laſt expedition under Major Eyre, a large quantity of boards, plank, and other materials for ſhip-building, were burnt. Theſe loſſes retarded the preparations of the Americans ſo much, that when D'Eſtaing arrived off Rhode-Iſland, they were not in readineſs for co-operation.

The French Admiral ſtationed two of his frigates in the Seaconnet Paſſage on the eaſt, and two of his line of battle ſhips in the Narraganſet Paſſage, on the weſt ſide of the iſland, to interrupt the communications of the garriſon, whilſt, with the remainder of his fleet, he anchored off Brenton's Ledge, at the ſouth eaſt ſide of the iſland, in a ſituation open to the ſea. On the eighth of Auguſt, every thing being in readi-

neſs on the part of the Americans, he entered the harbour of Newport with his fleet.

The Britiſh fleet was now increaſed to eight line of battle ſhips, five ſhips of fifty guns, two of forty four guns, four frigates, three fire-ſhips, two bombs, and a number of ſmaller veſſels. With this force Lord Howe followed the French fleet, and appeared in ſight of Rhode-Iſland on the ninth of Auguſt. He came to an anchor the ſame evening, off Point Judith, which forms the entrance on the ſouth-weſt ſide into the great bay that encompaſſes Rhode-Iſland, and the other ſmaller iſlands adjacent. On the following morning, the wind having changed to the north eaſt, the French Admiral ſailed out of the harbour with all his ſhips, and forming them in order of battle as they came out, bore down upon the Britiſh fleet. The Britiſh Admiral, for the preſent, thought it prudent to decline an engagement, and ſtood to the ſouthward, in the hope that a ſhift of wind might enable him to gain the weather-gage.

While the two commanders were exerting their naval ſkill to gain reſpectively the advantages of poſition, the wind freſhening into a tremendous ſtorm, not only parted the two fleets from each other, but ſeparated and diſperſed the individual ſhips of each ſquadron. In this conflict of the elements, two French ſhips of the line were diſmaſted. The diſperſion of the two fleets gave occaſion to the accidental meeting of ſingle ſhips, and produced engagements between them. The Renown, of fifty guns, fell in with the French Admiral's ſhip, the Languedoc, of eighty-four guns, diſmaſted; and reſolutely aſſailed her with apparent advantage, until darkneſs put an end to the engagement. The ſame evening, a ſimilar engagement happened between the Preſton, of fifty guns, and the Tonant, a French ſhip of eighty guns, with her mainmaſt only ſtanding. Night put an end to the conflict. Six ſail of the French ſquadron coming up in the night, ſaved the diſabled ſhips from any farther attack. The Britiſh ſuffered leſs in the ſtorm than their adverſaries, yet enough to make it neceſſary for them to return to New-York, for the purpoſe of refitting. The French fleet came to an anchor on the 20th, near to Rhode-Iſland, but ſailed on the 22d to Boſton.

As ſoon as the Britiſh fleet, which was now further augmented by the arrival of the Monmouth, one of Admiral By-

ron's fleet, was sufficiently refitted, Lord Howe put to sea with it again, hoping to reach the Bay of Boston before the French fleet; but in this hope he was disappointed. Upon his entering the bay, on the 13th of August, he found the French fleet already in the harbour, and so well secured by lying within certain points of land, on which batteries had been erected to cover and command the anchorage ground, that all attempts against them, in this situation, appeared impracticable. He again set sail, proceeding to the relief of Rhode-Island; but his assistance in that quarter no longer being necessary, he returned with his fleet to New-York, towards the middle of September. After the arrival of the remainder of Admiral Byron's squadron, Lord Howe resigned the command of the British fleet to Admiral Gambier, and took his departure for England.

Before the French fleet sailed for Boston, the Marquis de la Fayette and Gen. Greene went on board the Languedoc, to consult on measures proper to be pursued. They urged the French Admiral to return with his fleet into the harbour, but his principal officers were opposed to the measure. He had orders to go to Boston, if his fleet met with any misfortune. But whatever were the real reasons which induced him to sail for Boston, the Americans were greatly dissatisfied. They complained that they had incurred great expence and danger, under the prospect of the most effective co-operation; that they were abandoned at a time, when by persevering in the original plan, they had well grounded hopes of speedy success.

We will briefly relate the progress and issue of the invasion of Rhode-Island, which would not have been undertaken but in the prospect of a co-operation of the French fleet.

Previously to the arrival of the French fleet, Rhode-Island was sufficiently protected against an invasion from the Americans, by the garrison which the British had placed in it, and by the frigate and other smaller vessels of war, which were stationed round it for its security. Soon after the arrival of the French fleet upon the American coast, the British garrison was reinforced with five battalions, under General Prescot. As soon as the Count D'Estaing had detached two of his line of battle ships into the Narraganset passage, and as many frigates into the Seaconnet passage, the retreat

of such of the British ships as were advanced beyond them, was cut off: They could neither put to sea nor return to the harbor of Newport; and in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the French, they were dismantled and burnt. Sir Robert Pigot, being threatened with a descent in several quarters at the same time, was obliged to withdraw his outposts, and concentrate his force in an intrenched camp in the neighborhood of Newport. Thus all the north part of the Island was left unguarded by the British, and there General Sullivan effected a landing on the ninth of August, the day after the French fleet had entered the harbour of Newport. On the fourteenth, the Americans took possession of Honeyman's-Hill, and began to construct batteries, form lines of communication, and make regular approaches, which were continued without intermission until the morning of the twenty-sixth. But the departure of the French fleet for the harbor of Boston, threw a fatal damp upon the spirits of the men who composed Gen. Sullivan's army. They returned home in such numbers (three thousand of them having gone off in the course of one day) that the force which at last remained, did not exceed that of the British garrison. In these embarrassing circumstances, Gen. Sullivan extricated himself with judgment and ability. He saw the impossibility of succeeding, and took measures for effecting a retreat. Orders were dispatched to repair and strengthen the works in his rear, upon the north part of the island, and also at Bristol and Tiverton, upon the continent. His heavy artillery and baggage were sent off; and every preparation that was necessary being made, he began his retreat in the night of the twenty-eighth of August. Gen. Sullivan gained a march of several hours, unperceived by the British army, and by posting his light troops on various eminences in his line of march, and leaving them behind him with orders to skirmish with the British troops as they advanced, and then retire, he was enabled to make good his retreat with the main body of his army, to a commanding situation at the north end of the island; which, as we have seen, he had previously strengthened with some additional works, for the purpose of covering his retreat. Gen. Pigot discovered the retreat of the Americans at day light, on the morning of the twenty-ninth; and a pursuit being instantly ordered, the whole day was

ſpent in ſkirmiſhes; in which, the covering parties of the Americans were driven from the different poſts occupied by them, until they fell back upon the main body of their army, by this time encamped on the ground already mentioned. Theſe ſkirmiſhes were terminated by a ſharp action, in front of the American encampment, obſtinately maintained for half an hour, at the end of which, the Americans being reinforced, repulſed their purſuers. The loſs on each ſide, in killed, wounded, and miſſing, was between two and three hundred.

Gen. Sullivan, the next morning, received advice, that Lord Howe's fleet, with Sir Henry Clinton and 4000 troops on board, had again ſailed from New-York, and that a fleet was off Block-Iſland. He therefore concluded immediately to evacuate Rhode-Iſland. In the evening of that day, after having purpoſely exhibited every appearance of an intention to maintain his ground, he ſilently ſtruck his tents as ſoon as it was dark, and withdrew his troops unperceived; which, with the help of the numerous boats that attended upon him, were in a few hours tranſported acroſs the channel to the continent.

Sir Henry Clinton, having been diſappointed in cutting off the retreat of the Americans from Rhode-Iſland, returned with his fleet to New-York, but directed General Grey to proceed to Bedford and the neighbourhood, where ſeveral American privateers reſorted. The fleet of tranſports landed the Britiſh troops on the banks of the Acuſhnet river, on the fifth of September; and ſuch was the rapidity of the execution, that by noon of the next day they were all re-embarked, having in the mean time burnt and deſtroyed all the ſhips in the whole extent of the river, amounting to above 70 ſail. They alſo burnt at Bedford and Fairhaven a number of ſtore-houſes filled with proviſions and warlike ſtores. On the eaſt ſide of the river they diſmantled and burnt an incloſed fort mounting eleven pieces of heavy cannon. The royal troops, being re-embarked, proceeded to the iſland called Martha's Vineyard, where they deſtroyed a few veſſels, and obliged the inhabitants to deliver up the militia arms, the public money, 300 oxen, and 2000 ſheep. A ſimilar expedition, under Capt. Ferguſon, was about the ſame time undertaken againſt Little Egg-harbour, on the eaſt coaſt of

New-Jerſey, at which place the Americans had a number of privateers and prizes. Several of the veſſels got off, but all that were found were deſtroyed. Before the re embarkation of the Britiſh from Egg Harbour took place, Capt. Ferguſon, with 250 men, in the night, ſurprized and put to death about fifty of Pulaſki's corps, which was poſted in the vicinity. But one of the moſt diſaſtrous events which occurred during this campaign, was the ſurprize and maſſacre of an American regiment of light dragoons under the command of Col. Baylor. They were employed in a detached ſituation, to intercept a Britiſh foraging party, and had taken up their lodgings in a barn, near the village of Old Taapan. Major General Grey commanded the party which ſurprized them. His men proceeded with ſuch ſilence and addreſs, that they cut off a ſerjeant's patrole without noiſe, and ſurrounded old Taapan ſo completely, that very few of the regiment quartered in it were able to make their eſcape. They ruſhed in upon Baylor's regiment, while they were in a profound ſleep. Incapable of defence, the ſurprized dragoons ſued for quarters. Unmoved by their ſupplications, the Britiſh applied the bayonet, and continued its repeated thruſts while objects could be found in which any ſigns of life appeared. Baylor himſelf was wounded. He loſt 67 killed and wounded, and 40 were made priſoners. Theſe were indebted for their lives to one of Grey's Captains, who gave quarters to the whole fourth troop, contrary to the orders of his ſuperiors.

Humanity would induce us to throw a veil over ſights ſo hideous and deformed, did not a ſenſe of duty, with a view to prevent their repetition, inſtigate us to narrate ſuch enormities.

The ſeaſon for active operations drawing near to a cloſe, and no other force being neceſſary to be kept at New-York, during the winter, than would be ſufficient for the defence of the different poſts occupied by the Britiſh troops, a detachment of five thouſand troops was embarked to proceed to the Weſt-Indies, under the command of Gen. Grant. This force, which ſailed from Sandy Hook on the third of November, was eſcorted by a ſquadron of ſix ſhips of war, under the command of Commodore Hotham.

In the ſummer of this year, General Robert Howe, an officer in the American ſervice, undertook an expedition againſt Eaſt Florida. This was reſolved upon, with the dou-

ble view of protecting the State of Georgia from incurſions of the loyaliſts, who were obliged to fly from the Carolinas and Georgia, and of cauſing a diverſion. Howe, with two thouſand men, moſtly militia, proceeded as far as St. Mary's river. On his approach, the Britiſh deſtroyed a fort they had erected there, called Tonyn, and retreated towards St. Auguſtine. However, ſickneſs raged among the Americans to ſuch a degree that an immediate retreat became neceſſary.

Hitherto the conqueſt of the United States had been attempted from North to South: But in the cloſe of this year that order was inverted, and the Southern States became the principal theatre of Britiſh war operations. Georgia being one of the weakeſt States in the Union, was marked out as the firſt object of warfare.

The Britiſh troops ſent on this ſervice (conſiſting of two thouſand men) were commanded by Col. Campbell, and the naval force by Commodore Hyde Parker.

Gen. Howe had juſt returned from his unſucceſsful expedition, and lay with his army encamped in the neighbourhood of Savannah at the time of the arrival of the Britiſh ſquadron from New-York.

This fleet accompliſhed, the twenty-ninth of December, a landing about 12 miles up the river Savannah. From the landing place, a narrow cauſeway, with a ditch on each ſide, led through a rice ſwamp, to a high plantation ground, at the diſtance of ſix hundred yards. Capt. Cameron, of the 71ſt regiment, having firſt reached the ſhore with his company of light-infantry, immediately formed them, and advanced along the cauſeway, at the end of which was poſted a party of the Americans under Capt. Smith. Theſe received him with a general diſcharge of muſketry, by which this officer and ſeveral of his company were killed. But the Britiſh, ruſhing on with impetuoſity, made their way good, and compelled Capt. Smith to retreat. Whilſt the reſt of the troops were landing, Col. Campbell reconnoitered the poſition of the Americans, and determined to attack them before the evening. The Britiſh troops having advanced within half a mile of the enemy, were formed in order of battle. Gen. Howe, the American officer to whom the defence of Georgia was committed, had drawn up his forces, conſiſting of about 600 continentals, and a few hundred militia, acroſs the main road leading to Savannah, and about half a mile from

it. His right was covered by a thick woody ſwamp, and the houſes of a plantation filled with riflemen; his left reached to the rice ſwamps upon the river, and the town and fort of Savannah covered his rear. In this poſition the American General waited the approach of the Britiſh troops; and had the attack been made only in front, probably the ground would have been obſtinately diſputed. But the Britiſh commander having received information of a private path leading through the ſwamp, which covered the right flank of the Americans, detached the light infantry, under Sir James Baird, ſupported by the New-York volunteers, to proceed by that path, and gain Howe's rear. This detachment, having ſafely gained their ſtation, ſuddenly iſſued from the ſwamp, and attacked a body of militia, which was poſted to ſecure the great road leading from Ogeeche. Hitherto the Britiſh troops in front had remained quiet upon their ground; but as ſoon as it was perceptible that the light infantry had turned the flank of the Americans, the whole Britiſh line received orders to advance and move on briſkly; and the artillery, which had been previouſly formed behind a ſwell in the ground, to conceal it from view, was inſtantly run forward to the eminence, and began to play upon the Americans. Howe, thus attacked in front and rear, ordered an immediate retreat. The Britiſh purſued with great execution. Before night, thirty-eight commiſſioned officers, and four hundred and fifteen men, 48 pieces of cannon, 23 mortars, the town and fort of Savannah, with its ammunition and ſtores, the ſhipping in the river, and a great quantity of proviſions, were in the poſſeſſion of the conquerors, whoſe loſs, during the whole of this day, amounted only to ſeven killed, and nineteen wounded.

General Prevoſt, who commanded the Britiſh forces in Eaſt Florida, had received orders to advance with them into the ſouthern extremity of Georgia. He accordingly began his march from Eaſt-Florida, about the ſame time that the embarkation took place from New-York. After encountering many difficulties, he arrived at Savannah, and took the command of the combined forces from New-York and Eaſt-Florida. Previous to his arrival, a proclamation had been iſſued to encourage the inhabitants to come in and ſubmit to the conquerors. Campbell diſcovered abilities no leſs adapted to govern than to conquer. He did more in a few days, and

with a ſmall number of men, towards reſtoring the Britiſh government, than all the General officers who had preceded him in the projected conqueſt. He at once extirpated military oppoſition, and ſubverted, for ſome time, every trace of a republican government. Georgia was the only State in the Union, in which, after the declaration of Independence, a legiſlative body was convened under the ſanction of Britain.

Such were the principal events on the American ſea-coaſt during this campaign. On the weſtern frontiers a deſultory war was carried on between the States and the Indians, in the mode peculiar to thoſe ſavages. Mutual incurſions were made, and ruin and devaſtation followed on the ſteps of the invaders. Whole families were butchered, their houſes burnt, the growing corn cut up, and entire plantations laid waſte. In this barbarous warfare the flouriſhing new ſettlement of Wyoming, on the banks of the Suſquehannah, fell a ſacrifice to an incurſion of the Indians: And the Indian ſettlements of Unadilla and Anaquago, upon the upper parts of the ſame river, which were alſo inhabited by white people attached to the royal cauſe, were in their turn ravaged and deſtroyed by the Americans.

FIFTH CAMPAIGN, 1779.

THE rigour of winter ſuſpended all military operations between the two great armies in the State of New-York, until the return of ſpring; but even after that time the war, during the whole campaign, was, as ſhall be hereafter related, carried on for little more than diſtreſs and depredation. In the more Southern States, Carolina and Georgia, however, the re-eſtabliſhment of Britiſh government was effectually attempted. After the reduction of Savannah, a great part of the State of Georgia was reſtored to the King's peace. The royal army in that quarter, now under the command of Gen. Prevoſt, was ſtrengthened by numerous reinforcements. At that time there were but few continental troops in thoſe States, as during the late tranquillity in that quarter, they had been detached to ſerve in the main army under Gen. Waſhington. A body of militia was raiſed, and ſent forward by North-Carolina to aid her neighbours, but did not join the

continental troops till they had retreated out of Georgia, and taken poſt in South-Carolina.

General Lincoln was, in September of the laſt year, appointed by Congreſs to the command of their ſouthern army. That officer was the ſecond in command in the army which captured Burgoyne, a circumſtance which of itſelf was ſufficient to give him eclat. But his judicious, brave, and ſpirited conduct on the occaſion, gave him ſtill better pretenſions to fame, and entitled him, in the opinion of the Americans, to no ſmall ſhare in the glory of the atchievement. He arrived at Charleſton in South-Carolina about the beginning of December.

The royal army at Savannah began to extend their poſts, and made preparations to take poſſeſſion of Port-Royal, in South-Carolina. Major Gardiner, with 200 men, being detached with this view, landed on the iſland, but General Moultrie, at the head of an equal number of Americans, attacked and drove him off it. This repulſe reſtrained the Britiſh from attempting any immediate enterprize to the northward of Savannah, but they fixed poſts at Ebenezer and Auguſta, extending themſelves over a great part of Georgia; they alſo endeavoured to ſtrengthen themſelves by reinforcements from the Tories in the weſtern ſettlements of Georgia and Carolina. In this attempt they were ſucceſsful. Several hundreds of them rendezvouſed, and ſet off to join the royal forces at Auguſta. Among thoſe loyaliſts, there were many of the moſt infamous characters. They had no ſooner began their march, than they commenced ſuch a ſcene of plundering of the defenceleſs ſettlements through which they paſſed, as induced the orderly inhabitants to turn out to oppoſe them. Col. Pickens, with about three hundred men, purſued and came up with them near Kettle Creek. An action took place, in which the Tories were totally routed. About 40 of them, with their leader, were killed, and the reſt diſperſed.

The Britiſh had extended their poſts on the Georgia ſide of Savannah river. This induced Gen. Lincoln to fix encampments at Black Swamp, and nearly oppoſite to Auguſta, on the Carolina ſide. From theſe poſts he formed a plan of croſſing into Georgia, with the view of limiting the Britiſh to the low country, near the ocean. In the execution of this deſign, Gen. Aſh with 1500 North-Carolina militia, and a

few regular troops, after croſſing the river Savannah, took a poſition on Briar-Creek ; but in a few days he was ſurprized by Col. Prevoſt, brother of Gen. Prevoſt, who having made a circuitous march of fifty miles, came unexpectedly on his rear with about 900 men. The militia were thrown into confuſion, and fled at the firſt fire. They had 150 men killed, and 162 were taken priſoners. Of thoſe who got off ſafe, a great part returned home, ſo that the number which rejoined the American camp, did not exceed 450 men. This event opened a communication between the Britiſh, the Indians, and the Tories of North and South-Carolina.

The Americans ſoon after reſumed their original plan of penetrating into Georgia ; part of their force was ſtationed on the North ſide of the Savannah, while Gen. Lincoln and the main army, which was reinforced by this time, croſſed near Auguſta into Georgia. Gen. Prevoſt availing himſelf of Lincoln's abſence, croſſed into Carolina over the ſame river, with about 2400 men, among which there were a large party of Indians. Gen. Moultrie, who was charged with the defence of South Carolina was forced to retire. When Lincoln found that Gen. Prevoſt was ſeriouſly puſhing for Charleſton, he re-croſſed the Savannah, and purſued him. The abſence of the main army, Moultrie's retreat, the plunderings of the invaders, and above all the dread of the Indian Savages, diffuſed a general panic among the inhabitants: Many were induced to apply for Britiſh protection. In the mean time,the South Carolinians' made every preparation for the defence of their capital, the ſuburbs were burnt down ; lines were carried acroſs the Peninſula, between Aſhley and Cooper rivers ; and cannon were mounted at proper intervals, in its whole extent. In a few days a force of 3300 men aſſembled in Charleſton for its defence.

An advanced detachment of the Britiſh of 900 men, appeared before the town, the eleventh of May. The town was ſummoned to ſurrender. Commiſſioners from the garriſon were ſent to propoſe a neutrality during the war between Great Britain and America. But as theſe terms were refuſed, the garriſon expecting an immediate aſſault, prepared accordingly. The Britiſh however, did not think proper to attempt a ſtorm.

The approach of Gen. Lincoln induced the Britiſh commander to retreat from Charleſton, filing off with his whole

force from the main, to the islands near the sea, to prevent being between two fires. Both armies encamped in the vicinity of Charleston, watching each others' motions. John's Island, of which the British had taken possession, is separated from the main land by an inlet, to which has been given the name of Stono River; and the communication between the one and the other is preserved by a ferry. Upon the main land, at this ferry, the British had established a post, as well for the security of the island, as for the protection of their foraging parties. For the defence of it they had thrown up three redoubts, joined by lines of communication. The rear was covered by Stono inlet.

The weak state of the garrison, which did not much exceed 500 men, fit for duty, tempted Gen. Lincoln to attack it with a view of cutting it off. On the twentieth of June, he advanced against it with a superior force. The attack lasted for above an hour, but at last the Americans were forced to retreat, which they did in good order, carrying with them some of their killed and all their wounded. The British counted 129 killed and wounded; and the loss of the Americans was above two hundred killed, wounded and missing.

The militia under Gen. Lincoln were disheartened by this unsuccessful attack, and the greatest part of them soon after returned to their plantations. The British troops were no farther molested. They evacuated Stono Ferry, and retiring along the sea coast, passed from island to island, until they reached Beaufort, in the island of Port Royal. At Beaufort Gen. Prevost established a post, the garrison of which he left under the command of Col. Maitland, and returned with the rest of the British army to Georgia.

The profligate conduct of the officers and soldiers of the British army, in plundering the houses of individuals, during this incursion is incredible. Negroes were seduced or forced from their masters, furniture and plate were seized without decency or authority, and the most infamous violations of every law of honor and honesty, were openly perpetrated. Individuals thus accumulated wealth, but the royal cause suffered, and the British arms incurred an everlasting stigma.

The American army under Gen. Lincoln, soon after the action of Stono Ferry, retired to Sheldon, and nothing of any consequence was attempted by either army, till the arrival of

a French fleet on the coaſt, rouſed the whole country to immediate activity.

As ſoon as Admiral D'Eſtaing, in the month of November laſt, had re-fitted the French fleet at Boſton, he ſailed for the Weſt Indies. About the ſame time, as before related, Commodore Hotham with the Britiſh fleet, ſet out from New-York, to the ſame theatre of operations. The Britiſh took St. Lucia, and the French took St. Vincent's and Grenada. After the reduction of the latter, D'Eſtaing retired to Cape Francois. Here he received letters from Gen. Lincoln and Mr. Plombard, the French Conſul at Charleſton, in which they repreſented to him the ſtate of affairs in the ſouthern provinces, and pointed out the advantages which might be expected, ſhould he, during the hurricane months in the Weſt Indies, viſit the American coaſt with his fleet, and co-operate with Lincoln in the recovery of Georgia. The French Admiral, having diſcretionary orders from his Court for ſuch a co-operation, ſailed forthwith for the American continent, and arrived on the coaſt of Georgia on the firſt of September, with twenty ſail of the line, two fifty gun ſhips, and eleven frigates. He arrived ſo unexpectedly, that the Experiment of fifty guns, commanded by Sir James Wallace, the Ariel of twenty-four guns, and two ſtore ſhips, fell into his hands.

General Lincoln, as ſoon as intelligence of the arrival of the French fleet reached South-Carolina, marched with the force he had with him, towards Savannah, and the militia of Georgia and South-Carolina received orders to rendezvous near the ſame place. Veſſels of a proper draught of water were diſpatched from Charleſton, to aſſiſt in landing the French troops.

The Britiſh, on their ſide, took meaſures for increaſing the fortifications at Savannah, and putting the town in a proper poſture of defence. The garriſon at Sunbury was withdrawn, and orders were diſpatched to Beaufort to the commanders of the Britiſh troops and armed veſſels, to repair in all haſte to Savannah.

On the ninth of October the French fleet came to an anchor off the bar; and as the line of battle ſhips could not paſs it, nor come near the ſhore, the ſmall coaſting veſſels ſent from Charleſton were employed in receiving the troops from the French ſhips, and landing them at Beaulieu, in

ber, nor were their batteries ready to open until the fourth of October. The batteries of the beſiegers having on that

from Charleton were employed in receiving the troops from the French ships, and landing them at Beaulieu, in

Ofabaw Sound, an inlet of the ſea ſome miles ſouth of the mouth of the river Savannah. On the following day four French frigates entered the anchorage ground at Tybee, and the Britiſh naval force moved up the river to Savannah. The guns were landed from the Britiſh ſhips, and mounted on the batteries. They incorporated the marines with the grenadiers of the 60th regiment, and put the ſeamen on ſhore to aſſiſt in working the artillery. They ſunk the Roſe, and Savannah armed ſhip, with four tranſports, acroſs the channel below the town, to prevent the French frigates from coming higher; and above it they laid a boom acroſs to prevent fire rafts from being ſent down. The Germaine armed brig alone retained her guns; and ſhe was ſtationed off Yamiraw, above the town, to flank the right of the Britiſh lines. Theſe diſpoſitions the Britiſh made on the river, whilſt on ſhore, aſſiſted by ſome hundreds of negroes, they ſtrengthened the old, and erected new works for the defence of the town.

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day opened with a diſcharge from fifty three pieces of heavy cannon and fourteen mortars, a requeſt was made by Gen. Prevoſt that the women and children might be permitted to leave the town, and embark on board veſſels in the river, which ſhould be placed under the protection of the Count D'Eſtaing: But this propoſal was rejected, the combined armies ſuſpecting that a deſire of ſecreting the plunder, lately taken from the South-Carolinians, was covered under the veil of humanity.

From the fourth to the ninth of October an inceſſant cannonade was continued; but, fortunately for the inhabitants, leſs injury was done to the houſes in the town than might have been expected; few lives were loſt, and the defences were in no reſpect materially damaged. The French troops amounted to about five thouſand men, and the militia joined General Lincoln in ſuch numbers, that the combined armies, it is ſaid, amounted to about ten thouſand men. The garriſon in Savannah did not exceed two thouſand five hundred of all ſorts, regulars, ſeamen, militia, and volunteers. But the diſparity in numbers was in ſome degree compenſated by the extraordinary zeal and ardour which animated the beſieged. At the time the French landed, not more than twelve pieces of artillery appeared upon the fortifications at Savannah: But ſo inceſſantly did the garriſon labour in enlarging the old works, and in erecting new redoubts and batteries, that before the concluſion of the ſiege, near one hundred pieces of cannon were mounted.

The town of Savannah being ſituated upon the Southern bank of the river of that name, had two of its ſides ſecured by natural boundaries, one by the river behind it, and the other by a thick ſwamp and woody moraſs communicating with the river above the town. The other two ſides were originally open towards the country, which in front of them for ſeveral miles was level, and entirely cleared of wood: But they were by this time covered with artificial works, the right and left being defended by redoubts, and the centre by ſeamen's batteries in front, with impalements and traverſes thrown up behind to protect the troops from the fire of the beſiegers; and the whole extent of the works was ſurrounded with an abbatis. The redoubts on the right towards the ſwamp were three in number: That in the centre was garriſoned by two companies of militia, with the North-Caroli-

na regiment to ſupport them, under the command of Colonel Hamilton. The provincial corps of King's Rangers were poſted in the redoubt on the right, and the corps of Provincial dragoons in that on the left, called the Spring-Hill redoubt, ſupported by the South-Carolina regiment. To the right of the whole was a ſailor's battery of nine pounders, covered by a company of the Britiſh Legion; and between the centre and Spring-Hill redoubt was another of theſe batteries, behind which were poſted the grenadiers of the 60th regiment, with the marines which had been landed from the ſhips of war. The whole of this force on the right of the lines was under the orders of Col. Maitland. On the left of the lines were two redoubts, ſtrongly conſtructed, with a maſſy frame-work of green ſpongy wood, filled up with ſand, and mounted with heavy cannon, one of them commanded by Col. Cruger, and the other by Major Wright, having under him the Georgia loyaliſts. Behind the impalements and traverſes, in the centre of the works, were poſted the two battalions of the 71ſt. regiment, two regiments of Heſſians, the New-York volunteers, 1 battalion of Skinner's brigade, one of Delancey's, and the light infantry of the army under the command of Major Graham.

Such was the ſtate of the works at Savannah, and ſuch the poſition of the troops for its defence, at the time when the Count D'Eſtaing reſolved to diſcontinue his regular approaches, and ſtorm the Britiſh entrenchments. To this reſolution he was forced by his marine officers, who had remonſtrated againſt his continuing to riſk ſo valuable a fleet on a dangerous coaſt, in the hurricane ſeaſon, and at ſo great a diſtance from the ſhore, that it might be ſurprized by a Britiſh fleet, completely repaired and manned.

In order to facilitate the ſucceſs of the enterprize, an officer with five men, on the eighth of October, advanced under a heavy fire from the garriſon, and kindled the abbatis; but the dampneſs of the air, and the moiſture of the green wood of which the abbatis was compoſed, ſoon exſtinguiſhed the flames. The morning of the ninth of October, was fixed upon for making the aſſault; and two feigned attacks by the militia, were to draw the attention of the beſieged to their centre and left, whilſt a ſtrong body of choſen troops, from the combined armies, ſhould advance on the right of the Britiſh lines, and in two columns make the real attack.

The principal of theſe columns was commanded by Count D'Eſtaing, aſſiſted by Gen. Lincoln, and was deſtined to attack the Spring-Hill redoubt in front, whilſt the other column, commanded by Count Dillon, ſhould ſilently move along the edge of the ſwamp, paſs the redoubts and batteries, and get into the rear of the Britiſh lines. The troops which compoſed theſe two columns conſiſted of 3500 French, 600 regulars of the Americans, and 350 of the Charleſton militia. They were in motion long before day-light. The column commanded by Dillon miſtook its way, from the darkneſs of the morning, and was entangled in the ſwamp, from which it was unable to extricate itſelf until broad day-light appeared, and expoſed it to the view of the garriſon and the fire from the Britiſh batteries. This was ſo well directed, that it was never able even to form. In the mean time, the column led by D'Eſtaing advanced againſt the Spring-Hill redoubt, juſt as day-light appeared. As ſoon as it was diſcovered, it became expoſed to a continual blaze of muſquetry from the redoubt, and to a deſtructive croſs fire from the adjoining batteries, which mowed down whole ranks of the allies as they advanced. They, with great bravery, moved on until they reached the redoubt, where the conteſt became more fierce. A French and American ſtandard were for a ſhort time planted upon the parapet. The conteſt for the poſſeſſion of the redoubt nevertheleſs continued to be obſtinately maintained on both ſides, and the event remained in ſuſpenſe; when Col. Maitland, ſeizing the critical moment, ordered the grenadiers of the 60th regiment, with the marines, to move forward, and charge the American column. This movement decided the fate of the attack. The aſſailants were repulſed, driven out of the ditch of the redoubt, and routed with great loſs, leaving behind them, in killed and wounded, 637 of the French troops, and 264 of the Americans. The loſs of the garriſon, during the ſiege and aſſault, did not exceed 120. Count Pulaſki, who commanded an American corps, received a mortal wound, and D'Eſtaing was wounded in two places, but in neither of them dangerouſly.

This unſucceſsful aſſault determined the iſſue of the ſiege. The Americans and French kept poſſeſſion of their lines only till the artillery and heavy baggage were withdrawn, and reembarked on board the fleet. As ſoon as this was accom-

pliſhed, the ſiege was raiſed, and the allies ſeparated, the Americans retreating into South-Carolina, and the French returning to their ſhips. The Count D'Eſtaing, with part of the ſhips, returned to France, and the reſt proceeded to the Weſt-Indies.

With the raiſing of the ſiege of Savannah ended the campaign to the Southward, without any thing deciſive on either ſide. During this year, the Britiſh had overrun the State of Georgia for 150 miles from the ſea coaſt, and had penetrated as far as the lines of Charleſton, but at the end of the campaign they were reduced to their original limits in Savannah.

The campaign in the States to the northward of Carolina was ſpent in deſultory operations and partial expeditions, the object of which ſeems to have been to diſtract the attention of the Americans by their multiplicity, and to weaken them by cutting off their reſources, and deſtroying their magazines of naval and military ſtores.

Admiral Gambier, who ſucceeded Lord Howe in the command of the Britiſh fleet on the American coaſt, was recalled in the ſpring of the preſent year, and in the month of April reſigned the command to Sir George Collier. Not long after his arrival, an expedition to the Cheſapeak, in Virginia, was concerted between him and Sir Henry Clinton, the commander in chief of the Britiſh army. A detachment, conſiſting of the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards, the 42d regiment, a regiment of Heſſians, and the royal volunteers of Ireland, with a detachment of artillery, amounting in the whole to one thouſand eight hundred men, under the command of General Mathew, was aſſigned for this purpoſe, and embarked on board tranſports. Sir George Collier, in the Raiſonable of 64 guns, and ſome other veſſels, conveyed them. The fleet entered between the Capes of Virginia on the eighth of May, and on the thirteenth entered the mouth of Elizabeth river. The Britiſh troops effected a landing about three miles below the fort of Portſmouth. The American garriſon, fearful of being ſurrounded, and having their retreat cut off, haſtily evacuated the fort, leaving behind all the artillery, ammunition, baggage, and ſtores. Gen. Mathew, after having taken poſſeſſion of the fort, took a ſtrong poſition with his army between Portſmouth and the country, his right wing reaching to the fort, the left to the South branch of Elizabeth river, and the centre covered in front

by an impenetrable ſwamp. The Britiſh commander ſent detachments to Norfolk and Goſport; and all the veſſels in Elizabeth river, with an immenſe quantity of naval and military ſtores, merchandize, and proviſions, were either taken or deſtroyed by the Britiſh troops. At Kemp's Landing, in Princeſs Ann county, and at the town of Suffolk, in Nanſemond county, an immenſe quantity of proviſions and ſtores of all ſorts, with ſome veſſels richly laden, were either taken or deſtroyed by other detachments.

Theſe ſervices being performed, the Britiſh troops were re-embarked, and the whole fleet, with the prizes, having quitted Virginia, arrived at New-York before the end of the month, having been abſent only twenty-four days. The damage done to the Americans has been eſtimated at half a million ſterling, but it did no ſervice to the royal cauſe.

Soon after, a ſimilar expedition was projected againſt Connecticut. Governor Tryon was appoined to the command of about 2600 land forces, employed on this buſineſs, and he was ſupported by Gen. Garth. The tranſports which conveyed theſe troops, were covered by a ſuitable number of armed veſſels, commanded by Sir George Collier. They landed at Eaſt-Haven, and reduced the town to aſhes; after which they marched to New-Haven. The town was delivered up to promiſcuous plunder, and the inhabitants were ſtripped of every thing. An aged citizen, who laboured under a natural inability of ſpeech, had his tongue cut out by one of the royal army. After perpetrating every ſpecies of enormity, the invaders reimbarked, and proceeded by water to Fairfield. On their approach, the town was evacuated by moſt of the inhabitants. A few women remained, with a view of ſaving their property. Parties of the Britiſh entered the deſerted houſes, where they took every thing of value that came in their way, abuſing the women with the fouleſt language, threatening their lives, and preſenting the bayonets to their breaſts. A ſucking infant was plundered of its cloathing, while the bayonet was preſented to the breaſt of its mother. Towards evening they ſet the houſes on fire, which they had previouſly plundered. The town of Norfolk, and a part of Green's farms were likewiſe burnt, and two houſes of public worſhip were demoliſhed.

During this ſhort expedition, which had laſted only nine days, the injury ſuſtained by the inhabitants of Connecticut in the

loſs of property, was very conſiderable : But notwithſtanding the conflagration of ſo many towns on the ſea-coaſt, Gen. Waſhington could not be prevailed upon to abandon his ſtrong ſituation in the neighborhood of New-York. He apprehended, that one deſign of the Britiſh in theſe movements was to draw off a part of his army from Weſt-Point, to favour an intended attack on that important poſt. It was his uniform practice, to riſque no more by way of covering the country, than was conſiſtent with the general ſafety. His apparent apathy, with reſpect to Connecticut, produced murmurs among the inhabitants, and the Britiſh commanders were deviſing meaſures for improving the diſpoſition, which had manifeſted itſelf in Connecticut : But Gen. Waſhington had already atchieved an enterprize, which diſconcerted all their deſigns againſt that State, and called their attention to a different quarter. This was the ſurpriſe of the fort of Stony-Point, which was taken by aſſault in the night of the fifteenth of July. It was an enterprize of difficulty and danger ; and the American Gen. Wayne who conducted it, deſerved great praiſe for his gallantry and good conduct, as did the troops which he commanded, for their bravery.

With a ſtrong detachment, Gen. Wayne ſet out at noon, and completed a march of fourteen miles, over bad roads, by eight o'clock in the evening. After having reconnoitered the works, he divided his troops into two columns, entered the works in oppoſite quarters, and met in the centre of them about one in the morning of the ſixteenth of July. Neither the moraſs, the double row of abbatis, nor the ſtrength of the works, damped the ardour of the aſſailants. In the face of the moſt tremendous fire of muſketry, and of cannon loaded with grape ſhot, they forced their way at the point of the bayonet, through every obſtacle. Col. Johnſon, of the 17th regiment, commanded the Britiſh garriſon, which conſiſted of the 17th regiment, the grenadier company of the 71ſt, a company of the regiment of Loyal Americans, and a detachment of artillery, amounting in the whole to about ſix hundred men ; of theſe one hundred and fifty two were either killed or wounded, and the reſt, with their commander, were made priſoners. Two flags, two ſtandards, 15 pieces of ordnance, and a conſiderable quantity of military ſtores, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The conduct of the Americans upon this occaſion was

highly meritorious; for they would have been fully juſtified in putting the garriſon to the ſword; not one man of which was put to death but in fair combat.

As ſoon as the news of that event reached New-York, preparations were made to recover the fort. The Britiſh commander expected that Gen. Waſhington might be tempted to quit his faſtneſſes, and riſque an engagement for the poſſeſſion of Stoney-Point. But this was not Gen. Waſhington's intention. Orders were given for evacuating Stoney-Point, which was done after as many of the works had been deſtroyed as the time would permit. On the third day after the capture of that fort, the Britiſh regained poſſeſſion of it, repaired the works, and placed in it a larger garriſon.

This ſucceſsful enterprize was ſpeedily followed by another, which equalled it in boldneſs of deſign. This was the ſurprize of the Britiſh garriſon at Powles's Hook, oppoſite to New-York, on the Jerſey ſhore, which was effected by Major Lee, with about 350 men. About 30 of the Britiſh were killed, and 169 taken priſoners. Major Lee, according to the orders he had received, made an immediate retreat, without waiting to deſtroy either the barracks or the artillery.

But theſe advantages were counterbalanced by an unſucceſsful attempt, made by the State of Maſſachuſetts, on a Britiſh poſt at Penobſcot.

Gen. Francis Maclean, who commanded the Britiſh troops in Nova-Scotia, with a detachment of 650 men, in the month of June embarked in tranſports, and, eſcorted by three ſloops of war, arrived in the bay of Penobſcot, in order to form a ſettlement, and eſtabliſh a poſt which might not only ſerve to check the incurſions of the Americans, into Nova-Scotia, but be the means of obtaining a conſtant ſupply of ſhip timber, with which the neighbouring country abounded, for the uſe of the King's yards at Halifax and other places. The bay of Penobſcot is about ſeven leagues in breadth at the mouth, and ſeventeen leagues in length, terminating where the river Penobſcot empties itſelf into the head of it; and the lands all round were then covered with wood, ſcarcely any ſettlements having been made upon them. About nine miles below the mouth of Penobſcot river, on the eaſtern ſide of the bay, is a ſmall but convenient harbour, which ſtill retains its ancient Indian name of Majabagaduce; and a point of land, forming one ſide of that harbour, was the ſpot fixed

upon by Gen. Maclean for erecting a fort to protect the ſettlement.

This occaſioned alarm at Boſton, and it was reſolved to counteract the eſtabliſhment of the poſt. A ſquadron was ſoon got in readineſs, which conſiſted of nineteen armed ſhips and brigantines, the largeſt carrying thirty-two, and the ſmalleſt ten guns. To theſe were added twenty-ſeven tranſports, having on board three thouſand troops; the fleet being under the direction of Commodore Saltonſtall, and the troops under the command of General Lovel.

Gen. Maclean received intelligence of the ſailing of this armament only four days before its arrival at Penobſcot. At that time, two of the baſtions of the intended fort were not begun, and the other two, with the curtains, were in no part above five feet in height, and twelve in thickneſs. There was no platform laid, nor any artillery mounted, and the ditch in moſt parts was not more than three feet deep. Upon the arrival of this intelligence, Gen. Maclean employed his troops day and night on ſuch works as were immediately neceſſary to ſecure them againſt an aſſault.

The Americans effected a landing before day in the morning of the twenty-eighth of July, at a place which had been thought inacceſſible, and on the thirtieth opened a battery againſt the works, at the diſtance of ſeven hundred and fifty yards. From the inceſſant labour of the garriſon, the gorge of one of the unfiniſhed baſtions was filled up with logs of timber, and the other was ſurrounded with a work of facines and earth, ten feet thick; platforms were laid, and artillery mounted; ſo that by the time the Americans had opened their battery, the Britiſh thought themſelves tolerably prepared to reſiſt an aſſault. The Americans made frequent attempts to enter the harbour, but were conſtantly repulſed by the fire from the Britiſh ſhips of war, and a battery erected to ſupport them on ſhore. The American land forces, nevertheleſs, continued to make approaches, and erect new batteries; and a briſk cannonade was kept up between them and the garriſon for near a fortnight. Frequent ſkirmiſhes happened without the fort, the garriſon being under the neceſſity of preſerving a communication with the ſhipping and the battery which covered it. Gen. Maclean received, on the twelfth of Auguſt, intelligence by a deſerter, that on the following day an aſſault was to be made on the fort, and an

attack upon the ſhips of war about the ſame time. But the approach of the Britiſh ſquadron under Sir George Collier, which had ſailed from New-York to the relief of the garriſon, prevented the Americans from executing their intention. During the night of the thirteenth to the fourteenth of Auguſt the beſiegers evacuated the works, and re-embarked with the greateſt part of their cannon on board the ſhips. A flight of the American fleet took place, not daring to wait the ſhock of the Britiſh ſquadron. Two of the American armed ſhips endeavoured to get to ſea by paſſing round Long-Iſland, which lies in the middle of the bay; but they were ſoon intercepted, the firſt being taken, and the other run aſhore and blown up by the crew. The reſt of their fleet, with the tranſports, fled to the head of the bay, and entered the mouth of Penobſcot river, where they landed, and thereby became expoſed to a danger almoſt as great as that which they had eſcaped. They had, without proviſions or any other neceſſaries, to explore their way for more than an hundred miles through this pathleſs deſert, before they could reach a place from which ſupplies might be obtained. All the American armed veſſels were either taken or deſtroyed. The garriſon loſt 70 men, killed, wounded and miſſing.

Sir George Collier, on his return to New-York, found himſelf ſuperſeded by the arrival of Admiral Arbuthnot from England, with ſome ſhips of war, and a fleet of tranſports, bringing a reinforcement of troops. To the Admiral he reſigned the command, and embarked for England.

When this reinforcement arrived, the ſeaſon for action was not entirely over; but the appearance of the formidable French fleet on the coaſt of Georgia, and the expected attack againſt New-York, from the French by ſea, and the Americans by land, obliged Sir Henry Clinton to give up all thoughts of offenſive operations during the remainder of the campaign, and in order to concentre the Britiſh forces, Rhode-Iſland was evacuated, and the garriſon withdrawn to New-York. This viſit of the French fleet to the American coaſt, though unſucceſsful as to its main object, may be ſaid to have been ſerviceable to the American cauſe, as it obliged the Britiſh commander to change his ſyſtem, and act upon the defenſive during the remainder of the campaign.

While the war thus was languiſhing with reſpect to great objects in the country, where it originated, it was raging on a new element. Hoſtilities between the fleets of France and

England were carrying on in both the Indies, and in the European ſeas, as well as on the coaſt of America. Diſtreſſing was at this time the ſituation of Great-Britain. She was weakened and diſtracted in a domeſtic conteſt, was involved in a new and much more dangerous war with one of the greateſt powers of Europe, and before the end of this year, ſhe had the mortification to ſee the King of Spain alſo take a decided part againſt her. This union of Spain with France had for ſome time been foreſeen by Great-Britain, and the moſt vigorous preparations were made by her to reſiſt the impending ſtorm. Gibraltar, where an attack was expected, was, in the ſpring of the year, reinforced with troops, and plentifully ſupplied with proviſion, and ſtore.

The declaration of war againſt Great-Britain, on the part of the Spaniſh nation, though long expected, was not made till the month of June, after every thing had been prepared by them for acting with effect. The grand Spaniſh fleet was ready to ſail; troops were in motion to occupy the works at St. Roque, and inveſt Gibraltar by land, whilſt a naval force was proceeding to block it up by ſea. Whilſt Gr. Britain was embarraſſed with the complicated operations of ſo extenſive a war, it was hoped that Spain might with eaſe recover back ſome of the poſſeſſions that had been wreſted from her in leſs auſpicious times.

The province of Weſt-Florida, in the month of Auguſt, was invaded by two thouſand Spaniards, under the command of Don Bernardo de Galvez, and the reduction of Gibraltar being thought impracticable any other way than by blockade, it was inveſted both by ſea and land.

By this time, the difficulties under which the new formed States of America were labouring, had been greatly increaſed by the depreciation of their paper currency. The conteſt originating on the ſubject of taxation, the laying on of taxes adequate to the exigencies of war, would have been impolitic. The only plauſible expedient in the power of Congreſs was therefore to adopt the emiſſion of bills of credit, repreſenting ſpecie, under a public engagement to be ultimately ſunk by equal taxes, or exchanged for gold or ſilver. The United States derived from this paper creation, for a conſiderable time, much benefit. But the encreaſing expences of the war, the want of other reſources, and the readineſs of the people to receive theſe bills, prompted Congreſs to multiply

them beyond the limits of prudence. A diminution of their value was the unavoidable conſequence. The depreciation continued by a kind of gradual progreſſion from the year 1777 to 1780: ſo that at laſt the Continental dollars were paſſed in moſt parts of America from 50 or 60 for one, and afterwards 150 for one. The requiſition made by Congreſs to the ſeveral States for ſupplies, were alſo far from being always regularly complied with, and their troops were often in want of the moſt common neceſſaries. Hitherto the cauſe of the United States appears alſo to have ſuffered by their depending too much on temporary enliſtments. But, during this year, the Congreſs endeavoured to put their army upon a more permanent footing, and to give all the ſatisfaction to their officers and ſoldiers which their circumſtances would permit. They appointed a committee for arranging their finances, and made ſome new regulations reſpecting the war-office and treaſury board, and other public offices.

From theſe events, which cauſed but temporary embarraſſments, I reaſſume the thread of the hiſtory of the war.

SIXTH CAMPAIGN, 1780.

THE departure of Count D'Eſtaing, after his unſucceſsful attack upon Savannah, which has already been related, was no ſooner known, than Sir Henry Clinton ſet on foot an expedition, the object of which was the taking of Charleston, and the reduction of the province of South-Carolina. The troops deſigned for this expedition, were immediately embarked on board the tranſports; and theſe, eſcorted by admiral Arbuthnot, with an adequate naval force, ſailed from Sandy-Hook on the 26th of December, 1779. Sir Henry Clinton accompanied the expedition, committing the command of the royal army in New-York, to Gen. Knyphauſen. Such was the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, that this fleet was ſoon ſeparated, and driven out of its courſe by tempeſtuous weather; and ſcarcely any of the ſhips, arrived at Tybee, their place of rendezvous, before the end of January. Some of their veſſels were taken; ſome others were loſt, and all received damage. Amongſt the ſhips that were loſt, was one which contained the heavy ordnance, and almoſt all the horſes belonging to the artillery or cavalry, periſhed


SULLIVAN I.
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during the paſſage. After having repaired the damages, the fleet proceeded from Tybee to North Edenton Sound; and on the 11th of February, the Britiſh troops were diſembarked on John's Iſland, about thirty miles from Charleſton. They advanced ſlowly through the country, paſſing from John's to James' Iſland; and from thence over Wappoo-Cut, to the main land, until they reached the banks of Aſhley river, oppoſite to Charleſton. At the ſame time, part of the fleet was ſent round to block up the harbour of Charleſton by ſea.

The loſſes which the Britiſh army had ſuſtained in the late tempeſtous weather, induced Sir Henry Clinton, to diſpatch an order to New-York for reinforcements of men and ſtores. He at the ſame time directed Gen. Prevoſt, to ſend on to him twelve hundred men from the garriſon of Savannah. Gen. Patterſon at the head of this detachment, made his way good over the river Savannah, and through the intermediate country, and ſoon after joined Sir Henry Clinton near the banks of Aſhley river.

It was not until the 29th of March, that the advance of the royal army croſſed that river at the ferry, and landed on Charleſton Neck, ſome miles above. On the following day the Britiſh troops encamped in front of the American lines; and on the 1ſt of April, began to break ground before Charleſton, at the diſtance of about one thouſand yards from the American works.

The tedious paſſage from New-York to Tybee, and the ſlow advance of the royal army, after they had landed, gave the Americans time not only to ſtrengthen, but greatly to enlarge the defences of Charleſton. A chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries, was thrown up extending from Aſhley, to Cooper river, upon which were mounted upwards of eighty pieces of cannon and mortars. In front of the whole, was a ſtrong abbatis, and a wet ditch made by paſſing a canal from the heads of ſwamps, which run in oppoſite directions. Between the lines and the abbatis, deep holes were dug at ſhort intervals. The works on the right and left, were not only of great ſtrength, but advanced ſo far beyond the range of the intermediate line, as to enfilade the canal, almoſt from one end to the other: and in the centre was a hornwork of maſonry, which being cloſed during the ſiege, formed a kind of citadel. Works were alſo thrown up

PLAN
of the SIEGE of
CHARLESTOWN
in
SOUTH CAROLINA.

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on all ſides of the town, were a landing was practicable. But, beſides thoſe numerous batteries, Charleſton was ſtill more effectually protected by the bar, or ſand bank, at the mouth of the inlet that led from the ſea. This bar could not be paſſed by large ſhips of war, and the entry of others was rendered difficult and dangerous. The American commodore, Whipple, occupied the ſtation which commanded the bar, with a ſquadron of of nine ſail; the largeſt carrying forty-four, and the ſmalleſt ſixteen guns.

Great expectations were at firſt entertained, of the ſucceſsful defence of the bar, from the advantageous poſition of the American ſquadron; but, on further examination, this was found to be impracticable. Commodore Whipple, therefore fell back to fort Moultrie, and afterwards to Charleſton, and the crew and guns of all his veſſels, except one, were put on ſhore to reinforce the batteries. To prevent the Britiſh armed veſſels from running into Cooper river, eleven veſſels were ſunk acroſs the mouth of it. This was a moſt important precaution; for had the Britiſh fleet been permitted to gain poſſeſſion of Cooper river, their largeſt ſhips might have been ſo ſtationed as to rake the American lines, and to interrupt the only communication, that remained between the town and country.

Commodore Whipple having quitted his ſtation, admiral Arbuthnot entered the bar. On the the 9th of April he weighed anchor, at five fathom hole, and with the advantage of a ſtrong ſoutherly wind, and flowing tide, paſſed with his ſhips the fire of fort Moultre, with very little loſs, and their entry into Cooper river being precluded, they anchored near the remains of fort Johnſon. This ſquadron conſiſted of the Renown of fifty, the Romulus, and Roebuck, each of forty-four guns; the Richmond, Blonde, Raleigh and Virginia, frigates, and the Sandwich armed ſhip. The ſame day on which this fleet paſſed fort Moultrie, the firſt parallel of the beſiegers was finiſhed; and the town being now almoſt completely inveſted, both by ſea and land, the Britiſh commanders ſummoned Gen. Lincoln to ſurrender. His anſwer was ſhort, but firm, declaring that he would defend the town to the laſt extremity.

The batteries of the firſt parallel were opened upon the town, which did ſome execution; but ſtill the communication between the country and the garriſon was kept open

acrofs Cooper river. The American General, Woodford, paſſed this river with ſeven hundred men, and entered the town on the very day on which the ſummons was ſent to Gen. Lincoln. Nevertheleſs, the regular force in the garriſon was much inferior to that of the beſiegers, and but few of the militia could be perſuaded to leave their plantations, and reinforce their brethren in the capital. In order to keep up the communication between the town and country, Gen. Lincoln had left his cavalry without the lines, with orders to traverſe and keep open the country to the eaſtward of Cooper river; and the militia without the lines were requeſted to rendezvous there; but Sir Henry Clinton, after having ſecured his own communications with the ſea, detached Colonel Webſter, with one thouſand, four hundred men, to cut off thoſe of the Americans. The advanced guard of this detachment, compoſed of Tarleton's legion and Ferguſon's corps, in the night of the fourteenth of April, ſurpriſed the American cavalry, with the militia attached to them, at Biggin's Bridge, near Monk's corner, thirty-two miles from Charleſton, and completely routed and diſperſed them.

After this defeat, the Britiſh extended themſelves to the eaſtward of Cooper river, and the arrival of a reinforcement of 3000 men from New-York, enabled Sir Henry Clinton to ſend more conſiderable detachments to the Eaſtward of Cooper river, ſo as to cut off from the garriſon all reaſonable hopes of effecting a retreat. By the advice of a council of war, offers of capitulation were made to Sir Henry Clinton, which he inſtantly rejected, but the garriſon adhered to them, in hopes that ſuccours would arrive from the neighbouring ſtates. In the mean time the beſiegers were daily advancing their works: the ſecond parallel was completed on the twentieth of April, and the third on the the 6th of May. On the ſame day, the garriſon of Fort Moultrie ſurrendered to Capt. Hudſon of the navy, who had landed on Sullivan's iſland, with 200 ſeamen and marines, to attack the Fort by land, whilſt the ſhips prepared to batter it from the water; and, on the ſame day alſo, the remains of the American cavalry, which eſcaped from the ſurpriſe at Monk's corner, were again ſurpriſed by Col. Tarleton on the banks of the Santee, and the whole either captured, killed, or diſperſed.

While thus every thing profpered with the Britifh, Gen. Clinton, with a view of faving the effufion of blood, once more opened a correfpondence with Gen. Lincoln for the furrender of the town. But the American commander, wifhing to gain better terms for the citizens, demanded a conference; which Clinton refufed. The garrifon then recommenced hoftilities, and the befiegers immediately followed. The batteries of the third parallel opened upon the town, and did great execution. During this fire, which continued for two days without intermifion, the befiegers gained the counter-fcarp of the outwork, that flanked the canal; the canal itfelf was paffed: and the works were advanced almoft to the verge of the ditch. All expectation of fuccours was at an end; and an immediate aflault was to be expected. Under the preffure of thefe circumftances, a number of the citizens addreffed Gen. Lincoln in a petition, expreffing their acquiefcence in the terms which Gen. Clinton had offered, and requefting his acceptance of them. A flag of truce was accordingly fent out with a propofition to that effect; and the Britifh commander, unwilling to prefs to unconditional fubmifion a reduced enemy, whom indulgence might yet reconcile, accepted the propofition, and agreed to grant the fame terms which had been before rejected. On the 12th of May a capitulation was figned; and the fame day the garrifon laid down their arms, and Gen. Leflie took poffeffion of the town.

By articles of capitulation, the garrifon was to march out of town, and to depofit their arms in front of the works, but the drums were not to beat a Britifh march, nor the colours to be uncafed. The troops and feaman were to keep their baggage, and remain prifoners of war till exchanged. The militia were permitted to return to their refpective homes, as prifoners on parole; and while they adhered to their parole, were not to be moleſted by the Britifh troops, in perfon or property. The inhabitants of all conditions to be confidered as prifoners on parole, and to hold their property on the fame terms with the militia. The officers of the army and navy, to retain their fervants, fwords, piftols, and baggage unfearched. They were alfo permitted to fell their horfes, but not to remove them. A veffel was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia with Gen. Lincoln's difpatches unopened.

(To be continued.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF HORSE.

(Continued from page 210.)

A NON-COMMISSIONED Officer ſhould be acquainted alſo with the name of every village within view of his poſt, and to be able to tell their diſtance; that when his officer or the commander of the corps viſits him, he may give them proper anſwers.

If the enemy attacks, he ſhould endeavor to draw it from that troop, commanded by an officer, higher in rank than a non-commiſſioned officer; and ſhould the enemy advance againſt that troop notwithſtanding, he ſhould know how to get into its rear.

Though as I have ſaid, a non-commiſſioned officer is ſeldom left to himſelf, he may be under a neceſſity of placing *videttes*; of courſe he ſhould be inſtructed in this in time of peace, and this is the duty of the officer; from whoſe field-guard he is detached, as we ſhall ſee in the continuation.

Sect. IV. To inſtruct non-commiſſioned officers in making guard-patrols, is a thing principally to be attended to. They ſhould learn how to patrol a village, a wood, a hill, or paſs cut grounds unnoticed through occupied places: to ſecure a ſafe retreat, or return by a round-about way, and even to divide the troops under their command, and re-unite them at a fixed place. We ſhould teach them how to march in nightly patrols, and not ſuffer them to ſtray too far from them; how they are to act in winter-patrols, where they can only follow the common road. All this they ſhould be properly and diſtinctly ſhewn at the manœuvres, as ſuch things frequently occur in ſkirmiſhes.

Sect. V. If they can patrol well, they will be able to reconnoitre well, and to get good intelligence of the enemy. Here we ſhould ſhew them how they are to try any ground; to get ſlyly up to the enemy, in order to diſcover its poſition; to ſteal up to their field-guards, in order to diſcover their ſtrength; to creep by night into a village, to learn whether it is occupied; to lie down in a trench or ditch, to liſten and obſerve the enemy at a diſtance, and ſuffer them

to march by, in order to give intelligence of their ſtrength, or the way they have taken.

We ſhould, therefore, at the manœuvres act as follows. Sometimes in hilly, ſometimes in ſandy environs, we ſhould poſt a ſtrong and ſometimes a non-commiſſioned officer's guard, and make it take different poſitions on different days, and cover themſelves, by field guards properly. At one time we ſhould command a non-commiſſioned officer with from 6 to 12 men, according to the ſituation of the ground, to ſteal by with his men, or at leaſt with a couple of them, either at a diſtance or near; teach him how to quit his concealed troop; diſmounting himſelf, giving his horſe to another to hold, ſo as to get forward himſelf unperceived, in order to obſerve every thing more particularly. He ſhould have two piſtols continually in his hand, that in caſe he meets a peaſant or any other perſon, he may ſtop him, by clapping the piſtol to his breaſt, and threatening to kill him, if he does not inſtantly tell him what he knows of the enemy, or its poſition; or if he makes the leaſt noiſe. He may then aſk the perſon he meets, how he ſhall be able to get up cloſe to the enemy, and unperceived; but ſhould not, on any account, ſuffer ſuch perſon to go from him.

We ſhould alſo inſtruct the non-commiſſioned officers, in caſe they are taken priſoners, to ſay they are deſerters, and this, in order to prevent their troops being ſearched for and diſcovered; and as ſoon as their troops have any reaſon to ſuppoſe, that their officer, or officers, are taken priſoners, by a too long abſence, they ſhould retreat and give intelligence of it. They ſhould be practiſed, therefore in this, that they may be ready and expert at it.

We have occaſion ſometimes at night, to poſt field-guards, and make a fire near them; we ſhould therefore ſhew the non-commiſſioned officers and privates how to conduct themſelves in this. This may be done in day time; and they ſhould be taught how to act, in caſe they are diſcovered or attacked by a *vidette* or patrol.

They ſhould learn to reconnoitre an enemy from a diſtance; to this end, we ſhould ſend from 30 to 50, or more horſemen from one village to another, and give the officers orders to alter their march often. At this time, the non-commiſſioned officer, who is in command, being told where the enemy will paſs, is to endeavor, to get ſlyly by them,

without being discovered by the side-patrol, in order to observe their march. Here he should be taught occasionally to creep into a hedge, and let the enemy pass by him, in order to observe their strength; next to draw back, and get forward again, sideways of them; or get up a hill, a tree, or a post, to make fresh observation of their march.

When an *appel* is sounded, they should minutely report what they have seen; how strong they suppose the enemy to be, or how strong the troop is they have observed, to which quarter they have marched, what place they observed them from, and where they changed their route; whether they marched two by two, in platoons, or in whole fronts, and where they halted. And those officers who have the command of the troops, so called the enemy's, should also notice and remember their own motions, that it may be known whether the non-commissioned officers on the look-out, make a true and exact report or not.

The manœuvre ended, the non-commissioned officers should give their report in writing, which should be as plain, concise, and simple, as possible. On the receipt of this report, we should talk to them on the subject with temper, correct them if wrong, and order them to copy it.

Sect. VI. They should learn to levy contributions in a neighborhood, where an enemy is; to demand hostages, or secure suspected persons. In short, we cannot be too particular in our instructions to non-commissioned officers; and we shall be amply rewarded, if we can, by this labour and attention, make one in every squadron, so clever, as to be able to entrust him safely with a command, and to rely on his reports.

There are many things in which no instructions can be given in time of peace: but to those who are desirous of information and knowledge, we should frequently discourse of and talk such matters over; and should, as far as possible explain things to them, and point out all the ways and means and every advantage to be taken in case of necessity. For instance, we should represent to them, that patrols in an enemy's country, should get the best intelligence possible of their intention, by enquiries among the country-people; for which purpose they are to appear sometimes as friends, sometimes as an enemy: sometimes to use good words, and sometimes threats. Such things cannot be learned at manœuvres or exercise.

I have further to obſerve, that in the inſtructions, to non-commiſſioned officers, we ſhould advance with them gradually, give them time to make their patrols, and to reconnoitre; and ſhould not interrupt them, that they may get a liking for what they are to do; and every thing, as before an enemy, ſhould be made difficult, that they may know how to conduct themſelves in time of action.

(To be continued.)

JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH EXPEDITION AGAINST ALGIERS, IN 1775.

THE Count Alexander O'Reilly, is an Iriſhman, who began by a ſub-lieutenancy in the regiment of Hibernia: he was major of that corps, when he obtained leave to ſerve a campaign in the French army in Germany. At his return he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and afterwards the poſt of adjutant, or aide-major-general of exerciſe was created for him, in conſideration of his having introduced the German exerciſe into the Britiſh army. In the Portugueſe war, the command of a body of light troops, was given to O'Reilly, who was made a brigadier, before the end of the campaign; and ſoon after ſent out as mariſcal de campo, to ſuperintend the rebuilding of the fortifications of the Havannah, which had been lately reſtored to Spain, by the treaty of Fontainebleau.

His commiſſion being ended, he returned from Cuba; and, being named inſpector general of the Spaniſh infantry, formed a camp, where the king aſſiſted at the manœuvres in perſon. The monarch was ſo well pleaſed with the performance, that he raiſed the inſpector, to the rank of lieutenant-general, and diſpatched him to ſettle the diſputes in New-Orleans, where the French planters, refuſed to ſubmit to the Spaniſh government. He is the projector of the preſent ſcheme, and came to Carthagena, to put it in execution; being appointed commander in chief of all the troops aſſembled in this port. If he is ſucceſsful, no doubt he will be immediately named captain-general. An order is iſſued out, prohibiting all diſcourſe on the ſubject of this expedition, the deſtination of which remains a profound ſecret. Count O'Reilly has under his command nineteen thouſand eight

hundred and twenty foot, and thirteen hundred and ſixty-eight horſe. Coſtejon brings him forty-ſeven king's ſhips, of different rates and three hundred and forty-ſix tranſports.

June 15.

The proceſſion of *Corpus Chriſti* paſſed along the mole of Carthagena, and the fleet received the benediction. The ſhips, dreſt out with flags and ſtreamers of various colours, ſaluted the *Hoſt* with a triple diſcharge of all their artillery. Our generals, O'Reilly and Sir Philip Richardos, came on board at five in the afternoon. We remained till the

23d,

expecting every day to ſail, except that very one we actually did ſail. We had ſeen the wind ſo often favorable, without our making the leaſt motion, that I began to have my doubts about our departure; which however took place in the night between the 22d and 23d. We kept beating about before Carthagena, in the utmoſt diſorder, till the

27th,

when we bore away from that harbor; and, after two days of the ſtrangeſt manœuvres ever known, by which the fleet was ſeparated into an hundred diviſions, all ſteering different ways, we began to ſuſpect we were bound for Algiers.

30th.

At ten this moring, found ourſelves off Cape Cercely, fifteen leagues weſt of Algiers. All our ſcattered fleet got together in the night, and made for the land, between Cape Tenez, and Cape Cercely, where we lay to the remainder of the night. We ſaw fires on all the hills, and along the ſhore; ſignals, no doubt, to alarm the country.

July 1ſt.

At three in the morning, the admiral fired a gun, for us to keep on our courſe, and at nine we were about ſix leagues from Bocmeo. At eleven, we doubled Cape Peſcado and a little before twelve, the Bay of Algiers opened upon us, where we ſaw our men of war and miſſing ſhips lying at anchor. At one, we could diſtinguiſh the town with a ſpying-glaſs. Soon after, the Algerines fired ſome ſhot from the town and caſtles, and hoiſted ſeveral red flags. Came to an anchor in twenty five fathom water. The reſt of the fleet came up ſoon, and formed a moſt beautiful and formidable ſhew; but I muſt confeſs, that the fortifications of Al-

giers, and the dangerous appearance of the coaſt, were to the full as tremendous. We were in the belief, that we had ſeen a conſiderable camp on the eaſt of the river Inrac; and about nine at night, we were confirmed in our opinion, by the lighting of many fires; which in leſs than a quarter of an hour ran along and ſet the whole ridge of hills in a blaze. The dead calm which then reigned, and the ſweet harmony of two clarinets, that were playing on board a neighboring ſhip, made me paſs a moſt delicious hour, and forget that all thoſe charms were ſoon to be changed into horrors. Till midnight we heard a continual firing of muſkets, which we were told was the Mooriſh method of paſſing the parole. I now learned that the men of war, had come up the preceding evening; that our generals, diſguiſed in ſailors jackets, had reconnoitred the coaſt, and on their return had held a council of war.

At ſeven, the general ſent for the captains of the tranſports, to withdraw a ſealed paper they had received at Carthagena, which they were not to open, unleſs driven off by ſtreſs of weather. At five in the evening, he gave out the order for landing the next morning; but the ſea running rather high about eight, the expedition was put off. Our commanding officers had orders not to ſend for cartridges till next day. They are to be delivered out at the rate of ſixty for each ſoldier; which, with twenty-two he received at Barcelona, a pick-axe, a knapſack for proviſions, and a tin-box for vinegar and water, beſides his arms, will prove an intolerable burthen at this hot ſeaſon of the year.

3*d*.

All this day it blew a freſh gale from the E. N. E. which ruffled the ſea ſo much, as to prevent our landing the following night, as the general had propoſed. We diſcovered ſome new camps of Moors; one in particular, to the eaſtward of Algiers, which could neither annoy us, nor ſuccor thoſe we intended to attack; but we inferred from it, they were in no want of troops, ſince they had poſts on every ſide.

4*th*.

At noon, we had notice given us, that our four companies were to paſs on board another veſſel; but which it was to be, we were not informed till three; when we were told that five galliots were to take in fifty men each, and the ſurplus to be paſſed on board other ſhips; the captains of

which, were ordered to send their boats for them immediately. The cartridges, not being delivered, occasioned a delay of two hours, spent in great confusion. This affair being at length settled, we went on board the galliots, where we soon had a lively sense of the misery that awaited us. The orders of the day were, that the officers and soldiers should carry four days provision; and at eight at night, they should put off, in order to be able to land next morning on the beach of the gulf of the Badwoman, which is five leagues west of Algiers. Our generals had so often boasted of the plenty that was to follow us ashore, that we longed with the utmost impatience for the order for landing, as we looked upon it as the only thing that could put an end to our sufferings, which hourly increased on board the galliots, whither we had carried nothing but a little bad biscuit, some cheese and wine; most wretched food! besides the horrid inconvenience of not having room to lie down, or even to get up from the bench, we first sat down upon. A dead calm all night. The breeze failed and our landing was once more deferred, by which means both officers and men passed a cruel night.

5th.

Received orders to comply with those given out on the 2d, for the mode of disembarking, now no longer to be attempted at the gulf of the Badwoman; where we should indeed have been in the greatest danger of perishing. The very name denotes the danger we should have had to encounter. All day a smart gale from the east, and another demur; and a second most fatiguing night for the soldiers.

6th.

The plan being now changed, we were ordered at eight, to pass into the galliot that was to be placed on the left wing, with an hundred men of the Walloon guards on board. By some strange arrangement or other, our hundred was made up of two half companies, instead of one whole one. At ten, saw some men of war working out of the line of battle, to get near the shore. The slowness of their motion was no doubt, regulated by the desire they had of attacking three forts on the west, which it was deemed necessary to silence, before we could approach the land; but for what reason had this been deferred for so many days?

We had received orders to land so long ago as the 2d which would have been put in execution, but for the wea-

ther that proved unfavorable, although no ſuch precaution had been taken, nor even any floats prepared for the artillery. Indeed, ſince that time, they had been at work patching up ſome rafts.

At noon, the leſſer of the two Tuſcan frigates bore down within half a cannon ſhot of a fort that fired upon her. After having examined it, ſhe tacked about, and came along ſide of her commodore. At half paſt three, the *Saint Joſeph* ſteered towards the land, and drove within reach of three batteries that began to cannonade her; ſhe returned the fire, but theirs growing very briſk, the *Oriente* was ſent to take off the ſhot of a fort, that annoyed her very much on her ſtarboard quarter. This engagement laſted till eight, without much harm done to either ſide. The *Saint Joſeph* had four men killed and ſome wounded, among whom was the captain ſlighty bruiſed by a ſplinter: Some of the cannon of the fort were diſmounted. The galliots rowed away the two ſhips which were becalmed. During this action, the Tuſcan frigate ſailed in again, cloſe under the ſhore to cannonade ſome ſtraggling parties of Moors, and a fort at ſome diſtance on the left. A Spaniſh man of war, and a frigate had already attacked this fort, but had prudently placed themſelves out of the reach of all miſchief; their caution was exemplary and his catholic majeſty may ſafely entruſt ſuch dauntleſs captains with the command of his ſhips being well aſſured they will bring them back to his ports whole and untouched. At ſeven, we deſcried three Algerine barques, and about twelve ſhallops with heavy cannon, bearing down upon the *Saint Joſeph*. The half galley of D. Ant. Barcelo got under ſail in an inſtant to give them chace, and was followed by five of our galliots. The chace laſted till half after eight, when the enemy retired under the cannon of Algiers. The galliot I was in, was one of thoſe ſent out to tow a bombketch up to the Admiral's ſhip; but the breeze was ſo ſtrong that we would not row againſt it, and were obliged to give up the point, and come along ſide of the admiral, to wait for our orders.

7th.

At four, ſaw ſeveral ſhallops full of troops going and coming under the ſtern of the admiral. The major of the Walloon guards, whom I ſaw upon deck, called out to me, that the affair was put off to the next day, and that he would

take care to have boats for our hundred men. The poor soldiers, were quite caſt down with the wretchedneſs of their ſituation ; and it muſt be acknowledged, that to leave them four days, and as many nights, on a beach expoſed to the violent heats and unwholeſome damps of the coaſt of Africa, and to give them nothing to eat but bad bread and cheeſe, was but a ſorry preparation for an enterprize that required ſtrength of body and vigor of mind. Their officers were not much better off. The maſter of our barque did every thing in his power to alleviate our diſtreſſes ; but this kind of veſſel is ſo exceedingly inconvenient, that we were obliged to lie on the floor; and its cookery ſo nauſeous, that, even in our miſerable condition, we never could get any thing down but a little ſoup.

At nine, I went on board the ſhip where Gen. O'Reilly was, and learned that the attack had been deferred, becauſe many detachments had not been punctual to their hour. On this account, he ordered all the barques with the grenadiers and battalions deſtined for the firſt embarkation, to be along ſide of the admiral preciſely at eight in the evening, in order to ſet off at day-break, when the ſignal was to be given. The bomb-ketches were put in readineſs, and the galliots had orders to range themſelves behind them exactly at ten. Our commanders ſeemed to intend bombarding Algiers, but the deſign was not put in execution, nor have I learnt the reaſon. Till ten, the boats kept rowing up to the rendezvous, whilſt the reſt of the fleet drew near the batteries they were to cannonade, to cover our landing. Our inaction this whole day had given the Moors time to repair the damage done the foregoing one, and to put their forts in proper order. The boats our major promiſed us, did not yet appear ; ſo our maſter told us we ſhould have his, which, however, could only land part of us at a time.

8th.

At half paſt three, the men of war began the attack, with ſufficient prudence, not to be under any apprehenſions of the enemy's balls reaching them. The two Tuſcan frigates, and the Chebec commanded by Barcelo, by drawing too near the land, deſtroyed the beautiful uniformity of the line, formed afar by our men of war and frigates, whoſe fire was perfectly well kept up ; but unfortunately of no manner of ſervice, on account of their vaſt diſtance from the enemy. At half after

four, the admiral hung out the ſignal for going aſhore. Seven galliots advanced to clear the beach; they were followed by ſeven diviſions of boats; each diviſion carrying a brigade of ſoldiers, which was to form itſelf into a line of battle ſix deep, as ſoon as landed; but the boats were thrown into confuſion, as they had not been properly ſeparated and diſpoſed, before they left the place of rendezvous. This diſorder, which might have occaſioned our total overthrow, would have been prevented, had we been provided with boats proper for ſuch an operation. Luckily for us, we met with no obſtacles, the leaſt of which would have been fatal to us; and we landed about eight thouſand men on the ſhore, eaſt of Algiers; the boats left us immediately, and went back to fetch the ſecond diviſion, which did not arrive till an hour after, and then only part of the troops could get on ſhore.

The grenadiers of the army drew up in front, and advanced; but they had not marched an hundred yards, before many of their men and almoſt all their officers were killed or wounded. Thoſe next them, moved forward to ſupport them, without having time to form their ranks, a neceſſary conſequence of the manner in which they had been put into the boats and diſembarked; ſome companies never could get together, having landed in different places, and by parcels. The light infantry was by this time cut to pieces. The unevenneſs of the ground we occupied, rendered every ſand-heap, a ſmall breaſt-work, from behind which the Africans fired upon us by platoons, as they kept retiring towards the foot of the hills, about ſix hundred paces from the ſea, where they hid themſelves among the woods and gardens.

The General now ordered the left wing to advance. It was juſt ſix o'clock, and his ſcheme was to march the left wing to the brow of the hill, (the right reſting on the ſea-ſhore) and then to form a column, and advance about a league further, to the attack of the caſtle of Charles V. which commands the whole town. The ſtorming of this fort would have enſured the conqueſt of Algiers. Whilſt our left wing marched on with an intrepidity ſcarce to be expected in ſo dangerous a poſition; ſome battalions of the centre being rather before the reſt, drew up in battle array, and with the Spaniſh guards faced to the right, that they might defend us from the cavalry of the Bey of Maſcara. This body of horſe

was soon dispersed by their fire, and that of the chebec of Ant. Barcelo. But the Bey of Constantina, who commanded a large detachment of cavalry on our left, seized this opportunity to drive a herd of camels against the head of the Walloon guards. By this unexpected assault, he was in hopes of drawing off their attention, whilst he dispatched a body of fifteen thousand horse, to cut off their communication with the sea, from which we were now pretty far distant. Our corps de reserve wheeling off to the left, drew up to fill the space between the sea and the column of Walloons, who were forming their lines to repel the enemies that attacked them from behind the camels; but the greatest steadiness would have availed us little, nor could we have avoided being broken and slaughtered to a man, as our formation was too weak to resist the impetuosity of such a body of horse, had not Mr. Acton, the Tuscan commander, cut his cables, and let his ships drive into shore, just as the enemy was coming on us full gallop. The incessant fire of his great guns, loaded with grape shot, not only stopped them in their carreer, but obliged them to retire with great loss.

Being delivered from this danger, we made our retreat towards the sea-side, in such disorder as must ensue from a want of proper commanders, abandoning to the fury of the barbarians our unhappy fellow soldiers, that were unable to keep up with us.

Our general had been busy for the last two hours, throwing up an intrenchment with fascines, earth bags, and chevaux de frize. We continued the work, and, to cover our front and flanks, placed a few eight and twelve pounders that had been of great service to us all the morning, in our different operations. We remained thus the best part of the day, pretty secure from all attacks of the Mooriſh cavalry, but by no means sheltered from the balls of their carabines, which, carrying at least one third further than our firelocks, killed upwards of four hundred of our men, in this kind of camp. Here I saw our general on horse-back, going about to encourage the soldiers; who stretched out on the burning sands, seemed heedless of the dangers around, and only anxio us to procure a little rest to their weary limbs.

By one o'clock, the Moors had finished a battery on the right of our camp; and we were so pinched for room, and huddled together, that every shot took place. General

O'Reilly having called for a return of the killed and wounded, aſſembled a council of war, in which it was decided, that at four we ſhould reimbark, as the enemy was raiſing an other battery in front, which we muſt paſs under if we perſiſted in the undertaking. The Algerines, for want of experience in theſe matters, ſuffered us to accompliſh our ends undiſturbed; And about three in the morning, the laſt diviſion of the army reimbarked, leaving behind them fourteen field-pieces, two howitzers, ſome cheſts of ammunition, and the materials of our encampment, which the enemy broke into, the moment the grenadiers of the rear-guards puſhed off from the ſhore. We left on the field of battle, one thouſand three hundred men, and brought off three thouſand deſparately wounded.

There being unfortunately hoſpitals only for four hundred men, the boats that had landed the Walloons, were taken up for the reception of the wounded; this occaſioned the greateſt diſorder imaginable in our battalions, who came off as well as they could, in the firſt boats or tartans they could meet with. They remained in this confuſion above four and twenty hours employed, as well as any other regiments, in getting together their disjointed companies.

The Moors, as ſoon as they had burſt into our camp, cut off the heads of all our ſlain, and carried them off in bags, to demand the premium offered by the dey, for every chriſtian head; they afterwards heaped up the carcaſes upon the ſacines of the entrenchment, and ſet fire to the pile, which we ſaw burning for two days and two nights.

10th. and 11th.

All hurry; no water to be had, though there were ſhip-loads of it in the fleet. 12th.

At ſix, A. M. ſignal for weighing anchor. Soon after moſt of the fleet ſailed out of the bay.

15th.

At ſeven A. M. came to an anchor in Alicant road.

31ſt.

The Walloon guards were ordered aſhore, and quartered at Sanjuan. Auguſt 10th.

We re-imbarked, and 20th.

Landed at Barcelona.

Taken from Travels through Spain, in the years 1775, and 1776, by Henry Swinburne, Eſq.

EXTRAORDINARY VALOUR OF THE BRITISH GARRISON, OF ALICANT IN 1709.*

ALICANT is a city and port, commanded by a ſtrong caſtle, ſtanding on a rock, at a ſmall diſtance from the ſea, and about ſixty-eight miles ſouth from the capital city of Valentia. There was in it a pretty good garriſon, under the command of Major-General Richards, which made an obſtinate defence againſt a very numerous army of the French and Spaniards, with a very large train of heavy artillery, and excellently ſupplied with ammunition. At laſt the city being abſolutely untenable, the garriſon reſolved to retire into the caſtle, which had hitherto been eſteemed impregnable. They ſunk three ciſterns in the ſolid rock, and then, with incredible labor, filled them with water. The troops that retired into it, were Sir Charles Hotham's regiment, and that of Colonel Sibourg, generally called the French regiment, becauſe it was compoſed of refugees. After ſome progreſs made in this ſecond ſiege, the French ſaw that it was impoſſible to do any great matter in the uſual way, and therefore contrary to all expectation, reſolved upon a work exceſſively laborious, and in all outward appearance impracticable; which was that of mining through the ſolid rock, in order to blow up the caſtle and its garriſon into the air together. At firſt Major-General Richards, and all the officers in the place, looked upon the enemy's ſcheme as a thing utterly impoſſible to be accompliſhed, and were ſecretly well pleaſed with their undertaking, in hopes it would give time for the Britiſh fleet to come to their relief; yet this did not hinder them from doing all that lay in their power to incommode the workmen, and at leaſt to countermine them.

The beſiegers however, wrought ſo inceſſantly, and brought ſuch numbers of peaſants to aſſiſt them in their labours, that they, having in about twelve weeks time finiſhed the works thought proper for this ſervice, by very experienced engineers, and charged them with 1500 barrels of powder, ſeveral

* This place was taken by the Britiſh in 1706.

large beams, iron bars and crows, and other utenſils of deſtruction, ſummoned the caſtle to ſurrender, March 20th. moſt ſolemnly aſſuring, a ſafe and honorable convoy to Barcelona, with bag and baggage for every perſon in it, if they ſubmitted within three days, and prevented the ruin of the caſtle; but threatened otherwiſe, no mercy ſhould be ſhewn, if any might accidentally eſcape the blow: and, to demonſtrate the reality of their deſign, they deſired the garriſon might depute three or more engineers, with other gentlemen of competent ſkill, to view their works, and make a faithful report of what they ſaw. Accordingly, two field-officers went to the mine, and were allowed the liberty of making what ſcrutiny they pleaſed; upon which they told the governor, that, if their judgment failed them not, the exploſion would carry up the whole caſtle to the eaſternmoſt battery, unleſs it took vent in their own countermine, or vein; but at leaſt, they conceived it would carry away the ſea-battery, the lodging rooms in the caſtle cloſe, ſome of the chambers cut for ſoldiers barracks, and they very much ſcared, might affect the great ciſtern.

A grand council of war was called upon this; the French meſſage delivered, and the engineers made their report; the beſieged acknowledged their want of water, but believing the Britiſh fleet might be ſenſible of their diſtreſs, and conſequently under ſome concern for their relief, their unanimous reſolution was, to commit themſelves to the providence of God, and, whatever fate attended them, to ſtand the ſpringing of the mine. The French General, and Spaniſh Officers, expreſſed the utmoſt concern at this anſwer; and the ſecond night of the three allowed, ſent to divert them, from what they called, inexcuſable obſtinacy: offering the ſame honorable articles as before, even upon that late compliance; but theſe ſtill were rejected by the beſieged. The fatal third night approaching, and no fleet ſeen, the French ſent their laſt ſummons, and withal an aſſurance, that their mine was primed, and ſhould be ſprung by ſix o'clock the next morning; and though, as they ſaw, all hope and proſpect of relief was vain, yet there was room for ſafety ſtill, and the terms already propoſed, were in their power to accept. The beſieged perſiſted in their adherence to the reſult of their firſt council, and the French met their uſual anſwer again; therefore, as a prologue to their intended tragedy,

they ordered all the inhabitants of that quarter to withdraw from their houſes before five o'clock the enſuing morning. The beſieged, in the mean time, kept a general guard, devoting themſelves to their meditations. The Major-General, Col. Sibourg, and Lieut. Col. Thornicroft, of Sir Charles Hotham's regiment, ſat together in the Governor's uſual lodging room; other officers cantoned themſelves as their tempers inclined them, to paſs the melancholy night.

At length, day appearing, the Governor was informed, that the inhabitants were flying in crowds to the weſternmoſt part of the town. The Governor, attended by the above mentioned gentlemen, and about five or ſix other officers, went to the weſt battery, to inform himſelf better. After he had remained there about a quarter of an hour, Lieut. Col. Thornicroft deſired him to remove, as being unable to do any ſervice there; he and Col. Sibourg both anſwered, that no danger was to be apprehended there, more than in any other place; and that there they would wait the event. The Lieut. Colonel remained, becauſe his ſuperiors did, and other officers imitated the ſame example; but the hour of five being now conſiderably paſt, the corporal's guard cried out, that the train was fired, obſerving ſome ſmoke from the lighted matches, and other combuſtible matter near it, from whence the ſame aſcended to the centinels above. The Governor and field-officers were then urged to retreat, but refuſed.

The mine at laſt blew up; the rock opened and ſhut; the whole mountain felt the convulſion; the Governor and field-officers, with their company, ten guns, and two mortars, were buried in the abyſs; the walls of the caſtle ſhook, part of the great ciſtern fell, another ciſtern almoſt cloſed, and the rock ſhut a man to his neck in its cliff, who lived many hours in that afflicting poſture. About thirty-ſix centinels and women were ſwallowed in different quarters, whoſe dying groans were heard, ſome of them, after the fourth mournful day. Many houſes of the town were overwhelmed in their ruins, and the caſtle ſuffered much; but that it wears any form at all, was owing to the vent which the exploſion forced through the veins of the rock, and the countermine. After the loſs of the chief-officers, the government fell of courſe to Lieut. Col. Dalbeume, who drew out a detachment from the whole garriſon, and with it made a

desperate sally, to shew how little he was moved at their thunder. The bombs from the castle played on the town more violently; and the shot filled every corner of their streets; which marks of their resentment they continued till the arrival of the British fleet, which they had expected so long.

MILITARY MEMOIRS AND MAXIMS.

RETREAT.

A FINE retreat is look'd on by many experienced officers as the master-piece of a good General; for which reason nothing should be neglected to make it safe and honorable.

Remember never to halt and surrender your troops to the enemy, if there is a possibility of retreating or defending yourself with success.

You must give to all your troops a rendezvous remote from the field of battle.

After having computed the time necessary for your retreat, with that which the enemy will require to come up with you, gather your troops together, and your prisoners, and march to some strong ground without stopping.

If you have many prisoners, separate them in three or four bodies, and let them march between the squadrons, without arms or spurs; and mount the chief officers, or those who cannot walk, on the worst horses that can be got for them.

If you are obliged to fight again, send your prisoners and booty to some strong place, with a sufficient guard; or send them before, with a party in proportion to their number, whilst you are engaged with the enemy.

Let your retreat be made by ways where you do not expect the enemy; and in your march, put good detachments in the woods, vallies, narrow passes, or other places, which may obstruct the enemy in their pursuit.

Leave three or four troopers and a trumpet, well mounted, at the entrance of a wood, close country, or road at the top of a high ground. The enemy appearing, the troopers shew themselves, sound their trumpet, and oblige the enemy

to march ſlowly and with precaution ; and then at a certain diſtance they gallop as faſt as they can, and join your army.

If the enemy get before you, and attack your advanced guard, you muſt ſacrifice ſome of your troops, who are to charge the enemy, whilſt the reſt of your army marches off with the greateſt diligence.

If you can be well informed, that the enemy's advanced guard has marched with ſo much haſte, as not to be ſoon joined by the reſt of their troops, halt behind ſome eminence, hedge, or other covered place, have your troops drawn up in good order, and ſuddenly fall on them as ſoon as they appear : they will be weaker than you, perhaps in diſorder too, and you will eaſily rout them.

Do this always, when you have too little time for your retreat, and the enemy cannot come up to aſſiſt their advanced guard ; and attack them always with vigor.

When you are weak, and would not riſque a battle, you ſucceed by temporizing ; by keeping the enemy within their own country, and eating up their own forage ; and if they want the means of ſupporting a long war, have few or no fortified places, and the country they poſſeſs is too ſmall to ſubſiſt their army, it is then their intereſt to give you battle, and it is yours to avoid it.

You likewiſe may get the advantage of the enemy by ſtarving them, by burning their forage and magazines, by laying waſte the country from whence they draw their ſubſiſtence, ſeizing their paſſes, breaking their bridges, and ſending out great parties to ſurprize their foragers and convoys, and at the ſame time putting your army in order of battle, to prevent their weakening theirs by ſending parties to their relief.

Block them up in their camp by redoubts, ſmall forts, and poſſeſſing their paſſes, if the ſituation of the country will permit you ; or burn their camp by open force, or by people appointed for that purpoſe.

To prevent the enemy's ſtarving you, attack their ambuſhes, poſſeſs as much country as you can : make your camp ſure by good intrenchments and redoubts, which defend your avenues and communications ; change your camp ; endeavor to be near the ſea, or a navigable river ; in a word be maſter of your rear, and have wherewith to ſubſiſt your army.

You put the country under military execution, which refuſes to pay contribution; and you oblige them to it by burning their country, plundering, and taking ſome of the inhabitants priſoners for hoſtages.

When a country is ſuſpected, the General muſt keep ſome of the principal inhabitants near him, under the pretence of civility.

You ſeem ſometimes to ſhew fear, to give a greater confidence to the enemy in their own ſtrength, and to make them more negligent and leſs diſtruſtful of you.

You make a feint retreat, in order to induce them to make ſome falſe movement, which may put them in a diſadvantageous ſituation, and give you an eaſy opportunity of correcting them.

To throw a terror and conſternation into the enemy's country, ſeparate your troops into ſeveral bodies, as ſecretly as you can, to execute ſeveral enterprizes at the ſame time. Let it be reported abroad, that your troops are more numerous than they are; and to confirm that opinion, let bodies of them appear in ſeveral places at the ſame time.

PARTICULAR BATTLES AND AMBUSCADES.

You lie in ambuſh in woods, gardens, houſes, villages, ruins, ditches, hollow ways, and coppices.

Poſt yourſelf ſo, as that you may retire by ſeveral ways, in caſe the enemy ſhould come with a ſuperior force; and contrive it ſo that you may quit your ambuſh without diſorder.

Reconnoitre well the place you would chuſe for your ambuſh, leſt you yourſelf fall into one.

Poſt your ſentinels ſo, that they may ſee without being ſeen; and be very alert, leſt you ſhould be ſurprized. Make two or three ambuſcades at the ſame time.

Put all your troops in ambuſh, if the enemy can come at you only with a part of their army; but if they can come towards you with the whole, then make only ſmall ambuſcades.

You let ſingle people or ſmall parties paſs without ſhewing yourſelves, when you expect ſome more conſiderable ſtroke ſhall offer: but if they diſcover you, they muſt be ſtopped, and taken into your ambuſh, till the expected affair is over.

Thoſe who are commanded to attack an enemy in ambuſh, ſhould march to them by unknown and by-ways ; and the commanding officer ſhould be the only perſon who knows what he is going about.

SKIRMISHES.

You ſkirmiſh to reconnoitre the ſituation of the ground or place ; to animate your ſoldiers ; to try their courage, and that of the enemy ; to get priſoners, and intelligence ; to ſeize or ſecure a poſt ; or ſtop the march of an enemy.

If your army be ſmall, you muſt give it more front and leſs depth ; and let the ſame troops paſs ſeveral times in the ſight of the enemy ; widen your intervals ; let your drums beat, and your trumpets ſound, out of ſight of the enemy, and where you have no troops.

On the contrary, if you are ſtrong, hide part of your troops behind ſome cover, and let your front appear narrow, by giving depth to your regiments, or drawing one or more in the rear of the other.

In your ſkirmiſhing, you muſt take care not to be drawn into an ambuſcade ; ſuccour your troops often ; and if you think of retiring, let your ſkirmiſh grow hotter.

TO SURPRIZE A POST OR QUARTER.

To ſucceed in this, you muſt get a perfect knowledge of the place ; entertain good ſpies among the enemy, in order that if they ſhould get notice of your deſign, they may make no movement without your knowledge ; and agree on a place with them, where they may bring you their intelligence.

Have three or four light carts, drawn each with one horſe, to carry what is neceſſary for your purpoſe. In one you may have three or four petards ; in another a little folding-bridge, which may ſerve as a mantelet or ſhelter when you paſs the foſſé ; in another two chevres, or machines to mount your guns with, ſome large pincers, ſtrong ſaws, hatchets, hammers, nails, bolts, files, and other inſtruments of force, ſuch as cricks or jacks, handſpikes, and the like. Theſe carts may ſerve for cover. Add to theſe, two ſmall pieces of artillery, light and ſhort, mounted on very light carriages, and drawn by one horſe each ; and a ſmall mortar, with ſome cohorns, bombs, and grenades.

When you would ſurprize the enemy by a ſudden and unexpected attack, ſeize on ſuch paſſages as may ſecure your retreat; be at the place at the hour appointed for execution; and do not halt too near the place you deſign to attack, leſt you ſhould be diſcovered by the foragers, ſcouts, or ſmall parties of the enemy: and whilſt you are in action, have a body of troops abroad, to hinder the place from being relieved.

Endeavour to attack the poſt in flank or rear, and come as near as you can to it without being diſcovered: cut off their patrols, vedets, and advanced guards.

Theſe ſort of attacks are always beſt made in the night, or at the break of day, or cloſe of the evening; before the enemy have poſted their guards or ſentinels, or given any order for the ſecurity of the place.

You muſt not give them time to aſſemble their troops, but as ſoon as you are diſcovered, charge briſkly, and enter pell-mell with the enemy. Separate your troops into ſeveral bodies, and let them all attack, at the ſame time in different places.

Force your way immediately to their main guard, ſeize their place of arms, and puſh forward to hinder the enemy from deliberating, aſſembling, or putting themſelves in order of battle.

Let your horſe gallop inſtantly to the parade; where finding no reſiſtance, detach ſmall parties from them to ſcour the ſtreets, and ſeize the commanding and other officers; and whilſt this is doing, let another body of horſe be ordered to march round the out-ſkirts of the poſt, to ſeize all who would make their eſcape.

In the mean while the reſt of your infantry muſt march into the place, take poſt in the market-place, and draw up in order of battle, to be ready to march where there may be occaſion.

SURPRIZES.

You fall on the enemy by ſurprize when they march through narrow and difficult paſſes, when one part has paſſed, ſo as not eaſily to come to the ſuccour of the other; as in the paſſage of rivers, or woods, in which you lay an ambuſh of foot, poſting likewiſe a body of horſe near the place they

come out at ; and when part of the enemy are come out of the wood, you charge them in front, flank, and rear ; and you have them at a cheap rate.

ATTACK OF LINES OR INTRENCHMENTS.

When you attack lines, always make a falſe attack with a ſmall body of men, in order to favor the true ones ; and let your attacks begin preciſely at the ſame time.

Let your attacks be made in the night : the enemy, not ſeeing your diſpoſition, will not know where the ſtorm will fall, and conſequently muſt keep every place guarded.*

Take care for the above purpoſe, to carry good ſtore of faſcines and hurdles with you ; let your cavalry, as well as the infantry, be well loaded with them, in order to fill up all advanced or other foſſes : and direct your men, as ſoon as they have entered the lines, to open the barriers, and level the line for the cavalry to enter.

Reconnoitre well the enemy's lines, that you may know their ſituation, and the approaches to them, before you attack.

March briſkly up to them with your infantry in two lines ; keep your fire, and to each battalion of the front line, appoint four or five ſquadrons to carry the faſcines and hurdles.

Seem to reſolve to attack the intrenchment in the part you laſt deſign : let faſcines be cut, and other glaring preparations be made : and whilſt the enemy is intent on the defence of that part, you march in the night, and ſlip into their line where they leaſt ſuſpected you.

It almoſt always happens, that an army which attacks intrenchments or troops in the field with vigour, and is well ſuſtained, finds great advantages over thoſe who defend.

If you apprehend the enemy will attack your lines, keep conſtantly out ſmall parties, eſpecially in the night, to give you the earlieſt intelligence of their motions, that you may be ready to receive them.

* *See Ramſey's Turenne*, Vol. II. p. 130, *where there is a remarkable attack of lines.*

ON THE FITTING OUT OF SOLDIERS.

UNDER the term of fitting out of a ſoldier, we underſtand not only his arms and cloaths, but alſo the manner of his dreſs and ornaments. Utility is the firſt thing to which we muſt look: cleanlineſs and comfort the ſecond, and neatneſs the third. Where all three can be united, they certainly ſhould; but where it is not poſſible, there neatneſs muſt yield to comfortableneſs, and that to utility.

For the ſake of neatneſs, comfort and utility are often ſacrificed. The following remarks and propoſitions, at leaſt, merit ſome attention.

OF THE CLOATHING.

The narrow and ſhort coat is neither good for the cold nor for wet. A cloak, which would reach over the knees, in which the ſoldier might wrap himſelf up, but which he might lay aſide on the march, and at exerciſe, would be preferable. It certainly would coſt ſomewhat more, but it would laſt longer, and then tent-covers and guard-cloaks might be diſpenſed with.

Were coats to be aboliſhed, waiſtcoats muſt have ſleeves, and we might ornament theſe with cuffs, lappels and collars.

The breeches are commonly ſo narrow and ſhort, that with pain and art only, they are kept on the body, tearing away at a little violent motion. They ought to be ſpacious and reach to the navel.

The moſt uncomfortable of all clothing are the gaters. They are ſo narrow, and have ſuch a quantity of buttons, that a long time is requiſite to put them on properly. They are good for nothing but to make the ſoldier ſtiff and unhealthy. Thoſe of white linen are eternally to be waſhed; thoſe of black linen, which, with wax, are to be kept ſhining put the ſoldier to trouble and expence; thoſe of black cloth are the beſt, if ever any ſhould be given; but ſtill better it would be to give them half boots, inſtead of thoſe uncomfortable ſhoes and gaters. Theſe are very quickly put on, or pulled off, and are, in dirty weather, very comfortable.

Small cocked hats do not cover the head, and require faſtening, ſome way, to prevent their falling off the ſoldier's heads at the leaſt motion. Still more uncomfortable are grenadier's and fuſilier's caps. Theſe require faſtening as well as the hats, and are not of the leaſt uſe againſt rain, or a *coup de ſoleil*. They are inſupportable when the ſun ſhines on the tin, and makes it hot; or ſhould the rain run down ſtraight into the eyes of the ſoldier, he muſt not alter his poſition to wipe his face. Another uncomfortable thing is that the ſoldier never puts this cap on, but when on ſervice, and is obliged to provide a hat, at his own expence, which, on the march, he carries on his back, where it cuts a ridiculous figure, with the cartouch-pouch, his knapſack, and field-kettle, and increaſes the ſoldier's burthen, who has a full load without it. What utility or comfort is there in this? Even the ornament, of carrying a ſhining ſteeple upon the head, is nothing of moment. At the time when granades were thrown, round and pointed caps muſt have been of uſe, in order to throw the ſling readier over the head, but of what uſe are they now, as throwing of granades is no longer in practice? It is to be conſidered, whether round hats (as moſt of the Pruſſian regiments now have) ornamented with a card and feather, would not look as well, or better, and would not remove the uncomfortableneſs of the common hats and caps.

So far for the form and clothing of the ſoldier. Now for the colour of it, which is not unworthy of notice. Colours which are ſoon ſoiled, and want cleaning, colouring, or waſhing, are not good for a ſoldier. He has not time always to clean them; it puts him to expence, and he is obliged to carry with him, beſides his other load, bruſhes and chalk; and the cloth, by continual bruſhing and colouring, is ſooner worn out, than by any other uſe. Conſequently we ſhould avoid, as much as poſſible, white, yellow, and red. Blue and green are the fitteſt colours.

In order to eaſe the ſoldier in the dreſs of his head, and promote cleanlineſs, it would be wiſe to cut the hair round the head, by this the round hats might be faſtened, if it ever requires it, with a ribband under the chin.

By this mode of dreſs it will ſcarcely be neceſſary to keep the ſoldier in his cloaths in time of danger; becauſe he may be dreſſed in a minute. What an advantage at a ſurpriſe!

The iſſue of the whole affair may depend upon it. Beſides, this dreſs will give him a more warlike appearance than the preſent.

OF THE ARMS.

The arms are the only things in which we have been making improvements from time to time; but there are, perhaps, ſome more applicable.

The manner in which the bayonet is fixed on the fuſil is very unhandy. If it is faſtened too tight, it cauſes difficulty in reverſing the firelock; if too looſe, it falls down in preſenting the firelock. Before the exerciſe every thing may be in order, but during the exerciſe it loſes time, and gives trouble to the beſt diſciplined men. How eaſy would it be to remedy this by an invention, which would keep the bayonet faſt till a ſpring was touched. It is needleſs to deſcribe that which every one muſt conceive.

Every one knows that arms, on the march, as well as in camp, are not ſecure againſt wet. This might be remedied by a leather cover, from the butt to reach over the lock. On the march the firelock might be carried reverſed, and might in camp, on the ſide of the tent, be ſtuck by the bayonet into the ground. The falling out of the ſhot might eaſily be prevented by fixing the rammer, or any other ſtick into the barrel. Another advantage from it would be, that at a ſurpriſe, every ſoldier would in a moment, find his own fuſil. We know what diſorder it cauſes, if a whole company has to fetch its arms at two *manteaux d'armes*; and that it is impoſſible that each ſoldier, could without loſs of time, at night lay hold of his own fuſil, which is of ſome moment to him.

The bayonet-ſheaths, which are as long as ſwords, are ſuperfluous, in war-time at leaſt; and would be ſo in time of peace, if reverſing of arms was aboliſhed. But ſtill more uſeleſs are thoſe little machines for the cartridges, called pouches, or cartridge-boxes; they are neither handy, uſeful, nor ornamental. No ſoldier can truſt his cartridges to this machine, if he would not ſee them ſpoiled in a few days. Even in the action it ſerves no purpoſe; for, if we fill up more than one row of the holes, the ſoldier, in haſte, often takes hold of two at once. It would be better to ſave this conſiderable expence, or apply it to ſomething elſe. If that

machine was put aſide, the cartridge-pouch might be made ſmaller. A new ſaving to Government, and more eaſe to the ſoldier. Further, the cartridge-pouch has an uncomfortable poſition on the ſoldier's back. The cartridge cannot ſo handily be taken out, and it hinders the ſoldier's motions. Would it not be better to carry them before the body, as the grenadier non-commiſſioned officers do? Thirty cartridges, without that box, take a very little ſpace. The other thirty might be carried in the knapſack, or in any thing, applied to it for that purpoſe.

Thoſe long ſticks, called pikes, what a burthen are they to the officers! And how are they ſerviceable? Would not ſhort fuſils look as well, or rather better; and they are uſeful at the ſame time?

Perhaps, it may be poſſible to introduce, among the infantry, ſmall cuiraſſes, if they were eaſed of other things in the propoſed manner. At leaſt, they would be more uſeful to them them than to the heavy horſemen, who ſeldom are expoſed to the fire of ſmall arms.

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